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Metaphysics is a self delusional anadyne

The only thing you're good at is changing the playing field by putting your words into your target's mouth improperly. I have no simple model for movement. In fact if I had a model at all it would be one arising from competing tendencies from competing motive systems in multiple scenarios.

All I have are models for various subsystems which I employed very successfully when modeling behavior of highly motivated trained individuals in highly complex tasks such as air combat and when I was investigating the underpinnings of sense and perception. Example for both of which you can find on the web and in academic publications.

If you can't bring yourself to actually sitting down and analyzing my generative question this discussion is finished.

Here it is again:
If you want to test this from your own experience try moving your arm unexpectedly. I suggest unexpectedly because one is often surprised and needs respond appropriately very quickly. Not possible is it. Why? Models were already in place trending to other actions.

No reflex implied here. It's actually a variant of veto, you know the one you always sided with Haggard about.

Too much scent of dead fish are already fouling things.
 
You have no model for movement.

You name parts of the nervous system and spin yarns.

Your questions have been addressed but you don't know it.

There is reflexive movement and willed purposeful movement. Mobility is an interplay between the two.

You know a little about reflexive movement but know nothing of voluntary movement.

You have no clue how the reflexive tissues of the brain do anything.

You know areas of activity and observations of behavior and subjective reports.

You know nothing else.
 
The untermenche has no clothes. Even children are laughing at you as you pontificate. Reflexive movement is often inappropriate. Intended motion is not reflexive by definition. Note my task was for you to design an unexpected intended motion in the area where other motion is being nominally planned in the realm of intended motions.

Can't be clearer than that yet you remain unclothed.

Pity.
 
...my task was for you to design an unexpected intended motion in the area where other motion is being nominally planned in the realm of intended motions...

As clear as oil.

There is intended movement and unintended movement.

In other words voluntary and involuntary. There are also practiced voluntary movements that acquire a "memory".

And as I said mobility is an interplay between voluntary movement and reflexive movement.

There is movement directed by the intentional mind and movement directed by the reflexive brain.

The reason the mind can move the body is because the brain is reflexive.

I see no point from you anywhere.
 
There is likely intended movement and a range of less likely intended movements being monitored and maintained in one's brain at any one time.

I just googled Neuroscience behavior understanding action control and got 1.2 million citations in 0.1 seconds. Below are two of the top ten citations.

One of hundreds of investigations into the topic: Uncertainty-based competition between prefrontal anddorsolateral striatal systems for behavioral control http://matt.colorado.edu/teaching/highcog/fall11/readings/dnd5.pdf

Abstract:
A broad range of neural and behavioral data suggests that the brain contains multiple systems for behavioral choice, includingone associated with prefrontal cortex and another with dorsolateral striatum. However, such a surfeit of control raises an additionalchoice problem: how to arbitrate between the systems when they disagree. Here, we consider dual-action choice systems from anormative perspective, using the computational theory of reinforcement learning. We identify a key trade-off pitting computationalsimplicity against the flexible and statistically efficient use of experience. The trade-off is realized in a competition between thedorsolateral striatal and prefrontal systems. We suggest a Bayesian principle of arbitration between them according to uncertainty,so each controller is deployed when it should be most accurate. This provides a unifying account of a wealth of experimentalevidence about the factors favoring dominance by either system.

Lots of relations among types of thinking but no division in to voluntary and involuntary on the action contro front.

Oh. and here's a tern year old book on the topic with a shitload of referenced studies: Neuroscience and rule guided behavior https://books.google.com/books?hl=e...behavior understanding action control&f=false

Again, all one needs to do is look at chapters and references to understand the nature of such research is clearly different from your home grown partitions

Yes indeed. Look at the chapter reference. Do you see anything in there supporting your view? Uhm no.

As for as you adhom 'science' I call BS.
 
There is likely intended movement and a range of less likely intended movements being monitored and maintained in one's brain at any one time.

Yes.

When the mind commands the brain does have information about intended motion.

But if things go off a little then righting reflexes may kick in. If there is a stimuli of a certain nature, like a loud noise or a some other perceived threat then protective reflexes may kick in.

This is well known by people that actually work to reconnect the mind to the brain in a functional manner after a stroke.

Nobody that actually works with humans thinks they move using righting reflexes or protective reflexes.

And nobody that actually works with humans thinks you can improve the mobility of a stroke victim by ignoring their mind.
 
No one discussed whether one has reflexive behavior since it isn't jermane to any discussion about intended behavior. So you are just wandering off in the dark crying something strange whilst others are discussing intended behavior. If you want to link reflexive behavior to intended behavior start another thread.

Otherwise shut up. You are saying nothing relevant to my stated problem which is, again
...my task was for you to design an unexpected intended motion in the area where other motion is being nominally planned in the realm of intended motions...

Geez. Its so obvious that the issue is unexpected intended behavior something completely different from reflexive behavior. A fact I just showed isn't even considered among hierarchies of intended behavior.
 
There is no such thing as unexpected intended behavior.

There are righting reflexes and protective reflexes however.

And mobility is an interplay between intention and reflex.

You are babbling nonsense.
 
There is no such thing as unexpected intended behavior.

There are righting reflexes and protective reflexes however.

And mobility is an interplay between intention and reflex.

You are babbling nonsense.

Really?

There are large areas of research into spontaneous thinking, wandering thought, irregular and multiple intentional patterns in schizophrenics, all of which point to the rise of abnormal, changed, unexpected, intentional behavior.


The Neuroscience of Spontaneous Thought: An Evolving, Interdisciplinary Field https://talkfreethought.org/newreply.php?do=postreply&t=16519
An often-overlooked characteristic of the human mind is its propensity towander. Despite growing interest in the science of mind-wandering, most studies operationalizemind-wandering by its task-unrelated contents, which may be orthogonal to the processesconstraining how thoughts are evoked and unfold over time. In this chapter, we emphasize theimportance of incorporating such processes into current definitions of mind-wandering, andproposing that mind-wandering and other forms of spontaneous thought (such as dreaming andcreativity) are mental states that arise and transition relatively freely due to an absence ofconstraints on cognition. We review existing psychological, philosophical and neuroscientificresearch on spontaneous thought through the lens of this framework, and call for additionalresearch into the dynamic properties of the mind and brain.

Mind-Wandering With and Without Intention https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5004739/

The past decade has seen a surge of research examining mind-wandering, but most of this research has not considered the potential importance of distinguishing between intentional and unintentional mind-wandering. However, a recent series of papers has demonstrated that mind-wandering reported in empirical investigations frequently occurs with and without intention, and more critically, that intentional and unintentional mind-wandering are dissociable. This emerging literature suggests that to increase clarity in the literature, there is a need to reconsider the bulk of the mind-wandering literature with an eye toward deconvolving these two different cognitive experiences. In this review, we highlight recent trends in investigations of the intentionality of mind-wandering and outline a novel theoretical framework regarding the mechanisms underlying intentional and unintentional mind-wandering.

Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Caseof Schizophrenic Thought Insertionand Delusions of Control https://www.researchgate.net/profil...hought-Insertion-and-Delusions-of-Control.pdf

This article addresses questions about the sense of agency and its distinctionfrom the sense of ownership in the context of understanding schizophrenic thoughtinsertion. In contrast to “standard” approaches that identify problems with the sense ofagency as central to thought insertion, two recent proposals argue that it is more correctto think that the problem concerns the subject’s sense of ownership. This view involvesa “more demanding” concept of the sense of ownership that, I will argue, ultimatelydepends on the sense of agency. In this regard, the sense of agency still appears to bethe originating problem.Recent discussions of schizophrenic symptoms of delusions of control and thoughtinsertion suggest that it has become standard to explain such symptoms in terms ofproblems with the sense of agency (e.g., Bortolotti 2010; Langland-Hassan 2008;Roessler 2013). Both in developing and challenging this standard view a number oftheorists have paid close attention to the distinction between sense of agency (SA) andsense of ownership (SO), and have introduced a number of qualifications that complicate the original distinction (as found in Gallagher 2000; Graham and Stephens 1994;Stephens and Graham 2000). Some have argued that the notion of the SO has wronglybeen defined in terms of spatial location or privileged access (Bortolotti and Broome2009); others have argued that the primary problem in delusions of control and thoughtinsertion involves a loss of SO rather than SA (Billon 2013). In this paper I’ll focus ontwo arguments that suggest that the case of thought insertion is really or primarily aproblem with SO rather than SA. In contrast, I’ll suggest that SO cannot be the primary problem, and that a problem with SA still seems to be the right explanation. I begin,however, by clarifying and complicating the ownership/agency distinction.

All three of the above articles, each from a different perspective, deal with variation and change in intentional behavioral generation.

So your post is pure BS.
 
An unexpected thought is not intended either.

You can use your mind to form the ideas your mind intends to convey.

You can autonomously choose articles that talk about thoughts but don't have the slightest idea what a thought is.

But the idea of intention is one you don't seem to understand.
 
Wow. What a revelation. All unexpected thoughts are not intended. Yet many may be intentional.

If the soporific fits, say it you say. More genius from a wandering mind?

Or, like me, you can choose articles reflecting a wide range where intentional and changed intentional thought exists.

Understood. You don't understand me at all.

This is fun game.
 
You bore the hell out of me.

I'm glad you're amused by the nothingness you put forth.

It is nice your mind has the autonomy to post irrelevant nothingness.
 
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