Metaphysics is a self delusional anadyne

[Koyaanisqatsi]

Your ontology does not allow for you to state such a belief.

Alright.

You have quit

I have?

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

Nothing shows the dumb mind as opposed to the smart brain more than sciatica.

The dumb mind senses pressure or some other irritant to the nerve at the level of the lumbar spine as a problem with the leg. It interprets the sensation of an injured leg.

Not back pain. Severe leg pain.

The dumb mind fails in it's duty to interpret the brain's information in this instance.

While of course the smart brain figures out what is really happening.

With an MRI machine that no mind even knows exists.

 

[untermensche]

The mind experiences pain.

It does not create the experience of pain.

That is enough to show you have turned reality on it's head.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

The brain imbues the mind with the sensation the mind calls "pain."

It therefore creates the "experience of pain."

I would conclude with, "That is enough to show you have turned reality on it's head" but your ontology prevents you from being able to comprehend or even consider what "reality" entails.

 

[untermensche]

The brain imbues the mind with the sensation the mind calls "pain."

The mind is aware of pain.

The brain creates something for the mind to be aware of.

It therefore creates the "experience of pain."

The mind experiences pain. No quotes needed. Do you know what they mean?

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

The brain imbues the mind with the sensation the mind calls "pain."

The mind is aware of pain.

Your ontology does not allow for you to state such a belief. At best, you could assert, "The mind is imbued with awareness of bodily sensations that it calls 'pain,'" but even that is problematic.

The brain creates something for the mind to be aware of.

Your ontology does not allow for you to state such a belief. Period. Mind can't know what brain does (or does not) do, remember? Mind can only know that it experiences. It cannot know anything other than it experiences, including the content of the experiences as those are likewise imbued and therefore subject to uncertainty and unreliableness.

Regardless, the statement, "The brain creates something for the mind to be aware of" would necessitate that the brain is smarter than the mind and knows what that "something" entails in order for it to imbue the "mind" with an awareness of it.

It therefore creates the "experience of pain."

No quotes needed. Do you know what they mean?

I do and if you did too, then you'd know why they are needed.

 

[untermensche]

The mind is aware of pain.

Your ontology does not allow for you to state such a belief.

My ontology says the mind is that which experiences all things.

The mind experiences pain. It is aware of it.

The brain does not experience pain. It translate signals from the periphery into the experience of pain.

Sometimes the translation is off.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

The mind is aware of pain.

Your ontology does not allow for you to state such a belief.

My ontology says the mind is that which experiences all things.

Incoherent. At best you could only assert that the mind experiences. It could not know what it is experiencing, only that it is experiencing. Iow, it could only know--directly experience--the act of experiencing.

The mind experiences pain. It is aware of it.

Your ontology does not allow for you to state such a belief. At best you could assert, "The mind is in the act of experiencing something that it calls 'pain,'" but even the act of labeling must be a function of brain imbuing it.

The brain does not experience pain.

Since "pain"--at best--is the pet name of a sensation the brain is imbuing the mind with, it is an irrelevant semantics game to make such a distinction. The brain experiences the signals from the nervous system that are the basis of the imbued sensation for the mind to in turn--at best--label "pain" (again, stretching to the breaking point your ontology).

It translate signals from the periphery into the "experience of pain."

Fify, again, with the necessary quotations to denote that there is a category of experience the mind labels "pain" (but, to the breaking point caveat noted here as well).

Though, again, it would be more accurate to assert that the brain translates the signals from the nervous system as an alert that some part of the body is damaged or otherwise malfunctioning and the "mind" labels those signals as "pain" (which, again, stretches the limits of your ontology to their breaking point, since mind can only know that it is in the act of experiencing).

Everything about the content of any given experience must be imbued by the brain and is therefore subject to unreliableness and insurmountable doubt.

Sometimes the translation is off.

Quite.

 

[untermensche]

My ontology says the mind is that which experiences all things.

Incoherent.

?

Pathetic dodge.

It is the starting point of all things.

There is experience and the thing that is aware of it.

You cannot have experience without something aware of the experience.

We label that which experiences all things and all the things it experiences, AND all it can do, like move the arm and sort through ideas, the "mind". We commonly call the ability of the mind to do things the "will".

To say this is incoherent is to live on another planet as an unknown species of life.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

My ontology says the mind is that which experiences all things.

Incoherent.

Pathetic dodge.

You left off this part: At best you could only assert that the mind experiences. It could not know what it is experiencing, only that it is experiencing. Iow, it could only know--directly experience--the act of experiencing.

There is experience and the thing that is aware of it.

Incoherent. What does being "aware of it" entail? The "mind" is that which experiences. Are you arguing that it is aware that it experiences? If so, of trivial importance. If, however, by "aware" you are attempting to argue that it experiences AND that it can know the content of the experience, then no, that is not possible in your ontology.

The mind can only know--directly experience--the act of experiencing. It cannot know--directly experience--the objective content of the experience that the brain has translated and imbued the "mind" with. All the "mind" could know--directly experience--is the translated information imbued by the brain.

That would be identical to saying the record needle experiences the music that comes out of the speakers. No. Category error. The only form that the needle can "experience" is the groove made in the LP. If you don't know what an LP is, ask your grandfather.

You cannot have experience without something aware of the experience.

Equivocation. You have shifted from "aware" meaning "having direct interaction with the form of translated information imbued by the brain" to meaning "full meta understanding of the context and origin of the objective reality that the brain has translated for the purpose of imbuing to the mind."

Iow, you went from the needle knowing the groove in the LP to the needle hearing and understanding the music coming out of the speakers.

Ontology no-no.

We label that which experiences all things

It stretches your ontology to the breaking point for the "mind" to have the capacity to label. It would necessarily have to be an imbued capacity from the brain, which in turn necessitates the brain being the smarter of the two at the very least and for the brain to be the thing that has the meta understanding.

AND all it can do, like move the arm and sort through ideas

Your ontology does not allow the "mind" to perform any such actions. It can't know what an "arm" is or what "sorting" is and there are certianly no "ideas" accessible to it to "sort" through, regardless.

Your ontology only allow the "mind" to be the "thing that experiences the act of experiencing." Anything beyond that or outside of that must necessarily be the function of brain as the generator of "mind."

To say this is incoherent

It is apparent that you do not understand what the word "incoherent" means in regard to epistemology and ontological discussions. To dumb it down, it generally means incomplete, or not exhaustively explained or logically explored, or otherwise involving vague terminology and/or sophistry in one's position.

In the above example:

My ontology says the mind is that which experiences all things.

The "mind" may indeed be "that which experiences all things" but that is strictly limited to the act of expencing and can in no way be taken to mean that it understands the context of "all things" or that it even knows--directly experiences--any thing at all, because it could only "experience" the brain's translation of a "thing" at the very best.

So the exhaustively complete (or at least more so) phrasing of your ontology would necessarily have to be, "My ontology asserts the 'mind' is that which experiences the brain's translations" and that's about it. "All things" would be incoherent to such a "device" as it can only experience the act of experiencing the brain's translations. What the brain is translating from (or to, for that matter) is inaccessible to the "mind" so the category of "all things" (or, just "things") would be inaccessible and meaningless to the "mind."

In short, exactly like a phonograph needle, the only "thing" a "mind" can experience is the groove in the wax created by the brain. And nothing else.

 

[untermensche]

Saying the mind is that which experiences is not saying that is all the mind is.

That which experiences is also that which moves the arm.

The mind is not limited by your narrow imagination.

 

[Grendel]

The mind is not limited by your narrow imagination.

Unter,

What is the mind limited by?

Is it limited by the body?

 

[Grendel]

.
So, prove to me that evidence is something that exists outside our heads.
EB

When you truly believe the probability that 'nothing' exists (not a probability in QM btw) outside your head, as you do, then it becomes impossible to answer your challenge. Can you see that?

When you state 'outside our heads' can you prove to me that other heads exist? How do you know anyone exists?

You are forbidden to use the word 'our' again, or any plural or collective word. If you use one, just one, again you will debunk your own belief. You're on probation in this thread from this point on, got it. Signed: The voice inside your head.

.
Solipsism in philosophy, is an extreme form of subjective idealism that denies that the human mind has any valid ground for believing in the existence of anything but itself. The British idealist F. H. Bradley in Appearance and Reality (1893), characterized the solipsistic view as follows:

I cannot transcend experience, and experience must be my experience. From this it follows that nothing beyond my self exists; for what is experience is the self’s states.
.

Apart from the appalling self-centredness of this belief, which denies all other life exists except for oneself, and only oneself, it's just plain dim-witted as it means no transition of knowledge between sapients can occur. (Presumably because no other sapients truly exist ... heehe) As we know this does happen all the time, Solipism is debunked.

Solipism, the last unrecognised religion whose adherants claim they are athiests, in the genuine belief that they are purged of all spiritual superstition ... snigger

.
Example of Solipism given by Boethius: I'm blind, so prove that colour exists, I'm deaf, so prove that sound exists, I'm ...................

​

 

[Speakpigeon]

When you truly believe the probability that 'nothing' exists (not a probability in QM btw) outside your head, as you do, then it becomes impossible to answer your challenge. Can you see that?

There's no "probability" that could possibly be established as you suggests here, so your bit starts on the wrong foot. You're committing the same mistake as untermensche.

Also, I don't "believe nothing exists outside my head" as you say I do. So, see, you really seem to have a problem with understanding the world of which I am a part. Or is it just English?

When you state 'outside our heads' can you prove to me that other heads exist? How do you know anyone exists?

You are forbidden to use the word 'our' again, or any plural or collective word. If you use one, just one, again you will debunk your own belief. You're on probation in this thread from this point on, got it. Signed: The voice inside your head.

You're right. This is a good point. I'm all for it.

Still, I was using the word "head" because that's the word you would use but you're right, and so it's to be read as meaning "mind".

Apart from the appalling self-centredness of this belief, which denies all other life exists except for oneself, and only oneself, it's just plain dim-witted as it means no transition of knowledge between sapients can occur. (Presumably because no other sapients truly exist ... heehe) As we know this does happen all the time, Solipism is debunked.

Solipism, the last unrecognised religion whose adherants claim they are athiests, in the genuine belief that they are purged of all spiritual superstition ... snigger

.
Example of Solipism given by Boethius: I'm blind, so prove that colour exists, I'm deaf, so prove that sound exists, I'm ...................

You must have missed my explanation to Koyaanisqatsi earlier in this thread. This should tell you there's something you didn't quite understand in relation to solipsism. Here it is:

That some call this position solipsism shows how lost people are.

Considering that:

Solipsism is the philosophical idea that only one's own mind is sure to exist. As an epistemological position, solipsism holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; the external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist outside the mind.

It's perfectly understandable as that is almost exactly word-for-word what you have been regurgitating.

It seems to you are just wrong here. As far as I can tell, untermensche and I broadly have the same analysis and, like him, I don't equate my view with solipsism. I grant you that the distinction is subtle for the non-specialist but there's no doubt as to the fact. And it's not a matter of equivocating on words, there really is a difference. Like me, I don't think untermensche's view is that (A) only his own mind is sure to exist. According to this, UM's view is not solipsism (except, as he says, as a possibility).

To help you sort out the mess, please note that the rest of Wiki's explanation does apply to untermensche's view (and my own): (B) "knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; the external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist outside the mind".

The two bits, A and B, are not equivalent. And I believe that A doesn't apply to UM's view, while B does, at least as far as I understand his position but what he says here does confirm this.
EB

EDIT
In effect, we have A → B but not B → A. So, you can hold that B is true without necessarily holding that A is true.

Also, the difference between us is that untermensche's view is naive, i.e. he can't explain himself, which is why he keeps repeating again and again the same things, essentially a few trite ideas, and why he can't debate properly with other posters, as you will have noticed.

I hope this will be enough to stop you making unsubstantiated claims about me.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

it becomes impossible to answer your challenge. Can you see that?

I certainly think my position as to myself is the only logical position to have given the empirical evidence I have and therefore I expect that no one could prove it wrong. Still, you're free to have a different position as to yourself. It may even be possible that you had not the same evidence as I do. Although, since Descartes, we should all understand the point and accept there's nothing else to say about it. Descartes himself, after the Cogito, unable to shut up or just repeat himself, as I do here, went on to say very stupid things. It's only human, I guess. You want to believe things and you want to be part of the great debate about what we should all believe. I just happen to be more Cartesian and logical than Descartes, and perhaps less sentimental about life.

So, yes, I can see that. I'm not sure you do.
EB

 

[Grendel]

So your bit starts on the wrong foot. You're committing the same mistake as untermensche.

I don't "believe nothing exists outside my head" as you say I do. So, see, you really seem to have a problem with understanding the world of which I am a part. Or is it just English?

But I never said that did I? I said I said there is a probability, (meaning a possibility) that nothing exists outside your head. And that's all the difference in the world. Why did you cut the word 'probability' out of my post, and then tell me I'm mistaken? Your claim is now unsubstantiated, strike 1.

You must have missed my explanation to Koyaanisqatsi earlier in this thread. This should tell you there's something you didn't quite understand in relation to solipsism. Here it is: ...........

No, I didn't. How could I overlook such beautiful prose.

I'm only guilty of (B) not (A) ....

Here's (A) only his own mind is sure to exist.

Here's (B) which you say applies to you.

please note that the rest of Wiki's explanation does apply to untermensche's view (and my own): (B)

(B) "knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; the external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist outside the mind".
And what I said
(MY B) 'the probability that 'nothing' exists outside your head

So you see, I did nothing wrong at all, Strike 2. All your claims are unsubstantiated ones.

I hope this will be enough to stop you making unsubstantiated claims about me.
EB

Bwahahaaaaaa

As for the guy who did state (A), he wasn't me, he was on your side ...

Solipsism in philosophy, is an extreme form of subjective idealism that denies that the human mind has any valid ground for believing in the existence of anything but itself. The British idealist F. H. Bradley in Appearance and Reality (1893)

I grant you that the distinction is subtle for the non-specialist but there's no doubt as to the fact. And it's not a matter of equivocating on words, there really is a difference. (snigger )

 

[Grendel]

Descartes himself, after the Cogito went on to say very stupid things.

That's a BARE-FACED lie ... He always said stupid things, even as a child. He was noted for it. Haven't you ever read 'Mathesis Universalis'

 

[untermensche]

The mind is not limited by your narrow imagination.

Unter,

What is the mind limited by?

Is it limited by the body?

In some ways. Dementia destroys the mind. Loss of memory degrades the ability of the mind to function.

Things like language depend on the language capacity which is below the surface of consciousness.

But an intact mind is limited by the data it has access to and the abilities it has acquired to deal with that data.

How would the body limit an idea once understood?

 

[untermensche]

Descartes himself, after the Cogito went on to say very stupid things.

That's a BARE-FACED lie ... He always said stupid things, even as a child. He was noted for it. Haven't you ever read 'Mathesis Universalis'

They all said stupid things.

We stand on the shoulders of many giants.

Aristotle said many many crazy stupid things.

These people are not still with us because everything they said was a gem.

It is because they had one or a few gems.

"I think therefore I am" is a gem.

My formulation is: I experience therefore there is something that experiences and the things it experiences.

The salient point is there is an "I" that is thinking, an "I" that is experiencing.

There is not just thinking and not just experiencing. There is an "I".

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

Saying the mind is that which experiences is not saying that is all the mind is.

Saying anything at all is also not saying what something is; it's asserting what something is. The problem being, that your assertions must fall within the boundaries of your ontology.

Case in point:

That which experiences is also that which moves the arm.

Your ontology does not allow you to assert such a belief. So what are you basing that assertion upon? The "mind" of your ontology could not possibly have the meta understanding that the arm moved as a result of anything the "mind" experienced. It could only experience "arm moving" (as a result of the brain's translation being imbued into it).

You keep desperately trying to eat your cake and have it too. "The mind is" anything you say it is, evidently, to suit whatever argument you choose to make, but none of them are grounded in your ontology beyond "the mind is that which experiences the act of experiencing."

That is the only properly basic component of your ontology. Everything else is just you asserting that the mind can also be its own mirror and it can also have an omniscient understanding of everything the dumb old brain translates and imbues it with and it can also, somehow, autonomously puppeteer the brain and the body and send instructions back to the brain to move an arm or a leg, etc.

In fact, the "mind" of your ontology is really just the brain of everyone else's ontology, just reconfigured slightly and with vague, ill-defined terms and what it "is" and what it can "do" pulled out of your arse as it suits you.

Other case in point:

My formulation is: I experience therefore there is something that experiences and the things it experiences.

The first part is just Descartes. The part that falls completely out of any grounded ontology, however, is "and the things it experiences." Beyond the equivocation of "things," you can't get to that part through your ontology. All you can do is restate, "I think, therefore I am."

Since the "mind"--the "I"--of your ontology is generated and imbued by the brain--and the brain is an unreliable narrator--the "I" can't discern any "things it experiences." To it, the "things it experiences" are nothing more than the brain's translations; the brain's stories. But the brain is an unreliable narrator, so those stories--according to your own ontology--can't be trusted and certainly can't be independently verified by the "mind." How could they? So the very best that your ontology affords is that the "I" is the one who exepriences the act of experiencing and nothing else. No "things"--none of the content--of the story the brain imbues it with; just the base fact of process.

Which renders your ontology's version of a "mind" to be nothing more than a phonograph needle. It can "experience" the grooves in the album wax (created by the brain), but certainly NOT THE MUSIC coming out of the speakers or any other "thing" involved. How could it? What other magical qualities are you just omitting from your ontology that would allow the "I" to have so many omni-capabilities?

Don't attempt to say "none" as that is patently and demonstrably false.

The salient point is there is an "I" that is thinking, an "I" that is experiencing.

Which you appear to be falsely separating into two distinct "I"s, yet nothing in your ontology allows that either.

There is an "I".

Yeah, again, nothing new.

So, at best and as it stands, we have Descartes and then incoherent assertions, equivocations and derivations that cannot obtain from your incomplete ontology.