A thought experiment on killing

[Philos]

Folks,

Here is a thought experiment which may help to clarify our thoughts on the killing of a person.

Imagine that you are in Pakistan in 1999 and have the opportunity to meet and the means to kill Osama bin Laden. This can be done privately and you will be able to escape afterwards undetected.

Given the facts above, I would ask some questions that may enlighten us on our own views and feelings about killing.

1. Would you want to kill bin Laden?

2. I you do, do you feel that you have the stomach for a face to face killing?

3. If the answer to the first two questions if 'Yes', do you believe that the action is right?

Alex.

 

[Unbeatable]

There are plenty of people on this planet who I want to kill, but Osama bin Laden was never one of them.

I believe I have the stomach for a face-to-face killing. Face-to-face is, after all, the kind of killing that I've fantasized about most often.

Do I believe it would be right for me to kill the people I want to kill? No.
Do I believe it would be wrong for me to kill the people I want to kill? No.

 

[bilby]

Folks,

Here is a thought experiment which may help to clarify our thoughts on the killing of a person.

Imagine that you are in Pakistan in 1999 and have the opportunity to meet and the means to kill Osama bin Laden. This can be done privately and you will be able to escape afterwards undetected.

Given the facts above, I would ask some questions that may enlighten us on our own views and feelings about killing.

1. Would you want to kill bin Laden?

2. I you do, do you feel that you have the stomach for a face to face killing?

3. If the answer to the first two questions if 'Yes', do you believe that the action is right?

Alex.

1. No; Killing somebody as punishment for a crime is, IMO, morally indefensible in most cases; That goes double when the killing is pre-emptive. While I am in two minds about the application of the death penalty in the specific case of OBL, the penalty has to come after the crime. In 1999 Bin Laden wasn't even an important international criminal.

2. Yes, I think I could deliberately kill another person face to face, but only in immediate self defence. If OBL came at me with a machete, I wouldn't hesitate to shoot him dead at short range. I doubt that he would though, even if I could arrange to travel back in time; He strikes me as more of a manager than as someone who gets his own hands dirty, but I don't know a huge amount about him, so I may be wrong on that count.

3. No; as outlined above, the death penalty I believe is a little harsh even after the event; although given the crime he committed, I am not particularly opposed to making an exception in this case. Masterminding premeditated acts of mass murder or genocide are possible candidates for capital punishment IMO (although I do not support it in most cases), but in 1999 OBL was only planning a crime - he was not guilty of it. With foreknowledge of his intent, and a couple of years to do something about it, it should be possible to thwart his plans without killing anybody. A few anonymous phone calls to the FBI on the morning of September 10th 2001 would likely be sufficient to get the hijackers arrested before they could carry out their attacks.

There are plenty of options to prevent a calamity of which one has foreknowledge, without resorting to murder.

I am reminded of something I saw recently (sorry, I don't recall where - it might have been Facebook) where somebody said something like "Imagine you went back in time and killed Hitler as a teenager. Nobody would thank you; They would haul you up in court for murder, and when you said 'But I killed Hitler', the judge would look across the courtroom to the grieving father, Alois Hitler Sr., shrug his shoulders, and say 'Ja, na und?'".

 

[Valjean]

Bin Laden? -- a mere figurehead. Killing him would be purely symbolic. When he Taliban offered to turn him over the US rejected the offer.

 

[Philos]

Folks,

Thought experiments can be misleading, which is showing up on this thread and where I have posted it elsewhere.

Of course this is not about bin Laden (or the classic Hitler version). The question is whether we would kill someone if we were certain that this would have massive positive effects, such as saving many lives.

I guess it might be better if we have a more immediate scenario:

Imagine that you are in a primary school playground, with all the kids playing happily. There is a terrorist in the playground, with a suicide belt. If they detonate it, the children will be killed or maimed. You have a loaded gun in your hand and not enough time to physically reach the terrorist or warn the children. You see the terrorist moving to detonate the belt.

The same questions apply.

Alex.

 

[dx713]

Folks,

Here is a thought experiment which may help to clarify our thoughts on the killing of a person.

Imagine that you are in Pakistan in 1999 and have the opportunity to meet and the means to kill Osama bin Laden. This can be done privately and you will be able to escape afterwards undetected.

Given the facts above, I would ask some questions that may enlighten us on our own views and feelings about killing.

1. Would you want to kill bin Laden?

2. I you do, do you feel that you have the stomach for a face to face killing?

3. If the answer to the first two questions if 'Yes', do you believe that the action is right?

Alex.

1. No, because he would just be replaced by someone else. I don't believe terrorism can be fought by just eliminating the figurehead, you need to work on the underlying causes (in that specific case, what about killing the CIA operatives who helped the Talibans rise?)
2. Yes, if the physical gesture needed is not commensurate with the killing. I don't believe I have it in me to apply enough force to kill someone physically. But I think I could trick myself in squeezing the trigger of a gun, even at point blank range.
3. N/A

Folks,

Thought experiments can be misleading, which is showing up on this thread and where I have posted it elsewhere.

Of course this is not about bin Laden (or the classic Hitler version). The question is whether we would kill someone if we were certain that this would have massive positive effects, such as saving many lives.

I guess it might be better if we have a more immediate scenario:

Imagine that you are in a primary school playground, with all the kids playing happily. There is a terrorist in the playground, with a suicide belt. If they detonate it, the children will be killed or maimed. You have a loaded gun in your hand and not enough time to physically reach the terrorist or warn the children. You see the terrorist moving to detonate the belt.

The same questions apply.

Alex.

Your new scenario is still problematic. What if they've setup a dead man switch? How can I be sure they won't detonate the belt when I fire? A bullet isn't an instant death ray.
But trying to use the spirit of your scenario (like imagining the bomb isn't on a suicide belt but hidden in the playground and I do not have time to reach the terrorist before they run to the switch):
1. Yes, I would do it. The life of someone meaning harm vs the life of several, no contest. I even think that in this case, because of the reponsibility adults feel toward children, the decision would be instinctive.
2. Same answer than in the first scenario. So in your scenario where I have a gun, yes.
3. As I said, I believe it would be instinctive enough to override right/wrong questions. But in hindsight, yes, it would be the right thing to do - life of one vs lives of many, life of one meaning harm vs lives of innocents, both utilitarian morals and more instinctive "justice" morals agree on this one.

 

[Togo]

Bin Laden
1) No

Playground
1) Yes. Given the highly artificial constraints of the scenario, this would be the logical choice
2) Yes. I'd be upset afterwards, but not at the time
3) Not particularly. You've specified a scenario where this is the least-bad choice, and we all have perfect knowledge. So, by definition it's the least-bad choice given perfect knowledge. I can't imagine such a scenario ever occuring in real-life though.

 

[Loren Pechtel]

Bin Laden? -- a mere figurehead. Killing him would be purely symbolic. When he Taliban offered to turn him over the US rejected the offer.

They never offered to turn him over.

What they offered is that we provide the intel that made us think he was guilty and they would decide if they would turn him over or not. That's a total sham offer.

 

[Philos]

3. As I said, I believe it would be instinctive enough to override right/wrong questions. But in hindsight, yes, it would be the right thing to do - life of one vs lives of many, life of one meaning harm vs lives of innocents, both utilitarian morals and more instinctive "justice" morals agree on this one.

dx713,

Sorry about the messy thought experiments, I'm long out of practice.

Yes, your answer above gets to the guts of the philosophy. I'm going to refresh on deontological ethics and get back.

Alex.

 

[Underseer]

If I could prevent 9/11 by doing so, probably, however I doubt killing bin Laden would have prevented 9/11 since it was a plan hatched by a lot of people. More than likely, some kind of large scale terrorist attack or another would have been inevitable given the ideology of al Qa'eda.

 

[Philos]

3. As I said, I believe it would be instinctive enough to override right/wrong questions. But in hindsight, yes, it would be the right thing to do - life of one vs lives of many, life of one meaning harm vs lives of innocents, both utilitarian morals and more instinctive "justice" morals agree on this one.

dx713,

Sorry about the messy thought experiments, I'm long out of practice.

Yes, your answer above gets to the guts of the philosophy. I'm going to refresh on deontological ethics and get back.

Alex.

dx,

OK, this has been a hard think.

I used to be a hard Kantian deontologist, and actively critical of consequential ethics such as Utilitarianism. However, over time I've been unable to convince myself that ethics can be formed from rational principles alone. I'm still drawn to deontological ethics, but have been persuaded by Existentialists (notably Sartre) that a situational approach is more realistic. This still has a Kantian flavour, as the 'love' motive of situational ethics chimes with the 'good will' of Kant.

Your mention of "instinct" set me back to thinking on it, and has been most helpful. I do think that we tend to act instinctively in moral crises and then look for justifications after the event. I'm thinking that the 'love' and 'good will' motivations are the core of this instinct, and that Utilitarianism is still wrong as a moral theory, although the outcomes from this theory and a situational approach may often be similar. The justifications are however, quite different.

So, in my case, I would probably act against a terrorist if I had sure knowledge that dreadful terrorism was going to happen as a result of their intentions and power. Consequences are important of course, but the ethical point is that stopping them by any available means is the right thing to do in that situation.

Alex.

 

[PyramidHead]

So, in my case, I would probably act against a terrorist if I had sure knowledge that dreadful terrorism was going to happen as a result of their intentions and power. Consequences are important of course, but the ethical point is that stopping them by any available means is the right thing to do in that situation.

Alex.

I don't understand why you used the word 'but' in that sentence. Consequences are the most important reason why you would stop the terrorist. You can re-phrase that as a rule if you like, but in the end the rule is based on which consequences are desirable and which are not.

 

[untermensche]

Imagine that you are in Pakistan in 1999 and have the opportunity to meet and the means to kill Osama bin Laden.

In 1999 what do we think we are going to prevent by killing him?

I'd say the far better thing to do in hindsight would be to kill Cheney and Rumsfeld in 1999. Imagine the lives that would have been saved by that?

 

[Philos]

So, in my case, I would probably act against a terrorist if I had sure knowledge that dreadful terrorism was going to happen as a result of their intentions and power. Consequences are important of course, but the ethical point is that stopping them by any available means is the right thing to do in that situation.

Alex.

I don't understand why you used the word 'but' in that sentence. Consequences are the most important reason why you would stop the terrorist. You can re-phrase that as a rule if you like, but in the end the rule is based on which consequences are desirable and which are not.

Pyramid,

Of course you are right. This type of example is all about consequences. However, a deontologist who believes that the act of killing is wrong in all circumstances would have to make their decision based on the act (or rule) and not on the consequences. If they really believed in their ethics we could load up examples with millions of innocents dying and yet they would have to stick with not killing the terrorist.

I guess I am more of a consequentialist than I thought, which is a learning experience.

Alex.

 

[PyramidHead]

I don't understand why you used the word 'but' in that sentence. Consequences are the most important reason why you would stop the terrorist. You can re-phrase that as a rule if you like, but in the end the rule is based on which consequences are desirable and which are not.

Pyramid,

Of course you are right. This type of example is all about consequences. However, a deontologist who believes that the act of killing is wrong in all circumstances would have to make their decision based on the act (or rule) and not on the consequences. If they really believed in their ethics we could load up examples with millions of innocents dying and yet they would have to stick with not killing the terrorist.

I guess I am more of a consequentialist than I thought, which is a learning experience.

Alex.

Well, as I said, the deontologist could simply incorporate more and more consequences into her rule. The rule 'the act of killing is wrong in all circumstances' is a pretty crappy rule in practice, and I doubt any serious deontologists adopt it. It would be more like 'killing is wrong if it does not prevent more harm than it causes,' or 'killing is wrong if it violates someone's rights more than not killing' or something.

I could be thinking about this naively, but in my experience all ethical theories presume that consequentialism is the ultimate authority, even when apparently arguing against consequentialism. In any example that shows why consequentialism is false, it is always the consequences of adopting consequentialism that forms the basis for that conclusion!

 

[Philos]

I don't understand why you used the word 'but' in that sentence. Consequences are the most important reason why you would stop the terrorist. You can re-phrase that as a rule if you like, but in the end the rule is based on which consequences are desirable and which are not.

Pyramid,

Of course you are right. This type of example is all about consequences. However, a deontologist who believes that the act of killing is wrong in all circumstances would have to make their decision based on the act (or rule) and not on the consequences. If they really believed in their ethics we could load up examples with millions of innocents dying and yet they would have to stick with not killing the terrorist.

I guess I am more of a consequentialist than I thought, which is a learning experience.

Alex.

Hmm, now I'm quoting myself. After further thought I would remark that a deontologist can be concerned with consequences IMV, but that the consequences are not what makes an act morally right. For instance stopping the terrorist may not have the desired effect for some reason, or even make things worse, but that would not make the act morally wrong. It could be effectively wrong, or badly executed, but if the agent is acting from 'love' and or 'good will' it cannot become morally wrong through contingencies after the event.

Alex.

 

[PyramidHead]

I don't understand why you used the word 'but' in that sentence. Consequences are the most important reason why you would stop the terrorist. You can re-phrase that as a rule if you like, but in the end the rule is based on which consequences are desirable and which are not.

Pyramid,

Of course you are right. This type of example is all about consequences. However, a deontologist who believes that the act of killing is wrong in all circumstances would have to make their decision based on the act (or rule) and not on the consequences. If they really believed in their ethics we could load up examples with millions of innocents dying and yet they would have to stick with not killing the terrorist.

I guess I am more of a consequentialist than I thought, which is a learning experience.

Alex.

Well, as I said, the deontologist could simply incorporate more and more consequences into her rule. The rule 'the act of killing is wrong in all circumstances' is a pretty crappy rule in practice, and I doubt any serious deontologists adopt it. It would be more like 'killing is wrong if it does not prevent more harm than it causes,' or 'killing is wrong if it violates someone's rights more than not killing' or something.

I could be thinking about this naively, but in my experience all ethical theories presume that consequentialism is the ultimate authority, even when apparently arguing against consequentialism. In any example that shows why consequentialism is false, it is always the consequences of adopting consequentialism that forms the basis for that conclusion!

 

[Togo]

In any example that shows why consequentialism is false, it is always the consequences of adopting consequentialism that forms the basis for that conclusion!

Why is that a problem? If adopting consequentialism has negative consequences, then consequentialism is self-contradictory, whether it is true or not.

I think a more serious objection is that consequentialism is insufficient. Insisting that an act must be rated on the consequences of that act, only gets you from rating different acts to rating different outcomes. You still have to apply an arbitrary value system to the outcome, just as you would otherwise have done to the original act.

 

[PyramidHead]

In any example that shows why consequentialism is false, it is always the consequences of adopting consequentialism that forms the basis for that conclusion!

Why is that a problem? If adopting consequentialism has negative consequences, then consequentialism is self-contradictory, whether it is true or not.

The paradox goes both ways:

If consequentialism leads to undesirable outcomes, it is a bad guide for behavior.
If consequentialism is a bad guide for behavior, morality cannot be decided by consequences alone.
If morality cannot be decided by consequences alone, it does not necessarily matter that consequentialism leads to undesirable outcomes.
If it does not necessarily matter that consequentialism leads to undesirable outcomes, consequentialism is not necessarily a bad guide for behavior.

I think a more serious objection is that consequentialism is insufficient. Insisting that an act must be rated on the consequences of that act, only gets you from rating different acts to rating different outcomes. You still have to apply an arbitrary value system to the outcome, just as you would otherwise have done to the original act.

The point is that the values are always applied ultimately to the consequences. When it appears that values are being applied to rights, or to following rules, or to divine commands, in the end those considerations can be reduced to their outcomes. I have never come across a serious moral argument that could not be completely reduced to arguing about consequences.

 

[Togo]

Why is that a problem? If adopting consequentialism has negative consequences, then consequentialism is self-contradictory, whether it is true or not.

The paradox goes both ways:

If consequentialism leads to undesirable outcomes, it is a bad guide for behavior.
If consequentialism is a bad guide for behavior, morality cannot be decided by consequences alone.
If morality cannot be decided by consequences alone, it does not necessarily matter that consequentialism leads to undesirable outcomes.
If it does not necessarily matter that consequentialism leads to undesirable outcomes, consequentialism is not necessarily a bad guide for behavior.

If something is logically self-contradictory, then it's fitness is suspect whether it is a bad guide for behaviour or not. The reason why you have 'necessarily' in there is because the idea that consequentialism leads to bad outcomes is a problem for consequentialism even if you don't plan on evaluating morality based on outcomes.

I think a more serious objection is that consequentialism is insufficient. Insisting that an act must be rated on the consequences of that act, only gets you from rating different acts to rating different outcomes. You still have to apply an arbitrary value system to the outcome, just as you would otherwise have done to the original act.

The point is that the values are always applied ultimately to the consequences. When it appears that values are being applied to rights, or to following rules, or to divine commands, in the end those considerations can be reduced to their outcomes. I have never come across a serious moral argument that could not be completely reduced to arguing about consequences.

I don't think you can justify 'ultimately', or 'in the end', or 'reduce to'. I've never come across a serious argument based on consequences that didn't ultimately reduce to arguments about arbitrary values. You may think that an argument about not killing people reduces to an argument about the avoiding the consequence of a lot of dead people, but you could equally argue that any argument about the consequence of a lot of dead people reduces to an arbitrary value judgement about dead people being undesirable in general.