Having introduced the prevailing understandings of the Suspension Clause and of the political branches' plenary power over immigration, we now consider the relationship between these two areas of legal doctrine and how they apply to Petitioners' claim that the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 1252 violate the Suspension Clause.
Petitioners argue that under the Supreme Court's Suspension Clause jurisprudence -- especially St. Cyr and the finality-era cases -- courts must, at a minimum, be able to review the legal conclusions underlying the Executive's negative credible fear determinations, including the Executive's interpretation and application of a statute to undisputed facts.[24] And because § 1252(e)(2) does not provide for at least this level of review, Petitioners claim that it constitutes an inadequate substitute for habeas, in violation of the Suspension Clause.
The government, on the other hand, claims that the plenary power doctrine operates to foreclose Petitioners' Suspension Clause challenge. In the government's view, Petitioners should be treated no differently from aliens " on the threshold of initial entry" who clearly lack constitutional due process protections concerning their application for admission. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212. And because Petitioners " have no underlying procedural due process rights to vindicate in habeas," Respondents' Br. 49, the government argues that " the scope of habeas review is [ ] irrelevant." Id.
Petitioners raise three principal arguments in response to the government's contentions above. First, they claim that to deny them due process rights despite their having indisputably entered the country prior to being apprehended would run contrary to numerous Supreme Court precedents recognizing the constitutional rights of all " persons" within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976) (explaining that the Fifth Amendment applies to all aliens " within the jurisdiction of the United States," including those " whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory" ). Second, they argue that even if the Constitution does not impose any independent procedural minimums that the Executive must satisfy before removing Petitioners, the Executive must at least fairly administer those procedures that Congress has actually prescribed in the expedited removal statute. Cf. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 238-39 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process in deportation proceedings, and explaining that these rights " ste[m] from those statutory rights granted by Congress and the principle that '[m]inimum due process rights attach to statutory rights.'" (quoting Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 203 (3d Cir. 1996))). Third, Petitioners claim that, regardless of the extent of their constitutional or statutory due process rights, habeas corpus stands as a constitutional check against illegal detention by the Executive that is separate and apart from the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause.
We agree with the government that Petitioners' Suspension Clause challenge to § 1252 must fail, though we do so for reasons that are somewhat different than those urged by the government. As explained in Part III.B.1 above, Boumediene contemplates a two-step inquiry whereby courts must first determine whether a given habeas petitioner is prohibited from invoking the Suspension Clause due to some attribute of the petitioner or to the circumstances surrounding his arrest or detention. Cf. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739. Only after confirming that the petitioner is not so prohibited may courts then turn to the question whether the substitute for habeas is adequate and effective to test the legality of the petitioner's detention (or removal). As we explain below, we conclude that Petitioners cannot clear Boumediene 's first hurdle -- that of proving their entitlement vel non to the protections of the Suspension Clause.[25]
The reason Petitioners' Suspension Clause claim falls at step one is because the Supreme Court has unequivocally concluded that " an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application." Landon, 459 U.S. at 32. Petitioners were each apprehended within hours of surreptitiously entering the United States, so we think it appropriate to treat them as " alien seeking initial admission to the United States." Id. And since the issues that Petitioners seek to challenge all stem from the Executive's decision to remove them from the country, they cannot invoke the Constitution, including the Suspension Clause, in an effort to force judicial review beyond what Congress has already granted them. As such, we need not reach the second question under the Boumediene framework, i.e., whether the limited scope of review of expedited removal orders under § 1252 is an adequate substitute for traditional habeas review.