fast,
Thanks; I also respect you and value your input.
Regarding your analysis, I'm not sure I'm getting it right, but I do think I am trying to assess the whole thing. But it's not only the whole thing combining the $100 and the $200 into a single obligation, but rather, trying to assess their respective obligations from the perspective of the whole interaction and the relationship between the two. For instance, in the first scenario you described
here, I think he probably should pay $200 as you think, rather than only $100. On the other hand, it the scenario I described
here, I think it's only $100. I make those assessments intuitively, but if I had to guess the reason, I think it has something to do with the entire context of their interaction. In particular, in one case, she needs the money, and while she failed to pay before, the reasons are unspecified, and he agreed to pay knowning she had already failed to pay. In the other scenario, she grants that she's immorally not paying just to get an extra $100. I think her callous behavior with respect to the previous agreement may well be what makes a difference.
Generally, the whole relationship between the two people matters. For example, suppose my mother asked me for $400 the day before yesterday, and told me she'd give them back to me on Friday. If, on Friday, she tells me she got a great offer for a tour and she spent the money, so she'll pay me back later, then she's not doing anything wrong, and has no obligation to give them back (actually, she may just keep them). Now, I'm not saying that that would be the case for every mother with respect to her son. It depends on the situation. But I know she would not have an obligation. On the other hand, if a coworker did the same, she'd be acting immorally by spending the money on a tour when she promised to give it back to me. And this is so even if both my mother and the coworker use the same words, telling me that they'll give me the money back on such-and-such day, etc.
I think you also consider the whole thing when making those assessments, by the way. When you focus on those separate promises in your anaysis, I think that's probably because,
upon contemplating the whole thing intuitively, you reckoned that those two remain separate for the morally relevant matters at hand.
But why do we have different intuitions in some of the cases we have presented?
I can only speculate here, but I think that one potential reason is that sometimes, in hypothetical scenarios we are unfamiliar with (including but not limited to unrealistic ones), it's very difficult to fill in the blanks and make good probabilistic assessments about what is really going on in the interaction between the people whose obligations we are trying to assess, and that makes it difficult for us to get the right moral answer. In other words, the descriptions of the scenarios in this thread are not only incomplete (as always), but unfamiliar, and it may be that you and I are intuitively making different probabilistic assessments about other parts of their relationship, and things like intent, information available to each of the parties, etc., so we are actually assessing considerably different scenarios 'in our heads' so to speak. If so, the moral disagreement may not be fundamental after all, even if we can't find a way out. Still, there is an alternative possibility: it might happen also that the sense of right and wrong of different people diverge in some unrealistic scenarios, and this is happening here. I believe the human sense of right and wrong is generally reliable in realistic and in many unrealistic scenarios, but there are unrealistic scenarios when it is not so reliable, so either of us might be going wrong. I do not know for sure.
But as I said before, I do not think in an actual scenario we would have much trouble figuring out our moral obligations. In an actual scenario, we would have plenty of further information about our respective relations with the other person, so we would both very probably be able to make an informed and correct moral assessment (even if we might not be able to pinpoint the reasons for our assessment).
At any rate, as I said, I would agree that you're not being stupid. I think your friend probably made the following mistake: she failed to put herself properly into your shoes, and consider how your sense of right and wrong was assessing the matter. Maybe she is thinking of a scenario very different from the one you had in mind, by filling in the blanks differently.
fast said:
If there is a tradition that is outdated and it’s replaced with a more progressive appeal, I see harm (the destruction of the tradition) and I see benefit (the bringing of the new), and if the new outweighs the old, there is a net benefit and thus won’t be regarded as harmful but beneficial. People will refuse to acknowledge my take that there is harm because they want to reserve that term for post analysis only.
I'm not sure I'm getting this right, but if you're talking about a tradition about how to evaluate obligations, I see both the tradition and the new idea as approximations that may yield the right verdict in cases that may be more or less common depending on the place, time, country, etc., but not as a replacement for the basic method of considering things on a case by case basis, and using the intuitive human sense of right and wrong. There is no need to destroy the tradition, or to replace it. Rather, it's about considering that neither theory or method (the traditional or the new one) is general, but a shortcut applicable to some specific cases (maybe a good shortcut in some social environments, in the sense it works in nearly all cases in those environments, but we should take into consideration it might not work in others).
fast said:
How about this: are there two individual obligations that when evaluated yields a net obligation; or neither promise alone makes for an obligation and it’s the net difference of the promises that breeds the obligation?
I tend to think there is no simple answer. Rather, I think the relationship between two people results in many obligations, forming a very complex network. Promises do create some of those obligations, but the extent and conditions of them depend not only on what is said, but also on all sorts of complex interactions (e.g., consider the scenarios with my mother vs. my coworker above: they may both say
the exact same words, and yet the resulting obligations are very different; that is so because of the whole context of the relationship between each of them and me).
In short, I think that we can generally make proper assessments in realistic cases (and many unrealistic ones), but the study of the rules by which the obligations are governed (including those involving promises) is a very difficult matter for future research in human psychology and moral philosophy.
