It only seems likely that a simulation would have an intelligent creator in the context of our perceived universe where intelligent beings are the creators of most, if not all, simulations. If we discount our apparent experience - which we must if we assume that we could be in a simulation ourselves - then there's no reason to think an intelligent creator is more or less likely than anything else.
Hi Jarhyn, I apologize in advance if I've misunderstood your question so please let me know if that's the case once you've read my response.
I think you are asking whether I consider a brain or brain-like structure composed of semiconductors as being equally aware as a brain composed of neurons.
I have to be a little careful in my response here because I want to clarify the difference between my position when we assume that my experience is
not simulated and my position when we assume that my experience
could be simulated.
Assuming that we are not utterly decieved by virtue of being in a simulation, I suspect that both a conventional, neuronal brain and a brain composed of semiconductors are equally aware.
In the absence of that assumption (i.e. allowing for the possibility that we are in a simulation), I can't reasonably justify any belief about what awareness is or how it works or what it might require.
Assuming that what we experience is, at least to some extent, "real" (which is what I assume) then I am totally behind you in the belief that neuroscience and neurosurgery provide some insight into the nature of awareness.
Assuming that we could be totally decieved by virtue of being in a simulation (which is what excreationist's first premise entails), then we couldn't say that neurosurgery (or anything really) is real.
That's really the main sticking point of my disagreement with excreationist. If we discount our apparent experiences by assuming it could all be faked, then we're left with nothing to base any beliefs on.
I contend that we
must assume that our experiences are, by and large, real in order to have any meaningful discussions.
excreationist said:
connick
I think I've got a solution to your issues...
I could modify the first premise:
It is possible we are in a simulation that has an intelligent creator and limited resources, etc. It could also resemble the physics of our universe.
I think that helps a little, but mostly by moving the problem to a new place. Ultimately, I think the argument is still a non-starter but, with your modified premise above, for a slightly different reason. In fact, the reason this new premise leads to trouble is because it demands justification for not positing your original premise.
With your original premise we can know nothing, because it implies that all knowledge within the simulation is suspect at best and everything outside of it is utterly unknowable.
With your modified premise you confine the nature and origin of a possible simulation to something more limited, but that begs the question "why assume those limitations?"
So, if we work backwards from your modified premise, to your first premise to my assertion it goes, in my mind, something like this:
Modified Premise
"It is possible we are in a simulation that has an intelligent creator and limited resources, etc. It could also resemble the physics of our universe."
Rebuttal
Well, it is also possible that we are in a simulation without a creator (intelligent or otherwise) and that an external world has unlimited resources (or that the idea of resources is a meaningless one in the external world) and that the physics of the simulation or the outside world in no way resembles physics as we perceive them. So what justifies these limitations or qualifications placed on the original premise? Why not posit the original?
Original Premise
"It's possible we're in a simulation."
Rebuttal
This is definitely a possibility. However, if we accept this possibility, we must therefore consider all of our knowledge to be suspect. In other words, we cannot know anything further to be true other than the original premise.
My Assertion
We must axiomatically reject your original premise. The sole justification I have for rejecting your premise is that, otherwise, we cannot make any coherent statements about our experiences or the universe at large. In simple terms, the possibility of our being in a simulation is fundamentally undeniable, but the question of whether we really are in a simulation or not is unanswerable. Worse still, accepting the possibility of being in a simulation renders us mute.
As I've said before, any statement is rendered moot by invoking your first premise.
While nobody prefaces their statements with "assuming we're not in a simulation", I think that's generally taken for granted. In the case of your arguments here, it's obvious that we need to say so explicitly and I think I've given a reasonable explanation for
why we have to make this assumption.
It's literally for the sake of discussion.