Accidentally did what? Never mind, it’s another rhetorical question. As mentioned, from now on I’ll pass over your stuff in silence, unless, unlikely as it may seem, you have some sort of substantive response to what I wrote or will write. Again, I hope, and for the moment trust, that you are not a fair specimen of this board.Yeah.
Um, so you accidentally did it or was a conscious decision?
I just signed up and have mostly skimmed this thread, apologies, but I was attracted here by the posts of Marvin Edwards. His thinking seems to comport with mine, a line of thought I find rather underrepresented in the debate on causal determinism and free will.
As he has pointed out, there is a difference between will and must. It is a distinction so important that there is even a fallacy, from modal logic, attached to this confusion, called the modal scope or just modal fallacy.
Suppose today it is true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle. The worry, going back to the ancient Greeks, is that if this is right, tomorrow there must be a sea battle; fatalism obtains, and no one has free will.
The modal fallacy lies in confusing necessity (could not have been otherwise) with contingency (could have been otherwise).
In the case of the sea battle, if today it is true that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, sure enough, tomorrow there will be a sea battle. But it does not follow that there must be a sea battle.
All that follows is that true propositions, and the events that they describe or predict, must match — otherwise the propositions would be false.
If, then, tomorrow there is not a sea battle, then a different prior proposition would have been true — today it is true that tomorrow there will not be a sea battle.
Suppose God exists and knows in advance everything that I will do. If he knows today that tomorrow I will eat eggs for breakfast, then, intuition inclines us to think, tomorrow I must eat eggs for breakfast. But, as with the sea battle example, this is a modal fallacy. It’s true if God knows in advance I will eat eggs for breakfast, then sure enough I will do so. But it doesn’t follow that I must do so. If I have pancakes instead, then God would have had a different propositional foreknowledge, viz., that I will eat pancakes for breakfast tomorrow.
So it is with causal determinism. Given a vast ensemble of antecedent events — stretching all the way to the Big Bang? — tomorrow there will be a sea battle, or tomorrow I will eat eggs. But neither has to be the case. Rather, if there is no sea battle, or I eat pancakes instead of eggs, then a different ensemble of antecedent events would have preceded these choices or events.
As Marvin notes, determinism does not hold sway over us or cause us to do anything. The laws of nature are descriptive and not prescriptive. In fact, the idea that the so-called laws of nature govern the universe seems to be a hangover from theism, in which we have a lawgiver laying down the laws. But with no lawgiver there are no laws, only descriptions of what happens in the world, including our own freely willed acts.
[/QUOTE]Most of the time, when we use the term "inevitable", it means that matters are out of our control, and that there is nothing we can do about it. But in the context of universal causal necessity/inevitability, the inevitability incorporates our control within the overall scheme of causation.
For example, there is a hypothesis, due to Minkowski/Einstein but mostly Minkowski, that we live in a block universe in the sense that the past, present and future all exist. If this is true, it would render the future as unchangeable as the past.
But does mean we lack relevant free will? I don’t think so. We don’t complain that we lack free will because the past is fixed. If the future if fixed, why should it be any different?
If past, present and future are indeed fixed, it means, when it comes to us, that they were, are, and will be, fixed by our actions. It may indeed be the case that no one can change the past, present or future. But I would suggest that changing past, present, or future, is not a prerequisite for relevant free will. Rather, our free acts made the past be what it was, make the present be what it is, and will make the future be, what it will be.
Most of the time, when we use the term "inevitable", it means that matters are out of our control, and that there is nothing we can do about it. But in the context of universal causal necessity/inevitability, the inevitability incorporates our control within the overall scheme of causation.
I take it by "has been demonstrated" and "have been given", you're referring to some incident where you blerk-will debaters, after borrowing a word from the broader community and redefining it under the baleful influence of a theistic religion and using it to commit equivocation fallacies, and after some in the broader community took back our word and used it correctly, told us you own the word now.
No. Considering neuroscience, numerous experiments, case studies, lesions, memory loss, etc, it's clear that will is not means by which the brain acquires and processes information and generates response....
I.e., you're using an idiosyncratic definition of "option".and determinism by definition does not allow us the option of doing otherwise in any given instance.
No. "The only thing constant is change". Hardly anything is fixed as a matter of natural law: the speed of light, the quantum of action, the excess of matter over antimatter, and a handful of other things. Everything else changes constantly.Everything id fixed as a matter of natural law.
That's what I said: you're de facto claiming that your lot own the word "free". You don't. Whatever it is about the role of will and the nature of cognition that you are claiming would have to be otherwise in order for your concept of "free" to correctly apply to them, you have no case for thinking "free" is an appropriate word for your concept.Will plays no part in freedom.
To simply claim that uncoerced behaviour is free will ignores the role of will, the inevitability or necessity of determinism and the nature of cognition.
When you take a word that's already in common use, you redefine it, and then you tell the original users they're using it wrong, you're the one who's doing mere word play.Which reduces compatibilism to mere word play.
See, this is the point where blerk-will debaters break out of their navel-gazing and inflict their equivocation fallacies on broader philosophy. Free will and moral judgment don't have to go together. I know cats pretty well at this point, having lived with them my whole life; it's obvious they have free will. That doesn't make us judge them in moral terms. Morality evolves like everything else in biology, so of course species makes a difference. Humans have human morals; monkeys have monkey morals; dogs have dog morals; cats have no morals.Again:
''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes (and perhaps a dash of true chance). Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.''
I.e., the author is claiming he owns the word "free". Also the word "could", the word "fixed", and the word "unchangeable". (Also he's committing an ordinary non sequitur in statement 2: just because an action isn't determined doesn't mean we can't intentionally change the odds.)Quote:
If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will
This should be a clean version:
Marvin,
I think we mostly agree here, though perhaps are using slightly different terminology.
I am skeptical of the idea of causal necessity. This is also called physical or nomological necessity, and I don’t believe it exists. Necessity pertains entirely to logic, I think. It is necessarily true that triangles have three sides. It is necessarily true that bachelors are unmarried. It is necessarily true that two plus two equals four, and so on. It is not necessarily true that I will have breakfast tomorrow, even if God foreknows I will or if there is a true prior proposition that I will.
Except for the “universal causal/necessity” part, I agree with you on this:
Most of the time, when we use the term "inevitable", it means that matters are out of our control, and that there is nothing we can do about it. But in the context of universal causal necessity/inevitability, the inevitability incorporates our control within the overall scheme of causation.
For example, there is a hypothesis, due to Minkowski/Einstein but mostly Minkowski, that we live in a block universe in the sense that the past, present and future all exist. If this is true, it would render the future as unchangeable as the past.
But does mean we lack relevant free will? I don’t think so. We don’t complain that we lack free will because the past is fixed. If the future if fixed, why should it be any different?
If past, present and future are indeed fixed, it means, when it comes to us, that they were, are, and will be, fixed by our actions. It may indeed be the case that no one can change the past, present or future. But I would suggest that changing past, present, or future, is not a prerequisite for relevant free will. Rather, our free acts made the past be what it was, make the present be what it is, and will make the future be, what it will be.
There does not seem to be a preview post function here?
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will
Ah, I see, Mystery Meat navigation! (This is what a prominent designer once used to describe employing enigmatic icons on the web to describe simple functions. My suggestion would be to just have words saying, “Preview Post.”This should be a clean version:
Marvin,
I think we mostly agree here, though perhaps are using slightly different terminology.
I am skeptical of the idea of causal necessity. This is also called physical or nomological necessity, and I don’t believe it exists. Necessity pertains entirely to logic, I think. It is necessarily true that triangles have three sides. It is necessarily true that bachelors are unmarried. It is necessarily true that two plus two equals four, and so on. It is not necessarily true that I will have breakfast tomorrow, even if God foreknows I will or if there is a true prior proposition that I will.
Except for the “universal causal/necessity” part, I agree with you on this:
Most of the time, when we use the term "inevitable", it means that matters are out of our control, and that there is nothing we can do about it. But in the context of universal causal necessity/inevitability, the inevitability incorporates our control within the overall scheme of causation.
For example, there is a hypothesis, due to Minkowski/Einstein but mostly Minkowski, that we live in a block universe in the sense that the past, present and future all exist. If this is true, it would render the future as unchangeable as the past.
But does mean we lack relevant free will? I don’t think so. We don’t complain that we lack free will because the past is fixed. If the future if fixed, why should it be any different?
If past, present and future are indeed fixed, it means, when it comes to us, that they were, are, and will be, fixed by our actions. It may indeed be the case that no one can change the past, present or future. But I would suggest that changing past, present, or future, is not a prerequisite for relevant free will. Rather, our free acts made the past be what it was, make the present be what it is, and will make the future be, what it will be.
There does not seem to be a preview post function here?
The Preview button is in the upper right corner. The icon looks like a piece of paper with a magnifying glass. It's a toggle, so clicking it again returns to edit mode.
The block universe is a bit of fiction used to depict a deterministic universe. No such block exists in empirical reality. Time is the distance between events. Events are changes in the structure and location of objects. No object can be in different places at the same time, we simply do not have room for that.
No event is fully caused until its final prior causes have played themselves out. The meaningful causes are usually the most direct causes of the event. As we trace the causes of causes back through the chain, each cause becomes less meaningful and less relevant, and more incidental.
So, nothing in the future is already fixed. Causal necessity only means that future events will be necessitated by prior events. And that seems to be the case when we look around us at what is happening and the most recent history of the prior events leading up to the current events. In fact, we may view history as the proof of causal necessity.
The necessity you were describing is called "logical necessity". And just like it is logically necessary that 2 + 2 = 4, it is also logically necessary that every choosing operation begins with at least two real possibilities, two things that we can choose to do. For example, when choosing between A and B, it is logically necessary that "I can choose A" must be true and equally necessary that "I can choose B" is also true. If either is false, then choosing halts, because it is impossible to choose between a single possibility.
So, "I can choose A" and "I can choose B" must both be true statements, by logical necessity. And, at the end of our choosing operation, this guarantees that we end up with one "I will choose X" (A or B) and one "I could have chosen Y" (B or A).
The ability to do otherwise comes built-in, free of charge, with the choosing operation.
If I shift my weight to my left leg, and lift my right leg, then I will necessarily take one step. This is not a logical necessity, but a physical necessity. If I choose to walk to the kitchen, then I will necessarily walk to the kitchen. That is neither a logical nor a physical necessity, but rather a rational necessity, brought about by my reasoned choice to go there.
No. I don’t even know what you are on about. On an up note, the guy who was a bit in the bag and whose favorite color is blue bought one of my blue artworks for 300 bucks, so that is cool.Yeah, details.. care to start over?
I take it by "has been demonstrated" and "have been given", you're referring to some incident where you blerk-will debaters, after borrowing a word from the broader community and redefining it under the baleful influence of a theistic religion and using it to commit equivocation fallacies, and after some in the broader community took back our word and used it correctly, told us you own the word now.
No. Considering neuroscience, numerous experiments, case studies, lesions, memory loss, etc, it's clear that will is not means by which the brain acquires and processes information and generates response....
That's ridiculous. I considered whether to click your link, and then, by act of will, I clicked it -- and that's how I acquired the information that it's a dead link. "404 Not Found The resource requested could not be found on this server!". Of course will is means by which the brain acquires and processes information and generates response.
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will
- Does it? Or does it merely require that she would have acted otherwise, given different antecedent circumstances? There is a difference between “would” and “could.
- I believe this is a non sequitur. I would say, rather, that free will depends upon determinism. To me, determinism just means that there are regularities in the world that are described, but not prescribed, by the so-called laws of nature. For sentient creatures to exist at all there must be regularities so that we can reliably predict the outcomes of our free acts. A world of unpredictable chaos would probably not have life at all, at least not life as we know it, to borrow from Mr. Spock.
Yes, that is the role of will. But unfortunately for those who argue for free will, will itself doesn't run the show. The role that will plays is the prompt, the will to act.
That doesn't make our will free. It's just another cognitive function.
Nothing special in the scheme of things.
The brain chooses what it will do. The chosen intent then motivates and directs the body as it carries out that will.
The "free" part of free will simply means that, during the choosing of the will, we were not coerced or unduly influenced.
Yes, that is the role of will. But unfortunately for those who argue for free will, will itself doesn't run the show. The role that will plays is the prompt, the will to act.
That doesn't make our will free. It's just another cognitive function.
Nothing special in the scheme of things.
The brain chooses what it will do. The chosen intent then motivates and directs the body as it carries out that will.
The "free" part of free will simply means that, during the choosing of the will, we were not coerced or unduly influenced.
The brain acquires and processes information, 'selecting' the only possible action from a set of options in any given moment in time.
The unconscious action of response being determined by information conditions, inputs, architecture, chemical balance, etc, in that moment in time, is not an act of will, certainly not 'free will.'
Having nothing to do with will, be it conscious or not, it is incorrect to label the action of a brain processing information for a determined result, 'free will'
The illusionary nature of cognition;
Quote:
we presented evidence that the brain, when tricked by optical and sensory illusions, can quickly adopt another human form as its own, no matter how different it is. We designed two experiments. In the first one, the researchers fitted the head of a mannequin with two cameras connected to two small screens placed in front of the volunteer's eyes, so that the volunteer could see what the mannequin ''saw.''
When the mannequin's camera eyes and the volunteer's head, complete with the camera goggles, were directed downwards, the volunteer saw the dummy's body where he or she would normally have seen his or her own body. By simultaneously touching the stomachs of both the volunteer and the mannequin, we could create the illusion of body swapping.
I take it by "has been demonstrated" and "have been given", you're referring to some incident where you blerk-will debaters, after borrowing a word from the broader community and redefining it under the baleful influence of a theistic religion and using it to commit equivocation fallacies, and after some in the broader community took back our word and used it correctly, told us you own the word now.
No. Considering neuroscience, numerous experiments, case studies, lesions, memory loss, etc, it's clear that will is not means by which the brain acquires and processes information and generates response....
That's ridiculous. I considered whether to click your link, and then, by act of will, I clicked it -- and that's how I acquired the information that it's a dead link. "404 Not Found The resource requested could not be found on this server!". Of course will is means by which the brain acquires and processes information and generates response.
What is ridiculous is that you are simply labeling your ability to respond ''free will.'' The ability to respond is enabled by neural networks processing information, not ''will'' - especially not ''free will'' for the given reasons.
How Can There Be Voluntary Movement Without Free Will?
''Humans do not appear to be purely reflexive organisms, simple automatons. A vast array of different movements are generated in a variety of settings. Is there an alternative to free will? Movement, in the final analysis, comes only from muscle contraction. Muscle contraction is under the complete control of the alpha motoneurons in the spinal cord.
When the alpha motoneurons are active, there will be movement. Activity of the alpha motoneurons is a product of the different synaptic events on their dendrites and cell bodies. There is a complex summation of EPSPs and IPSPs, and when the threshold for an action potential is crossed, the cell fires.
There are a large number of important inputs, and one of the most important is from the corticospinal tract which conveys a large part of the cortical control. Such a situation likely holds also for the motor cortex and the cells of origin of the corticospinal tract. Their firing depends on their synaptic inputs. And, a similar situation must hold for all the principal regions giving input to the motor cortex.
For any cortical region, its activity will depend on its synaptic inputs. Some motor cortical inputs come via only a few synapses from sensory cortices, and such influences on motor output are clear. Some inputs will come from regions, such as the limbic areas, many synapses away from both primary sensory and motor cortices. At any one time, the activity of the motor cortex, and its commands to the spinal cord, will reflect virtually all the activity in the entire brain. Is it necessary that there be anything else? This can be a complete description of the process of movement selection, and even if there is something more -- like free will -- it would have to operate through such neuronal mechanisms.
The view that there is no such thing as free will as an inner causal agent has been advocated by a number of philosophers, scientistsand neurologists including Ryle, Adrian, Skinner and Fisher
A. adj.
I. Characterized by free will or choice; freely done or bestowed.
In most ordinary dictionaries, free will has two distinct definitions. One can be called the operational definition, and it is used when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions. It can be derived from the legal precedents in use as "a choice free of coercion and other forms of undue influence". The other is called the philosophical definition, and it is used to...well, it is only used to generate endless debate. It can be summarized as "a choice free of causal necessity".1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will
- Does it? Or does it merely require that she would have acted otherwise, given different antecedent circumstances? There is a difference between “would” and “could.
Different antecedent circumstances produce different outcomes, that is the point.
That how things unfold within a determined system is fixed as a matter of natural law.
Will, itself an inseparable part of the weave of determinism, cannot alter outcomes.
- I believe this is a non sequitur. I would say, rather, that free will depends upon determinism. To me, determinism just means that there are regularities in the world that are described, but not prescribed, by the so-called laws of nature. For sentient creatures to exist at all there must be regularities so that we can reliably predict the outcomes of our free acts. A world of unpredictable chaos would probably not have life at all, at least not life as we know it, to borrow from Mr. Spock.
Free will is a label being pasted upon one aspect of events that are fixed as a matter of natural law. Events unfold as they are determined. That we act without without being forced by someone doesn't mean we aren't being pressured, shaped and formed and swept along by the events of the world.
The feeling of being a 'free agent' doesn't take into account all of the elements that make us who we are, but have no control over....which is the illusion of conscious or 'free' will. We have will, which is not free will.
How do you figure I'm simply "labeling" something "free will"? Please point out where you are quoting from in your quotation of my words. Are you now claiming you own the word "will" too, and redefining it as a synonym for "free will"? Are you claiming there's no such thing as an act of will? Just how much of the English language are you planning to torpedo?
No. Considering neuroscience, numerous experiments, case studies, lesions, memory loss, etc, it's clear that will is not means by which the brain acquires and processes information and generates response....
That's ridiculous. I considered whether to click your link, and then, by act of will, I clicked it -- and that's how I acquired the information that it's a dead link. "404 Not Found The resource requested could not be found on this server!". Of course will is means by which the brain acquires and processes information and generates response.
What is ridiculous is that you are simply labeling your ability to respond ''free will.'' The ability to respond is enabled by neural networks processing information, not ''will'' - especially not ''free will'' for the given reasons.
Excellent point. I like to call it the "incredible shrinking dictionary". First there is no free will. Then there's no responsibility. Then there's no self. And I suppose that once self is gone, there's nobody around to use the dictionary anyway.How do you figure I'm simply "labeling" something "free will"? Please point out where you are quoting from in your quotation of my words. Are you now claiming you own the word "will" too, and redefining it as a synonym for "free will"? Are you claiming there's no such thing as an act of will? Just how much of the English language are you planning to torpedo?
No. Considering neuroscience, numerous experiments, case studies, lesions, memory loss, etc, it's clear that will is not means by which the brain acquires and processes information and generates response....
That's ridiculous. I considered whether to click your link, and then, by act of will, I clicked it -- and that's how I acquired the information that it's a dead link. "404 Not Found The resource requested could not be found on this server!". Of course will is means by which the brain acquires and processes information and generates response.
What is ridiculous is that you are simply labeling your ability to respond ''free will.'' The ability to respond is enabled by neural networks processing information, not ''will'' - especially not ''free will'' for the given reasons.
Why would physics be unable to describe uncaused events? When a photon hits glass it has a 4% chance of being reflected and a 96% chance of passing through. And when you say something can't happen because it's "irrational", you're philosophizing, not doing physics, rather like when astronomers tried to disprove Kepler by calling ellipses imperfect. "Irrational" is a property of decisions, not events.On the other hand, physics is also a fact of human psychology. And it presumes a reliable cause in everything it describes. It has no facility for describing uncaused events, as they would be irrational.
"Turnaround". That is rather the point. It's an "equal and opposite reaction" to a horizontal force from the pencil itself: a force that as far as we can tell is completely random.... of staying up longer than about five seconds, even if no external horizontal forces act on it other than the table's reaction to the horizontal component of the force exerted by the pencil on the table due to compression of the pencil along its axis due to the earth's gravitational attraction of the pencil and the table's electrical repulsion of the pencil, because the pencil's finite momentum guarantees it has nonzero uncertainty in the positions of its upper and lower ends, which in turn guarantees that the horizontal component of the compression vector along its length cannot be exactly zero.![]()
Well, that was a quick turnabout from "even if no external horizontal forces act on it" to "other than" a list of forces acting upon it.
Not according to QM. Uncertainty in QM is not a matter of missing knowledge; there is simply no fact of the matter to be known or unknown. The uncertainty in the position times the uncertainty in the momentum is never less than Planck's Constant. So whenever the uncertainty in the momentum is less than infinity, the pencil does not have a position more precise than a certain positive distance.And, of course, "the pencil's finite momentum guarantees it has nonzero uncertainty" reminds us that uncertainty is a matter of missing knowledge, and not a matter of unreliable causation.
Which is pretty much what determinists sound like when they talk about quantum mechanics. It's Cause of the Gaps.This goes beyond not discovering a cause. We haven't even been able to come up with a fantasy guess at any hypothetical something that could possibly cause it if that something were real -- never mind whether we can discover evidence for that something actually existing and actually causing quantum events.
Well, there is always the "God of the gaps".
Well, it would have been, if "Goddidit" were a differential equation that allowed us to predict what we'd see in an experiment.He just says, "My GPS would still work, same as always. Time slowing down is just an illusion due to our movement in the Lorentz Ether." And then he can run the numbers and show the LET calculations and prove his GPS still works.
Oh. So the Lorentz Ether was the "God of the gaps". Cool.
Exactly. But what we observe to happen reliably is not an event -- it's a statistical correlation between two or more events. If X happens on this side of the lab then there's an elevated probability of Y happening on that side of the lab. So the statement of probabilities qualifies as a common law of physics. But X and Y individually are unreliable.I.e., the force of the earth on the moon is propagated from the one to the other -- it's mediated by physical events we can describe and quantify taking place at every point between the two.
So, if we had an explanation like that for quantum entanglement then physicists would no longer find it spooky. Actually, an explanation as to why it happens is unnecessary. It is sufficient that it reliably happens in order for it to qualify as a common law of physics.
It looks like you're using "reliable" in two different senses. For philosophizing about determinism, you use it to mean "metaphysical certainty". But for testing your hypothesis, you're using it to mean "able to be relied on". But we rely on uncertain things all the time. If there's a 99.99% chance that our foot will hold our weight, that's plenty good enough to rely on being able to walk to the kitchen and back. And people do that -- we rely on it -- even though sometimes we fall down. Whether the 0.01% chance of falling results from true randomness or merely chaotic cause and effect makes no difference to our ability to rely on our feet.The theory of predictability is that every effect is reliably caused. It's that ordinary notion of reliable "cause and effect".That's not a theory. For it to be a theory you'd have to be able to get a testable prediction out of it.
But reliable cause and effect is very testable. We all test it every day and in everything we do. We move one foot forward and shift our weight and walk to the kitchen and back. That's reliable causation in every step.
It is the opposing theory, that some events are uncaused, that has yet to be demonstrated with experimental evidence.
Nope. But I've made a lot of choices since then, choices that would not have been made without me. From the moment we're born, we become active participants in our environment. We change the environment and the environment changes us. Consider the parents awakened at 2AM by their newborn's cries for food. From the beginning of us, we are negotiating for control with our physical (the crib) and social (the parents) environments.did you choose to be born?
and proto life?Nope. But I've made a lot of choices since then, choices that would not have been made without me. From the moment we're born, we become active participants in our environment. We change the environment and the environment changes us. Consider the parents awakened at 2AM by their newborn's cries for food. From the beginning of us, we are negotiating for control with our physical (the crib) and social (the parents) environments.did you choose to be born?
and proto life?Nope. But I've made a lot of choices since then, choices that would not have been made without me. From the moment we're born, we become active participants in our environment. We change the environment and the environment changes us. Consider the parents awakened at 2AM by their newborn's cries for food. From the beginning of us, we are negotiating for control with our physical (the crib) and social (the parents) environments.did you choose to be born?
Why would physics be unable to describe uncaused events? When a photon hits glass it has a 4% chance of being reflected and a 96% chance of passing through. And when you say something can't happen because it's "irrational", you're philosophizing, not doing physics, rather like when astronomers tried to disprove Kepler by calling ellipses imperfect. "Irrational" is a property of decisions, not events.On the other hand, physics is also a fact of human psychology. And it presumes a reliable cause in everything it describes. It has no facility for describing uncaused events, as they would be irrational.
Exactly. But what we observe to happen reliably is not an event -- it's a statistical correlation between two or more events. If X happens on this side of the lab then there's an elevated probability of Y happening on that side of the lab. So the statement of probabilities qualifies as a common law of physics. But X and Y individually are unreliable.So, if we had an explanation like that for quantum entanglement then physicists would no longer find it spooky. Actually, an explanation as to why it happens is unnecessary. It is sufficient that it reliably happens in order for it to qualify as a common law of physics.
This poses a big problem to anybody trying to come up with a deterministic model of the phenomenon. If we assume there's some prior event W that's a cause of X, then W becomes a potential point for intervention by the experimenter. If she can do something to make W happen or not happen, that will change the odds of X happening. But there's a reliable correlation between X and Y, so changing the odds of X will change the odds of Y. And when the odds of Y happening are changed, that will be observable on that side of the lab, simply by measuring the frequency of Y. So an observer on that side of the lab can tell whether the experimenter on this side of the lab is making W happen. I.e., if there's some prior event W that's a cause of X, then it seems this will make it possible to send a message from this side of the lab to that side of the lab, faster than the speed of light. But according to Relativity, you can't send a message any faster than light. This is why it's so difficult mathematically to reconcile Relativity and Quantum Mechanics and Determinism. "Pick any two."
... For philosophizing about determinism, you use it to mean "metaphysical certainty". But for testing your hypothesis, you're using it to mean "able to be relied on". But we rely on uncertain things all the time. If there's a 99.99% chance that our foot will hold our weight, that's plenty good enough to rely on being able to walk to the kitchen and back. And people do that -- we rely on it -- even though sometimes we fall down. Whether the 0.01% chance of falling results from true randomness or merely chaotic cause and effect makes no difference to our ability to rely on our feet.
In most ordinary dictionaries, free will has two distinct definitions. One can be called the operational definition, and it is used when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions. It can be derived from the legal precedents in use as "a choice free of coercion and other forms of undue influence". The other is called the philosophical definition, and it is used to...well, it is only used to generate endless debate. It can be summarized as "a choice free of causal necessity".1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will
- Does it? Or does it merely require that she would have acted otherwise, given different antecedent circumstances? There is a difference between “would” and “could.
Different antecedent circumstances produce different outcomes, that is the point.
That how things unfold within a determined system is fixed as a matter of natural law.
Will, itself an inseparable part of the weave of determinism, cannot alter outcomes.
- I believe this is a non sequitur. I would say, rather, that free will depends upon determinism. To me, determinism just means that there are regularities in the world that are described, but not prescribed, by the so-called laws of nature. For sentient creatures to exist at all there must be regularities so that we can reliably predict the outcomes of our free acts. A world of unpredictable chaos would probably not have life at all, at least not life as we know it, to borrow from Mr. Spock.
Free will is a label being pasted upon one aspect of events that are fixed as a matter of natural law. Events unfold as they are determined. That we act without without being forced by someone doesn't mean we aren't being pressured, shaped and formed and swept along by the events of the world.
The feeling of being a 'free agent' doesn't take into account all of the elements that make us who we are, but have no control over....which is the illusion of conscious or 'free' will. We have will, which is not free will.
Free Will
Merriam-Webster on-line:
1: voluntary choice or decision 'I do this of my own free will'
2: freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention
Short Oxford English Dictionary:
1 Spontaneous will, inclination to act without suggestion from others.
2 The power of directing one's own actions unconstrained by necessity or fate.
Wiktionary:
1. A person's natural inclination; unforced choice.
2. (philosophy) The ability to choose one's actions, or determine what reasons are acceptable motivation for actions, without predestination, fate etc.
How do you figure I'm simply "labeling" something "free will"? Please point out where you are quoting from in your quotation of my words. Are you now claiming you own the word "will" too, and redefining it as a synonym for "free will"? Are you claiming there's no such thing as an act of will? Just how much of the English language are you planning to torpedo?
No. Considering neuroscience, numerous experiments, case studies, lesions, memory loss, etc, it's clear that will is not means by which the brain acquires and processes information and generates response....
That's ridiculous. I considered whether to click your link, and then, by act of will, I clicked it -- and that's how I acquired the information that it's a dead link. "404 Not Found The resource requested could not be found on this server!". Of course will is means by which the brain acquires and processes information and generates response.
What is ridiculous is that you are simply labeling your ability to respond ''free will.'' The ability to respond is enabled by neural networks processing information, not ''will'' - especially not ''free will'' for the given reasons.
Yes, that is the role of will. But unfortunately for those who argue for free will, will itself doesn't run the show. The role that will plays is the prompt, the will to act.
That doesn't make our will free. It's just another cognitive function.
Nothing special in the scheme of things.
The brain chooses what it will do. The chosen intent then motivates and directs the body as it carries out that will.
The "free" part of free will simply means that, during the choosing of the will, we were not coerced or unduly influenced.
The brain acquires and processes information, 'selecting' the only possible action from a set of options in any given moment in time.
The unconscious action of response being determined by information conditions, inputs, architecture, chemical balance, etc, in that moment in time, is not an act of will, certainly not 'free will.'
Having nothing to do with will, be it conscious or not, it is incorrect to label the action of a brain processing information for a determined result, 'free will'
The illusionary nature of cognition;
Quote:
we presented evidence that the brain, when tricked by optical and sensory illusions, can quickly adopt another human form as its own, no matter how different it is. We designed two experiments. In the first one, the researchers fitted the head of a mannequin with two cameras connected to two small screens placed in front of the volunteer's eyes, so that the volunteer could see what the mannequin ''saw.''
When the mannequin's camera eyes and the volunteer's head, complete with the camera goggles, were directed downwards, the volunteer saw the dummy's body where he or she would normally have seen his or her own body. By simultaneously touching the stomachs of both the volunteer and the mannequin, we could create the illusion of body swapping.
In the experiment, the only point where choosing happens is before the experiment begins, when the subject chooses to participate. Assuming the subject volunteered, and was not coerced or unduly influenced to participate, that choice was of their own free will (that is, they chose for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence).
Your quoted experiment is an example of an induced illusion, in which "the brain, when tricked by optical and sensory illusions" reaches some odd conclusions. This is similar to the Phantom Limb effect.
The brain organizes sensory data into a model of reality. When the model is accurate enough to be useful, as when we navigate our body through a doorway, then this is called "reality", because the model is our only access to reality. But when the model is inaccurate enough to cause problems, as when we walk into a glass door, thinking it was open. Then that is called an "illusion".
To say that cognition is always an illusion, suggests that the brain is unable to produce an accurate model of reality. If that were the case, then we'd be unable to walk through a doorway, because we would be unable to perceive ourselves as ourselves, and to perceive the doorway as a doorway. So, the correct thing to say is that cognition is always a model, not that it is always an illusion.
It's not exactly a matter of 'choosing.'
Within a determined system, all actions are fixed as a matter of natural law. If determinism is true, the brain follows its determined path to whatever end with no possibility of divergence. The brain necessarily produces a determined outcome.
(1) P(A.B) > P(A).P(B)
(2) P(A.B|C) = P(A|C).P(B|C)
1- If determinism allows multiple options to be realized by an agent, as a matter of choice, why call it determinism?
2- If freedom does not require the possibility of realizable options, that the world proceeds along a determined, singular, course of events, why call it freedom?
3- If 'freedom' does not require a means for the selection an option from set of realizable alternatives, what is freedom?
4 - Without regulative control or realizable options, why call it free will?
''The argument is exceedingly familiar, and runs as follows. Either determinism is true or it is not. If it is true, then all our chosen actions are uniquely necessitated by prior states of the world, just like every other event. But then it cannot be the case that we could have acted otherwise, since this would require a possibility determinism rules out. Once the initial conditions are set and the laws fixed, causality excludes genuine freedom.'' - Colin McGinn is an Anglo-American Analytic (AAA) philosopher who presented the standard argument against free will.
Within a determined system, all actions are fixed as a matter of natural law.
"If determinism is true, the brain follows its determined path to whatever end with no possibility of divergence."
"The brain necessarily produces a determined outcome."
(1) P(A.B) > P(A).P(B)
(2) P(A.B|C) = P(A|C).P(B|C)
1- If determinism allows multiple options to be realized by an agent, as a matter of choice, why call it determinism?
2- If freedom does not require the possibility of realizable options, that the world proceeds along a determined, singular, course of events, why call it freedom?
3- If 'freedom' does not require a means for the selection an option from set of realizable alternatives, what is freedom?
"4 - Without regulative control or realizable options, why call it free will?"
''The argument is exceedingly familiar, and runs as follows. Either determinism is true or it is not. If it is true, then all our chosen actions are uniquely necessitated by prior states of the world, just like every other event. But then it cannot be the case that we could have acted otherwise, since this would require a possibility determinism rules out. Once the initial conditions are set and the laws fixed, causality excludes genuine freedom.'' - Colin McGinn is an Anglo-American Analytic (AAA) philosopher who presented the standard argument against free will.
Either determinism is true or it is not
If it is true, then all our chosen actions are uniquely necessitated by prior states of the world, just like every other event.
But then it cannot be the case that we could have acted otherwise, since this would require a possibility determinism rules out.
Once the initial conditions are set and the laws fixed, causality excludes genuine freedom.
Why would physics be unable to describe uncaused events? When a photon hits glass it has a 4% chance of being reflected and a 96% chance of passing through. And when you say something can't happen because it's "irrational", you're philosophizing, not doing physics, rather like when astronomers tried to disprove Kepler by calling ellipses imperfect. "Irrational" is a property of decisions, not events.
That theory is actually a lot older than quantum mechanics and doesn't depend on the debate between determinism and randomness...I think your example of the light reflection is not an uncaused event:
When the light is reflected there is a cause. It has encountered atoms that reflect the light.
When the light is not reflected there is also a cause. It has missed those atoms that would reflect it.
How do you figure I'm simply "labeling" something "free will"? Please point out where you are quoting from in your quotation of my words. Are you now claiming you own the word "will" too, and redefining it as a synonym for "free will"? Are you claiming there's no such thing as an act of will? Just how much of the English language are you planning to torpedo?
No. Considering neuroscience, numerous experiments, case studies, lesions, memory loss, etc, it's clear that will is not means by which the brain acquires and processes information and generates response....
That's ridiculous. I considered whether to click your link, and then, by act of will, I clicked it -- and that's how I acquired the information that it's a dead link. "404 Not Found The resource requested could not be found on this server!". Of course will is means by which the brain acquires and processes information and generates response.
What is ridiculous is that you are simply labeling your ability to respond ''free will.'' The ability to respond is enabled by neural networks processing information, not ''will'' - especially not ''free will'' for the given reasons.
I'm not talking about you personally, what you do or what you believe. I am pointing out the failure of compatibility, that freedom of will is incompatible with determinism for all the given reasons.....which is not my personal argument, but by the terms and conditions of determinism - which is defined as: everything that happens is FIXED as a matter of natural law.
Which means everything that happens is FIXED as determined, allowing no freedom to diverge, to choose or do other than what is determined.
Which everything within a determined system does, planets orbit, plants grow, animals hunt, people go about their business under the illusion that they are in control, that they are able to do otherwise, that their decisions and actions are not determined.
Compatibilism merely asserts freedom of will. ''He was not coerced, he acted freely, he has free will'' - ignoring the underlying drivers of his thoughts, decisions and action, which within a determined system are FIXED as a matter of natural law.
The problem is that we have a meaningful and operational definition of free will, one that is clearly about how we assess a person's moral and legal responsibility for their actions, that requires nothing supernatural, that makes no claim about uncaused events. It just humbly does its job, by distinguishing voluntary, deliberate behavior from accidental, coerced, or unduly influenced behavior.In most ordinary dictionaries, free will has two distinct definitions. One can be called the operational definition, and it is used when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their actions. It can be derived from the legal precedents in use as "a choice free of coercion and other forms of undue influence". The other is called the philosophical definition, and it is used to...well, it is only used to generate endless debate. It can be summarized as "a choice free of causal necessity".1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will
- Does it? Or does it merely require that she would have acted otherwise, given different antecedent circumstances? There is a difference between “would” and “could.
Different antecedent circumstances produce different outcomes, that is the point.
That how things unfold within a determined system is fixed as a matter of natural law.
Will, itself an inseparable part of the weave of determinism, cannot alter outcomes.
- I believe this is a non sequitur. I would say, rather, that free will depends upon determinism. To me, determinism just means that there are regularities in the world that are described, but not prescribed, by the so-called laws of nature. For sentient creatures to exist at all there must be regularities so that we can reliably predict the outcomes of our free acts. A world of unpredictable chaos would probably not have life at all, at least not life as we know it, to borrow from Mr. Spock.
Free will is a label being pasted upon one aspect of events that are fixed as a matter of natural law. Events unfold as they are determined. That we act without without being forced by someone doesn't mean we aren't being pressured, shaped and formed and swept along by the events of the world.
The feeling of being a 'free agent' doesn't take into account all of the elements that make us who we are, but have no control over....which is the illusion of conscious or 'free' will. We have will, which is not free will.
Free Will
Merriam-Webster on-line:
1: voluntary choice or decision 'I do this of my own free will'
2: freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention
Short Oxford English Dictionary:
1 Spontaneous will, inclination to act without suggestion from others.
2 The power of directing one's own actions unconstrained by necessity or fate.
Wiktionary:
1. A person's natural inclination; unforced choice.
2. (philosophy) The ability to choose one's actions, or determine what reasons are acceptable motivation for actions, without predestination, fate etc.
Dictionaries are merely a reflection of word use, how words and terms are commonly used.
If the question of free will could be resolved by pointing to a dictionary, the debate could have been resolved centuries ago.
As it stands, it is the dictionary but neuroscience that informs us on the nature of cognition and decision making.....and that is not looking good for the idea of free will.
If natural laws are both causative and immutable, and we attempt to hold them responsible, instead of ourselves, then how do we go about correcting those laws when they do something criminal, like robbing a bank?How do you figure I'm simply "labeling" something "free will"? Please point out where you are quoting from in your quotation of my words. Are you now claiming you own the word "will" too, and redefining it as a synonym for "free will"? Are you claiming there's no such thing as an act of will? Just how much of the English language are you planning to torpedo?
No. Considering neuroscience, numerous experiments, case studies, lesions, memory loss, etc, it's clear that will is not means by which the brain acquires and processes information and generates response....
That's ridiculous. I considered whether to click your link, and then, by act of will, I clicked it -- and that's how I acquired the information that it's a dead link. "404 Not Found The resource requested could not be found on this server!". Of course will is means by which the brain acquires and processes information and generates response.
What is ridiculous is that you are simply labeling your ability to respond ''free will.'' The ability to respond is enabled by neural networks processing information, not ''will'' - especially not ''free will'' for the given reasons.
I'm not talking about you personally, what you do or what you believe. I am pointing out the failure of compatibility, that freedom of will is incompatible with determinism for all the given reasons.....which is not my personal argument, but by the terms and conditions of determinism - which is defined as: everything that happens is FIXED as a matter of natural law.
Which means everything that happens is FIXED as determined, allowing no freedom to diverge, to choose or do other than what is determined.
Which everything within a determined system does, planets orbit, plants grow, animals hunt, people go about their business under the illusion that they are in control, that they are able to do otherwise, that their decisions and actions are not determined.
Compatibilism merely asserts freedom of will. ''He was not coerced, he acted freely, he has free will'' - ignoring the underlying drivers of his thoughts, decisions and action, which within a determined system are FIXED as a matter of natural law.
Our reflection in a still pond is clear until the surface is disturbed by a tossed pebble and light is reflected out in different directions, rather than in a consistent pattern. The polished glass is like the still pond, after its waves have been settled by polishing.Why would physics be unable to describe uncaused events? When a photon hits glass it has a 4% chance of being reflected and a 96% chance of passing through. And when you say something can't happen because it's "irrational", you're philosophizing, not doing physics, rather like when astronomers tried to disprove Kepler by calling ellipses imperfect. "Irrational" is a property of decisions, not events.
That theory is actually a lot older than quantum mechanics and doesn't depend on the debate between determinism and randomness...I think your example of the light reflection is not an uncaused event:
When the light is reflected there is a cause. It has encountered atoms that reflect the light.
When the light is not reflected there is also a cause. It has missed those atoms that would reflect it.
Lastly, were the rays of Light reflected by impinging on the solid parts of Bodies, their reflexions from polished Bodies could not be so regular as they are. For in polishing Glass with Sand, Putty or Tripoly, it is not to be imagined that those substances can by grating and fretting the Glass bring all its least particles to an accurate polish; so that all their surfaces shall be truly plain or truly spherical, and look all the same way, so as together to compose one even surface. The smaller the particles of those substances are, the smaller will be the scratches by which they continually fret and wear away the Glass until it be polished, but be they never so small they can wear away the Glass no otherwise than by grating and scratching it, and breaking the protuberances, and therefore polish it no otherwise than by bringing its roughness to a very fine Grain, so that the scratches and frettings of the surface become too small to be visible. And therefore if Light were reflected by impinging upon the solid parts of the Glass, it would be scattered as much by the most polished Glass as by the roughest. So then it remains a Problem, how Glass polished by fretting substances can reflect Light so regularly as it does. And this Problem is scarce otherwise to be solved than by saying, that the reflexion of a ray is effected, not by a single point of the reflecting Body, but by some power of the Body which is evenly diffused all over its surface, and by which it acts upon the ray without immediate contact. For that the parts of Bodies do act upon Light at a distance shall be shewn hereafter.- Isaac Newton