Geez, now there are New Compatibilists? Back when I first ran into the issue in the public library, there were no "compatibilists" at all. There was just determinism, and free will, and the imaginary issue between the two, you know, the "versus".
I've explained in detail in this thread what "the ability to do otherwise" is all about. Whether an incompatibilist can actually hear the explanation or confront it with any valid argument remains an open question.
Whether the Behavioral, Cognitive, and Neurosciences are capable of untangling themselves from the philosophical paradoxes that lead otherwise sane and intelligent people to question free will and personal responsibility is up for grabs. The silly paradox of free will "versus" determinism certainly gathers a lot of (undeserved) attention. But I would suggest that the sciences need to avoid that Chinese Finger Trap unless they are capable of escaping this self-induced hoax.
Compatibilism has not changed over time? The compatibilism of Hobbs is the same as Dennett's ''evitability?''
Semi compatibilism with its claim that responsibility is compatible with determinism, Fischer, et al? Reason responsiveness? Regulative control?
Actions are either caused/necessitated or they are free, there is no middle ground. Determinism necessitates all actions, therefore they are not freely chosen actions. Being determined, actions proceed or unfold as determined.
Wanting to do X is fully determined by prior causes. Once the desire to do X is felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.
Sorry, but no. A thief points a gun at you and says, "Stop, hand over your wallet!" Hasn't he constrained you from walking away? Hasn't he prevented you from spending your own money according to your own choices?
Both his actions and yours, are causally necessary from any prior point in time, but the fact the he is constraining you does not disappear. Within a perfectly deterministic system, there are still meaningful constraints, and thus there are still meaningful freedoms
Constraint comes in many forms, both external and internal.
Being free of external constraint, the thief with a gun, doesn't free you from the internal constraint of your own condition and information from the external world acting upon you, shaping your character and molding your thoughts and determining your response.
The absence of one - the thief with a gun - doesn't exclude inner necessitation.
''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''