The argument is that the compatibilist definition of free will is not sufficient to prove the proposition.
The compatibilist proposition is simply that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world.
The
proof is this:
P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.
Distinctions do matter. Of course they do.
Setting the bird free of its cage doesn't establish the bird's freedom of will.
The question is not whether the bird has free will or not. The question is what does "
freedom" mean.
The bird's
cage is a meaningful and relevant constraint upon the bird's freedom to fly away.
To have any meaning at all, a "freedom" must reference, either explicitly or implicitly, some meaningful and relevant constraint. A
meaningful constraint prevents us from doing something that we want to do. A
relevant constraint is something that we can actually be "free from" or "free of".
For example:
1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. We enjoy freedom of speech (free from political censorship).
3. We were offered free samples (free of charge).
4. We participated in Libet's experiment of our own free will (free of coercion and undue influence).
Freedom of speech, etc, doesn't establish freedom of will for the speaker.
Freedom of speech is about speaking our mind without penalty. If we were penalized for criticizing the government, we would not have freedom of speech. Censorship is a meaningful and relevant
constraint upon freedom of speech.
The ball bounces freely down the hillside.
And what would be some meaningful and relevant
constraints to the ball's freely bouncing down the hillside? A wall. A boulder. A fallen tree. When you say that "the ball bounces freely down the hillside" you are saying that there were no constraints preventing it from doing so.
In the same fashion "free will", a freely chosen will, implies there were no meaningful or relevant constraints preventing the person from deciding for themselves what they would do.
The bird dives and swoops freely through the air.... these are all actions that follow action production.
Again, the bird swooping freely through the air implies that there were no meaningful or relevant constraints preventing her from doing so (like a hawk, or a glass window pane, or a cage).
It is the nature of action production that is specific to the issue of freedom of will because it is specifically the means of action production that determines what action is action taken in a given instance in time.
Correct. In the case of free will, the question is whether the action was produced by the person's own deliberate choice, or, whether the person was coerced or unduly influenced to do something that they would not otherwise do.
The use of free in relation to action says nothing about the means, state or status of the activator of actions.
The use of "free" in relation to an action implies the lack of any meaningful or relevant constraints preventing the action. For example, a freely chosen will implies the absence of coercion and other forms of undue influence, such that the person was free to decide for themselves what they would do.
I argue that the term free will is redundant. The term 'free will' tells us us nothing about human behaviour, means or drivers. That we have will, but it's not free will.
Free will tells us that the person's behavior was caused by their own deliberate choice, and that they were not forced to act that way by someone or something else. This information is critical when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their behavior.
It seems to me that the term 'free will' has become somewhat of an ideology, an aspiration.
Nope. It's just a simple empirical distinction between the causes of a person's actions. Was the action deliberate, or was it coerced, or was it insane, or was it accidental, etc. It's a simple but important distinction.
To me, it just doesn't apply. Acting according to one's will is inevitable. We are evolved to act, and unless something prevents us from acting, we necessarily act according to our will.
Well, everything is always inevitable, so inevitability doesn't tell us anything useful. However, whether the person acted deliberately or whether they had a gun to their head, is critical information.
Our choices are determined by mechanisms and processes not of our choosing, they are necessitated choices.
All events are equally causally necessitated. So, that's not useful information. But whether someone made the choice themselves, or, the choice was imposed upon them against their will, is meaningful and relevant information.
Freedom is defined as 'freedom from necessity.'
But freedom is never defined as freedom from "causal necessity", because there ain't no such thing. All events are reliably caused by prior events, without exception, and without distinction. This includes all of our mental events.
Causal necessity is a different subject from practical necessity. Practical necessity is when we must do something whether we want to or not. Causal necessity incorporates all causes, including our wants and desires, within the total scheme of causation.
We don't choose our condition, yet our condition forms our being, our mind, character, thoughts and actions.
It is not necessary to cause ourselves in order for us to be the meaningful and relevant causes of other things. And if we are the meaningful and relevant cause of robbing a bank, then we will be held responsible, even though we have a history of prior causes stretching back to the Big Bang. No one is going to try to arrest the Big Bang.
Evolutionary Psychology;
''In other words, the reason we have one set of circuits rather than another is that the circuits that we have were better at solving problems that our ancestors faced during our species' evolutionary history than alternative circuits were. The brain is a naturally constructed computational system whose function is to solve adaptive information-processing problems (such as face recognition, threat interpretation, language acquisition, or navigation). Over evolutionary time, its circuits were cumulatively added because they "reasoned" or "processed information" in a way that enhanced the adaptive regulation of behavior and physiology.
Realizing that the function of the brain is information-processing has allowed cognitive scientists to resolve (at least one version of) the mind/body problem.
For cognitive scientists, brain and mind are terms that refer to the same system, which can be described in two complementary ways -- either in terms of its physical properties (the brain), or in terms of its information-processing operation (the mind). The physical organization of the brain evolved because that physical organization brought about certain information-processing relationships -- ones that were adaptive.
It is important to realize that our circuits weren't designed to solve just any old kind of problem. They were designed to solve adaptive problems''
Please note the portion I highlighted. There is no either/or between the brain and the mind. It is the same system whether we are speaking of mental operations, like reasoning, evaluating, and
choosing or brain neural functions.
One of the interesting functions of the brain/mind, is the ability to symbolically communicate ideas through language. Note that there are no neural connections between the authors' brains and our own. Yet the words on the page physically alter our neural connections such that we understand what they are saying.
Well, we actually do have some say in our condition. A person may choose to drop out of high school. That choice will change his future condition and thus impact other choices he makes down the road. We have each been active participants in all of the events that have affected us over the years. All of these choices, just like all other events, were causally necessary, of course. But this does not change the fact that we did in fact do the choosing. Nor does it prevent us from learning from our experience to make better decisions in the future.
Our inherent condition began long, long before we decide to drop out of high school. We don't get to choose our parents, genetic makeup, nation, state, society, culture, social conditions, economic status, physical or mental capacities, all of which make us what we are, how we think and in relation to our immediate circumstances, what we think.
That, after all, is the nature of determinism.
Yes, and it was that same determinism that assured it would be that individual, personally, and no other object in the universe, that would choose to drop our of school.
Determinism does not change anything. Determinism itself never determines anything. It has no regulatory control. To believe that it is a causal agent that removes our freedom, our control, or our responsibility, is an illusion.