Does religion make people more moral?

[ruby sparks]

I'm not sure what part isn't clear. Atheism involves the absence of what I might call the 'comfort blanket' of certain religious beliefs and practices. As such, I would not be surprised if it were correlated with a slight increase in nihilism. For example, I note that most if not all of the existential nihilists were/are atheists.

While it may be true that atheism leads to an increase in nihilism, the real question is whether that actually matters at all?

Yes, or maybe better to ask, 'what are the outcomes'? Or even, 'is there anything 'wrong' with nihilism'?

Personally, I think it can 'matter' to the individual, in terms of his or her experience of their life. Subjective mattering if you like.

As to how it might affect wider human society and/or the rest of the world, I reckon it would have some effect. I think we could discuss whether it was a 'good' (by which I mean benign or useful) effect or not. My guess is 'probably a mix'. And even then, we'd have to ask what 'useful' means. My preferred meaning for that would have to do with increasing happiness and/or satisfaction and the reduction of harm and pain. Mostly my own of course, and secondarily of those near and dear to me (because their happiness affects mine), and then of human society in general, since I live in it and as such its characteristics will affect me. I might also consider the 'usefulness' to other lifeforms too, in the final analysis, since again, their thriving/happiness/satisfaction might affect me in some way. I wouldn't even exclude non-living things, since I might have many good reasons to care about the weather, or the climate, but only in the sense that it all comes back to me or those I care about (which is still, ultimately, about me).

Or, we could take the word 'matters' in absolute terms and say that nothing really matters, ultimately.

But this is all slightly away from the OP, which is about morality. So steering back in that direction, we could see from the above that applying the so-called Silver or Golden Rules, for example, would still be warranted whether one is religious or not.

 

[Tom Sawyer]

Your post is the exact opposite of nihilism.

 

[ruby sparks]

Well, recently, I've learned to instead say that it is nihilistic, it's just that it isn't. Ask bilby.

 

[Vork]

I'm not religious and primarily because of that fact I find myself less likely to be nihilistic, which I would equate with being less moral.

There we go, Vork, a claim that atheism reduces nihilism. It's time for you to put up. Show us why we should believe your claim that atheism makes nihilism more likely.

Firstly, I'm not claiming all atheists will spiral into despair over the threat of moral nihilism. Perhaps the average atheist doesn't worry about it at all, and just gets on pretty much the same as anyone else.

That's a distinct issue from whether the naturalistic worldview is not such a good basis for morality *in theory*.

Of course it's plausible that worldviews will have some real-world impact here; but exactly how much impact is an empirical question. If perhaps the average atheist is more moral than the average theist, it doesn't strictly settle the worldview question of which position is better as a basis for morality. Maybe there are other factors that could explain that result, and worldview just wasn't having much real-world impact by comparison.

So...

(1) Ultimate reality for atheists has no purpose, and no moral purpose of course. It just happens to have thrown out humans with moral concerns, but those moral concerns have been generated by a completely non-moral process. When you start thinking about that greater context, under a naturalistic worldview, it will not connect with human moral concerns, but will rather (I would argue) be an alienating and mechanistic force that has just thrown up some human froth on the surface.

Also, (2) it's not uncommon for naturalists to deny free will, and a materialist view of the world does seem to create that problem (naturalists don't always have to be strict materialists) and that will then result in probably a denial of any strong moral responsibility. So of course people could still be held responsible in courts of law (or you would have chaos) but people aren't really responsible in the sense that you would really blame them. It's all just blind mechanism when it comes down to it. Even the worst criminals are really spotless and without sin. There is still a difference between good people and bad people, in the ordinary sense of behaviour. But there are no truly good people, or truly bad people, that we should praise or blame. Or if we do praise or blame, it's just a game to influence behaviour, or perhaps an illusion of folk thinking.

 

[Vork]

Things like point 1 above, or the lack of any ultimate accountability under naturalism, (so bad people may often enough benefit from being bad), I take to be solid facts in difference between the worldviews.

Point 2 about free will and moral responsibility, is a lot murkier. You can't strictly prove that naturalism is incompatible with a strong type of free will and strong type of moral responsibility. I think you can say it looks pretty doubtful. Even say, if a naturalist supported a mind/body dualism position, what they need is for material things to produce a fundamentally different thing in consciousness but that's not enough by itself for freedom. The consciousness generated can't just be a subordinate output; but rather it has to start controlling the very thing that produces it.

What atheists are likely to say is "Yeah we don't have free will but the whole idea is just flat out contradictory anyway regardless of your beliefs about mind/body dualism or the existence of God".

Or they will appeal to a Dennett style compatibilism. But that wouldn't help when it comes to moral responsibility as "free will" and "moral responsibility" will be given very different meanings under compatibilism. Or if someone wants to argue for a weak type of free will being compatible with a strong type of responsibility, they have a lot of explaining to do.

Also, theism may face a challenge that divine knowledge of the future undermines human freedom. That seems plausible *if* the future were like an already existing block of events before you get there, so to speak. If it's really a problem, there is always the option to say that God doesn't know the future because it's not something that exists to be known, and that doesn't represent a failure of divine knowledge.

 

[Vork]

According to Christian theology--correct me if I'm wrong--there is no justice. If you live a terrible life, and suck up to Jesus at the end, you go to paradise.

Christianity, although one particular theistic religion, isn't theism, so I'm not going to worry about this issue.

At the beginning, god knew everything that would ever happen in every possible world. He could have created a good world, but he chose one with all this suffering. It is theism that makes all this for nothing.

Knowing possible worlds isn't the same thing as being able to activate any possible world. The doctrine of Molinism maybe comes close to what you are thinking about, but even then (I think) it may be said that God can't activate all possible worlds. Personally I don't think Molinism makes much sense.

I don't see the bleakness that you try to impute to atheism. I certainly don't see how positing a powerful vicious guy who could eliminate all of the suffering--but who doesn't--makes it any better.

If you are going to compare different worldviews, you need to genuinely imagine that worldview on its own terms. So calling God a "powerful vicious guy" isn't really playing the game. And neither could God "eliminate all of the suffering" without presumably messing up morally good plans. Whether or not you personally see the existence of so much suffering as compatible with the existence of a morally good God, doesn't matter in this kind of comparison. You need to assume that there is a good reason and moral purpose for a place like earth to exist. So it's achieving large amounts of good; and suffering either achieves good in itself in whatever way, or it's a consequence of a system that generally achieves much good, and where a deity intervening too much would do more harm than good. Again, whether you personally think that's plausible doesn't matter for this kind of comparison. If you imagine a cruel deity that just doesn't care about suffering that he could easily prevent, then you aren't imagining real theism. You need to imagine theism with a truly morally good God, for the sake of argument, and compare against that picture.

So suffering would largely exist for a good purpose, and where people will overcome it, and may massively benefit from (at least) some types of suffering.

Compare that to atheistic naturalism, where massive amounts of suffering will be thrown out for no purpose at all. You would probably just be unlucky if that's what the universe is generating for you.

 

[Wiploc]

That said, I would not at all be surprised if it were the case that atheism was correlated with a slight increase in nihilism (colloquial, moral and/or existential), because it does, almost de facto, remove at least some ultimate or objective meaning (and purpose) from life.

Please explain, defend, justify, or expand on this point.

I'm not sure what part isn't clear. Atheism involves the absence of what I might call the 'comfort blanket' of certain religious beliefs and practices. As such, I would not be surprised if it were correlated with a slight increase in nihilism. For example, I note that most if not all of the existential nihilists were/are atheists.

My apologies. I may have been reading posts out of order.

 

[Wiploc]

(1) Ultimate reality

If "ultimate reality" is different from "reality," I don't have any idea what you're talking about.

for atheists has no purpose, and no moral purpose of course.

I assume we have the same amount of purpose you do.

If you're saying that we don't have purpose imposed on us by someone else, I can grant that. But I hardly think that me deciding your purpose for you would make you less nihilistic.

It just happens to have thrown out humans with moral concerns, but those moral concerns have been generated by a completely non-moral process. When you start thinking about that greater context, under a naturalistic worldview, it will not connect with human moral concerns, but will rather (I would argue) be an alienating and mechanistic force that has just thrown up some human froth on the surface.

Not sure what you're saying there. You may be saying you prefer to have your purpose handed to you by the author of Hellfire. If so, that's your personal preference, one that seems to me perverse. I don't see how it would lessen nihilism.

Also, (2) it's not uncommon for naturalists to deny free will,

I believe in free will.

and a materialist view of the world does seem to create that problem (naturalists don't always have to be strict materialists)

Thank you.

and that will then result in probably a denial of any strong moral responsibility. So of course people could still be held responsible in courts of law (or you would have chaos) but people aren't really responsible in the sense that you would really blame them. It's all just blind mechanism when it comes down to it. Even the worst criminals are really spotless and without sin.

You find it easier to blame people when Jehovah has hardened their hearts and darkened their counsels?

There is still a difference between good people and bad people, in the ordinary sense of behaviour. But there are no truly good people,

At least they don't have "total depravity" like Christians.

or truly bad people, that we should praise or blame. Or if we do praise or blame, it's just a game to influence behaviour, or perhaps an illusion of folk thinking.

Christians (I grew up in Kansas, so this is the form of theism I'm familiar with) are all supposed to be bad. Equally bad. God randomly elects some for salvation, but they don't deserve it. They are still bad.

That seems far more depressing than atheism.

 

[Wiploc]

Things like point 1 above, or the lack of any ultimate accountability under naturalism, (so bad people may often enough benefit from being bad), I take to be solid facts in difference between the worldviews.

What you call "solid facts," I call an aesthetic appeal. You want us to somehow see being told, "I'm telling you this is your purpose, whether you like it or not," as somehow desirable.

I recognize that you like it, but I cannot imagine why.

As always, when one represents another's thoughts, one risks the possibility of misrepresentation. If I have misrepresented, I invite your correction.

Point 2 about free will and moral responsibility, is a lot murkier. You can't strictly prove that naturalism is incompatible with a strong type of free will and strong type of moral responsibility. I think you can say it looks pretty doubtful.

It's obvious to me that I have free will. It's not at all obvious to me that I'd have free will if the world had been created by a god who already knew every decision I would ever make.

Even say, if a naturalist supported a mind/body dualism position, what they need is for material things to produce a fundamentally different thing in consciousness but that's not enough by itself for freedom. The consciousness generated can't just be a subordinate output; but rather it has to start controlling the very thing that produces it.

And yet you don't claim to control gods?

What atheists are likely to say is "Yeah we don't have free will but the whole idea is just flat out contradictory anyway regardless of your beliefs about mind/body dualism or the existence of God".

I disavow and repudiate the idea that I don't have free will. I feel no need to defend those who take that position.

I imagine that your position--and again I invite your correction--is that in the absence of magic you would have no free will. Since magic seems to me implausible, I imagine that your belief in free will must be tenuous. But maybe I'm projecting.

Or they will appeal to a Dennett style compatibilism. But that wouldn't help when it comes to moral responsibility as "free will" and "moral responsibility" will be given very different meanings under compatibilism. Or if someone wants to argue for a weak type of free will being compatible with a strong type of responsibility, they have a lot of explaining to do.

Also, theism may face a challenge that divine knowledge of the future undermines human freedom.

I'm not really serious on that point. It's just that you were trying to saddle me with not having free will, so I was pointing out that it would be at least as easy for me to do that to you.

I'm happy to accept that you believe in free will if you'll do the same for me.

 

[Wiploc]

Christianity, although one particular theistic religion, isn't theism, so I'm not going to worry about this issue.

I'm not sure that's fair.

Not believing in free will isn't atheism. And no reason for nihilism that you introduce will be atheism.

Knowing possible worlds isn't the same thing as being able to activate any possible world.

True. Knowing everything that will happen in all possible worlds (and, according to Plantinga, in all impossible worlds) is omniscience.

The ability to create any possible world is omnipotence, which is a different thing. (Plantinga points out that gods can't create worlds that aren't created by gods. But I assume that they could create otherwise-identical worlds that are created by gods.)

The doctrine of Molinism maybe comes close to what you are thinking about, but even then (I think) it may be said that God can't activate all possible worlds. Personally I don't think Molinism makes much sense.

I could look Molinism up, but, since you disavow it, I won't bother.

I don't see the bleakness that you try to impute to atheism. I certainly don't see how positing a powerful vicious guy who could eliminate all of the suffering--but who doesn't--makes it any better.

If you are going to compare different worldviews, you need to genuinely imagine that worldview on its own terms. So calling God a "powerful vicious guy" isn't really playing the game.

Christians call gods good, but they describe them as terrible. If I was the god of Oklahoma, and Jehovah was the god of everywhere else, everybody would come to Oklahoma. I'm not even all that nice, but there'd still be no comparison.

And neither could God "eliminate all of the suffering" without presumably messing up morally good plans.

If a god were omnipotent, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, then there would be no suffering. Even the goodness my Oklahoma would be trivial beside a world created by a tri-omni god.

Whether or not you personally see the existence of so much suffering as compatible with the existence of a morally good God, doesn't matter in this kind of comparison.

Are you requiring me to imagine contradictions in order to give your world-view a fair hearing?

You need to assume that there is a good reason and moral purpose for a place like earth to exist.

That doesn't make sense to me. Why don't you imagine that there is good reason for atheists to reject nihilism?

So it's achieving large amounts of good; and suffering either achieves good in itself in whatever way, or it's a consequence of a system that generally achieves much good, and where a deity intervening too much would do more harm than good.

To imagine that is to imagine that the deity is too weak or too stupid fix the problem.

Again, whether you personally think that's plausible doesn't matter for this kind of comparison. If you imagine a cruel deity that just doesn't care about suffering that he could easily prevent, then you aren't imagining real theism. You need to imagine theism with a truly morally good God, for the sake of argument, and compare against that picture. ...

I understand the problem of evil. I grok it. So it's not possible for me to imagine that it's not true.

And I can imagine a less-than-tri-omni god coexisting with evil. If you want to talk about a god who isn't strong enough to prevent all evil, or who isn't smart/knowing enough, or who isn't good enough, then I'm willing to talk about that.

Compare that to atheistic naturalism, where massive amounts of suffering will be thrown out for no purpose at all. You would probably just be unlucky if that's what the universe is generating for you.

I'd rather have evil be accidental than to have somebody doing it to me on purpose.

Particularly if that somebody had the power and knowledge to prevent all evil, but just couldn't be bothered. If you believed that a god really existed, and he had enough power and knowledge that all evil was gratuitous, then I could see how that belief could suck the juice out of you. If you wanted to argue that that belief causes nihilism, I wouldn't contest.

 

[T.G.G. Moogly]

How does one have evil without a god? A god is a necessary ingredient for evil to exist. Christian evil comes initially and directly from heaven.

 

[Bronzeage]

How does one have evil without a god? A god is a necessary ingredient for evil to exist. Christian evil comes initially and directly from heaven.

The definition of evil is just as elastic as the definition of moral. If your next door neighbor killed your family so he could steal all of your stuff, even though he didn't really need any of it, you might stretch the definition of evil to cover this.

To an aphid, a ladybug is Cthulhu and the ladybug thinks a chameleon is Godzilla.

 

[Vork]

Wiploc, to be sure I understand you correctly, you are saying you believe you have libertarian free will?

Or you are saying you believe you have free will of a compatibilist type?

 

[Wiploc]

Wiploc, to be sure I understand you correctly, you are saying you believe you have libertarian free will?

Or you are saying you believe you have free will of a compatibilist type?

I believe that I have free will, that I make choices. My belief in free will is that naive, that unsophisticated.

 

[T.G.G. Moogly]

How does one have evil without a god? A god is a necessary ingredient for evil to exist. Christian evil comes initially and directly from heaven.

The definition of evil is just as elastic as the definition of moral. If your next door neighbor killed your family so he could steal all of your stuff, even though he didn't really need any of it, you might stretch the definition of evil to cover this.

To an aphid, a ladybug is Cthulhu and the ladybug thinks a chameleon is Godzilla.

True that. But as a matter of accuracy within christian theology, the rebellious, disobedient angels are the first example we have of evil.

 

[Vork]

Wiploc, to be sure I understand you correctly, you are saying you believe you have libertarian free will?

Or you are saying you believe you have free will of a compatibilist type?

I believe that I have free will, that I make choices. My belief in free will is that naive, that unsophisticated.

So imagine that you could reset the day, and play things over again. But I don't mean like replaying a video. I mean reset it to the start of a "live" event.

Would you make all the same choices, do exactly the same things, every time? Would that fit with what you mean by free will?

Or could you do different things, despite the physical situations and history being the same? So in one replay you would have eggs for breakfast, and in a different replay you would have cornflakes for breakfast? (Libertarian style free will)

If you aren't supporting libertarian free will, then it's not going to mean much here. Of course naturalists can believe in compatibilist "free will" if they want. As mentioned, Daniel Dennett would be fairly well known for supporting compatibilism.

 

[Vork]

Or if you aren't sure what you believe in, I don't think I need to worry about it, as I don't see that it conflicts with anything I said about naturalism.

 

[Wiploc]

Or if you aren't sure what you believe in, I don't think I need to worry about it, as I don't see that it conflicts with anything I said about naturalism.

I'm a naturalist.

I'm not exactly a determinist, because some things are random, uncaused. But that element of chaos doesn't help us explain free will.

I've been known to say that if free will is an illusion then the illusion is free will. It exists, even if. Because the phenomenon we call free will exists.

So, yeah, this could easily be something you don't have to worry about.