Has William Lane Craig and his ilk ever addressed Euthyphro?

[Wiploc]

I'm not proposing a third horn of the dilemma. I don't have to because it's not a real dilemma.

You called Euthyphro's dilemma a "false dilemma." Almost anyone will read that as a claim that there is a third choice available. Thus:

A false dilemma (also called false dichotomy, false binary, black-and-white thinking, bifurcation, denying a conjunct, the either–or fallacy, fallacy of exhaustive hypotheses, the fallacy of false choice, or the fallacy of the false alternative) is a type of informal fallacy that involves a situation in which only limited alternatives are considered, when in fact there is at least one additional option.

But I now wonder whether you didn't mean something else. So looked up "dilemma" at dictionary.comm. The first hit offers this: "a situation requiring a choice between equally undesirable alternatives."

So your real point may be that don't find both choices undesirable. You are happy with the notion that your god not the creator of good and evil, but just the identifier of them.

Do I have that right?

If so, I recommend against using the "false dilemma" language; it will regularly get you into discussions where you and your conversational partner are talking past each other.

God doesn't 'decree' what is good.

He KNOWS what is good (without having to ask.)

We, on the other hand, do not.

You're going up against people like Plantinga and William Lane Craig then. They maintain that the existence of objective good and evil prove the existence of god, because they couldn't exist without god. Because such a thing can only exist if created by a god.

Therefore, if good and evil exist, then god exists.

You take the contrary position that good and evil exist independent of gods. If gods happen to know about them, and if they happen to tell us about them, that's fine, but it doesn't cause or create the good and evil.

That's fine, as good of a position as anyone could possibly have about a fictional being.

Hence we argue about it and make up ... imaginary 'dilemmas' as if God was one of us - just a slob like one of us - and is constrained by made-made either/or paradigms.

For many people, both choices are intolerable. So the dilemma is well named.

William Lane Craig, for instance, insists that neither is true, and offers an incoherent third horn, something like, "God doesn't create good, and he doesn't recognize good, but rather his character just happens to be good."

Anyone--including you, I assume--who doesn't find both horns of the dilemma unacceptable--will immediately see the problem with that. Imagine a burglar caught by the police:

Police: "Did you break in thru the door or the window?"
Burglar: "Neither, I entered by my character."

People who believe in gods, but who cannot accept either horn of Euthyphro's dilemma are in an impossible bind. It doesn't have to be a dilemma for you to be a dilemma.

 

[Lion IRC]

A false dilemma is the proposition that one must choose between alternatives. Either/Or.
But one does not have to 'split the horns' of Euthyphro if we equate Gods 'goodness' with His absolute wisdom.

- - - Updated - - -

Is God wise because He is wise?
Is wisdom wise because God says so?

 

[Draconis]

Saying "God is Good" is meaningless, being as there is no such thing as an absolute scale of goodness - a "goodness-meter", you might call it. It's like saying "God is tall" - measured against what exactly?

If there is such a thing, then there's a problem: where does this "goodness-meter" come from? Did God make it? Then he can define what being Good or Bad is and therefore can say "I'm Really Super Duper Amazingly Good" as he whatever he wants: it might actually be evil or indifferent, perhaps. And if he didn't make the "goodness-meter", then who did?

Saying God is infinitely good doesn't really help either. How much is infinity?

 

[James Brown]

I'm not proposing a third horn of the dilemma. I don't have to because it's not a real dilemma.

God doesn't 'decree' what is good.

He KNOWS what is good (without having to ask.)

Does this mean that at one point God did not know what was good? Did he learn what is good by trial and error? Reason and experiment? And now that he KNOWS what is good, he's trying his best to pass along his findings to us (not very well, in my view)?

Or if God has always known what was good without having to figure it out like we do, then where's the evidence that he's right? I admit, declaring that God just KNOWS whats good at all times can solve all sorts of logical problems (something that WLC does to solve his problems) but by what criteria do we judge God's knowledge?

Surely it would be premature to simply decide that God has it all figured out, and if we'll just take his word we'll all be better off. We wouldn't employ this sort of blind trust in any other scenario--why does WLC want us to do so when it comes to God?

 

[Lion IRC]

Saying "God is Good" is meaningless, being as there is no such thing as an absolute scale of goodness - a "goodness-meter", you might call it.

I agree that if you don't have an idea of what it is to be 'good' then Euthyphro goes away.
What's the point of asking if God is good if you yourself don't know what that word means or to whom it applies.

...It's like saying "God is tall" - measured against what exactly?

Exactly. You have to have a true datum. Who would know what is tall if not Someone who had seen the tallest and the shortest?

...If there is such a thing, then there's a problem: where does this "goodness-meter" come from? Did God make it? Then he can define what being Good or Bad is and therefore can say "I'm Really Super Duper Amazingly Good" as he whatever he wants: it might actually be evil or indifferent, perhaps.

You mean God might lie about what is and isn't good? Lying is bad.
Who would know if God is lying - God Himself would know. Thus He is the solution to the Euthyphro dilemma - not the subject of the dilemma.

... And if he didn't make the "goodness-meter", then who did?

Why must we assume it was 'created'? Goodness exists (ontologically) by virtue of the fact that we can (and do) think of categories of things which exist ontologically other than 'goodness'. And since God (goodness) has existed perpetually, His goodness has likewise existed for eternity - well at least insofar as there are observers in existence to contemplate what it means to be "other than good".

If everyone acted wisely and harmoniously with God's goodness (His wisdom) then "good" would be the universal norm and evil would cease to exist except in our memories of the past.
Bye bye Euthyphro.

 

[Lion IRC]

I'm not proposing a third horn of the dilemma. I don't have to because it's not a real dilemma.

God doesn't 'decree' what is good.

He KNOWS what is good (without having to ask.)

Does this mean that at one point God did not know what was good?

To Euthyphro maybe. Not to me.
I see no reason to assume that God HASNT always acted wisely - good.

Euthyphro wonders where did God learn to be good. But this is misplaced in the context of an All Knowing, past-eternal being. (Maximal being).

...Surely it would be premature to simply decide that God has it all figured out, and if we'll just take his word we'll all be better off. We wouldn't employ this sort of blind trust in any other scenario--why does WLC want us to do so when it comes to God?

Fair enough.
And I don't think we (biblical theists like me) are expected to blindly take Gods Word for it about what is in our best interests. There's enough scripture to support the claim that God wants us to wisely use logic and reason (and love) in persung the 'good'. Yes, we can love our neighbor just because God says so, but there IS a good reason why we ought to.

 

[Wiploc]

A false dilemma is the proposition that one must choose between alternatives. Either/Or.

It's not a false dilemma unless there's really a third choice. If there are just two choices, it is a dilemma, not a false dilemma.

 

[James Brown]

...Surely it would be premature to simply decide that God has it all figured out, and if we'll just take his word we'll all be better off. We wouldn't employ this sort of blind trust in any other scenario--why does WLC want us to do so when it comes to God?

Fair enough.
And I don't think we (biblical theists like me) are expected to blindly take Gods Word for it about what is in our best interests. There's enough scripture to support the claim that God wants us to wisely use logic and reason (and love) in persung the 'good'.

Then we must be reading different scriptures. When I open a Bible, I see God behaving petulantly and irrationally. I see God wreaking vengeance for the pettiest of actions--all the more so considering he's reportedly a "Maximal Being". I see God commit genocide, command others to do likewise, and become wroth when his followers show a modicum of mercy. I see God punish innocent beings for the sins of another. I see God utter illogical commands ("Death to those who gather firewood on Saturdays") while keeping life-saving commands to himself ("Thou shalt wash thy hands before eating or practicing healing.")

Apologists are quick to tell me that God has good reasons to act in such a manner. WLC likes to tell us that when God tells Israelites to kill babies, that's a good thing because those babies go straight to heaven. But those good reasons seem to satisfy a completely different definition of the word 'good'. It falls under the category of "Good is whatever God prefers."

Which is one horn of Euthyphro's dilemma.

 

[Cheerful Charlie]

Saying "God is Good" is meaningless, being as there is no such thing as an absolute scale of goodness - a "goodness-meter", you might call it. It's like saying "God is tall" - measured against what exactly?

If there is such a thing, then there's a problem: where does this "goodness-meter" come from? Did God make it? Then he can define what being Good or Bad is and therefore can say "I'm Really Super Duper Amazingly Good" as he whatever he wants: it might actually be evil or indifferent, perhaps. And if he didn't make the "goodness-meter", then who did?

Saying God is infinitely good doesn't really help either. How much is infinity?

Goodness often allows theists to dodge the issue of God's goodness. But we have the existence of sub-goodnesses. The Bible lists some of these as does the Quran and others. God is merciful, fair, compassionate, just, etc. If God lacks any one of the possible sub-goodensses one can list, then God is not good. In Romans, God is said to be a metaphorical potter, who makes some good vessels, and others bad vessels. Not very compassionate nor merciful, nor Just. To then argue that God's goodness is somehow mysterious or inscrutable becomes problematic. And in the past I have had Christians make that claim when considering various aspects of the problem of evil. Again, as supposed revelations make specific claims of various sub-goodnesses, one cannot dodge the issue unless one is willing to state words like just, compassionate, or merciful have no meaning. Taking refuge in rhetorical nihilism where no words have any meaning any more. Goodness is not a single, monolithic mystery. Of course, these mythologies list a number of supposed historical activities that are not merciful, just or compassionate. And that is where the theoretical problems lie.

 

[Vork]

I have never been satisfied with the idea that God as law-giver can generate moral duties. But then, moral duties just seem a bit of a mystery regardless of worldview. (Unless someone wants to explain it to me.)

However, I think you can ground morality (in part) in God by appealing to the benefit/harm to sentient creatures distinction as existing in some abstract, possible worlds sense. If sentient creatures are possible, then different ways of intentionally treating them will also exist as an abstract truth tied up with this.

What is to stop an atheist from appealing to that standard? Nothing really, and of course they do appeal to that standard.

But a theist could say that such abstract truths are somehow grounded in God as the bedrock of reality. It wouldn't be a clear victory for the theist side of the debate, but it's one way that morality *may actually* be grounded in God.

 

[Jolly_Penguin]

What is to stop an atheist from appealing to that standard? Nothing really, and of course they do appeal to that standard.

But a theist could say that such abstract truths are somehow grounded in God as the bedrock of reality. It wouldn't be a clear victory for the theist side of the debate, but it's one way that morality *may actually* be grounded in God.

They are not objective abstract truths though. We only see them that way because we are social animals with an evolved sense of empathy.

Nor does this address euthyphro. Are these abstract truths of goodness that way because they are grounded in God? Or is God good because he has these abstract truths built into him?

 

[Cheerful Charlie]

In one of his screeds, WCL claims that God owes us, his creations, no moral obligations. Which raises the question, why would WCL write that? Other than our Universe does not resemble a Universe where an omnipotent, perfectly moral God who loves us has any moral obligations to us, his creations. Absolute morality then does not seem to contain the concept of treating our creations well, with concern and care. Christians may claim that initially, but pressed on the issue soon play the redefinition game.

God then seems to be a cosmic jelly fish, drifting along, spreading her eggs in the great cosmic sea, without further care or thought for her offspring. Which may be fine with a brainless jelly fish, but not for an omnipotent, perfectly moral God.

Despite the posturing, Christian theology again has the problem of squaring its grandiose claims with reality, It all becomes a case of saving appearances.

------
https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/question-answer/on-the-goodness-of-god/

In fact, I’m inclined to think that God has no moral obligations whatsoever to fulfill. Moral obligations and prohibitions arise as a result of imperatives issued by a competent authority. Thus, the source of our moral duties is God’s commandments. That’s why what Herod did was wrong: he transgressed a divine command to not murder. Now since God presumably does not issue commands to Himself, it follows that He has no moral duties. Hence, it is logically incoherent to allege that God has done something which He ought not to do.

 

[James Brown]

Convenient that. We should worship God because (among other reasons) he's morally perfect. We should seek his advice on what to do because he knows the perfect thing to do in every situation.

But if he does something that appears to be immoral, then you can shut the hell up, because he doesn't owe you a thing.

 

[Vork]

What is to stop an atheist from appealing to that standard? Nothing really, and of course they do appeal to that standard.

But a theist could say that such abstract truths are somehow grounded in God as the bedrock of reality. It wouldn't be a clear victory for the theist side of the debate, but it's one way that morality *may actually* be grounded in God.

They are not objective abstract truths though. We only see them that way because we are social animals with an evolved sense of empathy.

Nor does this address euthyphro. Are these abstract truths of goodness that way because they are grounded in God? Or is God good because he has these abstract truths built into him?

It would address it in that moral truths wouldn't be outside God, even if they are outside of the control of God. So that's an answer, as long as you aren't worried that God would lack the ability to form his own moral truths as he sees fit. And that, anyway, would cause problems for divine morality.

And the objectivity would appear to me to be independent of any human desires. That is, there is a fundamental difference between them that nothing can change. It's harder to justify a moral duty that you ought to prefer and do the good, but there is certainly an objective difference between good and evil.

 

[Lion IRC]

Substitute "good" for "wise" and Euthyphro is resolved.
God does wise things because He is wise.
It is good to do wise things - agreed?

 

[Jolly_Penguin]

Substitute "good" for "wise" and Euthyphro is resolved.
God does wise things because He is wise.
It is good to do wise things - agreed?

Is what God does wise because God does them, or is God wise because he does wise things?

 

[bilby]

Substitute "good" for "wise" and Euthyphro is resolved.
God does wise things because He is wise.
It is good to do wise things - agreed?

Is what God does wise because God does them, or is God wise because he does wise things?

Oh, that's right, make him think it through.

It's all so simple, if nobody makes you think it through.

Why can't you just accept some vague handwaving, and be a happy little christian? Why do atheists insist on spoiling everything by thinking it through?

 

[Lion IRC]

Substitute "good" for "wise" and Euthyphro is resolved.
God does wise things because He is wise.
It is good to do wise things - agreed?

Is what God does wise because God does them, or is God wise because he does wise things?

Why the false dilemma?
That's like asking whether chocolate ice cream tastes like chocolate because it's chocolate ice cream or whether it tastes like it chocolate ice cream because it's called chocolate ice cream.

 

[Jolly_Penguin]

Substitute "good" for "wise" and Euthyphro is resolved.
God does wise things because He is wise.
It is good to do wise things - agreed?

Is what God does wise because God does them, or is God wise because he does wise things?

Why the false dilemma?
That's like asking whether chocolate ice cream tastes like chocolate because it's chocolate ice cream or whether it tastes like it chocolate ice cream because it's called chocolate ice cream.

It tastes like chocolate ice cream because it is ice cream and they put chocolate in it. If they filled it with vanilla and still called it chocolate ice cream, then that would be in name only and not really be chocolate ice cream.

Is God good in name only? Does goodness exist independent of God, like chocolate exists independent of ice cream?

 

[Lion IRC]

It doesn't make sense to speculate on what chocolate would be if it wasn't called chocolate or wasn't made of chocolate or didn't taste like chocolate. Does chocolate exist independently of the way it tastes? etc etc