Jarhyn
Wizard
- Joined
- Mar 29, 2010
- Messages
- 9,841
- Gender
- No pls.
- Basic Beliefs
- Natural Philosophy, Game Theoretic Ethicist
Facts exist, evidence exists, widely observed material effects clearly exist.If you have a coherent point to make, why obscure it in this word salad jumble?And my point is that axiomatic rejection of simulation is not necessary. Merely the possibility of not implies we ought operate as if we are not.I know this probably just amounts to talking to the wind, but I think the tone of this thread has been more toxic than it needs to be. If anyone cares to take this comment to heart, I think it could help the discussion but, hey, I'm not your dad.
Anyway, I just wanted to chime in about some of the statements regarding whether or not we could be in a simulation.
(I guess I've been out of practice too long here at IIDB and don't know how to properly attribute this quote, but it was stated by Jarhyn.)
I rather think all that "proof" is spurious. Part of the reason why science cannot prove zero gods is in fact that science cannot prove we are not in a simulation, and simulations can allow events to be observed uncaused by internal simulation mechanics.
As I've acknowledged in a number of previous threads, I believe it is true that we cannot disprove the possibility of being within a simulation. However, I believe that it is necessary to axiomatically reject the possibility of being in a simulation in order to make any inferences or draw any conclusions.
My reasoning is that if we accept the possibility of being in a simulation, then absolutely everything is uncertain (up to and including apparently self-evident properties and laws such as the laws of identity and non-contradiction) and no coherent arguments can be made. If one does not expressly (and without evidence, I concede) reject the possibility of being in a simulation, then one is rendered utterly mute.
To tie this back to the OP, I'm inclined to agree in broad terms that entire classes of "gods" (at least many of those that have been described in the past) cannot exist. I think there is room for entities or concepts that are a bit more nebulous than your typical omni-god, such as "god is love", or "god is the universe", but I don't think those are the types of gods that Adam has asserted to be inconsistent with the current or future state of scientific understanding.
Ordinarily, statements like "there is a house" are not preceded by a lengthy list of the underlying assumptions that must be accepted to understand and agree with them. We don't say "assuming we're not in a simulation" and "assuming that some things are actually knowable" and "assuming that minds other than my own are real" and "assuming that I am not currently hallucinating", etc. Nevertheless, some of those often unspoken assumptions (and many others) are necessary for such statements to be intelligible, communicable and acceptable.
Now, nobody is obliged to adopt the same axioms as everyone else. Anyone may entertain the idea of our being in a simulation, but as I mentioned before, that cuts off any further statements or conclusions. I think, however, that if one accepts certain subsets of axioms (such as the aforementioned laws of identity and non-contradiction) then one must draw certain conclusions as a matter of necessity. As such, if one axiomatically accepts the basis of formal logic, then beings with certain self-contradictory properties (such as entire classes of gods) are necessarily impossible.
If one further accepts certain axioms or follows from them the presentation of credible evidence and the necessary implications of that evidence then I think I think Adam is correct that, even beyond logically impossible gods, there are others which are ascribed properties that are not and, arguably, can never be, consistent with our understanding of the universe (or are entirely separate from it and therefore meaningless).
There are, as Adam notes, no gaps in our understanding (assuming one accepts a series of axioms which allows one to participate in discussion and evaluate the implications of credible evidence) where entities ascribed certain properties or behaviors might fit. If someone rejects all of the axioms that lead from solipsism to coherent consideration of scientific and logical arguments, I think they are compelled to speak no further on any subject, for all is doubted. If, on the other hand, one accepts some or all of the axioms that allow one to coherently participate in science, logic and discussions thereof, they must admit that certain types of gods to which are attributed logically impossible or physically impossible (i.e. those requiring the upending of the entire corpus of scientific knowledge to date) cannot exist.
Frankly, I don't think it should be as contentious of a statement as it has been taken to be. I'll hazard an attempt at combining my argument with Adam's.
If one accepts conclusions established through the exercise of logic and the scientific method (and that by dint of accepting certain underlying axioms and the necessary implications thereof) then that implies that there are logically and physically impossible classes of gods. If one rejects the impossibility of these classes of gods then it can only be by virtue of rejecting one of the underlying axioms or conclusions which they entail. Depending on the axioms or conclusions that are rejected, one is at best not talking about the same thing or, at worst, excluded from scientific discussions (if the verity of evidence or conclusions are rejected) or even from discussions at all (if the possibility of being in a simulation [or similar possibilities] are entertained).
Axiomatic rejection is simply not necessary, when "rejection unto evidence" is sufficient.
Zero being in "zero or more" gets you there to where you wish to be without dogmatic bullshit attached.
Further, "or more" allows putting together such ideas as "even if this is a simulation, there's nothing that says the god is good".
In some ways it prepares the person who holds this for what to do in the event the person is wrong, and for how to argue their position with someone who believes "or more", and who cannot be shaken from "or more".
Such persons recognize the inherent dishonesty in "exactly zero" even if they are unsure entirely how to articulate the exact nature of why such declarations of absolute are problematic, and you will never get them from "or more" to "exactly zero", nor should you try.
I can hold up a concrete proof that "gods are under no obligation to be good, so why should I care even if there is?"
I can hold up a concrete proof that "zero is still an open possibility on the table: no concrete causal adjacencies have been recorded, even as we look intently for them."
I can hold up concrete proof that every "spiritual" and "magical" claim is explained well through material mechanism, including the evidence that most point to to claim positively that there is a god; it does not prove what they think it proves.
But I know that if I try to claim "zero," I will be answered with claims which are similar to the ones I make here, for similar reasons, although drawn to incorrect conclusions (so to draw a line to 'or more'). Why would they not reject such spurious claims? I can reject them easily and I am practically an atheist.
So I seek not to post on stupid hills that cannot and should not be defended, such as the hill the OP stands on. I don't need that hill nor do I want it. It is a hill the creationist dies on all the same.
From what I can glean, you seem to be saying, "If I can imagine a possibility, that is enough to say something is possible".
To add to this you suggest, "If someone doesn't accept my urbane solipsism then they are like dull creationists".... sorry but the world doesn't work like that... Facts, evidence and scientific consensus exists.
God claims are (mostly) claims about how the universe operates and are squarely in the realm of scientific investigation.
You are the one departing from those things when you try to claim "exactly zero". You are engaging in wishful philosophy as much as the creationist.
Your imagining of what other people's God claims are about does not make it so.
The basic fundamental core of the God claims I encounter among the religious is exactly targeting "we cannot know", because you can't prove a negative through science, and when you pretend you can, rather than just leaning on the burden of proof, you just look a bit silly.
Well, it certainly means accepting such ideas as "I'm right until I'm wrong" and "trust but verify".However, if that possibility is not rejected, I believe that the only coherent position one can take is to assign indefinite truth values to every possible statement.
And in terms of axiomatic systems, we can absolutely assemble modal statements that lead to contingent truths. I can absolutely say, in all confidence that it is true "a creator god is not guaranteed to be good".
It does mean that one gets to forever cast doubt on their understanding of the world, as they ought, because doubt is the foundation of all improvement of understanding.
It means being strategic and critical with doubt, and so to apply the scientific method, and to be rigorous. It means looking at the properties of the universe and seeing if you can spot anomalies or aberrations against your understanding, and it means being able to reconfigure your understanding when you discover it is wrong.
This is what the atheist ostensibly asks the creationist to do, so why would the atheist reject the expectation of such?
I am, for all intents and purposes, an atheist. I do not believe in a creator god. I do not believe any of the things called God or worshipped as gods deserve such, nor deserve such a title. I do recognize that to ask someone else to assign indefinite truth to some aspect of their understanding, you have to show your understanding is vulnerable nor afraid of such.