Thank you
Spikepigeon
Intuition
1. The faculty of knowing or understanding something without reasoning or proof.
Nobody explained the reasoning motivating their votes, so it is fair to assume it is intuition.
And if not, same thing, since at some point whatever we think inevitably comes down to intuition.
First in response to your statements on intuition I have three, two Scientific and one Experimental Philosophical actually, articles attempting to frame material/experimental bases for the notion of intuition.
Intuition and Insight: Two Processes That Build on Each Other or Fundamentally Differ? https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5020639/
Partial Abstract: [FONT=&]Intuition and insight are intriguing phenomena of non-analytical mental functioning: whereas intuition denotes ideas that have been reached by sensing the solution without any explicit representation of it, insight has been understood as the sudden and unexpected apprehension of the solution by recombining the single elements of a problem. By face validity, the two processes appear similar; according to a lay perspective, it is assumed that intuition precedes insight. Yet, predominant scientific conceptualizations of intuition and insight consider the two processes to differ with regard to their (dis-)continuous unfolding. That is, intuition has been understood as an experience-based and gradual process, whereas insight is regarded as a genuinely discontinuous phenomenon.[/FONT]
Comment: I stopped there because it's a bit off topic and in my wheelhouse where they resort to the lowest form of validity, face validity = it looks good to me, in the set up for the article. A very bad sign.
Intuition: A fundamental bridging constructin the behavioural sciences http://www.trans-techresearch.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/intuition.pdf
Abstract: The concept of intuition has, until recently, received scant scholarly attention within and beyond the psychological sciences, despite its potential to unify a number of lines of inquiry. Presently, the literature on intuition is conceptually underdeveloped and dispersed across a range of domains of application, from education, to management, tohealth. In this article, we clarify and distinguish intuition from related constructs, such as insight, and review a number of theoretical models that attempt to unify cognition and affect. Intuition’s place within a broader conceptual framework that distinguishes between two fundamental types of human information processing is explored. We examine recent evidence from the field of social cognitive neuroscience that identifies the potential neural correlates of these separate systems and conclude by identifying a number of theoretical and methodological challenges associated with the valid and reliable assessment of intuition as a basis for future research in this burgeoning field of inquiry
Summary and Conclusions: As argued at the outset, within psychology the concept of intuition has until comparatively recently been regarded as scientifically weak and thus consigned to the fringes of the discipline. In this article, we have reviewed, albeit briefly, the considerable body of theory and research that has emerged over recent years, spanning a wide variety of domains of application including management and education. This research clearly demonstrates that the concept of intuition has emerged as a legitimate subject of scientific inquiry, one that has important ramifications for education, personal, medical and organizational decision making, personnel selection and assessment, team dynamics, training and organizational development. Recent theory and research point to clear differences between insight and intuition and to the role of intuition as an antecedent of creativity (rather than earlier views in which intuition was conflated with insight and creativity). A much clearer picture is now also emerging of the roles that implicit learning, tacit knowledge, pattern recognition and expertise play in intuitive judgment.These developments notwithstanding, we have argued that there is a need for further advancement of our understanding of intuition in terms of its underlying somatic, affective and cognitive components. In particular, there is a pressing need to understand more fully how these various components are integrated. Recent advances in dual-process theory have been highlighted as an important vehicle for this purpose,but several problems with this body of work have also been identified that need to be resolved in taking intuition research forward within a dual-process formulation.Finally, we have raised a number of measurement and related methodological issues arising from an over-reliance on psychometrically weak self report measures and called for the adoption of other, more direct approaches to the assessment of intuitive episodes and intuitive judgments. Several potentially profitable ways forward as a means of resolving these issues have been suggested. The conceptual clarity and compelling architecture that recent advances in dual-process theory provide have set the stage for a resurgence of inquiry into a construct that has the potential to contribute to a unified account of psychological functioning, across a wide range of domains of application,
Comment: essentially failing to find material correlates leads these researchers to fall back of a vaguely framed dual process theory, which IMHO is just inserting another intervening variable to provide frame for the intervening variable they pursue.
Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.714.1153&rep=rep1&type=pdf
Abstract: Experimental philosophers have empirically challenged the connection between intuition and philosophical expertise. This paper reviews these challenges alongside other research findings in cognitive science on expert performance and argues for three claims. First,evidence taken to challenge philosophical expertise may also be explained by the well researched failures and limitations of genuine expertise. Second, studying the failures and limitations of experts across many fields provides a promising research program upon which to base a new model of philosophical expertise. Third, a model of philosophical expertise based on the limitations of genuine experts may suggest a series of constraints on the reliability of professional philosophical intuition.
Conclusion: A full account of expertise in philosophy will require much more experimental data comparing philosophers to genuine experts of other fields. The framework provided by this paper is offered to help achieve this goal. Yet it is also perhaps no coincidence that the research conducted thus far points to well-known failures and limitations of expertise.Many results taken to challenge philosophical expertise may also be explained by genuine expertise. Such results also provide a promising new approach for understanding philosophical expertise and activity. In cataloguing when professional intuitions are likely to be wrong, we may be able to increase our confidence in their expertise, in the intuitional reliability, which experimental methods in psychology and cognitive science can help to reveal and address. Attending to these limitations and turning to those empirical methods not only helps us begin to approximate philosophical expertise and activity, but can help us do philosophy even better in the future
Comment: At least the experimental philosophers admit they don't have the expertise to frame the questions surrounding intuition.
Actually for readers it comes down to trying to make sense of a nonsensical statement so they can respond. Else, as suggested by the very few who have responded here, such an effort didn't seem worth the effort required.
You could have attempted to structure the question more appropriately into parts leading through some rational set of propositions to the contrast you made in a single meaningless statement. I conclude as I did that it was meaningless because of the evidence provided by respondents of 'not valid' in the questionnaire provided with the statement.
