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Imagining "Indeterminism"

fromderinside

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So choice is behavior. Define it precisely in material terms. Here's the definition. Choice: an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities. Your job is to supply the materiality, the operations. My sense is you'll have trouble with 'choice', 'decision', and 'faced'. Oh yeah, you'll probably have problems operationalizing behavior a well. This exercise request is legit since we are discussing determinism. The point I'm making is self-reference and words not materially defined don't fit within determinism. You need to specify what is the material basis for a mind for instance. Otherwise I'll just continue my freelance irritations to your non-operable anchored tech exercises.
So the most basic form is the JNZ instruction:
Jump of not zero. One possibility is that the context, unknown of the core, contains zero, and the PC executes jump. One possibility is that the context contains "zero" and the PC executes an increment.

These are both real possibilities for the architecture to encounter. One will happen, one will not and this choice will be made on the basis of the contents of a register.

We have observed that the rules of the system will allow a differential behavior on a singular element.
Your reply made sense. It wasn't responsive, but, it makes logical sense. That there are two possibilities is only one criterion for choice making. The other is that the chooser understands both options. You are going to be hard-pressed, you actually state the circuit does not know, to demonstrate that a circuit construction is known to the circuit. As I see it a bit comes through and the circuit operates. If it has a context zero there will be one result if it has context "zero" there will be another result. It will do the same thing every time in the same context. Seems pretty deterministic to me. You still need to define choice operationally. "Unknown of the core" isn't an operational statement.
I bolded the part that indicates you are not really understanding what choice is in the context.

Nowhere do I demand this for choice. You have shoehorned "understanding" in as if that is necessary to choice. It is not.

Understanding is a requirement for "intelligence" or "intelligent choice", but not for choice in general.

I did in fact make a typo, if is zero or "not zero", but you are not the sort to give charity to opposing viewpoints for the sake of understanding, else we would not be here.

AS it stands, the bit does not "come through" it is "looked at". A event happens, and as a part of that event something changes so the circuit looks at more information before doing a thing.

that something does the same thing in the same context makes it deterministic. That something does different things in different contexts means that those contexts generate differential choice within the system. That the system's choice is blind or reasoned doesn't matter to the fact a choosing operation happened.

these choices can be massive or complex. What is important is the consistency of the state machine that generates displays choice behavior.
The bit either leads to the next event or it doesn't therefore, correcting myself, information comes through the logic system. Either zero or 'zero' are compared depending on which exists in the logic reference library.

Both must be available since the logic system operates in both cases depending on which context the logic library provides. Since the context can be "zero" the comparator must be very large or the system would lock-up. It probably would be simpler to provide two logic systems for the task. Setting that aside I'm going with what you describe.

And it comes back to 'choice' the definition of which I provided.

Choice: an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities.

First I would argue the logic system isn't faced with a decision. It merely reacts one way depending on which context is provided. What looks like a choice isn't. There is no possibility of choice. There is only one possibility for each context. The fact that the logic can process both contexts is irrelevant since it is only processing one context at a time.

If both contexts were simultaneously available at the comparator I might be reacting differently but they aren't. With textual handwaving you are trying to make a point which you are not making.

That an element can provide either this or that data output is not an element processing both elements differentially. There is an either context A or context B operation.

A choice would be what a trained observer does when there isn't sufficient information to reliably distinguish between signal present or absent but one makes a choice regardless. Sufficient and insufficient information are available simultaneously. And even that is determined by a suite of existing conditions surrounding the decision space which can be resolved by a more sensitive detector.

I'd hate to think that we make choices simply by accessing wrong information (accessing inappropriate context).
 
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The argument is that the compatibilist definition of free will is not sufficient to prove the proposition.

The compatibilist proposition is simply that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world.

The proof is this:
P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

Distinctions do matter. Of course they do.
Setting the bird free of its cage doesn't establish the bird's freedom of will.

The question is not whether the bird has free will or not. The question is what does "freedom" mean.

The bird's cage is a meaningful and relevant constraint upon the bird's freedom to fly away.

To have any meaning at all, a "freedom" must reference, either explicitly or implicitly, some meaningful and relevant constraint. A meaningful constraint prevents us from doing something that we want to do. A relevant constraint is something that we can actually be "free from" or "free of".

For example:
1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. We enjoy freedom of speech (free from political censorship).
3. We were offered free samples (free of charge).
4. We participated in Libet's experiment of our own free will (free of coercion and undue influence).

Freedom of speech, etc, doesn't establish freedom of will for the speaker.

Freedom of speech is about speaking our mind without penalty. If we were penalized for criticizing the government, we would not have freedom of speech. Censorship is a meaningful and relevant constraint upon freedom of speech.

The ball bounces freely down the hillside.

And what would be some meaningful and relevant constraints to the ball's freely bouncing down the hillside? A wall. A boulder. A fallen tree. When you say that "the ball bounces freely down the hillside" you are saying that there were no constraints preventing it from doing so.

In the same fashion "free will", a freely chosen will, implies there were no meaningful or relevant constraints preventing the person from deciding for themselves what they would do.

The bird dives and swoops freely through the air.... these are all actions that follow action production.

Again, the bird swooping freely through the air implies that there were no meaningful or relevant constraints preventing her from doing so (like a hawk, or a glass window pane, or a cage).

It is the nature of action production that is specific to the issue of freedom of will because it is specifically the means of action production that determines what action is action taken in a given instance in time.

Correct. In the case of free will, the question is whether the action was produced by the person's own deliberate choice, or, whether the person was coerced or unduly influenced to do something that they would not otherwise do.

The use of free in relation to action says nothing about the means, state or status of the activator of actions.

The use of "free" in relation to an action implies the lack of any meaningful or relevant constraints preventing the action. For example, a freely chosen will implies the absence of coercion and other forms of undue influence, such that the person was free to decide for themselves what they would do.

I argue that the term free will is redundant. The term 'free will' tells us us nothing about human behaviour, means or drivers. That we have will, but it's not free will.

Free will tells us that the person's behavior was caused by their own deliberate choice, and that they were not forced to act that way by someone or something else. This information is critical when assessing a person's moral or legal responsibility for their behavior.

It seems to me that the term 'free will' has become somewhat of an ideology, an aspiration.

Nope. It's just a simple empirical distinction between the causes of a person's actions. Was the action deliberate, or was it coerced, or was it insane, or was it accidental, etc. It's a simple but important distinction.

To me, it just doesn't apply. Acting according to one's will is inevitable. We are evolved to act, and unless something prevents us from acting, we necessarily act according to our will.

Well, everything is always inevitable, so inevitability doesn't tell us anything useful. However, whether the person acted deliberately or whether they had a gun to their head, is critical information.

Our choices are determined by mechanisms and processes not of our choosing, they are necessitated choices.

All events are equally causally necessitated. So, that's not useful information. But whether someone made the choice themselves, or, the choice was imposed upon them against their will, is meaningful and relevant information.

Freedom is defined as 'freedom from necessity.'

But freedom is never defined as freedom from "causal necessity", because there ain't no such thing. All events are reliably caused by prior events, without exception, and without distinction. This includes all of our mental events.

Causal necessity is a different subject from practical necessity. Practical necessity is when we must do something whether we want to or not. Causal necessity incorporates all causes, including our wants and desires, within the total scheme of causation.

We don't choose our condition, yet our condition forms our being, our mind, character, thoughts and actions.

It is not necessary to cause ourselves in order for us to be the meaningful and relevant causes of other things. And if we are the meaningful and relevant cause of robbing a bank, then we will be held responsible, even though we have a history of prior causes stretching back to the Big Bang. No one is going to try to arrest the Big Bang.

Evolutionary Psychology;

''In other words, the reason we have one set of circuits rather than another is that the circuits that we have were better at solving problems that our ancestors faced during our species' evolutionary history than alternative circuits were. The brain is a naturally constructed computational system whose function is to solve adaptive information-processing problems (such as face recognition, threat interpretation, language acquisition, or navigation). Over evolutionary time, its circuits were cumulatively added because they "reasoned" or "processed information" in a way that enhanced the adaptive regulation of behavior and physiology.

Realizing that the function of the brain is information-processing has allowed cognitive scientists to resolve (at least one version of) the mind/body problem. For cognitive scientists, brain and mind are terms that refer to the same system, which can be described in two complementary ways -- either in terms of its physical properties (the brain), or in terms of its information-processing operation (the mind). The physical organization of the brain evolved because that physical organization brought about certain information-processing relationships -- ones that were adaptive.

It is important to realize that our circuits weren't designed to solve just any old kind of problem. They were designed to solve adaptive problems''
Please note the portion I highlighted. There is no either/or between the brain and the mind. It is the same system whether we are speaking of mental operations, like reasoning, evaluating, and choosing or brain neural functions.

One of the interesting functions of the brain/mind, is the ability to symbolically communicate ideas through language. Note that there are no neural connections between the authors' brains and our own. Yet the words on the page physically alter our neural connections such that we understand what they are saying.

Well, we actually do have some say in our condition. A person may choose to drop out of high school. That choice will change his future condition and thus impact other choices he makes down the road. We have each been active participants in all of the events that have affected us over the years. All of these choices, just like all other events, were causally necessary, of course. But this does not change the fact that we did in fact do the choosing. Nor does it prevent us from learning from our experience to make better decisions in the future.

Our inherent condition began long, long before we decide to drop out of high school. We don't get to choose our parents, genetic makeup, nation, state, society, culture, social conditions, economic status, physical or mental capacities, all of which make us what we are, how we think and in relation to our immediate circumstances, what we think.

That, after all, is the nature of determinism.

Yes, and it was that same determinism that assured it would be that individual, personally, and no other object in the universe, that would choose to drop our of school.

Determinism does not change anything. Determinism itself never determines anything. It has no regulatory control. To believe that it is a causal agent that removes our freedom, our control, or our responsibility, is an illusion.
 

Jarhyn

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Choice: an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities.

First I would argue the logic system isn't faced with a decision.
Then you are arguing nonsense. A decision here is just an event that goes one of "two or more possible ways" every time the same way in the same context, actually finding resolution

I do not accept your begged question in the second statement here. Thus we are at impasse.
 

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The question is not whether the bird has free will or not. The question is what does "freedom" mean.

The bird's cage is a meaningful and relevant constraint upon the bird's freedom to fly away.

To have any meaning at all, a "freedom" must reference, either explicitly or implicitly, some meaningful and relevant constraint. A meaningful constraint prevents us from doing something that we want to do. A relevant constraint is something that we can actually be "free from" or "free of".

For example:
1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. We enjoy freedom of speech (free from political censorship).
3. We were offered free samples (free of charge).
4. We participated in Libet's experiment of our own free will (free of coercion and undue influence)
I was actually thinking this through last night I sofar as coming to the realization that free will depends on constraint to operate: I was chasing my brain through circumstances wherein one would face a decision without ever facing being subordinated in will to limitations of action.

It is the rock in the stream that makes the atom of water break left or right, that forces decision on the basis of what shape the rock has, how it divides the stream.
 
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The question is not whether the bird has free will or not. The question is what does "freedom" mean.

The bird's cage is a meaningful and relevant constraint upon the bird's freedom to fly away.

To have any meaning at all, a "freedom" must reference, either explicitly or implicitly, some meaningful and relevant constraint. A meaningful constraint prevents us from doing something that we want to do. A relevant constraint is something that we can actually be "free from" or "free of".

For example:
1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. We enjoy freedom of speech (free from political censorship).
3. We were offered free samples (free of charge).
4. We participated in Libet's experiment of our own free will (free of coercion and undue influence)
I was actually thinking this through last night I sofar as coming to the realization that free will depends on constraint to operate: I was chasing my brain through circumstances wherein one would face a decision without ever facing being subordinated in will to limitations of action.

It is the rock in the stream that makes the atom of water break left or right, that forces decision on the basis of what shape the rock has, how it divides the stream.
A stream has no interests in where it flows. A guy in a kayak actually cares about whether he goes over a waterfall or not. Inanimate objects literally have no skin in the game, but the guy in the kayak does.

Free will, like any other freedom, is the absence of any meaningful and relevant constraints that prevent the person from choosing for themselves what they will do.

Causal necessity is not is a meaningful or a relevant constraint. It is not a meaningful constraint because it does not prevent us from doing what we want to do (it is the source of our want). And it is not something that we could be free of even if we wanted to, so there is no reason to ever bring it up. It makes itself irrelevant by its own ubiquity.
 

Jarhyn

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The question is not whether the bird has free will or not. The question is what does "freedom" mean.

The bird's cage is a meaningful and relevant constraint upon the bird's freedom to fly away.

To have any meaning at all, a "freedom" must reference, either explicitly or implicitly, some meaningful and relevant constraint. A meaningful constraint prevents us from doing something that we want to do. A relevant constraint is something that we can actually be "free from" or "free of".

For example:
1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. We enjoy freedom of speech (free from political censorship).
3. We were offered free samples (free of charge).
4. We participated in Libet's experiment of our own free will (free of coercion and undue influence)
I was actually thinking this through last night I sofar as coming to the realization that free will depends on constraint to operate: I was chasing my brain through circumstances wherein one would face a decision without ever facing being subordinated in will to limitations of action.

It is the rock in the stream that makes the atom of water break left or right, that forces decision on the basis of what shape the rock has, how it divides the stream.
A stream has no interests in where it flows. A guy in a kayak actually cares about whether he goes over a waterfall or not. Inanimate objects literally have no skin in the game, but the guy in the kayak does.

Free will, like any other freedom, is the absence of any meaningful and relevant constraints that prevent the person from choosing for themselves what they will do.

Causal necessity is not is a meaningful or a relevant constraint. It is not a meaningful constraint because it does not prevent us from doing what we want to do (it is the source of our want). And it is not something that we could be free of even if we wanted to, so there is no reason to ever bring it up. It makes itself irrelevant by its own ubiquity.
Why is interest necessary? It shall be as it is by it's nature and by the nature of it's constraints. We are not even talking about a stream, but a rock and a single atom within it. On the scale of the stream itself, things are mostly static. Again, there is no meaningful constraint around which to break on that order.

I do see free will as existing on the scale of person, but I do not find the restriction of free will to things as grand only as persons a meaningful distinction.

The transistor serves in its truth just as easily.

As always, the system, in it's consistent response to consistent context and differential response to different context, creates "decision matrixes" on the system.

The existence of this decision matrix through time is the real important bit, but only pops into reality when the constraint pushes change of context.
 
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The question is not whether the bird has free will or not. The question is what does "freedom" mean.

The bird's cage is a meaningful and relevant constraint upon the bird's freedom to fly away.

To have any meaning at all, a "freedom" must reference, either explicitly or implicitly, some meaningful and relevant constraint. A meaningful constraint prevents us from doing something that we want to do. A relevant constraint is something that we can actually be "free from" or "free of".

For example:
1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. We enjoy freedom of speech (free from political censorship).
3. We were offered free samples (free of charge).
4. We participated in Libet's experiment of our own free will (free of coercion and undue influence)
I was actually thinking this through last night I sofar as coming to the realization that free will depends on constraint to operate: I was chasing my brain through circumstances wherein one would face a decision without ever facing being subordinated in will to limitations of action.

It is the rock in the stream that makes the atom of water break left or right, that forces decision on the basis of what shape the rock has, how it divides the stream.
A stream has no interests in where it flows. A guy in a kayak actually cares about whether he goes over a waterfall or not. Inanimate objects literally have no skin in the game, but the guy in the kayak does.

Free will, like any other freedom, is the absence of any meaningful and relevant constraints that prevent the person from choosing for themselves what they will do.

Causal necessity is not is a meaningful or a relevant constraint. It is not a meaningful constraint because it does not prevent us from doing what we want to do (it is the source of our want). And it is not something that we could be free of even if we wanted to, so there is no reason to ever bring it up. It makes itself irrelevant by its own ubiquity.
Why is interest necessary? It shall be as it is by it's nature and by the nature of it's constraints. We are not even talking about a stream, but a rock and a single atom within it. On the scale of the stream itself, things are mostly static. Again, there is no meaningful constraint around which to break on that order.

I do see free will as existing on the scale of person, but I do not find the restriction of free will to things as grand only as persons a meaningful distinction.

The transistor serves in its truth just as easily.

As always, the system, in it's consistent response to consistent context and differential response to different context, creates "decision matrixes" on the system.

The existence of this decision matrix through time is the real important bit, but only pops into reality when the constraint pushes change of context.
You're doing what DBT was doing, burying the distinction within the generality, and losing significant meaning. The consequences of the kayak going over the dam are pretty dire for the guy in the kayak. The kayak, the dam, the water, and the atoms in the rocks in the water, on the other hand, could care less.

If the water flow is free to control where the kayak goes, then the kayaker dies. If the kayaker controls where it goes, then the kayaker lives. So, the kayaker is the only object that has an interest in the outcomes of this event. And that interest in the consequences is producing considerable action. So, the interest serves as a motivational cause of action.
 

fromderinside

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The question is not whether the bird has free will or not. The question is what does "freedom" mean.

The bird's cage is a meaningful and relevant constraint upon the bird's freedom to fly away.

To have any meaning at all, a "freedom" must reference, either explicitly or implicitly, some meaningful and relevant constraint. A meaningful constraint prevents us from doing something that we want to do. A relevant constraint is something that we can actually be "free from" or "free of".

For example:
1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. We enjoy freedom of speech (free from political censorship).
3. We were offered free samples (free of charge).
4. We participated in Libet's experiment of our own free will (free of coercion and undue influence)
I was actually thinking this through last night I sofar as coming to the realization that free will depends on constraint to operate: I was chasing my brain through circumstances wherein one would face a decision without ever facing being subordinated in will to limitations of action.

It is the rock in the stream that makes the atom of water break left or right, that forces decision on the basis of what shape the rock has, how it divides the stream.
A stream has no interests in where it flows. A guy in a kayak actually cares about whether he goes over a waterfall or not. Inanimate objects literally have no skin in the game, but the guy in the kayak does.

Free will, like any other freedom, is the absence of any meaningful and relevant constraints that prevent the person from choosing for themselves what they will do.

Causal necessity is not is a meaningful or a relevant constraint. It is not a meaningful constraint because it does not prevent us from doing what we want to do (it is the source of our want). And it is not something that we could be free of even if we wanted to, so there is no reason to ever bring it up. It makes itself irrelevant by its own ubiquity.
Why is interest necessary? It shall be as it is by it's nature and by the nature of it's constraints. We are not even talking about a stream, but a rock and a single atom within it. On the scale of the stream itself, things are mostly static. Again, there is no meaningful constraint around which to break on that order.

I do see free will as existing on the scale of person, but I do not find the restriction of free will to things as grand only as persons a meaningful distinction.

The transistor serves in its truth just as easily.

As always, the system, in it's consistent response to consistent context and differential response to different context, creates "decision matrixes" on the system.

The existence of this decision matrix through time is the real important bit, but only pops into reality when the constraint pushes change of context.
You're doing what DBT was doing, burying the distinction within the generality, and losing significant meaning. The consequences of the kayak going over the dam are pretty dire for the guy in the kayak. The kayak, the dam, the water, and the atoms in the rocks in the water, on the other hand, could care less.

If the water flow is free to control where the kayak goes, then the kayaker dies. If the kayaker controls where it goes, then the kayaker lives. So, the kayaker is the only object that has an interest in the outcomes of this event. And that interest in the consequences is producing considerable action. So, the interest serves as a motivational cause of action.
I think Jarhyn is closer to nailing the issue. It takes both opportunity and constraint to bound the possibility of choice. He only misses it with his circuit in that the bit lacks both options being available at the critical juncture. He, being the circuit god, constrains the availability of options by asserting singular fixed context. Now his example as he presents it is what I think most people believe constitutes a choice. As I've shown his model is clearly not a choice since it doesn't include constraint and opportunity. In fact, deterministic behavior is always limited by opportunity.

He's also correct in his assertion that most think that attributing multiple contexts to human action enables choice. It doesn't anymore than do several forces vectors pushing on a rock from different angles actually fail to impose multiple outcomes. The schemes we develop to justify the notion of choice are inventions outside the scope of empirical scientific law.
 

fromderinside

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Choice: an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities.

First I would argue the logic system isn't faced with a decision.
Then you are arguing nonsense. A decision here is just an event that goes one of "two or more possible ways" every time the same way in the same context, actually finding resolution

I do not accept your begged question in the second statement here. Thus we are at impasse.
No my analysis of what you call choice is correct. Just because one says there are two different interpretations in existence in the system does not mean there are two different interpretations available at one time. It is either this context or that context. That, at best, is superimposed forced choice. Clearly, you show there is either context A or context B, never both together since that creates a logical impossibility for the circuit which has only a single comparator. Yes, the system can produce two different outcomes at different times using different contexts. So what. They are both determined.

You state clearly it is either A or B depending on context. Context is an invention, an intervening variable, common to most philosophy and folk science. It is inserted as a 'reason' to assert choice when there is none. Context, multiple options, exist only to justify your 'hypothesis. There are never multiple directions of input (context) permitting multiple directions of output (choice) in a human in existence.

What is necessary for what humans pass as a choice is outside physical possibility. Presuming a complex being can transcend empirical scientific law because he is complex is just a modern Roman praying to his personal Jupiter. Hell, we have complex nervous systems so we must be able to get around physical constraints.

What you are saying is no different than saying humans are superior to apes because humans are smarter than apes or that humans are superior to four-legged mammals because we walk upright. Sure, humans are these, ignoring all the time that apes predate man by maybe 12 million years and four-legged mammals predate humans by up to 80 million years and they are still here.

Thanks Jarhyn. Your comments force me to concentrate on what we are actually trying to do which is to explain why some think choice is something beings actually perform as beings living in an obviously determined world.

I've always known mind, superiority, and choice are things that men use to distinguish themselves from other living beings and even from the material world. We are material beings in a material world. Live with it.

Why are rats run in Skinner boxes and forced to operate manipulanda for food and water? Not to understand them, but to demonstrate how mechanical they are.

Its amazing how similar are seeing and hearing to the operation of analogous electronic light and sound sensing circuits.

Two comments to frame from where I'm coming.
 
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As I've shown his model is clearly not a choice since it doesn't include constraint and opportunity. In fact, deterministic behavior is always limited by opportunity.

He's also correct in his assertion that most think that attributing multiple contexts to human action enables choice. It doesn't anymore than do several forces vectors pushing on a rock from different angles actually fail to impose multiple outcomes. The schemes we develop to justify the notion of choice are inventions outside the scope of empirical scientific law.

We observe people walking toward a restaurant. We call that behavior "walking".

We observe people pulling out a chair and sitting at the table. We call that behavior "sitting".

We observe people browsing the menu for awhile and then placing their order. We call that behavior "choosing".

Because each of these behaviors was objectively observed, we must assume that each behavior is consistent with empirical scientific law.

If someone were to suggest to us that what we objectively observed did not happen, and was some kind of an illusion, then we would naturally claim that the illusion was theirs, and not ours.

Oh, and, of course each of these behaviors was causally necessary from any prior point in time. But then again, all events are always causally necessary from any prior point in time, so it barely deserves mentioning. The logical fact of causal necessity is the grandest of all trivialities.
 

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the bit lacks both options being available at the critical juncture
You are looking at it from the global frame. The machine, the reference frame (and in physics, this means something Very Important! Locality is a property of physics) Lacks context. The choice, the critical juncture is arriving, can't not arrive, but the information does not exist in the reference frame yet to actually make the determination.

The decision to make a choice has been made (which is, ironically enough, also a choice, usually!) But in reality, on the physics, the path it's going to decide against is not yet determined in the reference frame of the choice.

The junction is there, the choice is presented, the machine in it's state can still break either way. It can go both until the context completes and the information settles into the system to determine it.

It is in fact that the system is prepared to go either way, and that it is some external factor that has not yet arrived that will determine it.

The moment of choice, the point where the last piece comes in and decision happens, that doesn't need to be able to go two ways in the moment. It needs a physical arrangement that is metaphysically capable of doing different things in different contexts.
 

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the bit lacks both options being available at the critical juncture
You are looking at it from the global frame. The machine, the reference frame (and in physics, this means something Very Important! Locality is a property of physics) Lacks context. The choice, the critical juncture is arriving, can't not arrive, but the information does not exist in the reference frame yet to actually make the determination.

The decision to make a choice has been made (which is, ironically enough, also a choice, usually!) But in reality, on the physics, the path it's going to decide against is not yet determined in the reference frame of the choice.

The junction is there, the choice is presented, the machine in it's state can still break either way. It can go both until the context completes and the information settles into the system to determine it.

It is in fact that the system is prepared to go either way, and that it is some external factor that has not yet arrived that will determine it.

The moment of choice, the point where the last piece comes in and decision happens, that doesn't need to be able to go two ways in the moment. It needs a physical arrangement that is metaphysically capable of doing different things in different contexts.
I respectfully agree with most of your analysis, but I disagree with the conclusions you draw for it.

To wit: an observer is presented with two intervals of exposure to a sound that may or may not be present in either interval. The protocol calls for her to choose the interval in which she sensed a physical sensory stimulus, a sound or light or taste. Dutifully she trains to and establishes competency in the method. We glibly name that procedure two-alternative forced choice.

The observer is not choosing the interval with the sound which may not be there she is reporting an interval in which she has evidence the stimuli is sufficient for her to distinguish from the other interval. We say she is "choosing the interval", actually just probabilistic reporting with a signal. We know whether there was a signal at any interval. She does not.

After thirty years of doing this stuff, I came to the conclusion we can be just as mechanical as the machine, that we are not choosing. Rather we are responding to satisfy a protocol that is designed to measure sensitivity to stimuli just as does a mindless circuit. It's not the other way around as your example is designed to suggest for the reasons I listed. In fact, the procedure was designed to accomplish a mechanistic response as close as any 'free-willed' human can mimic. We can take the 'human' element out of 'human' behavior.

Now if we generalize my analysis to common behavior it becomes clear the same mechanistic factors are in place when we claim choice.

I'm reporting this way because it is not the deterministic world but the messed up human who, with her lack of knowing is trying to justify what she is doing that leads them to the notion of choice as a consequence of 'free-will'. The physics is right the human interpretations are all fxxxxd up. Indeterminism is a human concocted fiction attempting to satisfy any 'splaining needed.
 
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fromderinside

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As I've shown his model is clearly not a choice since it doesn't include constraint and opportunity. In fact, deterministic behavior is always limited by opportunity.

He's also correct in his assertion that most think that attributing multiple contexts to human action enables choice. It doesn't anymore than do several forces vectors pushing on a rock from different angles actually fail to impose multiple outcomes. The schemes we develop to justify the notion of choice are inventions outside the scope of empirical scientific law.

We observe people walking toward a restaurant. We call that behavior "walking".

We observe people pulling out a chair and sitting at the table. We call that behavior "sitting".

We observe people browsing the menu for awhile and then placing their order. We call that behavior "choosing".

Because each of these behaviors was objectively observed, we must assume that each behavior is consistent with empirical scientific law.

If someone were to suggest to us that what we objectively observed did not happen, and was some kind of an illusion, then we would naturally claim that the illusion was theirs, and not ours.

Oh, and, of course each of these behaviors was causally necessary from any prior point in time. But then again, all events are always causally necessary from any prior point in time, so it barely deserves mentioning. The logical fact of causal necessity is the grandest of all trivialities.
Have you got a mouse in your pocket? It's not we anything. You have your views with which you are very casual while I'm sticking to a view that is a bit more, uh deterministic. Inventing causal necessity is really a bit much. If this follows that consistently it is determined. No need to insert some intervening variable such as necessary causality or causal necessity.
 
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As I've shown his model is clearly not a choice since it doesn't include constraint and opportunity. In fact, deterministic behavior is always limited by opportunity.

He's also correct in his assertion that most think that attributing multiple contexts to human action enables choice. It doesn't anymore than do several forces vectors pushing on a rock from different angles actually fail to impose multiple outcomes. The schemes we develop to justify the notion of choice are inventions outside the scope of empirical scientific law.

We observe people walking toward a restaurant. We call that behavior "walking".

We observe people pulling out a chair and sitting at the table. We call that behavior "sitting".

We observe people browsing the menu for awhile and then placing their order. We call that behavior "choosing".

Because each of these behaviors was objectively observed, we must assume that each behavior is consistent with empirical scientific law.

If someone were to suggest to us that what we objectively observed did not happen, and was some kind of an illusion, then we would naturally claim that the illusion was theirs, and not ours.

Oh, and, of course each of these behaviors was causally necessary from any prior point in time. But then again, all events are always causally necessary from any prior point in time, so it barely deserves mentioning. The logical fact of causal necessity is the grandest of all trivialities.
Have you got a mouse in your pocket? It's not we anything. You have your views with which you are very casual while I'm sticking to a view that is a bit more, uh deterministic. Inventing causal necessity is really a bit much. If this follows that consistently it is determined. No need to insert some intervening variable such as necessary causality or causal necessity.

Determinism is the belief in causal necessity. Causal necessity is the notion that events are reliably caused by prior events. The prior events necessitate the current event. For example, if Babe Ruth hits the ball at the appropriate angle with sufficient force, then the ball will necessarily go over the outfield fence, scoring a home run.

The definition of determinism suggested in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) reads like this: "Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law."

Causal necessity simply asserts that every event is the reliable effect of prior events. The term "natural law" is a metaphor for that reliability. It is AS IF the objects were following a set of rules. But in actuality the rules are derived from observing reliable patterns of behavior in the objects and forces themselves. Neither natural law nor scientific law ever causes anything to happen. Only the objects and forces can actually cause events.
 

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the bit lacks both options being available at the critical juncture
You are looking at it from the global frame. The machine, the reference frame (and in physics, this means something Very Important! Locality is a property of physics) Lacks context. The choice, the critical juncture is arriving, can't not arrive, but the information does not exist in the reference frame yet to actually make the determination.

The decision to make a choice has been made (which is, ironically enough, also a choice, usually!) But in reality, on the physics, the path it's going to decide against is not yet determined in the reference frame of the choice.

The junction is there, the choice is presented, the machine in it's state can still break either way. It can go both until the context completes and the information settles into the system to determine it.

It is in fact that the system is prepared to go either way, and that it is some external factor that has not yet arrived that will determine it.

The moment of choice, the point where the last piece comes in and decision happens, that doesn't need to be able to go two ways in the moment. It needs a physical arrangement that is metaphysically capable of doing different things in different contexts.
I respectfully agree with most of your analysis, but I disagree with the conclusions you draw for it.

To wit: an observer is presented with two intervals of exposure to a sound that may or may not be present in either interval. The protocol calls for her to choose the interval in which she sensed a physical sensory stimulus, a sound or light or taste. Dutifully she trains to and establishes competency in the method. We glibly name that procedure two-alternative forced choice.

The observer is not choosing the interval with the sound which may not be there she is reporting an interval in which she has evidence the stimuli is sufficient for her to distinguish from the other interval. We say she is "choosing the interval", actually just probabilistic reporting with a signal. We know whether there was a signal at any interval. She does not.

After thirty years of doing this stuff, I came to the conclusion we can be just as mechanical as the machine, that we are not choosing. Rather we are responding to satisfy a protocol that is designed to measure sensitivity to stimuli just as does a mindless circuit. It's not the other way around as your example is designed to suggest for the reasons I listed. In fact, the procedure was designed to accomplish a mechanistic response as close as any 'free-willed' human can mimic. We can take the 'human' element out of 'human' behavior.

Now if we generalize my analysis to common behavior it becomes clear the same mechanistic factors are in place when we claim choice.

I'm reporting this way because it is not the deterministic world but the messed up human who, with her lack of knowing is trying to justify what she is doing that leads them to the notion of choice as a consequence of 'free-will'. The physics is right the human interpretations are all fxxxxd up. Indeterminism is a human concocted fiction attempting to satisfy any 'splaining needed.
You are glibly forgetting that for me, CHOOSING IS THE VERY NATURE OF MECHANISM!

There are situations right now wherein your reference frame has an indeterminate future in it's locality.

The most fucked up thing in this conversation is that our universe on the quantum level is not clearly deterministic: it is probabilistic.

Deterministic behavior only arises from statistical trends in the probabilistic layer combined with fixed patterns of motion within the fields that occur as a result of the probabilistic events!

The nature of an indeterministic universe... Is deterministic layers forming out of the indeterministic ones.
 

fromderinside

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the bit lacks both options being available at the critical juncture
You are looking at it from the global frame. The machine, the reference frame (and in physics, this means something Very Important! Locality is a property of physics) Lacks context. The choice, the critical juncture is arriving, can't not arrive, but the information does not exist in the reference frame yet to actually make the determination.

The decision to make a choice has been made (which is, ironically enough, also a choice, usually!) But in reality, on the physics, the path it's going to decide against is not yet determined in the reference frame of the choice.

The junction is there, the choice is presented, the machine in it's state can still break either way. It can go both until the context completes and the information settles into the system to determine it.

It is in fact that the system is prepared to go either way, and that it is some external factor that has not yet arrived that will determine it.

The moment of choice, the point where the last piece comes in and decision happens, that doesn't need to be able to go two ways in the moment. It needs a physical arrangement that is metaphysically capable of doing different things in different contexts.
I respectfully agree with most of your analysis, but I disagree with the conclusions you draw for it.

To wit: an observer is presented with two intervals of exposure to a sound that may or may not be present in either interval. The protocol calls for her to choose the interval in which she sensed a physical sensory stimulus, a sound or light or taste. Dutifully she trains to and establishes competency in the method. We glibly name that procedure two-alternative forced choice.

The observer is not choosing the interval with the sound which may not be there she is reporting an interval in which she has evidence the stimuli is sufficient for her to distinguish from the other interval. We say she is "choosing the interval", actually just probabilistic reporting with a signal. We know whether there was a signal at any interval. She does not.

After thirty years of doing this stuff, I came to the conclusion we can be just as mechanical as the machine, that we are not choosing. Rather we are responding to satisfy a protocol that is designed to measure sensitivity to stimuli just as does a mindless circuit. It's not the other way around as your example is designed to suggest for the reasons I listed. In fact, the procedure was designed to accomplish a mechanistic response as close as any 'free-willed' human can mimic. We can take the 'human' element out of 'human' behavior.

Now if we generalize my analysis to common behavior it becomes clear the same mechanistic factors are in place when we claim choice.

I'm reporting this way because it is not the deterministic world but the messed up human who, with her lack of knowing is trying to justify what she is doing that leads them to the notion of choice as a consequence of 'free-will'. The physics is right the human interpretations are all fxxxxd up. Indeterminism is a human concocted fiction attempting to satisfy any 'splaining needed.
You are glibly forgetting that for me, CHOOSING IS THE VERY NATURE OF MECHANISM!

There are situations right now wherein your reference frame has an indeterminate future in it's locality.

The most fucked up thing in this conversation is that our universe on the quantum level is not clearly deterministic: it is probabilistic.

Deterministic behavior only arises from statistical trends in the probabilistic layer combined with fixed patterns of motion within the fields that occur as a result of the probabilistic events!

The nature of an indeterministic universe... Is deterministic layers forming out of the indeterministic ones.
Right. A combination of things, molecules, circuits, etc. are by agreement mechanisms. Operationalization is the method by which we understand mechanisms. Macrostructure is a basis. Subsequent to agreement we insert an intervening variables, cause and effect - because Oh, shit - the world is deterministic. Now we're trying to play God. First cause are U shitting me.

Scientific practice is based on deterministic theory. That same practice arrived at a deterministic relativistic model of things combined with a probabilistic quantum theory only results in determined models which goes a long way to explaining what, why, and how. Probabilistic quantum theory is not indeterministic.

Quantum theory may be non-deterministic where there is space for symmetry. Why are there no positrons? There should be positrons, there are when certain collisions take place. But they aren't anywhere to be found. This is true for many anti-particles. I'm not saying there aren't winners and losers. There may be other universes where other combinations of fundamental things are extant. We will probably never know that.

I'm just angry firing at will here. It is very difficult to communicate with people who interpose variables in order to explain. Choosing is something humans believe they do, it cannot be consistently operationalized.
 

fromderinside

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As I've shown his model is clearly not a choice since it doesn't include constraint and opportunity. In fact, deterministic behavior is always limited by opportunity.

He's also correct in his assertion that most think that attributing multiple contexts to human action enables choice. It doesn't anymore than do several forces vectors pushing on a rock from different angles actually fail to impose multiple outcomes. The schemes we develop to justify the notion of choice are inventions outside the scope of empirical scientific law.

We observe people walking toward a restaurant. We call that behavior "walking".

We observe people pulling out a chair and sitting at the table. We call that behavior "sitting".

We observe people browsing the menu for awhile and then placing their order. We call that behavior "choosing".

Because each of these behaviors was objectively observed, we must assume that each behavior is consistent with empirical scientific law.

If someone were to suggest to us that what we objectively observed did not happen, and was some kind of an illusion, then we would naturally claim that the illusion was theirs, and not ours.

Oh, and, of course each of these behaviors was causally necessary from any prior point in time. But then again, all events are always causally necessary from any prior point in time, so it barely deserves mentioning. The logical fact of causal necessity is the grandest of all trivialities.
Have you got a mouse in your pocket? It's not we anything. You have your views with which you are very casual while I'm sticking to a view that is a bit more, uh deterministic. Inventing causal necessity is really a bit much. If this follows that consistently it is determined. No need to insert some intervening variable such as necessary causality or causal necessity.

Determinism is the belief in causal necessity. Causal necessity is the notion that events are reliably caused by prior events. The prior events necessitate the current event. For example, if Babe Ruth hits the ball at the appropriate angle with sufficient force, then the ball will necessarily go over the outfield fence, scoring a home run.

The definition of determinism suggested in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) reads like this: "Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law."

Causal necessity simply asserts that every event is the reliable effect of prior events. The term "natural law" is a metaphor for that reliability. It is AS IF the objects were following a set of rules. But in actuality the rules are derived from observing reliable patterns of behavior in the objects and forces themselves. Neither natural law nor scientific law ever causes anything to happen. Only the objects and forces can actually cause events.
Scientific method depends on testable, empirical, explanations. Determinism lies at the base of the setting, execution, measurement, and findings of experiments. Scientific theory depends on verification/falsification by empirical tests.

Now if what you propose cannot be operationalized, measured, contrasted empirically it cannot be science. Nor can it be any part of determinism. The next time anyone spouts causal necessity they need empirically demonstrate the theoretical utility of their spout. From the above one needs to operationalize the terms reliable, effect, event. I doubt the general consensus about the definition of Natural Law would stand up to such tests.
 

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If you work in the field of artificial intelligence, you should know that free will is not a factor. That processing information and selecting an option according to sets of criteria has nothing to do with free will.

You really should be more cautious in making blanket statements about a field that you have no expertise in. The usefulness free will in robotics has long been an open question, and it is a popular topic in AI. Here is a well-known 1999 paper by AI pioneer, John McCarthy: FREE WILL-EVEN FOR ROBOTS

I can't access the page. Not that it matters. Unless there has been some miraculous breakthrough, AI has yet to achieve consciousness, yet alone 'free will' - something that has been debated for centuries, two sides to the argument, compatibilism and incompatibilism.

If the issue hasn't been resolved in humans....good luck with computers that possess neither consciousness or will, only mechanical function.

Are you using the argument from authority? John McCarthy says this , therefore it is so?

No, I'm using it as evidence that free will is a research topic in AI. In fact, it comes up a lot at conferences, because the overarching goal of AI is to replicate intelligent behavior in machines. It is of particular interest in the field of robotics, because robots have all the same problems that humans do in navigating in uncertain environments. They have to make the same kind of choices, and we model their behavior on human and animal behavior.

Intelligent behaviour in mechanical systems is not willed behaviour. There is no 'will' involved, just function. Function that is determined by circuitry and software.

To conflate intelligence with will is a category error. They are two different things. An animal may not be considered intelligence, yet have both will and the ability to act in accordance to its will.

It would also be a mistake to conflate plain will with free will. We have will, but it is not free will.

Both the will of the animal and the actions that follow are necessitated by antecedents beyond the control of the animal.

I think you believe that you have, but you don't show much evidence of understanding what definitions do or how they work.

I know exactly what definitions are. Just as I know exactly why compatibilists, given the nature of determinism and the nature of brain function, decision making, action initiation, etc, must define free will in the way they do.


They don't actually prescribe how words ought to be used. They describe how words are used. So you need to focus on how English speakers actually use the expression to mean something, not how philosophers think it ought to mean something in the context of a deterministic universe. The philosophical discussion, not surprisingly, comes out of theological discussions concerning whether a god that knows the future can judge the actions of beings that don't know the future. Philosophers and theologicans have nothing to do with what expressions like "will" and "free will" mean.

Irrelevant to my point.

We've discussed Pereboom's Manipulation Argument in the past, and it has more to do with problems inherent in assigning moral responsibility than in actual free will. We judge the behavior of others because we are all expected to adhere to a moral code. However, that has more to do with moral philosophy than what it means to choose from a set of alternative acts of will. What does it mean to be responsible for one's actions? His article was very influential among philosophers, but it attracted as much criticism as praise. Although moral responsibility is often associated with free will, it doesn't actually define it. People may not always be held accountable for their actions, just as we don't hold animals accountable for theirs. Lacking a proper sense of moral responsibility does not mean that one lacks free will.

Moral responsibility is related to free will. As is the nature of cognition, decision making and action initiation.

Another way of putting it being:

Abstract

If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced:

1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated

2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers

3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powers

Therefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false.
 
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Scientific method depends on testable, empirical, explanations. Determinism lies at the base of the setting, execution, measurement, and findings of experiments. Scientific theory depends on verification/falsification by empirical tests.

So, does your statement that "determinism lies at the base of the setting, execution, measurement, and findings of experiments" pass your own test, "scientific theory depends on verification/falsification by empirical tests"? What is the empirical test for determinism?
 

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The argument is that the compatibilist definition of free will is not sufficient to prove the proposition.

The compatibilist proposition is simply that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world.

The proof is this:
P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

The compatibilist definition is inadequate because unimpeded actions necessarily follow from necessitated decisions.

Freedom demands causal power in agents, the ability to regulate decision making and access or initiate alternate action, to have done otherwise;

Necessity;
If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced:

1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated

2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers

3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powers

Therefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false



The question is not whether the bird has free will or not. The question is what does "freedom" mean.

The bird's cage is a meaningful and relevant constraint upon the bird's freedom to fly away.

To have any meaning at all, a "freedom" must reference, either explicitly or implicitly, some meaningful and relevant constraint. A meaningful constraint prevents us from doing something that we want to do. A relevant constraint is something that we can actually be "free from" or "free of".

For example:
1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. We enjoy freedom of speech (free from political censorship).
3. We were offered free samples (free of charge).
4. We participated in Libet's experiment of our own free will (free of coercion and undue influence).

Relative abilities and unimpeded action necessitated by antecedent events that an agent has no access to, or control over, are not instances of 'free will' - they are necessitated actions freely performed. Not only freely performed, but necessarily performed.

Actions that follow from necessitated decisions are not free will actions, they are necessitated actions.

Definitions alone do not prove the proposition.

To claim that necessitated action, which are necessarily unimpeded or unrestricted by the very token of being determined is false labelling.

Yes, and it was that same determinism that assured it would be that individual, personally, and no other object in the universe, that would choose to drop our of school.

Determinism does not change anything. Determinism itself never determines anything. It has no regulatory control. To believe that it is a causal agent that removes our freedom, our control, or our responsibility, is an illusion.


Sure, determinism enables a reliable, predictable world. It's simply that actions inevitably following antecedents makes freedom of will incompatible with determinism.

In other words. ''determinism makes it impossible for us to “cause and control our actions in the right kind of way.”
 
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Abstract

If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced:

1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated

2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers

3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powers

Therefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false.

Premise #2, "If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers", is not only false, but is clearly paradoxical. If there are no powers, then how is any event ever necessitated? Force, such as the force of gravity, causally necessitates the orbit of the Earth around the Sun. Without that force, the Earth would fly off into space. So, gravity has the power to keep the Earth orbiting the Sun. Gravity exercises this power without choosing to do so, so gravity has no free will. But it definitely has the power to necessitate planetary orbits and necessitate objects falling to the ground when dropped, etc.

Premise #1 is correct, a priori, by definition. Determinism is the belief that all events are necessitated by prior events.
Premise #3 is almost correct, but it only applies to the agent's specific power to choose for itself what the agent will do.

Because premises #1 and #3 do not contradict each other, we must conclude that compatibilism is true.
 
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The compatibilist proposition is simply that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world.

The proof is this:
P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

The compatibilist definition is inadequate because unimpeded actions necessarily follow from necessitated decisions.

I've just demonstrated a proof of compatibility and you have not questioned any of the premises, so I believe you are stuck with the conclusion: The notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

Freedom demands causal power in agents, the ability to regulate decision making and access or initiate alternate action, to have done otherwise;

And the agent, when sitting in the restaurant and reading the menu, has the power to choose any item on the menu. If you wish to empirically test for this power, then order the first item on the menu today. Come again tomorrow and order the second item from the menu. Continue this testing until you've ordered each item on the menu.

Your power to order any item off of the menu can be empirically demonstrated, very easily.

Perhaps you had some other notion of power? Perhaps you were thinking that one must be able to choose to become someone else? Or, perhaps you were thinking one must be free of prior causes in order to be the meaningful and relevant cause of their own actions? Those are kind of silly, don't you agree?

Necessity;
If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced:
1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated
2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers
3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powers
Therefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false

Well, don't depend upon what others have come up with unless you're ready to defend it. Going by the abstract, the authors of that article have seriously blundered. Here's why:

Premise #2, "If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers", is not only false, but is clearly paradoxical. If there are no powers, then how is any event ever necessitated? Force, such as the force of gravity, causally necessitates the orbit of the Earth around the Sun. Without that force, the Earth would fly off into space. So, gravity has the power to keep the Earth orbiting the Sun. Gravity exercises this power without choosing to do so, so gravity has no free will. But it definitely has the power to necessitate planetary orbits and necessitate objects falling to the ground when dropped, etc.

Premise #1 is correct, a priori, by definition. Determinism is the belief that all events are necessitated by prior events.
Premise #3 is almost correct, but it only applies to the agent's specific power to choose for themselves what they will do.

Because premises #1 and #3 do not contradict each other, we must conclude that compatibilism is true.

About freedom:
To have any meaning at all, a "freedom" must reference, either explicitly or implicitly, some meaningful and relevant constraint. A meaningful constraint prevents us from doing something that we want to do. A relevant constraint is something that we can actually be "free from" or "free of".

For example:
1. We set the bird free (from its cage).
2. We enjoy freedom of speech (free from political censorship).
3. We were offered free samples (free of charge).
4. We participated in Libet's experiment of our own free will (free of coercion and undue influence).

... Actions that follow from necessitated decisions are not free will actions, they are necessitated actions.

Case A: If my own goals, my own reasons, and my own interests causally necessitated my choice, then I was free to choose for myself what I would do. This is referred to as a freely chosen will, or simply free will.

Case B: If a guy was holding a gun to my head, and it was his goals, his reasons, and his interests that causally necessitated my choice, then I was not free to choose for myself what I would do.

Both are examples of causally necessitated actions. In Case A, it was causally necessary that I was free to choose for myself. In Case B, I was forced to submit my will to his.

Causal necessity holds true in both cases. Free will holds true in Case A, where I was free to choose for myself what I would do. But coercion, and not free will, holds true in Case B.

The fact of causal necessity does not contradict the fact of free will in Case A, nor does it contradict the fact of coercion in Case B.

Definitions alone do not prove the proposition.

Well, that's why I presented you with a formal proof again at the top of this comment.

To claim that necessitated action, which are necessarily unimpeded or unrestricted by the very token of being determined is false labelling.

As to whether the labelling is true or false will depend entirely upon the definition:
Free will is a choice we make for ourselves while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
Determinism is the belief that all events are causally necessitated by prior events.
There is no contradiction at all between these two definitions.

If you are unhappy with these definitions, then present an argument for some other definition.

It's simply that actions inevitably following antecedents makes freedom of will incompatible with determinism. In other words. ''determinism makes it impossible for us to “cause and control our actions in the right kind of way.”

Apparently, that claim of incompatibility is false. The fact that our choice is inevitable entails that it was also inevitable that we, and no other object in the physical universe, would be doing the choosing. We remain the most meaningful and relevant cause that necessitated that choice, when free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
 

Jarhyn

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So, I'm just gonna go and snip all the places you just kind of went off on weird lexical diarrhea storms of shit I didn't bring up and don't care about..

A combination of things, molecules, circuits, etc. are by agreement mechanisms. Operationalization is the method by which we understand mechanisms. Macrostructure is a basis. Subsequent to agreement we insert an intervening variables, cause and effect - because Oh, shit - the world is deterministic.

Ok, so, now we are beyond the point where you accept that there IS in fact an indeterminant element to our universe...

We cannot treat this cause and effect as singular, either.

Scientific practice is based on deterministic theory

Yes, and while it is fun to recognize that there are many things science is blind to, because they only ever happen once...

Scientific practice is based on deterministic theory. That same practice arrived at a deterministic relativistic model of things combined with a probabilistic quantum theory only results in determined models which goes a long way to explaining what, why, and how. Probabilistic quantum theory is not indeterministic
Probabilistic systems are, by definition "non-deterministic".

You ask a mathematician especially in the field of discrete mathematics "hey man, is snakes and ladders a deterministic game?" They will say "oh hell no, it's purely probabilistic."

"What about the card game 'war'"

"Oh that's purely probabilistic too; if you want a deterministic game, maybe consider a nice game of Tic Tac Toe, or Chess, or Go."

You may not like that very much, but that is the way this language works.

Choosing is something a transistor does. Choosing is something a processor core does.

Trying to find something so complicated that YOU as an individual can not wrap their head around the sheer scale of the graph that is doing this particular choice is no excuse to ignore that it is doing the same thing as the transistor, as the processor core:

Creating a juncture to which there is an indeterminate input, on which a differential outcome will occur on the basis of that input.

This input is indeterminate, with respect to the choosing reference frame, because of the property of LOCALITY.
 

fromderinside

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As I've shown his model is clearly not a choice since it doesn't include constraint and opportunity. In fact, deterministic behavior is always limited by opportunity.

He's also correct in his assertion that most think that attributing multiple contexts to human action enables choice. It doesn't anymore than do several forces vectors pushing on a rock from different angles actually fail to impose multiple outcomes. The schemes we develop to justify the notion of choice are inventions outside the scope of empirical scientific law.

We observe people walking toward a restaurant. We call that behavior "walking".

We observe people pulling out a chair and sitting at the table. We call that behavior "sitting".

We observe people browsing the menu for awhile and then placing their order. We call that behavior "choosing".

Because each of these behaviors was objectively observed, we must assume that each behavior is consistent with empirical scientific law.

If someone were to suggest to us that what we objectively observed did not happen, and was some kind of an illusion, then we would naturally claim that the illusion was theirs, and not ours.

Oh, and, of course each of these behaviors was causally necessary from any prior point in time. But then again, all events are always causally necessary from any prior point in time, so it barely deserves mentioning. The logical fact of causal necessity is the grandest of all trivialities.
Have you got a mouse in your pocket? It's not we anything. You have your views with which you are very casual while I'm sticking to a view that is a bit more, uh deterministic. Inventing causal necessity is really a bit much. If this follows that consistently it is determined. No need to insert some intervening variable such as necessary causality or causal necessity.

Determinism is the belief in causal necessity. Causal necessity is the notion that events are reliably caused by prior events. The prior events necessitate the current event. For example, if Babe Ruth hits the ball at the appropriate angle with sufficient force, then the ball will necessarily go over the outfield fence, scoring a home run.

The definition of determinism suggested in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) reads like this: "Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law."

Causal necessity simply asserts that every event is the reliable effect of prior events. The term "natural law" is a metaphor for that reliability. It is AS IF the objects were following a set of rules. But in actuality the rules are derived from observing reliable patterns of behavior in the objects and forces themselves. Neither natural law nor scientific law ever causes anything to happen. Only the objects and forces can actually cause events.
BS

Example why
Scientific method depends on testable, empirical, explanations. Determinism lies at the base of the setting, execution, measurement, and findings of experiments. Scientific theory depends on verification/falsification by empirical tests.

So, does your statement that "determinism lies at the base of the setting, execution, measurement, and findings of experiments" pass your own test, "scientific theory depends on verification/falsification by empirical tests"? What is the empirical test for determinism?
Love it, "the empirical test". Every procedure testing energy or information in operationally defined elements would be an empirical test for/of determinism. We normally call it the scientific method.
 

fromderinside

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So, I'm just gonna go and snip all the places you just kind of went off on weird lexical diarrhea storms of shit I didn't bring up and don't care about..

A combination of things, molecules, circuits, etc. are by agreement mechanisms. Operationalization is the method by which we understand mechanisms. Macrostructure is a basis. Subsequent to agreement we insert an intervening variables, cause and effect - because Oh, shit - the world is deterministic.

Ok, so, now we are beyond the point where you accept that there IS in fact an indeterminant element to our universe...

We cannot treat this cause and effect as singular, either.

Scientific practice is based on deterministic theory

Yes, and while it is fun to recognize that there are many things science is blind to, because they only ever happen once...

Scientific practice is based on deterministic theory. That same practice arrived at a deterministic relativistic model of things combined with a probabilistic quantum theory only results in determined models which goes a long way to explaining what, why, and how. Probabilistic quantum theory is not indeterministic
Probabilistic systems are, by definition "non-deterministic".

You ask a mathematician especially in the field of discrete mathematics "hey man, is snakes and ladders a deterministic game?" They will say "oh hell no, it's purely probabilistic."

"What about the card game 'war'"

"Oh that's purely probabilistic too; if you want a deterministic game, maybe consider a nice game of Tic Tac Toe, or Chess, or Go."

You may not like that very much, but that is the way this language works.

Choosing is something a transistor does. Choosing is something a processor core does.

Trying to find something so complicated that YOU as an individual can not wrap their head around the sheer scale of the graph that is doing this particular choice is no excuse to ignore that it is doing the same thing as the transistor, as the processor core:

Creating a juncture to which there is an indeterminate input, on which a differential outcome will occur on the basis of that input.

This input is indeterminate, with respect to the choosing reference frame, because of the property of LOCALITY.
Locality comes out of deterministic scientific theory. Even Einstein saw It as a subcategory of determinism, it is not indeterministic.

Now things get interesting. Your response forced me to take a crash, three-hour tour through locality and to scan an article on Einstein's thought experiments.

 Einstein's thought experiments


Excerpts:

Does a physical reality exist independent of our ability to observe it? To Bohr and his followers, such questions were meaningless. All that we can know are the results of measurements and observations. It makes no sense to speculate about an ultimate reality that exists beyond our perceptions.[6]: 460–461 

In the EPR thought experiment, however, Bohr had to admit that "there is no question of a mechanical disturbance of the system under investigation." On the other hand, he noted that the two particles were one system described by one quantum function. Furthermore, the EPR paper did nothing to dispel the uncertainty principle.[12]: 454–457  [note 19]

So stood the situation for nearly 30 years. Then, in 1964, John Stewart Bell made the groundbreaking discovery that Einstein's local realist world view made experimentally verifiable predictions that would be in conflict with those of quantum mechanics. Bell's discovery shifted the Einstein–Bohr debate from philosophy to the realm of experimental physics. Bell's theorem showed that, for any local realist formalism, there exist limits on the predicted correlations between pairs of particles in an experimental realization of the EPR thought experiment. In 1972, the first experimental tests were carried out. Successive experiments improved the accuracy of observation and closed loopholes. To date, it is virtually certain that local realist theories have been falsified.[49]

The EPR paper did not prove quantum mechanics to be incorrect. What it did prove was that quantum mechanics, with its "spooky action at a distance," is completely incompatible with commonsense understanding.[51] Furthermore, the effect predicted by the EPR paper, quantum entanglement, has inspired approaches to quantum mechanics different from the Copenhagen interpretation, and has been at the forefront of major technological advances in quantum computing, quantum encryption, and quantum information theory.[52]
So while I still hold that determinism is the basis for the scientific method I accept there are aspects of QM that need resolution for us to get to a reality we can communicate. I thank you Jarhyn for pushing me there.

At the same time, I'm ever more confident that information and thermodynamics are related. But, at the same time I'm with Bohr in all that we need to be concerned about are empirical (deterministic= scientific method) experimental results.

Even now I'm seeing advances in science following empirical principles, keeping me firmly in the Determinists camp. Yet it would be a hoot for a deterministic methodology to arrive at reality as not deterministic.
 
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... Every procedure testing energy or information in operationally defined elements would be an empirical test for/of determinism. We normally call it the scientific method.

The choosing operation inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and outputs a single choice. We can objectively observe people walking into the restaurant, sitting at a table, browsing a literal menu of options, and placing their orders. We hear them telling the waiter, "I will have this, please" or "I will have that, please". We observe the waiters bringing the meals to the customers along with a bill for their meal, holding each responsible for their deliberate act of placing the order.

If you want objective measurements we can count the customers, grouping them by gender and age. We can count the meals served broken down into the ratios of "this's" versus "that's" ordered. We can also survey the customers as to why they chose "this" meal rather than "that" meal, and classify their motives into different categories. We can do an economic analysis of the profit margins for each meal, and figure out what that restaurant owes their local and state government in meal taxes, and the share of the owner's profits that will go to her income taxes.

So, I think we can demonstrate, through empirical scientific methods, that choosing happened, why the choices were made, and the effects of that choosing upon the real world, in terms of the economic consequences that were causally necessitated by those choosing operations.

What we cannot do, given the empirical scientific data, is make any kind of metaphysical claim that the choosing operation did not happen.
 

Copernicus

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...In fact, it comes up a lot at conferences, because the overarching goal of AI is to replicate intelligent behavior in machines. It is of particular interest in the field of robotics, because robots have all the same problems that humans do in navigating in uncertain environments. They have to make the same kind of choices, and we model their behavior on human and animal behavior.

Intelligent behaviour in mechanical systems is not willed behaviour. There is no 'will' involved, just function. Function that is determined by circuitry and software.

You seem to think that human bodies are not mechanical systems for some reason. This is just doubling down on a genetic fallacy. Because robots are not "fleshy machines", you believe that bodies made of different materials cannot be made to perform the same functions. At least, that appears to be the unwarranted conclusion you are jumping to.

To conflate intelligence with will is a category error. They are two different things. An animal may not be considered intelligence, yet have both will and the ability to act in accordance to its will.

It would also be a mistake to conflate plain will with free will. We have will, but it is not free will.

Both the will of the animal and the actions that follow are necessitated by antecedents beyond the control of the animal.

Nobody has conflated intelligence with will, so that is a straw man. Obviously, we want people to make intelligent decisions, but they have been known to make stupid ones. Animals have brains and are obviously possess varying degrees of intelligence. The only reason they've been inserted in this discussion is because they don't have the same sense of morality that humans do, and moral responsibility is an issue that we associate with free will. However, in a debate over causal necessity where a concept like "free will" is on the chopping block, I don't see how moral responsibility is going to escape the same doom. I consider the moral responsibility issue as tangential, because morality only concerns human interactions, and even humans exempt each other from responsibility for their actions under many different circumstances. Animals are usually not held responsible for their actions by humans unless they can be trained to behave the way we want them to.

I think you believe that you have, but you don't show much evidence of understanding what definitions do or how they work.

I know exactly what definitions are. Just as I know exactly why compatibilists, given the nature of determinism and the nature of brain function, decision making, action initiation, etc, must define free will in the way they do.

Sorry, but you really don't seem to understand the descriptive nature of definitions, no matter how much you protest otherwise. You won't accept ordinary English usage in the definition of "free will" and insist on prescribing your own definition that seeks to make causal necessity a part of the definition. That begs the question of whether causal necessity ought to be part of the definition. That's why compatibilists consider hard determinists to be engaging in a  fallacy of definition wrt "free will". That's what the debate is about, so it can't be made a premise in your argument.

...

We've discussed Pereboom's Manipulation Argument in the past, and it has more to do with problems inherent in assigning moral responsibility than in actual free will. We judge the behavior of others because we are all expected to adhere to a moral code. However, that has more to do with moral philosophy than what it means to choose from a set of alternative acts of will. What does it mean to be responsible for one's actions? His article was very influential among philosophers, but it attracted as much criticism as praise. Although moral responsibility is often associated with free will, it doesn't actually define it. People may not always be held accountable for their actions, just as we don't hold animals accountable for theirs. Lacking a proper sense of moral responsibility does not mean that one lacks free will.

Moral responsibility is related to free will. As is the nature of cognition, decision making and action initiation.

Moral responsibility is related to free will, but free will does not entail moral responsibility. It is only about the role of free will in assigning moral responsibility, and there are many instances of free will that have nothing to do with morality. For example, animals and infants are responsible for the decisions they make, but not necessarily to adult humans. We teach children to be morally responsible in exercising free will, but we don't judge their actions as if they were already adults. There's a learning curve involved, and they don't suddenly acquire free will when they achieve adulthood.

Another way of putting it being:

Abstract

If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced:

1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated

2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers

3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powers

Therefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false.

Others have already dealt with this. From my perspective, it lacks a definition of what the word "powers' means, so it requires reading the paper that this is an abstract for in order to really discuss its merits intelligently.
 

Jarhyn

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So, I'm just gonna go and snip all the places you just kind of went off on weird lexical diarrhea storms of shit I didn't bring up and don't care about..

A combination of things, molecules, circuits, etc. are by agreement mechanisms. Operationalization is the method by which we understand mechanisms. Macrostructure is a basis. Subsequent to agreement we insert an intervening variables, cause and effect - because Oh, shit - the world is deterministic.

Ok, so, now we are beyond the point where you accept that there IS in fact an indeterminant element to our universe...

We cannot treat this cause and effect as singular, either.

Scientific practice is based on deterministic theory

Yes, and while it is fun to recognize that there are many things science is blind to, because they only ever happen once...

Scientific practice is based on deterministic theory. That same practice arrived at a deterministic relativistic model of things combined with a probabilistic quantum theory only results in determined models which goes a long way to explaining what, why, and how. Probabilistic quantum theory is not indeterministic
Probabilistic systems are, by definition "non-deterministic".

You ask a mathematician especially in the field of discrete mathematics "hey man, is snakes and ladders a deterministic game?" They will say "oh hell no, it's purely probabilistic."

"What about the card game 'war'"

"Oh that's purely probabilistic too; if you want a deterministic game, maybe consider a nice game of Tic Tac Toe, or Chess, or Go."

You may not like that very much, but that is the way this language works.

Choosing is something a transistor does. Choosing is something a processor core does.

Trying to find something so complicated that YOU as an individual can not wrap their head around the sheer scale of the graph that is doing this particular choice is no excuse to ignore that it is doing the same thing as the transistor, as the processor core:

Creating a juncture to which there is an indeterminate input, on which a differential outcome will occur on the basis of that input.

This input is indeterminate, with respect to the choosing reference frame, because of the property of LOCALITY.
Locality comes out of deterministic scientific theory. Even Einstein saw It as a subcategory of determinism, it is not indeterministic.

Now things get interesting. Your response forced me to take a crash, three-hour tour through locality and to scan an article on Einstein's thought experiments.

 Einstein's thought experiments


Excerpts:

Does a physical reality exist independent of our ability to observe it? To Bohr and his followers, such questions were meaningless. All that we can know are the results of measurements and observations. It makes no sense to speculate about an ultimate reality that exists beyond our perceptions.[6]: 460–461 

In the EPR thought experiment, however, Bohr had to admit that "there is no question of a mechanical disturbance of the system under investigation." On the other hand, he noted that the two particles were one system described by one quantum function. Furthermore, the EPR paper did nothing to dispel the uncertainty principle.[12]: 454–457  [note 19]

So stood the situation for nearly 30 years. Then, in 1964, John Stewart Bell made the groundbreaking discovery that Einstein's local realist world view made experimentally verifiable predictions that would be in conflict with those of quantum mechanics. Bell's discovery shifted the Einstein–Bohr debate from philosophy to the realm of experimental physics. Bell's theorem showed that, for any local realist formalism, there exist limits on the predicted correlations between pairs of particles in an experimental realization of the EPR thought experiment. In 1972, the first experimental tests were carried out. Successive experiments improved the accuracy of observation and closed loopholes. To date, it is virtually certain that local realist theories have been falsified.[49]

The EPR paper did not prove quantum mechanics to be incorrect. What it did prove was that quantum mechanics, with its "spooky action at a distance," is completely incompatible with commonsense understanding.[51] Furthermore, the effect predicted by the EPR paper, quantum entanglement, has inspired approaches to quantum mechanics different from the Copenhagen interpretation, and has been at the forefront of major technological advances in quantum computing, quantum encryption, and quantum information theory.[52]
So while I still hold that determinism is the basis for the scientific method I accept there are aspects of QM that need resolution for us to get to a reality we can communicate. I thank you Jarhyn for pushing me there.

At the same time, I'm ever more confident that information and thermodynamics are related. But, at the same time I'm with Bohr in all that we need to be concerned about are empirical (deterministic= scientific method) experimental results.

Even now I'm seeing advances in science following empirical principles, keeping me firmly in the Determinists camp. Yet it would be a hoot for a deterministic methodology to arrive at reality as not deterministic.
"Indetermined" is not equal to "indeterministic" or even "probabilistic"

It just means that "the information that will create the next configuration if this stable system has not happened and does not exist within the locality yet.

Read my post again while holding that in your mind and then make a more correct reply, if any.
 

fromderinside

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Now things get interesting. Your response forced me to take a crash, three-hour tour through locality and to scan an article on Einstein's thought experiments.

 Einstein's thought experiments

So while I still hold that determinism is the basis for the scientific method I accept there are aspects of QM that need resolution for us to get to a reality we can communicate. I thank you Jarhyn for pushing me there.

At the same time, I'm ever more confident that information and thermodynamics are related. But, at the same time I'm with Bohr in all that we need to be concerned about are empirical (deterministic= scientific method) experimental results.

Even now I'm seeing advances in science following empirical principles, keeping me firmly in the Determinists camp. Yet it would be a hoot for a deterministic methodology to arrive at reality as not deterministic.
"Indetermined" is not equal to "indeterministic" or even "probabilistic"

It just means that "the information that will create the next configuration if this stable system has not happened and does not exist within the locality yet.

Read my post again while holding that in your mind and then make a more correct reply, if any.
Thank ewe for clearing me up. Just because something may as are not in a locality, an energy field already exists, there is always something in space which is one reason why I wrote quantum locality is just a convenience in an earlier post.


Schwinger, DeRaad, and Milton (1978) are cited by Milonni (1994) as validly, though unconventionally, explaining the Casimir effect with a model in which "the vacuum is regarded as truly a state with all physical properties equal to zero."[31][32] In this model, the observed phenomena are explained as the effects of the electron motions on the electromagnetic field, called the source field effect. Milonni writes:

The basic idea here will be that the Casimir force may be derived from the source fields alone even in completely conventional QED, ... Milonni provides detailed argument that the measurable physical effects usually attributed to the vacuum electromagnetic field cannot be explained by that field alone, but require in addition a contribution from the self-energy of the electrons, or their radiation reaction. He writes: "The radiation reaction and the vacuum fields are two aspects of the same thing when it comes to physical interpretations of various QED processes including the Lamb shift, van der Waals forces, and Casimir effects."[33]
I think that is a pretty good placeholder for fields being everywhere. Now all we need do is include that information substrate is not the particular information itself leading to your noting "... stable system ....". But the fields exist in some form, state everywhere.

So, yes the specific state can't travel faster than the speed of light but some status of the state exists there so no cake and eat it too. The field exists all the time, just not in a particular configuration to introduce probabilistic nature to support speed limits in QM.

I think that handles sets stage for whatever we need to explain how reality and relativity exist at the same time.
 

fromderinside

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... Every procedure testing energy or information in operationally defined elements would be an empirical test for/of determinism. We normally call it the scientific method.

The choosing operation inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and outputs a single choice. We can objectively observe people walking into the restaurant, sitting at a table, browsing a literal menu of options, and placing their orders. We hear them telling the waiter, "I will have this, please" or "I will have that, please". We observe the waiters bringing the meals to the customers along with a bill for their meal, holding each responsible for their deliberate act of placing the order.

If you want objective measurements we can count the customers, grouping them by gender and age. We can count the meals served broken down into the ratios of "this's" versus "that's" ordered. We can also survey the customers as to why they chose "this" meal rather than "that" meal, and classify their motives into different categories. We can do an economic analysis of the profit margins for each meal, and figure out what that restaurant owes their local and state government in meal taxes, and the share of the owner's profits that will go to her income taxes.

So, I think we can demonstrate, through empirical scientific methods, that choosing happened, why the choices were made, and the effects of that choosing upon the real world, in terms of the economic consequences that were causally necessitated by those choosing operations.

What we cannot do, given the empirical scientific data, is make any kind of metaphysical claim that the choosing operation did not happen.
So I'm supposed to justify you provided an operational definition with that bit.

Nope. "I think you can find ..." doesn't cut it.
 

DBT

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Abstract

If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced:

1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated

2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers

3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powers

Therefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false.

Premise #2, "If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers", is not only false, but is clearly paradoxical. If there are no powers, then how is any event ever necessitated?

Premise #2 clearly refers to determinants that act upon us, elements that we have no control over: antecedents. We have no control over the circumstances of our birth, parents, genetics, location, culture, language, social and economic status, etc, etc...yet all of these things and more make us what we are, how we think and what we do.



Force, such as the force of gravity, causally necessitates the orbit of the Earth around the Sun. Without that force, the Earth would fly off into space. So, gravity has the power to keep the Earth orbiting the Sun. Gravity exercises this power without choosing to do so, so gravity has no free will. But it definitely has the power to necessitate planetary orbits and necessitate objects falling to the ground when dropped, etc.

Yes, but the problem still remains that ''determinism makes it impossible for us to “cause and control our actions in the right kind of way” to qualify as an instance of 'freedom of will'


Premise #1 is correct, a priori, by definition. Determinism is the belief that all events are necessitated by prior events.
Premise #3 is almost correct, but it only applies to the agent's specific power to choose for itself what the agent will do.

Because premises #1 and #3 do not contradict each other, we must conclude that compatibilism is true.

Which overlooks the critical point: ''If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers'' - meaning necessary control over the processes that make us who we are, how we think, what we think and what we do is absent, and necessitated actions do not qualify as freedom of will.

''....take just one of our senses, vision. Light enters through the cornea, reaches the retina and is converted to nerve impulses by complex chemical reactions (rod,cones, etc) and conveyed by the optic nerve to the visual cortex, from there it is propogated throughout the brain, gathering memory and infomation before the signals return to the visual cortex and a representation of that information is formed, a conscious image of what we see.

The visual information is interpreted by the various systems of the brain and translated into a signals to take action (visual,auditory,tactile reflexes) and on to the prefrontal cortex region which deal with complex responses, one's social values, cultural expectations, ethics, etc - the seat of one's personality and sense of self. Finally the brain forms conscious thoughts a deliberation and sends a commands to its motor neurons, muscle groups, glands... and the action is undertaken.''
 

DBT

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Faith is a form of self deception.
...In fact, it comes up a lot at conferences, because the overarching goal of AI is to replicate intelligent behavior in machines. It is of particular interest in the field of robotics, because robots have all the same problems that humans do in navigating in uncertain environments. They have to make the same kind of choices, and we model their behavior on human and animal behavior.

Intelligent behaviour in mechanical systems is not willed behaviour. There is no 'will' involved, just function. Function that is determined by circuitry and software.

You seem to think that human bodies are not mechanical systems for some reason. This is just doubling down on a genetic fallacy. Because robots are not "fleshy machines", you believe that bodies made of different materials cannot be made to perform the same functions. At least, that appears to be the unwarranted conclusion you are jumping to.

I didn't say, or intend to imply, that human bodies are not mechanical systems. My distinction was meant to be between biological and artificial mechanical systems, evolved brains in contrast to silicon chips and circuitry. That's all.

To conflate intelligence with will is a category error. They are two different things. An animal may not be considered intelligence, yet have both will and the ability to act in accordance to its will.

It would also be a mistake to conflate plain will with free will. We have will, but it is not free will.

Both the will of the animal and the actions that follow are necessitated by antecedents beyond the control of the animal.

Nobody has conflated intelligence with will, so that is a straw man. Obviously, we want people to make intelligent decisions, but they have been known to make stupid ones. Animals have brains and are obviously possess varying degrees of intelligence. The only reason they've been inserted in this discussion is because they don't have the same sense of morality that humans do, and moral responsibility is an issue that we associate with free will. However, in a debate over causal necessity where a concept like "free will" is on the chopping block, I don't see how moral responsibility is going to escape the same doom. I consider the moral responsibility issue as tangential, because morality only concerns human interactions, and even humans exempt each other from responsibility for their actions under many different circumstances. Animals are usually not held responsible for their actions by humans unless they can be trained to behave the way we want them to.

You brought up 'free will' in robots when your presented: ''Here is a well-known 1999 paper by AI pioneer, John McCarthy: FREE WILL-EVEN FOR ROBOTS''

I pointed out that intelligence is not a matter of will, but circuitry, architecture and software. That a non-biological mechanical system has neither consciousness or will, only functionality.

That being the distinction between biological and artificial mechanical systems. We as biological systems have both consciousness and will, but will is not the driver or regulator, nor is will free. It is just will, the urge or drive to act.

Others have already dealt with this. From my perspective, it lacks a definition of what the word "powers' means, so it requires reading the paper that this is an abstract for in order to really discuss its merits intelligently.

It's been dealt with countless times: it means the regulative control necessary to qualify as freedom of will;

If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will


Movement Intention After Parietal Cortex Stimulation in Humans;
''Parietal and premotor cortex regions are serious contenders for bringing motor intentions and motor responses into awareness. We used electrical stimulation in seven patients undergoing awake brain surgery. Stimulating the right inferior parietal regions triggered a strong intention and desire to move the contralateral hand, arm, or foot, whereas stimulating the left inferior parietal region provoked the intention to move the lips and to talk. When stimulation intensity was increased in parietal areas, participants believed they had really performed these movements, although no electromyographic activity was detected. Stimulation of the premotor region triggered overt mouth and contralateral limb movements. Yet, patients firmly denied that they had moved. Conscious intention and motor awareness thus arise from increased parietal activity before movement execution.''
 

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The compatibilist proposition is simply that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world.

The proof is this:
P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

I've just demonstrated a proof of compatibility and you have not questioned any of the premises, so I believe you are stuck with the conclusion: The notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

You have brought this up before and I have addressed each and every point many times.

P1 is incorrect -and misleading - because an action is not chosen in the sense the sense that another option was possible. Given determinism, the action taken was not chosen, it was necessitated. The wording of P1 is designed to give the impression of choice where no choice exists. Choice requires alternate possibilities. No alternate possibilities exist within a determined system. The action that follows is a necessitated action, which if determined, must necessarily proceed unimpeded or unrestricted. The action must necessarily happen as determined.

P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.

Correct. Not just reliably caused, but necessarily caused with no possible alternate action.

P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).

An action is not freely chosen, it is necessitated by goals, reasons or interests that have their own determinants/antecedents. We don't choose the circumstances of our birth, genetics, location, culture, social and economic circumstance, etc. Someone born into the slums of Calcutta is necessarily different perspective on life, self-identity and prospects than someone from a well to do family living in New York.

P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).

External force or influence interferes with or disrupts a persons desires or wishes, which, being determined by the factors outlined above, were not an example of free will.

The distinction lies between acting according to one's will and being forced against one's will: doing what you don't want to do.

What you do want to do is determined by prior causes;
''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.'' - cold comfort in compatibilism

C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

The conclusion, for reasons outlined above, does not follow from P1, P2, P3 or P4.

Sorry.











 

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Now things get interesting. Your response forced me to take a crash, three-hour tour through locality and to scan an article on Einstein's thought experiments.

 Einstein's thought experiments

So while I still hold that determinism is the basis for the scientific method I accept there are aspects of QM that need resolution for us to get to a reality we can communicate. I thank you Jarhyn for pushing me there.

At the same time, I'm ever more confident that information and thermodynamics are related. But, at the same time I'm with Bohr in all that we need to be concerned about are empirical (deterministic= scientific method) experimental results.

Even now I'm seeing advances in science following empirical principles, keeping me firmly in the Determinists camp. Yet it would be a hoot for a deterministic methodology to arrive at reality as not deterministic.
"Indetermined" is not equal to "indeterministic" or even "probabilistic"

It just means that "the information that will create the next configuration if this stable system has not happened and does not exist within the locality yet.

Read my post again while holding that in your mind and then make a more correct reply, if any.
Thank ewe for clearing me up. Just because something may as are not in a locality, an energy field already exists, there is always something in space which is one reason why I wrote quantum locality is just a convenience in an earlier post.


Schwinger, DeRaad, and Milton (1978) are cited by Milonni (1994) as validly, though unconventionally, explaining the Casimir effect with a model in which "the vacuum is regarded as truly a state with all physical properties equal to zero."[31][32] In this model, the observed phenomena are explained as the effects of the electron motions on the electromagnetic field, called the source field effect. Milonni writes:

The basic idea here will be that the Casimir force may be derived from the source fields alone even in completely conventional QED, ... Milonni provides detailed argument that the measurable physical effects usually attributed to the vacuum electromagnetic field cannot be explained by that field alone, but require in addition a contribution from the self-energy of the electrons, or their radiation reaction. He writes: "The radiation reaction and the vacuum fields are two aspects of the same thing when it comes to physical interpretations of various QED processes including the Lamb shift, van der Waals forces, and Casimir effects."[33]
I think that is a pretty good placeholder for fields being everywhere. Now all we need do is include that information substrate is not the particular information itself leading to your noting "... stable system ....". But the fields exist in some form, state everywhere.

So, yes the specific state can't travel faster than the speed of light but some status of the state exists there so no cake and eat it too. The field exists all the time, just not in a particular configuration to introduce probabilistic nature to support speed limits in QM.

I think that handles sets stage for whatever we need to explain how reality and relativity exist at the same time.
This is.. so you realize that you are claiming all information exists everywhere? This is patently false. Not to mention also false due to the exclusion principle.

Information is not globally available. If it were, there would be no failure to ever predict anything and we would all know 100% of the future.

How is it so hard for you to accept that, in a locality, knowledge of oncoming states is not possible until those states happen?

There is a locality, the locality contains a discrete arrangement of stuff, and then that locality has additional contextual information become a part of it. The nature of the machine, part of what it has previously been caused it to be, is something that will generate decision on its context.

The fact that I can "draw a line" around any thing in the universe and look at just that one piece of the universe and say "IF the universe around this thing contains waves that will hit this bit of the thing presently, THEN the thing will change this way; else, it will change that way" is what choice is.

I try to narrow things down so you can understand them by looking at things that only experience a single form of decision, mostly because the more complicated things are much more obscure.

Anything you can draw a line around and make a statement like that, that thing experiences decision and choice. Which is... Pretty much everything once you get to standard model scales.

There will always be localities that do not contain certain information.

No matter how much you wish to squeeze locality out of the picture in terms of it's impact on the hiddenness of the future, it's still there, keeping you ignorant of the next moment, forcing you to make decisions: locally, there ARE many real possibilities. IF you see the red light, THEN you will stop.

Determinism does not invalidate choice. Rather it defines and creates it.
 

The AntiChris

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The compatibilist proposition is simply that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world.

The proof is this:
P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

I've just demonstrated a proof of compatibility and you have not questioned any of the premises, so I believe you are stuck with the conclusion: The notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

You have brought this up before and I have addressed each and every point many times.

P1 is incorrect -and misleading - because an action is not chosen in the sense the sense that another option was possible. Given determinism, the action taken was not chosen, it was necessitated. The wording of P1 is designed to give the impression of choice where no choice exists. Choice requires alternate possibilities. No alternate possibilities exist within a determined system. The action that follows is a necessitated action, which if determined, must necessarily proceed unimpeded or unrestricted. The action must necessarily happen as determined.

P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.

Correct. Not just reliably caused, but necessarily caused with no possible alternate action.

P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).

An action is not freely chosen, it is necessitated by goals, reasons or interests that have their own determinants/antecedents. We don't choose the circumstances of our birth, genetics, location, culture, social and economic circumstance, etc. Someone born into the slums of Calcutta is necessarily different perspective on life, self-identity and prospects than someone from a well to do family living in New York.

P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).

External force or influence interferes with or disrupts a persons desires or wishes, which, being determined by the factors outlined above, were not an example of free will.

The distinction lies between acting according to one's will and being forced against one's will: doing what you don't want to do.

What you do want to do is determined by prior causes;
''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.'' - cold comfort in compatibilism

C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

The conclusion, for reasons outlined above, does not follow from P1, P2, P3 or P4.

Sorry.











This rebuttal reduces to: 'choice cannot exist in a deterministic world'.

This position is only sustainable if one subscribes to a usage of 'choose' that virtually no one else uses.
 
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Abstract

If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced:

1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated
2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers
3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powers
Therefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false.

Premise #2, "If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers", is not only false, but is clearly paradoxical. If there are no powers, then how is any event ever necessitated?

Premise #2 clearly refers to determinants that act upon us, elements that we have no control over: antecedents.

But how can those determinants act upon us if they have no power?! The authors of that article have blundered. I'm sure they had some idea in mind, some new way of expressing the same old nonsense, but they have unfortunately only added more nonsense.

We have no control over the circumstances of our birth, parents, genetics, location, culture, language, social and economic status, etc, etc...yet all of these things and more make us what we are, how we think and what we do.

So, this is the old argument that someone must somehow be the cause of themselves before they can be considered the "true" cause of anything else. If they have prior causes, then those prior causes are the "true" causes.

There is a simple test that disposes of this kind of argument: Which of those prior causes had no prior causes? None. So, none of the prior causes can be considered "true" causes either. And we can repeat this test upon each of the prior causes of those prior causes with the same result. Thus we end up with a causal chain without a single "true" cause in the chain. Well, there goes true causation, down the drain, dragging determinism along with it.

What then is the "real deal" about the prior causes of us? Well, they are either an integral part of who and what we are right now, or they have no influence at all. I'm sitting alone in a room with a bowl of apples on the table. I'm feeling a bit peckish, and it's a couple of hours yet until dinner time. So, I decide to eat an apple. The hunger is me. The need to decide whether to postpone eating until dinnertime or have a snack now, is my own. I decide it will be okay to eat an apple now, so, I eat the apple.

All of the prior causes of me that could participate in my choice had to first become an integral part of who and what I am. Any other prior causes of me were missing from the room. Thus, it was who and what I was at that moment that actually made the choice to have the apple. It was really me, and not the prior causes of me.

The power to choose is an ability located uniquely within each of us. This power is nothing mystical or supernatural. It is our own brain, processing the information, that transforms our multiple options into a singular will to do something specific. This operation goes by the name "choosing", and we ourselves have the ability (power) to perform that operation.

Force, such as the force of gravity, causally necessitates the orbit of the Earth around the Sun. Without that force, the Earth would fly off into space. So, gravity has the power to keep the Earth orbiting the Sun. Gravity exercises this power without choosing to do so, so gravity has no free will. But it definitely has the power to necessitate planetary orbits and necessitate objects falling to the ground when dropped, etc.

Yes, but the problem still remains that ''determinism makes it impossible for us to “cause and control our actions in the right kind of way” to qualify as an instance of 'freedom of will'

No. Choosing from the menu what I will order for dinner is precisely the "right kind of way" that qualifies as a freely chosen will. I made the choice myself, while free of any coercion or undue influence. Therefore, it was a choice of my own free will.

You are using some other definition of free will. You need to explicitly state it and then be prepared to defend it.

Which overlooks the critical point: ''If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers" - meaning necessary control over the processes that make us who we are, how we think, what we think and what we do is absent, and necessitated actions do not qualify as freedom of will.

That argument does not hold up. It asserts that in order for me to be the "true" cause of any event, then I must not have any prior causes, because those prior causes would be the "true" causes of the event, and not me. The problem with that argument is that all of my prior causes also happen to have prior causes, therefore they cannot be the "true" causes either! The hard determinist undermines determinism with that argument, because you end up with no "true" causes of anything. So, the argument is absurd.

''....take just one of our senses, vision. Light enters through the cornea, reaches the retina and is converted to nerve impulses by complex chemical reactions (rod,cones, etc) and conveyed by the optic nerve to the visual cortex, from there it is propogated throughout the brain, gathering memory and infomation before the signals return to the visual cortex and a representation of that information is formed, a conscious image of what we see.

The visual information is interpreted by the various systems of the brain and translated into a signals to take action (visual,auditory,tactile reflexes) and on to the prefrontal cortex region which deal with complex responses, one's social values, cultural expectations, ethics, etc - the seat of one's personality and sense of self. Finally the brain forms conscious thoughts a deliberation and sends a commands to its motor neurons, muscle groups, glands... and the action is undertaken.''

Thanks. Please note the portion I've highlighted. The brain forming conscious thoughts of deliberation and sending commands to its motor neurons to carry out its deliberately chosen intention is called a "freely chosen will", or simply "free will".
 

Copernicus

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...
You seem to think that human bodies are not mechanical systems for some reason. This is just doubling down on a genetic fallacy. Because robots are not "fleshy machines", you believe that bodies made of different materials cannot be made to perform the same functions. At least, that appears to be the unwarranted conclusion you are jumping to.

I didn't say, or intend to imply, that human bodies are not mechanical systems. My distinction was meant to be between biological and artificial mechanical systems, evolved brains in contrast to silicon chips and circuitry. That's all.

The problem here is not that you made a distinction. It is that you never explained its relevance. There is no reason to believe that an artificial mechanical system cannot do what an evolved biological mechanical one can. You are making a gratuitous distinction without a difference here.

...

Nobody has conflated intelligence with will, so that is a straw man. Obviously, we want people to make intelligent decisions, but they have been known to make stupid ones. Animals have brains and are obviously possess varying degrees of intelligence. The only reason they've been inserted in this discussion is because they don't have the same sense of morality that humans do, and moral responsibility is an issue that we associate with free will. However, in a debate over causal necessity where a concept like "free will" is on the chopping block, I don't see how moral responsibility is going to escape the same doom. I consider the moral responsibility issue as tangential, because morality only concerns human interactions, and even humans exempt each other from responsibility for their actions under many different circumstances. Animals are usually not held responsible for their actions by humans unless they can be trained to behave the way we want them to.

You brought up 'free will' in robots when your presented: ''Here is a well-known 1999 paper by AI pioneer, John McCarthy: FREE WILL-EVEN FOR ROBOTS''

I brought it up as a response to your skepticism that free will had anything to do with robotics, nothing more. I proved that it was a topic of interest in AI.

I pointed out that intelligence is not a matter of will, but circuitry, architecture and software. That a non-biological mechanical system has neither consciousness or will, only functionality.

That being the distinction between biological and artificial mechanical systems. We as biological systems have both consciousness and will, but will is not the driver or regulator, nor is will free. It is just will, the urge or drive to act.

You really seem stuck on this assumption that there is something special about biological mechanical systems that gives them a special power unavailable to mechanical systems composed of non-biological materials. I don't know why you assert your assumption here, but it is gratuitous. Your position on materialism is the same as mine--that the human mind depends entirely on physical brain activity. Why is the material that the "brain" is constructed from so relevant to your argument? You do realize, don't you, that this is the very essence of a genetic fallacy?

Others have already dealt with this. From my perspective, it lacks a definition of what the word "powers' means, so it requires reading the paper that this is an abstract for in order to really discuss its merits intelligently.

It's been dealt with countless times: it means the regulative control necessary to qualify as freedom of will;

If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will


Movement Intention After Parietal Cortex Stimulation in Humans;
''Parietal and premotor cortex regions are serious contenders for bringing motor intentions and motor responses into awareness. We used electrical stimulation in seven patients undergoing awake brain surgery. Stimulating the right inferior parietal regions triggered a strong intention and desire to move the contralateral hand, arm, or foot, whereas stimulating the left inferior parietal region provoked the intention to move the lips and to talk. When stimulation intensity was increased in parietal areas, participants believed they had really performed these movements, although no electromyographic activity was detected. Stimulation of the premotor region triggered overt mouth and contralateral limb movements. Yet, patients firmly denied that they had moved. Conscious intention and motor awareness thus arise from increased parietal activity before movement execution.''

The rebuttals have also been given countless times, so you don't get to declare yourself the winner of an argument if you just keep restating your original position as if it hadn't been refuted repeatedly and decisively. In the mind of the agent, there are alternative actions, so the agent believes it could have acted otherwise. Agents don't know which action would be best, and a calculation is made whose outcome is ultimately determined by factors unknown to the agent at the time. Free will is about the perception of an agent at a point in time, even if its future behavior is determined by prior events outside of its control. The freedom of choice is in the perspective of the agent, not God.
 
Last edited:
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The compatibilist proposition is simply that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world.

The proof is this:
P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

P1 is incorrect -and misleading - because an action is not chosen in the sense the sense that another option was possible.

An action is chosen in the sense that two or more options are input, some criteria of comparative evaluation is applied, and a single choice is output. For example, a person enters a restaurant, browses the menu and places their order. I'm sure you've seen this many times, so it cannot reasonably be said that choosing doesn't happen.

You are using the "figurative sense", which does not reflect what is actually happening in the real world. Your claim is that, since the choice was inevitable it is AS IF choosing never happened. But it is an objective fact that choosing actually happened.

The problem with the figurative sense is that every figurative statement is literally false. I am describing what is actually happening, and you are not.

Given determinism, the action taken was not chosen, it was necessitated.

No. Given determinism it was causally necessary/inevitable that the action would be actually chosen.

If a person's choice was inevitable, then it was also inevitable that the person would perform the choosing. The notion of universal causal necessity/inevitability does not imply what you believe it implies.

The wording of P1 is designed to give the impression of choice where no choice exists. Choice requires alternate possibilities.

You're still caught up in the figurative sense. In the literal sense, the person in the restaurant has an actual menu of alternate possibilities. You cannot claim that any item on the menu is impossible, because the chef is prepared to fix any meal that the person chooses.

No alternate possibilities exist within a determined system.

Pardon me, but isn't that a menu you're holding?

The action that follows is a necessitated action, which if determined, must necessarily proceed unimpeded or unrestricted. The action must necessarily happen as determined.

And if the choosing is a necessitated action then it must necessarily happen. There is no way around this.


P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.

Correct. Not just reliably caused, but necessarily caused with no possible alternate action.

Well, no. It was causally necessary that the restaurant would be there, that it would have menus on the table full of alternate possibilities, and that the person would choose one of them, of their own free will.

P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).

An action is not freely chosen, it is necessitated by goals, reasons or interests that have their own determinants/antecedents. We don't choose the circumstances of our birth, genetics, location, culture, social and economic circumstance, etc. Someone born into the slums of Calcutta is necessarily different perspective on life, self-identity and prospects than someone from a well to do family living in New York.

1. Free will does not require freedom from prior causes. In fact, the prior causes are assumed and explicitly referenced by "(with their prior causes)".
2. Free will does not require freedom from who and what we are at the time of choosing. P3 includes all of the genetics, culture, etc. which one would normally expect to apply.

Free will only requires freedom from coercion and other forms of undue influence that might remove our control over our own choices.

P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).

External force or influence interferes with or disrupts a persons desires or wishes,

Yes. A guy with a gun can force his will upon a person, forcing them to submit their will to his.

which, being determined by the factors outlined above, ...

Already included in my argument.

were not an example of free will.

A person does not get to choose their own genetics, etc., so things that are not chosen are unrelated to free will. Free will is about what we choose to do.

The distinction lies between acting according to one's will and being forced against one's will: doing what you don't want to do.

Yes. That is what coercion is about, when someone forces a person to do something against their will.

What you do want to do is determined by prior causes

Yes. So, causal necessity cannot be viewed as coercion, because coercion forces the person to do what they don't want, and it is logically and physically impossible for causal necessity to do the same. Causal necessity is a person doing what they would have done anyway. It never "makes" them do something they would rather not do.


''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.'' - cold comfort in compatibilism

Please stop quoting that trash. It adds nothing to your argument.

C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

The conclusion, for reasons outlined above, does not follow from P1, P2, P3 or P4.

Unfortunately, the reasons you outlined above fail to contradict any of the premises or the conclusion.
 
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fromderinside

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Now things get interesting. Your response forced me to take a crash, three-hour tour through locality and to scan an article on Einstein's thought experiments.

 Einstein's thought experiments

So while I still hold that determinism is the basis for the scientific method I accept there are aspects of QM that need resolution for us to get to a reality we can communicate. I thank you Jarhyn for pushing me there.

At the same time, I'm ever more confident that information and thermodynamics are related. But, at the same time I'm with Bohr in all that we need to be concerned about are empirical (deterministic= scientific method) experimental results.

Even now I'm seeing advances in science following empirical principles, keeping me firmly in the Determinists camp. Yet it would be a hoot for a deterministic methodology to arrive at reality as not deterministic.
"Indetermined" is not equal to "indeterministic" or even "probabilistic"

It just means that "the information that will create the next configuration if this stable system has not happened and does not exist within the locality yet.

Read my post again while holding that in your mind and then make a more correct reply, if any.
Thank ewe for clearing me up. Just because something may as are not in a locality, an energy field already exists, there is always something in space which is one reason why I wrote quantum locality is just a convenience in an earlier post.


Schwinger, DeRaad, and Milton (1978) are cited by Milonni (1994) as validly, though unconventionally, explaining the Casimir effect with a model in which "the vacuum is regarded as truly a state with all physical properties equal to zero."[31][32] In this model, the observed phenomena are explained as the effects of the electron motions on the electromagnetic field, called the source field effect. Milonni writes:

The basic idea here will be that the Casimir force may be derived from the source fields alone even in completely conventional QED, ... Milonni provides detailed argument that the measurable physical effects usually attributed to the vacuum electromagnetic field cannot be explained by that field alone, but require in addition a contribution from the self-energy of the electrons, or their radiation reaction. He writes: "The radiation reaction and the vacuum fields are two aspects of the same thing when it comes to physical interpretations of various QED processes including the Lamb shift, van der Waals forces, and Casimir effects."[33]
I think that is a pretty good placeholder for fields being everywhere. Now all we need do is include that information substrate is not the particular information itself leading to your noting "... stable system ....". But the fields exist in some form, state everywhere.

So, yes the specific state can't travel faster than the speed of light but some status of the state exists there so no cake and eat it too. The field exists all the time, just not in a particular configuration to introduce probabilistic nature to support speed limits in QM.

I think that handles sets stage for whatever we need to explain how reality and relativity exist at the same time.
This is.. so you realize that you are claiming all information exists everywhere? This is patently false. Not to mention also false due to the exclusion principle.

Information is not globally available. If it were, there would be no failure to ever predict anything and we would all know 100% of the future.

How is it so hard for you to accept that, in a locality, knowledge of oncoming states is not possible until those states happen?

There is a locality, the locality contains a discrete arrangement of stuff, and then that locality has additional contextual information become a part of it. The nature of the machine, part of what it has previously been caused it to be, is something that will generate decision on its context.

The fact that I can "draw a line" around any thing in the universe and look at just that one piece of the universe and say "IF the universe around this thing contains waves that will hit this bit of the thing presently, THEN the thing will change this way; else, it will change that way" is what choice is.

I try to narrow things down so you can understand them by looking at things that only experience a single form of decision, mostly because the more complicated things are much more obscure.

Anything you can draw a line around and make a statement like that, that thing experiences decision and choice. Which is... Pretty much everything once you get to standard model scales.

There will always be localities that do not contain certain information.

No matter how much you wish to squeeze locality out of the picture in terms of it's impact on the hiddenness of the future, it's still there, keeping you ignorant of the next moment, forcing you to make decisions: locally, there ARE many real possibilities. IF you see the red light, THEN you will stop.

Determinism does not invalidate choice. Rather it defines and creates it.
Not squeezing because of hiddenness, just saying that information is available localities to some extent everywhere, not hidden. The probabilistic game begins to play as current information obeys the speed limit. Otherwise, the locality is moot. Something that has not arrived is being transmitted, not hidden. It is simply obeying material law. Otherwise, there'd be time travel. Once created information exists and the mailman will deliver it.

What we're having trouble with is how humans seem to have information before behavior. Think of behavior as many rather than singular. Then humans can have information, subvocalized and heard, before the muscles and other components engage. both are carriers of information, perhaps the same information or like, perhaps not.
 

fromderinside

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Now things get interesting. Your response forced me to take a crash, three-hour tour through locality and to scan an article on Einstein's thought experiments.

 Einstein's thought experiments

So while I still hold that determinism is the basis for the scientific method I accept there are aspects of QM that need resolution for us to get to a reality we can communicate. I thank you Jarhyn for pushing me there.

At the same time, I'm ever more confident that information and thermodynamics are related. But, at the same time I'm with Bohr in all that we need to be concerned about are empirical (deterministic= scientific method) experimental results.

Even now I'm seeing advances in science following empirical principles, keeping me firmly in the Determinists camp. Yet it would be a hoot for a deterministic methodology to arrive at reality as not deterministic.
"Indetermined" is not equal to "indeterministic" or even "probabilistic"

It just means that "the information that will create the next configuration if this stable system has not happened and does not exist within the locality yet.

Read my post again while holding that in your mind and then make a more correct reply, if any.
Thank ewe for clearing me up. Just because something may as are not in a locality, an energy field already exists, there is always something in space which is one reason why I wrote quantum locality is just a convenience in an earlier post.


Schwinger, DeRaad, and Milton (1978) are cited by Milonni (1994) as validly, though unconventionally, explaining the Casimir effect with a model in which "the vacuum is regarded as truly a state with all physical properties equal to zero."[31][32] In this model, the observed phenomena are explained as the effects of the electron motions on the electromagnetic field, called the source field effect. Milonni writes:

The basic idea here will be that the Casimir force may be derived from the source fields alone even in completely conventional QED, ... Milonni provides detailed argument that the measurable physical effects usually attributed to the vacuum electromagnetic field cannot be explained by that field alone, but require in addition a contribution from the self-energy of the electrons, or their radiation reaction. He writes: "The radiation reaction and the vacuum fields are two aspects of the same thing when it comes to physical interpretations of various QED processes including the Lamb shift, van der Waals forces, and Casimir effects."[33]
I think that is a pretty good placeholder for fields being everywhere. Now all we need do is include that information substrate is not the particular information itself leading to your noting "... stable system ....". But the fields exist in some form, state everywhere.

So, yes the specific state can't travel faster than the speed of light but some status of the state exists there so no cake and eat it too. The field exists all the time, just not in a particular configuration to introduce probabilistic nature to support speed limits in QM.

I think that handles sets stage for whatever we need to explain how reality and relativity exist at the same time.
This is.. so you realize that you are claiming all information exists everywhere? This is patently false. Not to mention also false due to the exclusion principle.

Information is not globally available. If it were, there would be no failure to ever predict anything and we would all know 100% of the future.

How is it so hard for you to accept that, in a locality, knowledge of oncoming states is not possible until those states happen?

There is a locality, the locality contains a discrete arrangement of stuff, and then that locality has additional contextual information become a part of it. The nature of the machine, part of what it has previously been caused it to be, is something that will generate decision on its context.

The fact that I can "draw a line" around any thing in the universe and look at just that one piece of the universe and say "IF the universe around this thing contains waves that will hit this bit of the thing presently, THEN the thing will change this way; else, it will change that way" is what choice is.

I try to narrow things down so you can understand them by looking at things that only experience a single form of decision, mostly because the more complicated things are much more obscure.

Anything you can draw a line around and make a statement like that, that thing experiences decision and choice. Which is... Pretty much everything once you get to standard model scales.

There will always be localities that do not contain certain information.

No matter how much you wish to squeeze locality out of the picture in terms of it's impact on the hiddenness of the future, it's still there, keeping you ignorant of the next moment, forcing you to make decisions: locally, there ARE many real possibilities. IF you see the red light, THEN you will stop.

Determinism does not invalidate choice. Rather it defines and creates it.
Not squeezing because of hiddenness, just saying that information is available localities to some extent everywhere, not hidden. The probabilistic game begins to play as current information obeys the speed limit. Otherwise, the locality is moot. Something that has not arrived is being transmitted, not hidden. It is simply obeying material law. Otherwise, there'd be time travel. Once created information exists and the mailman will deliver it.

What we're having trouble with is how humans seem to have information before behavior. Think of behavior as many rather than singular. Then humans can have information, subvocalized and heard, together with or before the muscles and other components engage. Both are carriers of information, perhaps the same information or like, perhaps not. Notice I didn't invoke choice. Didn't have to because the situation was properly defined. To understand try this thought experiment. Consider a plan then consider the muscles acting on the plan. What you'll get is confirmation you have executed the plan. I would be a waste of words to say we 'chose'. Here we go loop-de-loop ......
 

Jarhyn

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Now things get interesting. Your response forced me to take a crash, three-hour tour through locality and to scan an article on Einstein's thought experiments.

 Einstein's thought experiments

So while I still hold that determinism is the basis for the scientific method I accept there are aspects of QM that need resolution for us to get to a reality we can communicate. I thank you Jarhyn for pushing me there.

At the same time, I'm ever more confident that information and thermodynamics are related. But, at the same time I'm with Bohr in all that we need to be concerned about are empirical (deterministic= scientific method) experimental results.

Even now I'm seeing advances in science following empirical principles, keeping me firmly in the Determinists camp. Yet it would be a hoot for a deterministic methodology to arrive at reality as not deterministic.
"Indetermined" is not equal to "indeterministic" or even "probabilistic"

It just means that "the information that will create the next configuration if this stable system has not happened and does not exist within the locality yet.

Read my post again while holding that in your mind and then make a more correct reply, if any.
Thank ewe for clearing me up. Just because something may as are not in a locality, an energy field already exists, there is always something in space which is one reason why I wrote quantum locality is just a convenience in an earlier post.


Schwinger, DeRaad, and Milton (1978) are cited by Milonni (1994) as validly, though unconventionally, explaining the Casimir effect with a model in which "the vacuum is regarded as truly a state with all physical properties equal to zero."[31][32] In this model, the observed phenomena are explained as the effects of the electron motions on the electromagnetic field, called the source field effect. Milonni writes:

The basic idea here will be that the Casimir force may be derived from the source fields alone even in completely conventional QED, ... Milonni provides detailed argument that the measurable physical effects usually attributed to the vacuum electromagnetic field cannot be explained by that field alone, but require in addition a contribution from the self-energy of the electrons, or their radiation reaction. He writes: "The radiation reaction and the vacuum fields are two aspects of the same thing when it comes to physical interpretations of various QED processes including the Lamb shift, van der Waals forces, and Casimir effects."[33]
I think that is a pretty good placeholder for fields being everywhere. Now all we need do is include that information substrate is not the particular information itself leading to your noting "... stable system ....". But the fields exist in some form, state everywhere.

So, yes the specific state can't travel faster than the speed of light but some status of the state exists there so no cake and eat it too. The field exists all the time, just not in a particular configuration to introduce probabilistic nature to support speed limits in QM.

I think that handles sets stage for whatever we need to explain how reality and relativity exist at the same time.
This is.. so you realize that you are claiming all information exists everywhere? This is patently false. Not to mention also false due to the exclusion principle.

Information is not globally available. If it were, there would be no failure to ever predict anything and we would all know 100% of the future.

How is it so hard for you to accept that, in a locality, knowledge of oncoming states is not possible until those states happen?

There is a locality, the locality contains a discrete arrangement of stuff, and then that locality has additional contextual information become a part of it. The nature of the machine, part of what it has previously been caused it to be, is something that will generate decision on its context.

The fact that I can "draw a line" around any thing in the universe and look at just that one piece of the universe and say "IF the universe around this thing contains waves that will hit this bit of the thing presently, THEN the thing will change this way; else, it will change that way" is what choice is.

I try to narrow things down so you can understand them by looking at things that only experience a single form of decision, mostly because the more complicated things are much more obscure.

Anything you can draw a line around and make a statement like that, that thing experiences decision and choice. Which is... Pretty much everything once you get to standard model scales.

There will always be localities that do not contain certain information.

No matter how much you wish to squeeze locality out of the picture in terms of it's impact on the hiddenness of the future, it's still there, keeping you ignorant of the next moment, forcing you to make decisions: locally, there ARE many real possibilities. IF you see the red light, THEN you will stop.

Determinism does not invalidate choice. Rather it defines and creates it.
Not squeezing because of hiddenness, just saying that information is available localities to some extent everywhere, not hidden. The probabilistic game begins to play as current information obeys the speed limit. Otherwise, the locality is moot. Something that has not arrived is being transmitted, not hidden. It is simply obeying material law. Otherwise, there'd be time travel. Once created information exists and the mailman will deliver it.

What we're having trouble with is how humans seem to have information before behavior. Think of behavior as many rather than singular. Then humans can have information, subvocalized and heard, before the muscles and other components engage. both are carriers of information, perhaps the same information or like, perhaps not.
You claim that "it is being transmitted and is not hidden".

This is false; It is locally hidden.

This is material law.

The FACT that the mailman has not yet delivered it is relevant.
 

fromderinside

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Now things get interesting. Your response forced me to take a crash, three-hour tour through locality and to scan an article on Einstein's thought experiments.

 Einstein's thought experiments

So while I still hold that determinism is the basis for the scientific method I accept there are aspects of QM that need resolution for us to get to a reality we can communicate. I thank you Jarhyn for pushing me there.

At the same time, I'm ever more confident that information and thermodynamics are related. But, at the same time I'm with Bohr in all that we need to be concerned about are empirical (deterministic= scientific method) experimental results.

Even now I'm seeing advances in science following empirical principles, keeping me firmly in the Determinists camp. Yet it would be a hoot for a deterministic methodology to arrive at reality as not deterministic.
"Indetermined" is not equal to "indeterministic" or even "probabilistic"

It just means that "the information that will create the next configuration if this stable system has not happened and does not exist within the locality yet.

Read my post again while holding that in your mind and then make a more correct reply, if any.
Thank ewe for clearing me up. Just because something may as are not in a locality, an energy field already exists, there is always something in space which is one reason why I wrote quantum locality is just a convenience in an earlier post.


Schwinger, DeRaad, and Milton (1978) are cited by Milonni (1994) as validly, though unconventionally, explaining the Casimir effect with a model in which "the vacuum is regarded as truly a state with all physical properties equal to zero."[31][32] In this model, the observed phenomena are explained as the effects of the electron motions on the electromagnetic field, called the source field effect. Milonni writes:

The basic idea here will be that the Casimir force may be derived from the source fields alone even in completely conventional QED, ... Milonni provides detailed argument that the measurable physical effects usually attributed to the vacuum electromagnetic field cannot be explained by that field alone, but require in addition a contribution from the self-energy of the electrons, or their radiation reaction. He writes: "The radiation reaction and the vacuum fields are two aspects of the same thing when it comes to physical interpretations of various QED processes including the Lamb shift, van der Waals forces, and Casimir effects."[33]
I think that is a pretty good placeholder for fields being everywhere. Now all we need do is include that information substrate is not the particular information itself leading to your noting "... stable system ....". But the fields exist in some form, state everywhere.

So, yes the specific state can't travel faster than the speed of light but some status of the state exists there so no cake and eat it too. The field exists all the time, just not in a particular configuration to introduce probabilistic nature to support speed limits in QM.

I think that handles sets stage for whatever we need to explain how reality and relativity exist at the same time.
This is.. so you realize that you are claiming all information exists everywhere? This is patently false. Not to mention also false due to the exclusion principle.

Information is not globally available. If it were, there would be no failure to ever predict anything and we would all know 100% of the future.

How is it so hard for you to accept that, in a locality, knowledge of oncoming states is not possible until those states happen?

There is a locality, the locality contains a discrete arrangement of stuff, and then that locality has additional contextual information become a part of it. The nature of the machine, part of what it has previously been caused it to be, is something that will generate decision on its context.

The fact that I can "draw a line" around any thing in the universe and look at just that one piece of the universe and say "IF the universe around this thing contains waves that will hit this bit of the thing presently, THEN the thing will change this way; else, it will change that way" is what choice is.

I try to narrow things down so you can understand them by looking at things that only experience a single form of decision, mostly because the more complicated things are much more obscure.

Anything you can draw a line around and make a statement like that, that thing experiences decision and choice. Which is... Pretty much everything once you get to standard model scales.

There will always be localities that do not contain certain information.

No matter how much you wish to squeeze locality out of the picture in terms of it's impact on the hiddenness of the future, it's still there, keeping you ignorant of the next moment, forcing you to make decisions: locally, there ARE many real possibilities. IF you see the red light, THEN you will stop.

Determinism does not invalidate choice. Rather it defines and creates it.
Not squeezing because of hiddenness, just saying that information is available localities to some extent everywhere, not hidden. The probabilistic game begins to play as current information obeys the speed limit. Otherwise, the locality is moot. Something that has not arrived is being transmitted, not hidden. It is simply obeying material law. Otherwise, there'd be time travel. Once created information exists and the mailman will deliver it.

What we're having trouble with is how humans seem to have information before behavior. Think of behavior as many rather than singular. Then humans can have information, subvocalized and heard, before the muscles and other components engage. both are carriers of information, perhaps the same information or like, perhaps not.
You claim that "it is being transmitted and is not hidden".

This is false; It is locally hidden.

This is material law.

The FACT that the mailman has not yet delivered it is relevant.
How far are you willing to go with your mailman analogy. I contend it is in the system and the mailman has it. I've already specified the speed limit constraint. Then you tell me the location is material, that because choosing is important the processor and register in the processor are in a locality. Well so is a bit of field information reserving the line for the particular content at the location even in the register.

So why exclude information just because it takes time to complete the trip. Seems to me that location as a condition isn't very viable given the system exists to receive the message whether it is adjacent, in location or information must travel space to the location where some of the information exists already.

The information contains the operation and the machine merely contains the processes necessary to execute the information. It's not choosing due to the existence of locality because the locality has nothing to do with choosing. That a machine has many capabilities is meaningless because the information only produces information to do one thing. Locality only establishes the place where the information is executed.

Poof.
 

DBT

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The compatibilist proposition is simply that free will is a meaningful concept within a deterministic world.

The proof is this:
P1: A freely chosen will is when someone chooses for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.
P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.
P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).
P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).
C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

I've just demonstrated a proof of compatibility and you have not questioned any of the premises, so I believe you are stuck with the conclusion: The notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

You have brought this up before and I have addressed each and every point many times.

P1 is incorrect -and misleading - because an action is not chosen in the sense the sense that another option was possible. Given determinism, the action taken was not chosen, it was necessitated. The wording of P1 is designed to give the impression of choice where no choice exists. Choice requires alternate possibilities. No alternate possibilities exist within a determined system. The action that follows is a necessitated action, which if determined, must necessarily proceed unimpeded or unrestricted. The action must necessarily happen as determined.

P2: A world is deterministic if every event is reliably caused by prior events.

Correct. Not just reliably caused, but necessarily caused with no possible alternate action.

P3: A freely chosen will is reliably caused by the person's own goals, reasons, or interests (with their prior causes).

An action is not freely chosen, it is necessitated by goals, reasons or interests that have their own determinants/antecedents. We don't choose the circumstances of our birth, genetics, location, culture, social and economic circumstance, etc. Someone born into the slums of Calcutta is necessarily different perspective on life, self-identity and prospects than someone from a well to do family living in New York.

P4: An unfree choice is reliably caused by coercion or undue influence (with their prior causes).

External force or influence interferes with or disrupts a persons desires or wishes, which, being determined by the factors outlined above, were not an example of free will.

The distinction lies between acting according to one's will and being forced against one's will: doing what you don't want to do.

What you do want to do is determined by prior causes;
''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes. Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms.'' - cold comfort in compatibilism

C: Therefore, the notion of a freely chosen will (and its opposite) is still meaningful within a fully deterministic world.

The conclusion, for reasons outlined above, does not follow from P1, P2, P3 or P4.

Sorry.











This rebuttal reduces to: 'choice cannot exist in a deterministic world'.

This position is only sustainable if one subscribes to a usage of 'choose' that virtually no one else uses.


Common usage refers to action and appeared, which doesn't necessarily relate to the ultimate nature of the world, that if determinism is true, all events are fixed according to initial conditions and proceed as a matter of natural law. If that is the case, options are not chosen, they are necessitated. There is no possible alternate action. Common usage does not account for the physics of determinism, only surface appearance. Just like we feel that we are making conscious decisions, yet neuroscience tells us that the work is done unconsciously milliseconds prior to conscious experience.

This has been explained over and over and over....yet the same objections are trotted out regardless.
 

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...
You seem to think that human bodies are not mechanical systems for some reason. This is just doubling down on a genetic fallacy. Because robots are not "fleshy machines", you believe that bodies made of different materials cannot be made to perform the same functions. At least, that appears to be the unwarranted conclusion you are jumping to.

I didn't say, or intend to imply, that human bodies are not mechanical systems. My distinction was meant to be between biological and artificial mechanical systems, evolved brains in contrast to silicon chips and circuitry. That's all.

The problem here is not that you made a distinction. It is that you never explained its relevance. There is no reason to believe that an artificial mechanical system cannot do what an evolved biological mechanical one can. You are making a gratuitous distinction without a difference here.

The relevance is that machine intelligence has neither consciousness or will, only function. Humans and other animals have functionality that acts through the medium of consciousness and will (the urge or prompt to act).

Some feel that because they are making conscious, willed, decisions that this is free will at work. Machined cannot think consciously nor do they have will. Which is relevant for that definition of free will, making conscious decisions.

Compatibilism of course defines free will as acting in accordance to ones will, which is in contrast to non biological mechanical intelligence which has neither consciousness or will, but is able to produce determinations and unimpeded actions based on its deteminations.

The significance of all this has been explained numerous times, and I'm tired of repeating.






...

Nobody has conflated intelligence with will, so that is a straw man. Obviously, we want people to make intelligent decisions, but they have been known to make stupid ones. Animals have brains and are obviously possess varying degrees of intelligence. The only reason they've been inserted in this discussion is because they don't have the same sense of morality that humans do, and moral responsibility is an issue that we associate with free will. However, in a debate over causal necessity where a concept like "free will" is on the chopping block, I don't see how moral responsibility is going to escape the same doom. I consider the moral responsibility issue as tangential, because morality only concerns human interactions, and even humans exempt each other from responsibility for their actions under many different circumstances. Animals are usually not held responsible for their actions by humans unless they can be trained to behave the way we want them to.

You brought up 'free will' in robots when your presented: ''Here is a well-known 1999 paper by AI pioneer, John McCarthy: FREE WILL-EVEN FOR ROBOTS''

I brought it up as a response to your skepticism that free will had anything to do with robotics, nothing more. I proved that it was a topic of interest in AI.

It is a topic of interest in AI, however as far as I know, AI has yet to achieve consciousness or will.

I pointed out that intelligence is not a matter of will, but circuitry, architecture and software. That a non-biological mechanical system has neither consciousness or will, only functionality.

That being the distinction between biological and artificial mechanical systems. We as biological systems have both consciousness and will, but will is not the driver or regulator, nor is will free. It is just will, the urge or drive to act.

You really seem stuck on this assumption that there is something special about biological mechanical systems that gives them a special power unavailable to mechanical systems composed of non-biological materials. I don't know why you assert your assumption here, but it is gratuitous. Your position on materialism is the same as mine--that the human mind depends entirely on physical brain activity. Why is the material that the "brain" is constructed from so relevant to your argument? You do realize, don't you, that this is the very essence of a genetic fallacy?

I'm not stuck on anything. You asked for a distinction between the brain and Computer AI, and I gave it. Pointing out that AI has neither mind or will, only functionality, however complex. The suggestion was that free will may be possible for AI.

That's all. Don't read too much into it.

The rebuttals have also been given countless times, so you don't get to declare yourself the winner of an argument if you just keep restating your original position as if it hadn't been refuted repeatedly and decisively. In the mind of the agent, there are alternative actions, so the agent believes it could have acted otherwise. Agents don't know which action would be best, and a calculation is made whose outcome is ultimately determined by factors unknown to the agent at the time. Free will is about the perception of an agent at a point in time, even if its future behavior is determined by prior events outside of its control. The freedom of choice is in the perspective of the agent, not God.

Compatibilism has no rebuttals, only carefully crafted wording designed to give the impression of free will where no free will exists.

Acting according to one's will is not an instance of free will, but a necessity. Determined actions are not freely chosen, they are necessitated

The distinction between being forced against ones will and acting in accordance with ones will is that. Will itself is not free, acting in accordance with ones will is inevitable, unless disrupted by force....with that disruptive element itself being determined.

The correct description being ''he acted according to his will'' or ''he was forced against his will'' Just 'will' because if the world is determined, free will is an illusion.
 

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Abstract

If one’s solution to the free will problem is in terms of real causal powers of agents then one ought to be an incompatibilist. Some premises are contentious but the following new argument for incompatibilism is advanced:

1. If causal determinism is true, all events are necessitated
2. If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers
3. Free will consists in the exercise of an agent’s powers
Therefore, if causal determinism is true, there is no free will; which is to say that free will is incompatible with determinism, so compatibilism is false.

Premise #2, "If all events are necessitated, then there are no powers", is not only false, but is clearly paradoxical. If there are no powers, then how is any event ever necessitated?

Premise #2 clearly refers to determinants that act upon us, elements that we have no control over: antecedents.

But how can those determinants act upon us if they have no power?! The authors of that article have blundered. I'm sure they had some idea in mind, some new way of expressing the same old nonsense, but they have unfortunately only added more nonsense.

Cause and effect (causal determinism) is the power. Cause is an effect and effect becomes cause. Physics, the nature of matter/energy and progression of determined events is the power that shapes and forms our being, our thoughts and actions.

Evolution brought us into being, determined our genetic makeup, our capacities and weaknesses, our thoughts and our actions.

That is the nature and definition of a determined world. Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

Compatibilism accepts that the world is determined, but defines free will as acting in accordance to one's will.

A definition that is inadequate to prove the proposition because mind and will itself is determined and the actions that follow are inevitable actions, not freely willed actions

''Not freely willed'' in the real sense that what is being willed is a consequence of antecedents, the pesky actions of cause/effect, each cause an effect and each effect a cause as time and events roll on, unstoppable as a runaway freight train, no deviations, no alternate thoughts, decisions or actions, no maybe, no if only, no what if, only what is.

That is determinism.


The visual information is interpreted by the various systems of the brain and translated into a signals to take action (visual,auditory,tactile reflexes) and on to the prefrontal cortex region which deal with complex responses, one's social values, cultural expectations, ethics, etc - the seat of one's personality and sense of self. Finally the brain forms conscious thoughts a deliberation and sends a commands to its motor neurons, muscle groups, glands... and the action is undertaken.''

Thanks. Please note the portion I've highlighted. The brain forming conscious thoughts of deliberation and sending commands to its motor neurons to carry out its deliberately chosen intention is called a "freely chosen will", or simply "free will".


Only by those who the desire to prove the idea of free will through the use of carefully crafted wording. Conscious thoughts or deliberations are not the means of decision making, only the report, a part of the conscious 'mental map' of self and one's surroundings generated as a means of navigation within a complex environment: the world around us.

Basically:
''What did you have for breakfast this morning? Was it delicious? Was it one to forget? Whatever it was, you didn't choose to have it. You might think you did. But, in actuality, you didn't. And though you may have had the conscious awareness of choice — porridge or toast? coffee or tea? — and remember making an active decision, the fact is you could not have selected any other option. Any decision you think you may have made was simply an illusion.''

''And, unfortunately, it doesn't just stop at breakfast. Or lunch. Or dinner. Or in fact any decision you ever remember making. Everything you've done couldn't possibly have happened any other way, and everything you will do will be decided for you — without any input from your conscious self.''

''Free will is an illusion. Our wills are simply not of our own making. Thoughts and intentions emerge from background causes of which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control. We do not have the freedom we think we have.''
 

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Natural Philosophy, Game Theoretic Ethicist
How far are you willing to go with your mailman analogy. I contend it is in the system and the mailman has it. I've already specified the speed limit constraint.
Nobody is contending whether "the mailman has it". The mailBOX does not.

Until the mail is in my hot little hand, I have a choice set up, just waiting to see which way the pins go. Then when the mail comes, decision on the choice happens
 

The AntiChris

Senior Member
Joined
Mar 22, 2002
Messages
515
Location
UK
Basic Beliefs
Positive Atheist
Common usage does not account for the physics of determinism, only surface appearance.
You're confirming what I said. When you talk about 'choice', you're not talking about about the same thing as the rest of us.
 
Joined
Sep 29, 2021
Messages
490
Location
Virginia
Basic Beliefs
Humanist
Cause and effect (causal determinism) is the power.

Nope. Concepts do not possess any powers. You are once again suggesting that causal necessity as an agent exercising control over the actual objects and forces that make up the actual universe. The reason I keep pointing this out is that you and I happen to be actual objects within the actual universe.

If I toss a rock off a cliff, it will be the force of gravity that causally necessitates that the rock will fall downward. It will not be causal necessity that exerts power over the rock. It will be the power of gravity that is causing the falling.

In the same fashion, it will be my own power to lift the rock, and toss it over the cliff, that causally necessitates that the rock will have a long journey to the base of the cliff.

Cause is an effect and effect becomes cause.

Yes. Prior events caused me, and now I myself can cause new events.

Physics, the nature of matter/energy and progression of determined events is the power that shapes and forms our being, our thoughts and actions.

Physics describes what is happening in physical terms. But Physics is not a power that "shapes or forms" anything. Physics describes gravity and inertia, but physics is not gravity or inertia.

Physics can describe the power that I exercise when I pick up the rock. Physics can describe the power that I exercise when I toss the rock over the side of the cliff.

But physics cannot lift the rock or toss the rock. Only I can do that. Physics has no power to actually do anything.

And when it comes to describing why I happened to pick up and toss the rock, Physics is at a complete loss. It must hand off those questions to Biology and Psychology.

Evolution brought us into being, determined our genetic makeup, our capacities and weaknesses, our thoughts and our actions.

Yes. Prior events caused me, and now I myself can cause new events, according to my own goals, reasons, and interests. Evolution will not choose for me what I will have for breakfast. I will have to do that myself.

That is the nature and definition of a determined world. Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

Again, determinism is not an agent with its own agenda and the power to enforce it. Determinism is the belief that all events are the reliable result of prior events. For example, my choosing to toss the rock off the cliff was the prior event that causally necessitated the rock falling to the base of the cliff. And I was able to do that choosing and that tossing without breaking any of the laws of nature.

Compatibilism accepts that the world is determined, but defines free will as acting in accordance to one's will.

Yes.

A definition that is inadequate to prove the proposition because mind and will itself is determined and the actions that follow are inevitable actions, not freely willed actions

Our choices are always causally necessary/inevitable, and, when free of coercion and undue influence, our choices are always our own. But when not free of coercion and undue influence, our choices are not our own.

There is no "either inevitable or me". It is always "both inevitable and inevitably me" (or "both inevitable and the guy with the gun").

''Not freely willed'' in the real sense that what is being willed is a consequence of antecedents, the pesky actions of cause/effect, each cause an effect and each effect a cause as time and events roll on, unstoppable as a runaway freight train, no deviations, no alternate thoughts, decisions or actions, no maybe, no if only, no what if, only what is.

I don't find my prior causes to be pesky. After all, they made me the man that I am today. And I happen to be intelligent being with the ability to imagine alternative possibilities and choose for myself what I will do.

That is determinism.

Yes, and free will, too.


The visual information is interpreted by the various systems of the brain and translated into a signals to take action (visual,auditory,tactile reflexes) and on to the prefrontal cortex region which deal with complex responses, one's social values, cultural expectations, ethics, etc - the seat of one's personality and sense of self. Finally the brain forms conscious thoughts a deliberation and sends a commands to its motor neurons, muscle groups, glands... and the action is undertaken.''

Thanks. Please note the portion I've highlighted. The brain forming conscious thoughts of deliberation and sending commands to its motor neurons to carry out its deliberately chosen intention is called a "freely chosen will", or simply "free will".

Only by those who the desire to prove the idea of free will through the use of carefully crafted wording.

Hmm. And what about all those metaphors and figurative statements that hard determinists employ?

Conscious thoughts or deliberations are not the means of decision making, only the report, a part of the conscious 'mental map' of self and one's surroundings generated as a means of navigation within a complex environment: the world around us.

Every decision that is likely to require an explanation will involve conscious thought. None of the decisions in the Libet experiments required the subjects to explain their choices. However, someone might expect to be asked, "Why did you volunteer to be a subject in Libet's experiment?"

Basically:
''What did you have for breakfast this morning? Was it delicious? Was it one to forget? Whatever it was, you didn't choose to have it. You might think you did. But, in actuality, you didn't. And though you may have had the conscious awareness of choice — porridge or toast? coffee or tea? — and remember making an active decision, the fact is you could not have selected any other option. Any decision you think you may have made was simply an illusion.''

''And, unfortunately, it doesn't just stop at breakfast. Or lunch. Or dinner. Or in fact any decision you ever remember making. Everything you've done couldn't possibly have happened any other way, and everything you will do will be decided for you — without any input from your conscious self.''

''Free will is an illusion. Our wills are simply not of our own making. Thoughts and intentions emerge from background causes of which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control. We do not have the freedom we think we have.''

Hello, Sam Harris. Sam, be a dear, and explain to us who or what decided what I would have for breakfast this morning. If it was not me (with all my prior causes), then who was it?
 
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