Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Marvin Edwards]

The specific causes of specific effects must be reliable in order to create a consistent pattern. For example, I press the "H" key and an "h" appears in my text. But, suppose the effect of pressing the "H" was indeterministic. Suppose that sometimes when I press the "H" I get an "m". Other times I press "H" and a "7" appears.

Let's turn up the indeterminism dial. Now, when I press any key on the keyboard, I get a random letter each no matter which key I press. All I will get is gibberish. My freedom to type my thoughts would be gone.

So, in order to have freedom, we must have control. In order to have control, the results of our actions must be predictable. And, in order for the results of our actions to be predictable, we must have reliable cause and effect.

Freedom requires a deterministic world, a world of reliable cause and effect. Agency requires determinism, or at least a deterministic world.

Don't make the mistake of equating stochastic processes with uniformly random processes. Statistics has clear cause and effect, but it is not deterministic. Statistics is stochastic.

Realistically, your keyboard does have the possibility of random letters in it already. The underlying hardware and software could end up with a bug, it could already have a bug for all you know. But since 99.99999999999999% of the time, any time you hit the "H" key, you're going to see "h" typed out. And that remaining 0.00---1% of the time you'll probably chalk it up to fat fingering the keyboard

Stochastic processes have very clear causes. They have very clear effects. It simply isn't a *single* effect. There are multiple possible effects prior to the event, but ultimately only a single effect will occur.

Consider a bag full of marbles. Before you reach in, you may have a 90% chance of pulling out a red marble, and a 105 chance of pulling out a blue marble. Those chances are real chances. There are two possible effects. But the cause is clearly you sticking your hand in and picking a marble.

After you have chosen a marble, the prior probabilities are no longer relevant. The fact that you had only a 10% chance to select the blue marble that you hold in your hand doesn't alter the fact that you now have a blue marble with 100% certainty.

This gets into some bayesian stuff, which I have mostly forgotten the mechanics of at this point.

I find it simpler to assume a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. Chaotic or random behavior are problems with prediction, not causation. I assume that quantum events are also problems of prediction, and that the quarks are behaving deterministically, but by their own rules, which we have yet to decipher.

Once we assume that perfectly reliable cause and effect are universal, causal necessity becomes a triviality that can be dismissed. It is like a constant that appears on both sides of every equation, and it can be subtracted from both sides without affecting the result. For example, if causal necessity excuses the thief who stole your wallet, then it also excuses the judge who cuts off his hand.

Universal causal necessity changes nothing. It has no practical implications to any human scenarios. It makes itself irrelevant by its own ubiquity.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I walk into a restaurant, sit at a table, and browse the menu. I know that I actually have a choice, because I'm staring at a literal menu of choices. I consider items that catch my fancy, and choose the one that I estimate will best satisfy both my tastes and my dietary objectives. All these events occurred in objective reality. I was not imagining them.

It is all performed before you are aware of what you are looking at, feeling, considering or thinking. The selection is made (the only possible action in that moment in time), milliseconds prior to it being brought to conscious awareness.

And yet, since it was a new restaurant, I had to consciously open and read the menu before my unconscious mind could perform its calculation and report the choice back to my conscious awareness. Otherwise, how could the unconscious functions have the information required to make the choice.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... Within a determined system, you are simply a part of its unfolding progression of events over time (unless we have block time, which is another topic)

Nicely put. But the "determined system" exists only as the whole set of the individual objects and forces in the universe, interacting with each other to cause all of the chains of events. In other words, I am not a passive part of the unfolding, but rather I am one of the agents that is actually doing the unfolding. You are poetically speaking of the forest, and I am suggesting that you notice the trees.

Within a causal chain, intelligent species show up as control links. Unlike the behavior of physical objects, like the Earth and the Sun, which are totally governed by physical forces, intelligent species literally have skin in the game. We choose to do things, for purposes and reasons and interests, that exist solely within us.

That which is actually choosing what will actually happen next is exerting control.

And, at the end of choosing, we will still say "You were able to choose A and you were able to choose B, but you decided to choose A, even though you could have chosen B".

That is the illusion of limited perspective. We talk like that, and from our limited perspective it makes sense because that is how things appear to be. Yet appearances can be deceptive.

Appearances can be deceptive. But sometimes things are precisely as they appear.

That it appears to us that 'you were able to choose A and you were able to choose B, but you decided to choose A, even though you could have chosen' is an illusion for the reasons given above: that you don't have actual options at any point in time , only apparent options because each moment in time is determined. Consequently, when you are [apparently] presented with option A or B, what proceeds - time t and a matter of natural law - is determined by elements beyond your regulative control and what transpires is your only possible response.

It was causally necessary, from any prior point in time, that I would have to choose between A and B before I could continue. The choosing operation requires that "I can choose A" must be true. The choosing operation also requires that "I can choose B" must be true. The choosing operation, being guaranteed to occur due to causal necessity, in turn guarantees the ability to do otherwise. This is how the causal mechanism works.

There is no regulative control in determinism.

And yet we humans exercise all kinds of regulative control within determinism. All of the control we exercise is, of course, causally necessary from any prior point in time. Yet it is validly called regulative control because our choices regulate our actions and our actions causally determine what happens next.

Compabilism is based on the ability to act without coercion or compulsion...which is problematic for the given reasons.

Well, seeing as how reliable cause and effect, in itself, is neither coercive nor undue, causal necessity poses no threat to free will at all.

 

[The AntiChris]

I suspect that DBT understands Marvin's point--that there is such a thing as non-deterministic behavior in a deterministic system

I don't think this is what Marvin has been saying - he's consistently made it clear that there are no non-deterministic events in his account of free will.

I raise this because your comment could cause confusion,

You may have confused "non-deterministic behavior" with "non-deterministic events".

I think the distinction you're attempting to draw is irrelevant. If your conception of free will requires "non-deterministic behaviour" then it's not compatibilism.

The problem here is that relying on "non-deterministic behaviour" to defend compatibilism just just gives weight to DBT's unshakeable belief that compatibilists are sneaking indeterminism through the back door.

 

[DBT]

I walk into a restaurant, sit at a table, and browse the menu. I know that I actually have a choice, because I'm staring at a literal menu of choices. I consider items that catch my fancy, and choose the one that I estimate will best satisfy both my tastes and my dietary objectives. All these events occurred in objective reality. I was not imagining them.

It is all performed before you are aware of what you are looking at, feeling, considering or thinking. The selection is made (the only possible action in that moment in time), milliseconds prior to it being brought to conscious awareness.

And yet, since it was a new restaurant, I had to consciously open and read the menu before my unconscious mind could perform its calculation and report the choice back to my conscious awareness. Otherwise, how could the unconscious functions have the information required to make the choice.

That's not how it works. The brain must first acquire information before it is processed and presented in conscious form. Conscious experience must necessarily follow acquisition and processing of information. What you experience has already been decided by prior processing;

Decision making
''Decision-making is such a seamless brain process that we’re usually unaware of it — until our choice results in unexpected consequences. Then we may look back and wonder, “Why did I choose that option?” In recent years, neuroscientists have begun to decode the decision-making process. What they’re learning is shedding light not only on how the healthy brain performs complex mental functions, but also on how disorders, such as stroke or drug abuse, affect the process.''

''Recent findings: Voluntary, willed behaviours preferentially implicate specific regions of the frontal cortex in humans. Recent studies have demonstrated constraints on cognition, which manifest as variation in frontal lobe function and emergent behaviour (specifically intrinsic genetic and cognitive limitations, supervening psychological and neurochemical disturbances), and temporal constraints on subjective awareness and reporting. Although healthy persons generally experience themselves as 'free' and the originators of their actions, electroencephalographic data continue to suggest that 'freedom' is exercised before awareness.

 

[DBT]

Appearances can be deceptive. But sometimes things are precisely as they appear.

Not always, and especially not when it comes to brain function.


Feelings of free will;
''When it comes to the human brain, even the simplest of acts can be counter-intuitive and deceptively complicated. For example, try stretching your arm. Nerves in the limb send messages back to your brain, but the subjective experience you have of stretching isn't due to these signals. The feeling that you willed your arm into motion, and the realisation that you moved it at all, are both the result of an area at the back of your brain called the posterior parietal cortex. This region helped to produce the intention to move, and predicted what the movement would feel like, all before you twitched a single muscle.

Michel Desmurget and a team of French neuroscientists arrived at this conclusion by stimulating the brains of seven people with electrodes, while they underwent brain surgery under local anaesthetic. When Desmurget stimulated the parietal cortex, the patients felt a strong desire to move their arms, hands, feet or lips, although they never actually did. Stronger currents cast a powerful illusion, convincing the patients that they had actually moved, even though recordings of electrical activity in their muscles said otherwise.''

And yet we humans exercise all kinds of regulative control within determinism. All of the control we exercise is, of course, causally necessary from any prior point in time. Yet it is validly called regulative control because our choices regulate our actions and our actions causally determine what happens next.

For the reasons given above, we have the perception of conscious regulative control. The perception of conscious regulative control, as shown in the given examples is an illusion formed by a disconnect (absence of a feedback loop) between the means of experience and the experience itself, which lacks awareness of the underlying production activity.

Of course, once the drive and desire to act is formed, there is no impediment to action;

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes (and perhaps a dash of true chance). Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

In modern times, the Epicurean notion of atoms, subject to “indeterministic swerves”, is mirrored in the suggestion of quantum indeterminacy. Unfortunately, causal indeterminism, if it exists anywhere, reduces our ability to understand, predict, and control events, because the event has no reliable cause (if the cause is reliable, then the event is deterministic). Ironically, causal indeterminism does not increase our freedom at all, but instead reduces it, by limiting our ability to control events.

Causal determinism asserts that we live in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, where there are no uncaused events, and each event is the reliable result of some specific prior events. Causal indeterminism would be the opposite of determinism, where the effects of a given cause are unreliable, and thus unpredictable.

The concept of “causal indeterminism” is impossible to imagine, because we’ve all grown up in a deterministic universe, where, although we don’t always know what caused an event, we always presume that there was a cause.

To get an idea of a “causally indeterministic universe”, imagine we had a dial we could use to adjust the balance of determinism versus indeterminism. We start by turning it all the way to determinism: I pick an apple from the apple tree and, as expected, I have an apple in my hand. Then, we turn the dial a little bit toward indeterminism: now if I pick an apple, I might find an orange or banana or some other random fruit in my hand. Turn the dial further toward indeterminism, and when I pick an apple I may find a kitten in my hand, or a pair of slippers, or a glass of milk. One more adjustment toward indeterminism and when I pick an apple gravity reverses!

If objects were constantly popping into and out of existence, or if gravity erratically switched between pulling things one moment to pushing them the next, then any attempts to control anything in our lives would be hopeless. We would have even less control than Alice, in Wonderland. In such a universe, we could not reliably cause any effect, which means we would not be free to do anything at all.

Fortunately, that does not appear to be the case. We, ourselves, are a collaborative collection of reliable causal mechanisms that keep our hearts beating, and enables us to think and to act. Without reliable cause and effect, we could never reliably cause any effect, and would have no freedom to do anything at all. The very notion of "freedom" implies a world of reliable causation.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

And yet, since it was a new restaurant, I had to consciously open and read the menu before my unconscious mind could perform its calculation and report the choice back to my conscious awareness. Otherwise, how could the unconscious functions have the information required to make the choice.

That's not how it works. The brain must first acquire information before it is processed and presented in conscious form. Conscious experience must necessarily follow acquisition and processing of information. What you experience has already been decided by prior processing;

Decision making
''Decision-making is such a seamless brain process that we’re usually unaware of it — until our choice results in unexpected consequences. Then we may look back and wonder, “Why did I choose that option?” In recent years, neuroscientists have begun to decode the decision-making process. What they’re learning is shedding light not only on how the healthy brain performs complex mental functions, but also on how disorders, such as stroke or drug abuse, affect the process.''

''Recent findings: Voluntary, willed behaviours preferentially implicate specific regions of the frontal cortex in humans. Recent studies have demonstrated constraints on cognition, which manifest as variation in frontal lobe function and emergent behaviour (specifically intrinsic genetic and cognitive limitations, supervening psychological and neurochemical disturbances), and temporal constraints on subjective awareness and reporting. Although healthy persons generally experience themselves as 'free' and the originators of their actions, electroencephalographic data continue to suggest that 'freedom' is exercised before awareness.

It makes no difference if "'freedom' is exercised before awareness" as noted in your excerpt from the abstract. If the choice is made unconsciously, and then presented to awareness as a dinner already cooked, then the choosing is still being performed by that same brain. And the only explanation we have for the choice is how it is described by the conscious experience of events, the part of the brain that Michael Gazzaniga calls the "interpreter", the part that explains our behavior to ourselves and others.

So, if deciding what we will do, while free of coercion and undue influence, is happening consciously or unconsciously, it makes no difference. Free will is not freedom from one's own brain. That's an impossible freedom. Free will is a question of whether the decision making performed by that brain is free of coercion and undue influence.

As the abstract notes, neuroscience is studying how volition works. Volition is will. Will is chosen. Hopefully, neuroscience will continue to increase our understanding of how the brain performs this function. But explaining how something works does not "explain it away", it simply explains how it works.

The notion of "free will" references both internal (mental health) and external (coercion) influences upon our process of choosing what we will do. The neuroscientist provides information to the psychiatrist as to any physical causes behind a mental illness. The psychiatrist addresses mental illness due to both physical and psychological factors.

In any case, free will remains what it has always been, choosing what we will do when free of coercion and undue influence.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Appearances can be deceptive. But sometimes things are precisely as they appear.

Not always, and especially not when it comes to brain function.


Feelings of free will;
''When it comes to the human brain, even the simplest of acts can be counter-intuitive and deceptively complicated. For example, try stretching your arm. Nerves in the limb send messages back to your brain, but the subjective experience you have of stretching isn't due to these signals. The feeling that you willed your arm into motion, and the realisation that you moved it at all, are both the result of an area at the back of your brain called the posterior parietal cortex. This region helped to produce the intention to move, and predicted what the movement would feel like, all before you twitched a single muscle.

Michel Desmurget and a team of French neuroscientists arrived at this conclusion by stimulating the brains of seven people with electrodes, while they underwent brain surgery under local anaesthetic. When Desmurget stimulated the parietal cortex, the patients felt a strong desire to move their arms, hands, feet or lips, although they never actually did. Stronger currents cast a powerful illusion, convincing the patients that they had actually moved, even though recordings of electrical activity in their muscles said otherwise.''

And yet we humans exercise all kinds of regulative control within determinism. All of the control we exercise is, of course, causally necessary from any prior point in time. Yet it is validly called regulative control because our choices regulate our actions and our actions causally determine what happens next.

For the reasons given above, we have the perception of conscious regulative control. The perception of conscious regulative control, as shown in the given examples is an illusion formed by a disconnect (absence of a feedback loop) between the means of experience and the experience itself, which lacks awareness of the underlying production activity.

Of course, once the drive and desire to act is formed, there is no impediment to action;

''Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes (and perhaps a dash of true chance). Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X.

I would suggest that Michel Desmurget is simply overstating his case. Explaining how something works does not explain it away, it only explains how it works. The fact that certain areas of the brain function to provide a given experience is not a surprise. The key fact here is that the experience explains the behavior: I was told to stretch out my arm. I decided to actually do that. And then I did that. There is nothing inaccurate about my description of what happened. Desmurget provided additional facts about what parts of the brain were involved in doing what. But none of these facts contradict the objective observation that "I was told to stretch out my arm. I decided to actually do that. And then I did that."

The second paragraph describes the experiment where Desmurget's team manipulated a patient's brain to produce the feeling that he had performed some movement that he did not actually do. Whenever a person is effectively manipulated they are not acting of their own free will. Their own free will would involve their posterior parietal cortex being altered only by their own brain as part of its normal process of deciding what it will do.

The experiment did nothing to falsify the objective observation that "I was told to stretch out my arm. I decided to actually do that. And then I did that." It was my own brain that exercised regulatory control of the movement of my arm.

Now if someone else's brain, say the brain of Desmurget, was experimenting upon me to see what manipulating my posterior parietal cortex would do, and he made my arm move, such that it punched someone in the face, then he would be responsible for that act, and not me.

But if my own brain decided to stretch out my arm and punch someone in the face, then I would be held responsible. Because I did so deliberately, of my own free will.

 

[none]

Nicely put. But the "determined system" exists only as the whole set of the individual objects and forces in the universe, interacting with each other to cause all of the chains of events. In other words, I am not a passive part of the unfolding, but rather I am one of the agents that is actually doing the unfolding. You are poetically speaking of the forest, and I am suggesting that you notice the trees.

Within a causal chain, intelligent species show up as control links. Unlike the behavior of physical objects, like the Earth and the Sun, which are totally governed by physical forces, intelligent species literally have skin in the game. We choose to do things, for purposes and reasons and interests, that exist solely within us.

That which is actually choosing what will actually happen next is exerting control.

That is the illusion of limited perspective. We talk like that, and from our limited perspective it makes sense because that is how things appear to be. Yet appearances can be deceptive.

Appearances can be deceptive. But sometimes things are precisely as they appear.

That it appears to us that 'you were able to choose A and you were able to choose B, but you decided to choose A, even though you could have chosen' is an illusion for the reasons given above: that you don't have actual options at any point in time , only apparent options because each moment in time is determined. Consequently, when you are [apparently] presented with option A or B, what proceeds - time t and a matter of natural law - is determined by elements beyond your regulative control and what transpires is your only possible response.

It was causally necessary, from any prior point in time, that I would have to choose between A and B before I could continue. The choosing operation requires that "I can choose A" must be true. The choosing operation also requires that "I can choose B" must be true. The choosing operation, being guaranteed to occur due to causal necessity, in turn guarantees the ability to do otherwise. This is how the causal mechanism works.

There is no regulative control in determinism.

And yet we humans exercise all kinds of regulative control within determinism. All of the control we exercise is, of course, causally necessary from any prior point in time. Yet it is validly called regulative control because our choices regulate our actions and our actions causally determine what happens next.

Compabilism is based on the ability to act without coercion or compulsion...which is problematic for the given reasons.

Well, seeing as how reliable cause and effect, in itself, is neither coercive nor undue, causal necessity poses no threat to free will at all.

Besides the bullshit narrative you have been pushing..., this bolded comment made me lose faith..
I guess this amount of arrogance is the basis of your thesis.
Geesh, aren't you special because you have declared your special and nobody can take that away from you...geesh.
Maybe you should get into the politics discussion forum, there are plenty of apes presenting as if they are not rabid. uck
On a side note you are very handsome aren't you? blah..

 

[none]

In modern times, the Epicurean notion of atoms, subject to “indeterministic swerves”, is mirrored in the suggestion of quantum indeterminacy. Unfortunately, causal indeterminism, if it exists anywhere, reduces our ability to understand, predict, and control events, because the event has no reliable cause (if the cause is reliable, then the event is deterministic). Ironically, causal indeterminism does not increase our freedom at all, but instead reduces it, by limiting our ability to control events.

Causal determinism asserts that we live in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, where there are no uncaused events, and each event is the reliable result of some specific prior events. Causal indeterminism would be the opposite of determinism, where the effects of a given cause are unreliable, and thus unpredictable.

The concept of “causal indeterminism” is impossible to imagine, because we’ve all grown up in a deterministic universe, where, although we don’t always know what caused an event, we always presume that there was a cause.

To get an idea of a “causally indeterministic universe”, imagine we had a dial we could use to adjust the balance of determinism versus indeterminism. We start by turning it all the way to determinism: I pick an apple from the apple tree and, as expected, I have an apple in my hand. Then, we turn the dial a little bit toward indeterminism: now if I pick an apple, I might find an orange or banana or some other random fruit in my hand. Turn the dial further toward indeterminism, and when I pick an apple I may find a kitten in my hand, or a pair of slippers, or a glass of milk. One more adjustment toward indeterminism and when I pick an apple gravity reverses!

If objects were constantly popping into and out of existence, or if gravity erratically switched between pulling things one moment to pushing them the next, then any attempts to control anything in our lives would be hopeless. We would have even less control than Alice, in Wonderland. In such a universe, we could not reliably cause any effect, which means we would not be free to do anything at all.

Fortunately, that does not appear to be the case. We, ourselves, are a collaborative collection of reliable causal mechanisms that keep our hearts beating, and enables us to think and to act. Without reliable cause and effect, we could never reliably cause any effect, and would have no freedom to do anything at all. The very notion of "freedom" implies a world of reliable causation.

Another thread.. based of the same crap...
Before this gets way outta hand and you get feelings, ponder this: LIFE IS NOT UNIQUE, it is fragile..so please stop.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Nicely put. But the "determined system" exists only as the whole set of the individual objects and forces in the universe, interacting with each other to cause all of the chains of events. In other words, I am not a passive part of the unfolding, but rather I am one of the agents that is actually doing the unfolding. You are poetically speaking of the forest, and I am suggesting that you notice the trees.

Within a causal chain, intelligent species show up as control links. Unlike the behavior of physical objects, like the Earth and the Sun, which are totally governed by physical forces, intelligent species literally have skin in the game. We choose to do things, for purposes and reasons and interests, that exist solely within us.

That which is actually choosing what will actually happen next is exerting control.





Appearances can be deceptive. But sometimes things are precisely as they appear.



It was causally necessary, from any prior point in time, that I would have to choose between A and B before I could continue. The choosing operation requires that "I can choose A" must be true. The choosing operation also requires that "I can choose B" must be true. The choosing operation, being guaranteed to occur due to causal necessity, in turn guarantees the ability to do otherwise. This is how the causal mechanism works.

There is no regulative control in determinism.

And yet we humans exercise all kinds of regulative control within determinism. All of the control we exercise is, of course, causally necessary from any prior point in time. Yet it is validly called regulative control because our choices regulate our actions and our actions causally determine what happens next.

Compabilism is based on the ability to act without coercion or compulsion...which is problematic for the given reasons.

Well, seeing as how reliable cause and effect, in itself, is neither coercive nor undue, causal necessity poses no threat to free will at all.

Besides the bullshit narrative you have been pushing..., this bolded comment made me lose faith..
I guess this amount of arrogance is the basis of your thesis.
Geesh, aren't you special because you have declared your special and nobody can take that away from you...geesh.
Maybe you should get into the politics discussion forum, there are plenty of apes presenting as if they are not rabid. uck
On a side note you are very handsome aren't you? blah..

What's your problem?

 

[none]

Nicely put. But the "determined system" exists only as the whole set of the individual objects and forces in the universe, interacting with each other to cause all of the chains of events. In other words, I am not a passive part of the unfolding, but rather I am one of the agents that is actually doing the unfolding. You are poetically speaking of the forest, and I am suggesting that you notice the trees.

Within a causal chain, intelligent species show up as control links. Unlike the behavior of physical objects, like the Earth and the Sun, which are totally governed by physical forces, intelligent species literally have skin in the game. We choose to do things, for purposes and reasons and interests, that exist solely within us.

That which is actually choosing what will actually happen next is exerting control.





Appearances can be deceptive. But sometimes things are precisely as they appear.



It was causally necessary, from any prior point in time, that I would have to choose between A and B before I could continue. The choosing operation requires that "I can choose A" must be true. The choosing operation also requires that "I can choose B" must be true. The choosing operation, being guaranteed to occur due to causal necessity, in turn guarantees the ability to do otherwise. This is how the causal mechanism works.



And yet we humans exercise all kinds of regulative control within determinism. All of the control we exercise is, of course, causally necessary from any prior point in time. Yet it is validly called regulative control because our choices regulate our actions and our actions causally determine what happens next.

Compabilism is based on the ability to act without coercion or compulsion...which is problematic for the given reasons.

Well, seeing as how reliable cause and effect, in itself, is neither coercive nor undue, causal necessity poses no threat to free will at all.

Besides the bullshit narrative you have been pushing..., this bolded comment made me lose faith..
I guess this amount of arrogance is the basis of your thesis.
Geesh, aren't you special because you have declared your special and nobody can take that away from you...geesh.
Maybe you should get into the politics discussion forum, there are plenty of apes presenting as if they are not rabid. uck
On a side note you are very handsome aren't you? blah..

What's your problem?

You should have used quotes to qualify the word "problem."

 

[Bomb#20]

In modern times, the Epicurean notion of atoms, subject to “indeterministic swerves”, is mirrored in the suggestion of quantum indeterminacy. ...
The concept of “causal indeterminism” is impossible to imagine, because we’ve all grown up in a deterministic universe, where, although we don’t always know what caused an event, we always presume that there was a cause. ...
If objects were constantly popping into and out of existence, or if gravity erratically switched between pulling things one moment to pushing them the next, then any attempts to control anything in our lives would be hopeless. ...
Fortunately, that does not appear to be the case. ...

Am I missing some subtlety in your presentation, or are you claiming to have demonstrated the existence of "hidden variables" underlying quantum mechanics, by philosophizing from your armchair?

"I, at any rate, am convinced that God does not throw dice." - Einstein

 

[Marvin Edwards]

In modern times, the Epicurean notion of atoms, subject to “indeterministic swerves”, is mirrored in the suggestion of quantum indeterminacy. ...
The concept of “causal indeterminism” is impossible to imagine, because we’ve all grown up in a deterministic universe, where, although we don’t always know what caused an event, we always presume that there was a cause. ...
If objects were constantly popping into and out of existence, or if gravity erratically switched between pulling things one moment to pushing them the next, then any attempts to control anything in our lives would be hopeless. ...
Fortunately, that does not appear to be the case. ...

Am I missing some subtlety in your presentation, or are you claiming to have demonstrated the existence of "hidden variables" underlying quantum mechanics, by philosophizing from your armchair?

"I, at any rate, am convinced that God does not throw dice." - Einstein

I don't know anything about about quantum mechanics. I'm simply demonstrating the problem with indeterminism. The hard determinists present reliable causation (causal necessity) as a boogeyman that robs us of our freedom and control of our destiny. This sends the theist running to the supernatural and the atheist running to quantum indeterminism. I'm demonstrating why indeterminism is not a source of freedom.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

In modern times, the Epicurean notion of atoms, subject to “indeterministic swerves”, is mirrored in the suggestion of quantum indeterminacy. Unfortunately, causal indeterminism, if it exists anywhere, reduces our ability to understand, predict, and control events, because the event has no reliable cause (if the cause is reliable, then the event is deterministic). Ironically, causal indeterminism does not increase our freedom at all, but instead reduces it, by limiting our ability to control events.

Causal determinism asserts that we live in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, where there are no uncaused events, and each event is the reliable result of some specific prior events. Causal indeterminism would be the opposite of determinism, where the effects of a given cause are unreliable, and thus unpredictable.

The concept of “causal indeterminism” is impossible to imagine, because we’ve all grown up in a deterministic universe, where, although we don’t always know what caused an event, we always presume that there was a cause.

To get an idea of a “causally indeterministic universe”, imagine we had a dial we could use to adjust the balance of determinism versus indeterminism. We start by turning it all the way to determinism: I pick an apple from the apple tree and, as expected, I have an apple in my hand. Then, we turn the dial a little bit toward indeterminism: now if I pick an apple, I might find an orange or banana or some other random fruit in my hand. Turn the dial further toward indeterminism, and when I pick an apple I may find a kitten in my hand, or a pair of slippers, or a glass of milk. One more adjustment toward indeterminism and when I pick an apple gravity reverses!

If objects were constantly popping into and out of existence, or if gravity erratically switched between pulling things one moment to pushing them the next, then any attempts to control anything in our lives would be hopeless. We would have even less control than Alice, in Wonderland. In such a universe, we could not reliably cause any effect, which means we would not be free to do anything at all.

Fortunately, that does not appear to be the case. We, ourselves, are a collaborative collection of reliable causal mechanisms that keep our hearts beating, and enables us to think and to act. Without reliable cause and effect, we could never reliably cause any effect, and would have no freedom to do anything at all. The very notion of "freedom" implies a world of reliable causation.

While I agree that compatibilism is true, that goes too far. The indeterministic interpretations of QM do not seem to imply anything of the sort. Granted, QM is not a 100% accurate description of our universe because it lacks some stuff, but still, "indeterminism" does not mean 100% randomness.


Imagine, for example, that we pick a number from 1 to 10, we can - deterministically - choose an indeterministic number, i.e., the choice to pick a random number follows deterministically from our previous thought processes and some other stuff, but not the number we pick. I fail to see how that would take away any freedom from us.

 

[none]

In modern times, the Epicurean notion of atoms, subject to “indeterministic swerves”, is mirrored in the suggestion of quantum indeterminacy. Unfortunately, causal indeterminism, if it exists anywhere, reduces our ability to understand, predict, and control events, because the event has no reliable cause (if the cause is reliable, then the event is deterministic). Ironically, causal indeterminism does not increase our freedom at all, but instead reduces it, by limiting our ability to control events.

Causal determinism asserts that we live in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, where there are no uncaused events, and each event is the reliable result of some specific prior events. Causal indeterminism would be the opposite of determinism, where the effects of a given cause are unreliable, and thus unpredictable.

The concept of “causal indeterminism” is impossible to imagine, because we’ve all grown up in a deterministic universe, where, although we don’t always know what caused an event, we always presume that there was a cause.

To get an idea of a “causally indeterministic universe”, imagine we had a dial we could use to adjust the balance of determinism versus indeterminism. We start by turning it all the way to determinism: I pick an apple from the apple tree and, as expected, I have an apple in my hand. Then, we turn the dial a little bit toward indeterminism: now if I pick an apple, I might find an orange or banana or some other random fruit in my hand. Turn the dial further toward indeterminism, and when I pick an apple I may find a kitten in my hand, or a pair of slippers, or a glass of milk. One more adjustment toward indeterminism and when I pick an apple gravity reverses!

If objects were constantly popping into and out of existence, or if gravity erratically switched between pulling things one moment to pushing them the next, then any attempts to control anything in our lives would be hopeless. We would have even less control than Alice, in Wonderland. In such a universe, we could not reliably cause any effect, which means we would not be free to do anything at all.

Fortunately, that does not appear to be the case. We, ourselves, are a collaborative collection of reliable causal mechanisms that keep our hearts beating, and enables us to think and to act. Without reliable cause and effect, we could never reliably cause any effect, and would have no freedom to do anything at all. The very notion of "freedom" implies a world of reliable causation.

While I agree that compatibilism is true, that goes too far. The indeterministic interpretations of QM do not seem to imply anything of the sort. Granted, QM is not a 100% accurate description of our universe because it lacks some stuff, but still, "indeterminism" does not mean 100% randomness.


Imagine, for example, that we pick a number from 1 to 10, we can - deterministically - choose an indeterministic number, i.e., the choice to pick a random number follows deterministically from our previous thought processes and some other stuff, but not the number we pick. I fail to see how that would take away any freedom from us.

3.14159....->

 

[Marvin Edwards]

In modern times, the Epicurean notion of atoms, subject to “indeterministic swerves”, is mirrored in the suggestion of quantum indeterminacy. Unfortunately, causal indeterminism, if it exists anywhere, reduces our ability to understand, predict, and control events, because the event has no reliable cause (if the cause is reliable, then the event is deterministic). Ironically, causal indeterminism does not increase our freedom at all, but instead reduces it, by limiting our ability to control events.

Causal determinism asserts that we live in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, where there are no uncaused events, and each event is the reliable result of some specific prior events. Causal indeterminism would be the opposite of determinism, where the effects of a given cause are unreliable, and thus unpredictable.

The concept of “causal indeterminism” is impossible to imagine, because we’ve all grown up in a deterministic universe, where, although we don’t always know what caused an event, we always presume that there was a cause.

To get an idea of a “causally indeterministic universe”, imagine we had a dial we could use to adjust the balance of determinism versus indeterminism. We start by turning it all the way to determinism: I pick an apple from the apple tree and, as expected, I have an apple in my hand. Then, we turn the dial a little bit toward indeterminism: now if I pick an apple, I might find an orange or banana or some other random fruit in my hand. Turn the dial further toward indeterminism, and when I pick an apple I may find a kitten in my hand, or a pair of slippers, or a glass of milk. One more adjustment toward indeterminism and when I pick an apple gravity reverses!

If objects were constantly popping into and out of existence, or if gravity erratically switched between pulling things one moment to pushing them the next, then any attempts to control anything in our lives would be hopeless. We would have even less control than Alice, in Wonderland. In such a universe, we could not reliably cause any effect, which means we would not be free to do anything at all.

Fortunately, that does not appear to be the case. We, ourselves, are a collaborative collection of reliable causal mechanisms that keep our hearts beating, and enables us to think and to act. Without reliable cause and effect, we could never reliably cause any effect, and would have no freedom to do anything at all. The very notion of "freedom" implies a world of reliable causation.

While I agree that compatibilism is true, that goes too far. The indeterministic interpretations of QM do not seem to imply anything of the sort. Granted, QM is not a 100% accurate description of our universe because it lacks some stuff, but still, "indeterminism" does not mean 100% randomness.

Imagine, for example, that we pick a number from 1 to 10, we can - deterministically - choose an indeterministic number, i.e., the choice to pick a random number follows deterministically from our previous thought processes and some other stuff, but not the number we pick. I fail to see how that would take away any freedom from us.

There are two meanings of "determine", one suggesting knowledge and the other suggesting causation. For example, "We were unable to determine (know) whether it was the increase in temperature or the increase in pressure that determined (cause) when the chemical reaction happened".

Notions of random or chaotic behavior suggest problems of prediction (knowledge) rather than problems of causation. For example, a coin toss, to see who goes first, appears to produce a random (unpredictable) result. But, if we give it some thought, we know that the behavior of the coin is reliably caused by the location and force of the thumb during the flip, and then the air resistance, and then the bouncing before the coin settles, heads up or tails up. And we can imagine building a machine where all these factors are controlled, such that the machine could always cause the coin to land heads up. So, random or chaotic behavior is still deterministic, in that the result is reliably caused, even if we are unable to predict the results.

So, we use statistical analysis to predict the coin's behavior over a large number of cases. And, couldn't that be the same problem with quantum indeterminism? Isn't it more likely that the behavior of quarks is actually reliably caused but simply unpredictable? We generally get our "physical laws" by observing reliable patterns of behavior. But it is very difficult to observe the behavior of quarks without building huge colliders.

Physical matter organized differently follows different rules of behavior. Inanimate objects behave passively in response to physical forces, but living organisms behave as if they had skin in the game. It may be the case that quarks are reliably following a different set of rules that apply only to quarks.

Imagine, for example, that we pick a number from 1 to 10, we can - deterministically - choose an indeterministic number, i.e., the choice to pick a random number follows deterministically from our previous thought processes and some other stuff, but not the number we pick. I fail to see how that would take away any freedom from us.

I don't see how it is possible to deterministically produce a causally indeterministic number. We can easily produce a number that someone else cannot guess (determine as in "to know"). But I don't think it is possible to deterministically cause a causally indeterministic number. The means by which the number is produced makes it predictable in theory, if not in practice.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Notions of random or chaotic behavior suggest problems of prediction (knowledge) rather than problems of causation. For example, a coin toss, to see who goes first, appears to produce a random (unpredictable) result. But, if we give it some thought, we know that the behavior of the coin is reliably caused by the location and force of the thumb during the flip, and then the air resistance, and then the bouncing before the coin settles, heads up or tails up. And we can imagine building a machine where all these factors are controlled, such that the machine could always cause the coin to land heads up. So, random or chaotic behavior is still deterministic, in that the result is reliably caused, even if we are unable to predict the results.

What degree of reliability are we talking about to get "reliable"?
We know that classical physics provided a really good approximation to reality, to the point it allowed people to go to the Moon. Yet, a claim that classical physics provides a true depiction of reality (no qualifications) would be false.

Is the behavior of the coin deterministic?

That said, I do believe the problems we deal with are generally problems of knowledge, not of causation. Indeed, assigning (close to) 1/2 to the hypothesis that an ordinary coin will land heads is rational, but so is the (almost) 1/2 prediction that it already landed heads, if we know it landed already. So, in this case, our focus seems clearly on knowledge. Nevertheless, this does not tell us that the coin is deterministic, or that the universe is. Maybe it is. Maybe it is not. But if it is not, it seems to me that the sort of indeterminism that there is, is not the sort of indeterminism that threatens or ability to act of our own free will. It might at most reduce it a little bit in some odd circumstances, but generally we can act of our own free will regardless of whether determinism happens to be true. Furthermore, some forms of indeterminism - if real - would not reduce the aformention ability at all.

So, we use statistical analysis to predict the coin's behavior over a large number of cases. And, couldn't that be the same problem with quantum indeterminism? Isn't it more likely that the behavior of quarks is actually reliably caused but simply unpredictable? We generally get our "physical laws" by observing reliable patterns of behavior. But it is very difficult to observe the behavior of quarks without building huge colliders.

Well, in any case from the little I know there are some difficulties with that, no matter how big the collider. But that's a side issue. I do not have the belief that the world is not deterministic. I do not have the belief that it is deterministic, either. But my objection is to the claim that indeterminism would have the consequences that you say it would have. Granted, some forms of indeterminism would do that. But others wouldn't.

I don't see how it is possible to deterministically produce a causally indeterministic number. We can easily produce a number that someone else cannot guess (determine as in "to know"). But I don't think it is possible to deterministically cause a causally indeterministic number. The means by which the number is produced makes it predictable in theory, if not in practice.

You just need a rule in the universe that is something like (If B obtains, then the output is a number between 1 and 10), and no rule that fixes which number it is. I'm not suggesting that this is how our universe works. Rather, it's an example to show that some forms of indeterminism would not threaten our ability to act of our own accord.

 

[fromderinside]

Causal determinism asserts that we live in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect, where there are no uncaused events, and each event is the reliable result of some specific prior events. Causal indeterminism would be the opposite of determinism, where the effects of a given cause are unreliable, and thus unpredictable.

Carl Hoefer one of the more influential authors of the Stanford Encyclopedia chapter on Determinism wrote the following Causality and Determinism:Tension, or Outright Conflict?: https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/download/RESF0404220099A/9609

There has been a strong tendency in the philosophical literature to conflate determinism and causality, or at the very least, to see the former as a particularly strong form of the latter. The tendency persists even today. When the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy asked me to write the entry on determinism, I found that the title was to be “Causal determinism”.

I therefore felt obliged to point out in the opening paragraph that determinism actually has little or nothing to do with causation; for the philosophical tradition has it all wrong. What I hope to show in this paper is that, in fact, in a complex world such as the one we inhabit, determinism and genuine causality are probably incompatible with each other. After we see why this is so, we can appreciate better the different metaphysical options available to philosophers hoping to understand the complex issues concerning laws of nature, causality, and physical theory.

Then there's Determinism_without_causality https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235357679_

Abstract Causality has been often confused with the notion of determinism. It is mandatory to separate the two notions in view of the debate about quantum foundations. Quantum theory provides an example of causal not-deterministic theory. Here we introduce a toy operational theory that is deterministic and non-causal, thus proving that the two notions of causality and determinism are totally independent.

I suggest you read these before you go forward with your windmill constructions.

In other words your premise is pure fiction, has nothing to do with determinism and further removes from possibility of any issue about compatibility.


Oh the chaos we raise when our hands begin to wave.
Read then revise, or better, abandon.

Second point be sure to have the following available to you was you read>

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

Also: Determinism and natural law work forward and backward so how do you get backward causation.

Oh the chaos we raise when our hands we begin to wave.