In Free Will, What Makes it "Free"

[PyramidHead]

Of course there is a difference between a coerced action and an non coerced action, the former means that you are being pressured or forced to act against your will, and in the latter case you are not being pressured or forced to act against your will.

There is no discrepancy between the two remarks, I simply fleshed out the first remark by adding more detail in the second.

As an English speaker in a community of people who know English, I may choose to distinguish the former from the latter case by using my mouth to utter a certain string of phonemes. Specifically, the vocalizations that comprise the word "free" followed by the word "will". You just said (literally, word-for-word as I quoted above) that there is a legitimate distinction to be made between coerced and non-coerced actions. An English speaker who is using the words "free will" to refer to exactly that distinction cannot possibly be wrong, unless you argue that your use of the word "will" is the only correct use.

As 'an English speaker in a community of people who know English' you should understand that words are symbols used in reference to articles for the purpose of communication, and not the articles themselves.

The word 'moon' is not the actual moon, which is an object that has its own features and attributes regardless of the names we label it with, Lunar, Moon, etc.

Now, if the architecture and electrochemical activity of a brain is is deterministic and therefore its output (feelings, thoughts, decisions, actions) is determined by neural condition, 'will' - a word that is used in relation to feelings, thoughts, decisions, actions - cannot be defined as being free (will has no independence, it cannot choose to do otherwise) regardless of the presence or absence of coercion.

If the system is free from coercion (coercion is absent) the word 'free' specifically relates to the absence of coercion and not to the state or condition of 'will'

Words refer to whatever the speaker is using it to refer to. The word 'will' is no more exempt from this reality than the word 'free.' If 'free' can mean the absence of coercion, 'will' can mean something other than the neural and cellular conditions you refer to by using that word. And, as it turns out, most people probably use 'will' to mean something other than that.

Lets say that the police catch a addict in the act of an armed hold up. The put him in handcuffs, drive him to the Police Station where they put him in a cell and then remove his handcuffs through the bars of the cell.

The addict is now free from his handcuffs, but this freedom from handcuffs says nothing about the condition of the addict as a whole. He is free from his handcuffs but he is locked in a cell, he is not free.

The word free relates specifically to the article; the handcuffs (the handcuffs have been removed.)

So, if there were a Handcuff Compatibilist who claimed that freedom from handcuffs is all that is meant by his use of 'free', you would have no disagreement with him?

Similarly with coercion, if there is no sign of coercion, one is free from coercion, coercion is absent, but this tells us nothing about the overall state or condition of the sole agent of 'feelings, thoughts, decisions, actions' - the brain.

The word 'free' specifically relates to its article, in this instance 'the absence of coercion' and nothing more.

Then we agree that free will exists, if the words 'free will' are used to refer to the absence of coercion and nothing more. In other words, we are both compatibilists.

This doesn't change because 'an English speaker in a community of people who know English' may erroneously extend the reference into an area where it doesn't relate.

It is not possible to be wrong about the referent of a word as long as one is consistent. There is no authority on what is 'an area where it doesn't relate'. Language doesn't work that way, and all we are talking about right now is language.

 

[DBT]

Words refer to whatever the speaker is using it to refer to.

The speaker may have little or no understanding of the thing he/she is referring to. A speaker may be referring to QM, but have no idea about the discoveries or principles related to QM. Some may refer to their 'god' - just because a speaker makes a reference in terms of words and their meanings, doesn't mean they are reasonable or correct references....'god' may not exist, the term QM tells us nothing about the theory it represents.

The word is not the thing. The word itself does not fully describe its article, if at all. Words are mere symbols.

The word 'will' is no more exempt from this reality than the word 'free.' If 'free' can mean the absence of coercion, 'will' can mean something other than the neural and cellular conditions you refer to by using that word. And, as it turns out, most people probably use 'will' to mean something other than that.

The word itself -- 'will' - tells us nothing about the nature and attributes of the thing we call 'will'

Free from coercion refers specifically to the absence of coercion, and says nothing about the nature of the object that is free from coercion. It is an article specific reference: an absence of coercion. This says nothing about the nature of will itself, which is something that has its own source, attributes, features, etc, regardless of the presence or absence of coercion.

So, if there were a Handcuff Compatibilist who claimed that freedom from handcuffs is all that is meant by his use of 'free', you would have no disagreement with him?

Definitions alone do not say or prove anything in relation to actual objects and events that exist independently of our definitions, and have their own attributes.

You can 'prove' anything exists merely by using semantic constructs, but ultimately meaningless and futile.


A definition or an ontological argument alone proves nothing.

1)God is love.
2)Love can be experienced.
3)Love exists.
4)God exists.

The common definition of free will is equally meaningless:

1)Free will is the ability to make conscious decisions.
2)Conscious decision making can be experienced.
3)Conscious decision making exists.
4) Free will exists.

There is no given reason to define or conflate Love with God. Love is love, nothing more and nothing less.

Just as there is no given reason to define conscious decision making as ''free will'' - conscious decision making requires nothing additional, it is a function of neural activity, nothing more and nothing less.

Then we agree that free will exists, if the words 'free will' are used to refer to the absence of coercion and nothing more. In other words, we are both compatibilists.

No it doesn't, being free from coercion is 'freedom from coercion' and not 'freedom of will' because will exists independently from coercion and has its own features and attributes, which are shaped and form by neural information processing.

The absence of coercion is no more an instance of 'free will' than is the addict a 'free man' because his handcuffs were removed when he was locked in a cell. He is still a prisoner regardless of being freed from his handcuffs, and when he is freed from his cell, he is still bound by his addiction, and if he manages to get help to free himself from his addiction, his will is still determined by brain information state, just like the rest of us.

Quote;
If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

 

[The AntiChris]

Quote;
If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

#1 (free will requires the ability to have acted otherwise in exactly the same circumstances - i.e. non-deterministically) is an unargued assumption.

 

[DBT]

Quote;
If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

#1 (free will requires the ability to have acted otherwise in exactly the same circumstances - i.e. non-deterministically) is an unargued assumption.

But it has been thoroughly argued, from several sides and several positions.

Again, this is not something new:

Could Have Done Otherwise.
''The idea that a free agent "could have done otherwise" is a key element in the libertarian argument.
It is seen as a condition for moral responsibility, although freedom in this sense is prior to moral issues. In recent philosophical jargon, it is known as (PAP) the "principle of alternative possibilities."

A person is morally responsible for performing a given act only if he could have acted otherwise.

PAP is under attack by many compatibilists and determinists.'' And so on....

As I said in the other thread, the subject matter is a mess, a dog's breakfast.

What exactly is 'free will?' What is it free from? What can this so called 'free will' do that is not being done by the brain?

And if the brain is doing it without free will, as the evidence suggests, what is 'free will?' Where is free will?

Libertarians have their own unrealistic (not supported by evidence) version, compatibalists perform mental and semantic gymnastics in order to distort determinism to suit their own definition of free will (a failed argument), then there are the quantum magicians; non determinism is their bona fide free will (poorly defined), by golly.

 

[ryan]

Quote;
If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control

My issue with this is that indeterminate actions would be relative. In other words, the actions would be random to everyone except the agent who makes the choice.

 

[DBT]

Quote;
If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control

My issue with this is that indeterminate actions would be relative. In other words, the actions would be random to everyone except the agent who makes the choice.

The agent has no agency in relation to indeterminate events, be they mental expressions or motor actions. They are not chosen, nor are they willed.

2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control

 

[The AntiChris]

#1 (free will requires the ability to have acted otherwise in exactly the same circumstances - i.e. non-deterministically) is an unargued assumption.

But it has been thoroughly argued, from several sides and several positions.

Again, this is not something new:

Could Have Done Otherwise.
''The idea that a free agent "could have done otherwise" is a key element in the libertarian argument.

Fine. So the argument you presented in post #622 is really saying:

If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Libertarian free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with Libertarian free will

Compatibilists would have absolutely no problem with this argument.

It just makes no sense at all to present this argument in response to a compatibilist argument as you did in post #622. Did you think PyramidHead was arguing for libertarian (incompatibilist) free will?

 

[DBT]

But it has been thoroughly argued, from several sides and several positions.

Again, this is not something new:

Could Have Done Otherwise.
''The idea that a free agent "could have done otherwise" is a key element in the libertarian argument.

Fine. So the argument you presented in post #622 is really saying:

If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Libertarian free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with Libertarian free will

Compatibilists would have absolutely no problem with this argument.

It just makes no sense at all to present this argument in response to a compatibilist argument as you did in post #622. Did you think PyramidHead was arguing for libertarian (incompatibilist) free will?

I'm giving an overview of the subject matter. I know what PyramidHead is arguing. And I have addressed the failure of compatibalism in this thread, in response to PyramidHead, and in numerous other threads, mainly FRDB....where you yourself were present, and at times active.

The way you respond, it's as if its been forgotten. Like everything that was said never happened. Another version of Groundhog Day!

You are cherry picking. You ignore a large part of the narrative, but pick out one aspect of what I said in order to offer a criticism that doesn't relate to the argument as a whole.

 

[The AntiChris]

Fine. So the argument you presented in post #622 is really saying:

If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Libertarian free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with Libertarian free will

Compatibilists would have absolutely no problem with this argument.

It just makes no sense at all to present this argument in response to a compatibilist argument as you did in post #622. Did you think PyramidHead was arguing for libertarian (incompatibilist) free will?

I'm giving an overview of the subject matter.

The problem is that you tend to do this in most of your responses. I have to say I find it difficult to follow your reasoning at the best of times and your inclusion of irrelevant 'overview' information just serves to exacerbate the situation.

 

[rrr6]

Universe Limited Is No Brainer

Free will is an illusion ergo cause and effect determinism has been my stance for many years now and have been very clear in those regards in my posts in this thread.

Uncertainty need not neccessiate chaos. There is only order.

Disorder is superficial resultant of not having mapping of all relate events.

Universe is free to opperate within specific limits ergo all parts of Universe are limited. This is no brainer.

However, it does require a brain to access mind/intellect abstraction concepts of the above.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Free will is a great illusionary resultant of non-observed connection--- missing link --between gravity and our observed reality.

A cosmic missing link. imho My recent, an dvery preliminary numerical sine-wave--- that is inside-outed ---explorations, have led me to assign the label/identity of time as the link between positive shaped gravity and negative shape gravity/reality.

Torus = ( ( ) ) = great torus

Non-occupied space torus--- defined by time (( )) ---within a great torus

(--( (--( )--) )--)

So we may say, that, we have gravitational time and gravitational/reality time.

Outer, positive shape gravity--time

non-occupied space within

Inner, negative shape gravity/reality--time

With the inside-outed, numerical sine-wave, the sequence of numbers,beginng with 0 on outer time line goes to #1 on the outer gravity line.

From #1 on outer surface, we may find that, there is trajectory of geodesic connection between outer positive surface #1 and inner negative surface #2

........1................5........7..............................
0.............................6....................................

non-occupied space tube within the toroidal tube

.................3...............................................
............2........4..........................................

 

[ryan]

My issue with this is that indeterminate actions would be relative. In other words, the actions would be random to everyone except the agent who makes the choice.

The agent has no agency in relation to indeterminate events, be they mental expressions or motor actions. They are not chosen, nor are they willed.

2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control

A choice could be random to anyone observing the person making it. But it wouldn't be random to the person making the choice.

 

[Juma]

A choice could be random to anyone observing the person making it. But it wouldn't be random to the person making the choice.

Ok... So the person making the choice then have som hidden reasons no-one else knows about? Or do you mean that person doesnt need any reasons at all?

 

[ryan]

A choice could be random to anyone observing the person making it. But it wouldn't be random to the person making the choice.

Ok... So the person making the choice then have som hidden reasons no-one else knows about? Or do you mean that person doesnt need any reasons at all?

The wording here is tricky, and keep in mind that we are assuming free will exists. I put "could" because it would be up to the agent to decide whether or not anyone can know what he will do.

Now, this goes back to quantum mechanical mechanisms to explain how someone would be able to choose to do something that does not have a classically mechanical explanation.

An omniscient demon that can see what every particle is doing would see that the choice would come down to highly constricted quantum mechanisms.

 

[Juma]

Ok... So the person making the choice then have som hidden reasons no-one else knows about? Or do you mean that person doesnt need any reasons at all?

The wording here is tricky, and keep in mind that we are assuming free will exists. I put "could" because it would be up to the agent to decide whether or not anyone can know what he will do.

Now, this goes back to quantum mechanical mechanisms to explain how someone would be able to choose to do something that does not have a classically mechanical explanation.

An omniscient demon that can see what every particle is doing would see that the choice would come down to highly constricted quantum mechanisms.

That was... many words without answering my question.

 

[ryan]

So the person making the choice then have som hidden reasons no-one else knows about?

Like I tried to say, it depends on whether or not the agent allows people to know his reasons.

Or do you mean that person doesnt need any reasons at all?

The agent may choose freely from the options available. "Reason" just regresses the agent back to a puppet.

 

[rrr6]

Chaos Is Superficial Disintegration In Orderly Manner

[h=2]Superifical, chaotic disorder, is a resultant of our inability to integrate the immediate circumstances before us/around us. imho[/h] Cause and effect determinsim is the only ultra-complex order. Our inabbility to see that order sometimes appears as a random chotic mess. It never is and never will be, accept as perception of it as a chaoticall random disintegration of our consciousness and/or our immediated surrounding set of circumstances. Wait long enough and perception of order returns. imho
Uncertainty need not neccessiate chaos. There is only order.

Disorder is superficial resultant of not having mapping of all relate events.

Universe is free to opperate within specific limits ergo all parts of Universe are limited. This is no brainer.

However, it does require a brain to access mind/intellect abstraction concepts of the above.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Free will is a great illusionary resultant of non-observed connection--- missing link --between gravity and our observed reality.

A cosmic missing link. imho My recent, an dvery preliminary numerical sine-wave--- that is inside-outed ---explorations, have led me to assign the label/identity of time as the link between positive shaped gravity and negative shape gravity/reality.

Torus = ( ( ) ) = great torus

Non-occupied space torus--- defined by time (( )) ---within a great torus

(--( (--( )--) )--)

So we may say, that, we have gravitational time and gravitational/reality time.

Outer, positive shape gravity--time

non-occupied space within

Inner, negative shape gravity/reality--time

With the inside-outed, numerical sine-wave, the sequence of numbers,beginng with 0 on outer time line goes to #1 on the outer gravity line.

From #1 on outer surface, we may find that, there is trajectory of geodesic connection between outer positive surface #1 and inner negative surface #2

........1................5........7..............................
0.............................6....................................

non-occupied space tube within the toroidal tube

.................3...............................................
............2........4..........................................

 

[bilby]

[h=2]Superifical, chaotic disorder, is a resultant of our inability to integrate the immediate circumstances before us/around us. imho[/h] Cause and effect determinsim is the only ultra-complex order. Our inabbility to see that order sometimes appears as a random chotic mess. It never is and never will be, accept as perception of it as a chaoticall random disintegration of our consciousness and/or our immediated surrounding set of circumstances. Wait long enough and perception of order returns. imho
Uncertainty need not neccessiate chaos. There is only order.

Disorder is superficial resultant of not having mapping of all relate events.

Universe is free to opperate within specific limits ergo all parts of Universe are limited. This is no brainer.

However, it does require a brain to access mind/intellect abstraction concepts of the above.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Free will is a great illusionary resultant of non-observed connection--- missing link --between gravity and our observed reality.

A cosmic missing link. imho My recent, an dvery preliminary numerical sine-wave--- that is inside-outed ---explorations, have led me to assign the label/identity of time as the link between positive shaped gravity and negative shape gravity/reality.

Torus = ( ( ) ) = great torus

Non-occupied space torus--- defined by time (( )) ---within a great torus

(--( (--( )--) )--)

So we may say, that, we have gravitational time and gravitational/reality time.

Outer, positive shape gravity--time

non-occupied space within

Inner, negative shape gravity/reality--time

With the inside-outed, numerical sine-wave, the sequence of numbers,beginng with 0 on outer time line goes to #1 on the outer gravity line.

From #1 on outer surface, we may find that, there is trajectory of geodesic connection between outer positive surface #1 and inner negative surface #2

........1................5........7..............................
0.............................6....................................

non-occupied space tube within the toroidal tube

.................3...............................................
............2........4..........................................

The Pies!! The Pies!!

 

[Juma]

Like I tried to say, it depends on whether or not the agent allows people to know his reasons.

Or do you mean that person doesnt need any reasons at all?

The agent may choose freely from the options available. "Reason" just regresses the agent back to a puppet.

So you are actully considering act without reason as a legit example of will? That is an act without making any thought at all (and no unconcious reasoning either) , just a random act.

 

[ryan]

Like I tried to say, it depends on whether or not the agent allows people to know his reasons.



The agent may choose freely from the options available. "Reason" just regresses the agent back to a puppet.

So you are actully considering act without reason as a legit example of will? That is an act without making any thought at all (and no unconcious reasoning either) , just a random act.

That's if we have indeterminate freedoms by way of quantum mechanics.

 

[DBT]

Fine. So the argument you presented in post #622 is really saying:

If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Libertarian free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with Libertarian free will

Compatibilists would have absolutely no problem with this argument.

It just makes no sense at all to present this argument in response to a compatibilist argument as you did in post #622. Did you think PyramidHead was arguing for libertarian (incompatibilist) free will?

I'm giving an overview of the subject matter.

The problem is that you tend to do this in most of your responses. I have to say I find it difficult to follow your reasoning at the best of times and your inclusion of irrelevant 'overview' information just serves to exacerbate the situation.

It's nowhere near as difficult to understand as you like to make out.

I replied to PyramidHead's post on the basis of the questions that were raised, and what I said in reply was directly related to these issues.

You then popped in and made the objection; #1 (free will requires the ability to have acted otherwise in exactly the same circumstances - i.e. non-deterministically) is an unargued assumption...to which I responded by giving a general overview of the 'done otherwise' argument as it relates to issue of free will.

For example -''Compatibilists (or "soft determinists" as they have been known since William James) identify free will with freedom of action - the lack of external constraints. We are free, and we have free will, if we are not in physical chains. But freedom of the will is different from freedom of action.'' - utterly fails as an argument for free will because action is a consequence of 'will' but action based on will says nothing about the nature of 'will.'

Which, if determinism is true, will being determined, therefore not free, will cannot be defined as being free.

The argument being:
Quote;
''Still others, most notably David Hume and some prominent contemporary social psychologists, believe they can have it both ways: accept determinism while also postulating a type of non-libertarian, straight-jacketed “free” will that still enables moral judgment [I put the “free” in quotation marks because the semantics are drained from the word].

More;
''How is this supposed to work? First, we have to accept the view that prior events have caused the person’s current desire to do X. Wanting to do X is fully determined by these prior causes (and perhaps a dash of true chance). Now that the desire to do X is being felt, there are no other constraints that keep the person from doing what he wants, namely X. At this point, we should ascribe free will to all animals capable of experiencing desires (e.g., to eat, sleep, or mate). Yet, we don’t; and we tend not to judge non-human animals in moral terms. Exceptions occur, but are swiftly dismissed as errors of anthropomorphism.''