- Jan 23, 2006
- Buenos Aires
- Basic Beliefs
Regardless, my point is that there is no problem.
Well, there clearly is if we both agree that a moral judgement does not follow from a nonmoral issue.
Perhaps there is a logical error in all the cases you mention. So what? It is still the case that there is a problem with one of them. The relevant one in fact.
The person raising the is/ought issue objects to moral assessments on the basis that they do not follow logically from the assessments on which they are based and allegedly that is a problem, but the same person all the time makes assessments that do not follow follow logically from the assessments on which they are based, and fails to see that by the very same standards they raise against morality, their own assessments about pretty much everything everywhere would be equally flawed.
That of course unless they do follow with implicit probabilistic premises and they are also probabilistic, but in that case, the same can apply to the moral case.