PyramidHead
Contributor
The philosopher Thomas Nagel had this to say about being himself (1965):
[By the way, "token-reflexive" expressions are just those that can only be understood in the context of the person expressing them: this, here, now, mine, today, yesterday, etc. are all token-reflexive.]
For the past couple of years now, this additional fact has fascinated me and I'm still not sure what to make of it. Is it purely an invention of language, or is it something that can be coherently referred to as an object of inquiry? Joe Kern explores this issue in a book he's still working on:
Is this an actual difference between the two hypothetical universes? Of course, later in the paper Kern concludes it is not, because you exist in any universe that includes consciousness, as all of the conscious beings simultaneously and across spacetime. This is one way of solving the problem, but are there others? Arnold Zuboff (1990) arrives at the same conclusion through statistical reasoning:
It is this immediacy of subjective experience that he speaks of, which I am treating the same way as Kern's "personal existence" and Nagel's "which one is me", that baffles and excites me. I am drawn to the idea that there is only one such immediacy, one "me-ness", that is not tied to the specific conditions of individual iterations thereof (in much the same way that the existence of the novel Moby Dick is not dependent on the existence of any particular copy of the novel in any particular language). But I concede that it seems outlandish, even though the alternative may be statistically unlikely as Zuboff claims. If it weren't for this ineffable quality, there would be no problem to solve, but it's there--it's here--and cannot be ignored or left out of any account of the way things are.
I would also like to offer the suggestion that it is substrate-independent, in that it doesn't matter whether it is wholly a product of brain activity, some kind of immaterial soul, or an attribute of all matter in the universe. These are all descriptions of the problem, not solutions to it. As such, this isn't a task suited for neuroscience, or even for philosophy of mind, but a metaphysical one, perhaps the only real metaphysical question that can't be reduced to semantic disputes.
[By the way, "token-reflexive" expressions are just those that can only be understood in the context of the person expressing them: this, here, now, mine, today, yesterday, etc. are all token-reflexive.]
Thomas Nagel said:The problem can be shown to be general in the following way: consider everything that can be said about the world without employing any token-reflexive expressions. This will include a description of all its physical contents and their states. . . It will also include a description of all persons in the world and their histories, memories, thoughts, sensations, perceptions, intentions, and so forth. I can describe without token-reflexives the entire world and everything in it—and this will include a description of Thomas Nagel and what he is thinking and feeling. But there seems to remain one thing I cannot say in this fashion—namely, which of the various persons in the world I am. And when everything that can be said in the specified manner has been said, and the world in a sense has been completely described, there seems to remain one fact that has not been expressed, and that is the fact that I am Thomas Nagel. This is the fact that I am the subject of these experiences; this body is my body; the subject or the center of my world is this person, Thomas Nagel.
For the past couple of years now, this additional fact has fascinated me and I'm still not sure what to make of it. Is it purely an invention of language, or is it something that can be coherently referred to as an object of inquiry? Joe Kern explores this issue in a book he's still working on:
Now imagine [an] alternate present in which you don’t exist but a lot of other people who are not you do exist. Imagine that one of those other people who are not you is a lot like you. In fact, essentially exactly like you. Let’s say that this person is like an identical twin, with the same DNA as you, though we’ll add the one stipulation that they weren’t produced from the splitting of the zygote that produced you. We’ll say that the zygote that produced you never existed in this situation we’re imagining. But this person just happens to exist who has the same DNA as you in this situation of a present in which you don’t exist. You don’t need to imagine the technical details of how this could come about. Just erase yourself from the world, and put someone else with your same DNA into it.
This should not be controversial, but for some I think it will be. But really, it should not be. It is easy to imagine yourself not existing. And it is easy to imagine people who are not you existing. You don’t even have to imagine for the latter; they are already all around you. And these people who are not you could have all manner of DNA. And they could have DNA that is quite close to yours, and still not be you any more than those whose DNA is quite distant. And they could have DNA that is exactly like yours and still not be you any more than those whose DNA is quite distant. None of this should be controversial.
And if you can imagine all this, then you should be able to take these final steps. Imagine someone that is not you but that is exactly like you in every possible way, not just in DNA, but in every physical structure. And imagine this person in a present in which you don’t exist. Finally, imagine this person occupying the exact same location in space and time as you do now, doing exactly what you are doing now, and thinking exactly the thoughts you are now, including having all of the same memories you have now. You don’t exist, but this person does, exactly like you in every possible way, doing and thinking just what you are doing and thinking now. Just erase yourself from existence, and put this other person who is not you in your place.
Have you done this? Good. I call this person who just took your place your perfect doppelgänger. This person performs a very important function for you: he or she clarifies what you are actually referring to when you say “I exist”. The thing you are referring to, the thing you are pointing to, is the sole difference throughout the universe between actual reality and the alternate possibility in which your perfect doppelgänger exists in your stead. That thing, that sole difference, is your existence, what you are referring to when you say “I exist”.
Is this an actual difference between the two hypothetical universes? Of course, later in the paper Kern concludes it is not, because you exist in any universe that includes consciousness, as all of the conscious beings simultaneously and across spacetime. This is one way of solving the problem, but are there others? Arnold Zuboff (1990) arrives at the same conclusion through statistical reasoning:
Arnold Zuboff said:Imagine that you and a duplicate of yourself are lying unconscious, next to each other, about to undergo a complete step-by-step exchange of bits of your bodies. It certainly seems that at no stage in this exchange of bits will you have thereby switched places with your duplicate. Yet it also seems that the end-result, with all the bits exchanged, will be essentially that of the two of you having switched places. Where will you awaken? I claim that one and the same person possesses both bodies, occupies both places and will experience both awakenings, just as a person whose brain has been bisected must at once experience both of the unconnected fields of awareness, even though each of these will falsely appear to him as the entirety of his experience. I also claim that the more usual apparent boundaries of persons are as illusory as those in brain bisection; personal identity remains unchanged through any variation or multiplication of body or mind. In all conscious life there is only one person - I - whose existence depends merely on the presence of a quality that is inherent in all experience - its quality of being mine, the simple immediacy of it for whatever is having experience. One powerful argument for this is statistical: on the ordinary view of personhood it is an incredible coincidence for you (though not for others) that out of 200,000,000 sperm cells the very one required on each occasion for your future existence was first to the egg in each of the begettings of yourself and all your ancestors. The only view that does not make your existence incredible, and that is not therefore (from your perspective) an incredible view, is that any conscious being would necessarily have been you anyway.
It is this immediacy of subjective experience that he speaks of, which I am treating the same way as Kern's "personal existence" and Nagel's "which one is me", that baffles and excites me. I am drawn to the idea that there is only one such immediacy, one "me-ness", that is not tied to the specific conditions of individual iterations thereof (in much the same way that the existence of the novel Moby Dick is not dependent on the existence of any particular copy of the novel in any particular language). But I concede that it seems outlandish, even though the alternative may be statistically unlikely as Zuboff claims. If it weren't for this ineffable quality, there would be no problem to solve, but it's there--it's here--and cannot be ignored or left out of any account of the way things are.
I would also like to offer the suggestion that it is substrate-independent, in that it doesn't matter whether it is wholly a product of brain activity, some kind of immaterial soul, or an attribute of all matter in the universe. These are all descriptions of the problem, not solutions to it. As such, this isn't a task suited for neuroscience, or even for philosophy of mind, but a metaphysical one, perhaps the only real metaphysical question that can't be reduced to semantic disputes.