There isn't really a 'freewill problem'.

[Subsymbolic]

I'm restarting this as a separate thread as it's clearly not a good fit for the Freewill Poll.


I think that the overwhelming majority of the freewill problem comes from remaining committed to a series of misleading questions based upon some very archaic assumptions, most of which don't remotely stand up to analysis.

The easiest one to dispose of is the idea that we 'could have done otherwise all other conditions remaining the same'. There are literally no real world situations in which one could 'do otherwise all other conditions remaining the same'. This has nothing to do with any issues about freewill and everything to do with the impossibility of all other conditions remaining the same.

The fact is that any given state of the universe, or even the relevant light cone, can only occur once. More to the point a given agent can only occupy the same place at the same time once, not least because they would get in their own way. I'll say it again, it's impossible for all other conditions to ever be the same. We only ever get one shot at any given state of the universe.
As such this idea is always impossible for any given account of freewill. It can't even really be imagined, and as is so often the case with misleading thought experiments, one can only imagine imagining it. It's not only physically and practically impossible, it is simply logically impossible for the same thing to be in the same place at the same time twice.


The modified claim 'could have done otherwise almost all conditions remaining the same' really doesn't have the same force for obvious reasons. indeed, with the benefit of chaos theory and the realisation that there is always a sensitive dependence on initial conditions, the old adage that you cannot stand in the same river twice takes on additional force.

Even if it were possible, which it most certainly isn't, there's something inherently odd about wanting to do be able to do otherwise all other conditions remaining the same. Surely whatever form the will takes, you'd want it to be rational and that means that given identical circumstances you'd reach the same conclusion through whatever rational process you followed. However, this minor quibble pales into literal insignificance because you couldn't ever be in that situation.

Any objections?

 

[The AntiChris]

The easiest one to dispose of is the idea that we 'could have done otherwise all other conditions remaining the same'. There are literally no real world situations in which one could 'do otherwise all other conditions remaining the same'. This has nothing to do with any issues about freewill and everything to do with the impossibility of all other conditions remaining the same.

I'd always thought of this as a kind of thought experiment. It never occurred to me that anyone actually envisaged the same set of universal circumstances genuinely recurring.

 

[ruby sparks]

I think that whilst it's true that if you think about it hard enough, the idea of an uncaused cause or an event or action which defies the known laws of the universe, does throw up problems.

On the other hand, I don't think that what I'm going to call the average Joe (or Josephine) does think about it much. Free will, as commonly conceived, seems to be intuitive and vague and often involves aspects which are deterministic, indeterministic and compatibilist, often in different mixes according to different situations.

As such, free will is generally concieved, it seems to me, to be not entirely unlike magic.

So I would not say anything about it can't be imagined.

 

[Subsymbolic]

The easiest one to dispose of is the idea that we 'could have done otherwise all other conditions remaining the same'. There are literally no real world situations in which one could 'do otherwise all other conditions remaining the same'. This has nothing to do with any issues about freewill and everything to do with the impossibility of all other conditions remaining the same.

I'd always thought of this as a kind of thought experiment. It never occurred to me that anyone actually envisaged the same set of universal circumstances genuinely recurring.

What did you imagine this thought experiment achieving?

 

[Subsymbolic]

I think that whilst it's true that if you think about it hard enough, the idea of an uncaused cause or an event or action which defies the known laws of the universe, does throw up problems.

That's one, very polite, way of putting it.

On the other hand, I don't think that what I'm going to call the average Joe (or Josephine) does think about it much. Free will, as commonly conceived, seems to be intuitive and vague and often involves aspects which are deterministic, indeterministic and compatibilist, often in different mixes according to different situations.

I quite agree. However, I was rather hoping to try for something a little less average.

As such, free will is generally concieved, it seems to me, to be not entirely unlike magic.

So, for most people, are flight, televisions and colour changing gob stoppers. It doesn't mean that one cannot aspire to a clear analysis or explanation.

So I would not say anything about it can't be imagined.

I always have a problem with people feeling that they can imagine the impossible. There's a real gulf between imagining you can imagine something and actually imagining it. Someone might feel that they can imagine the same person being in a situation in which all other conditions are exactly the same, but they can't, they can only imaging imagining it. It's in the same ball park as imagining a colour that is entirely red and entirely blue at the same time.

 

[The AntiChris]

What did you imagine this thought experiment achieving?

It describes the situation in which libertarian free willers claim that more than possible option for action is available and in which hard determinists claim there can only ever be one option available. It's what defines the difference between the two camps.

I'm not aware of any free will argument which relies on the actualization of more than one precise set of circumstances.

 

[Subsymbolic]

What did you imagine this thought experiment achieving?

It describes the situation in which libertarian free willers claim that more than possible option for action is available and in which hard determinists claim there can only ever be one option available. It's what defines the difference between the two camps.

I'm not aware of any free will argument which relies on the actualization of more than one precise set of circumstances.

But that's precisely the point. When it is demonstrably logically impossible for such a situation to ever occur, the thought experiment fails, surely?

 

[The AntiChris]

What did you imagine this thought experiment achieving?

It describes the situation in which libertarian free willers claim that more than possible option for action is available and in which hard determinists claim there can only ever be one option available. It's what defines the difference between the two camps.

I'm not aware of any free will argument which relies on the actualization of more than one precise set of circumstances.

But that's precisely the point. When it is demonstrably logically impossible for such a situation to ever occur, the thought experiment fails, surely?

I suspect we're talking past each other.

What do you mean by "such a situation"? All that the 'could have done otherwise' argument (also known as PAP - the Principle of Alternative Possibilities) requires is for one to consider whether a single set of circumstances can give rise to alternative possibilities for action. This consideration does not require any actual repetition of the same set of circumstances. I'm afraid I'm not seeing your problem with this.

 

[Treedbear]

...
But that's precisely the point. When it is demonstrably logically impossible for such a situation to ever occur, the thought experiment fails, surely?

It's not a thought experiment. It's a statement of principle that under any specific circumstances there is more than one choice possible. It counters the determinist principle that there was no other choice possible.

prin·ci·ple
prinsəpəl/
noun

1. a fundamental truth or proposition that serves as the foundation for a system of belief or behavior or for a chain of reasoning.

• a rule or belief governing one's personal behavior.
• morally correct behavior and attitudes.
• a general scientific theorem or law that has numerous special applications across a wide field.
• a natural law forming the basis for the construction or working of a machine.

2. a fundamental source or basis of something.

• a fundamental quality or attribute determining the nature of something; an essence.

 

[Subsymbolic]

...
But that's precisely the point. When it is demonstrably logically impossible for such a situation to ever occur, the thought experiment fails, surely?

It's not a thought experiment. It's a statement of principle that under any specific circumstances there is more than one choice possible. It counters the determinist principle that there was no other choice possible.

prin·ci·ple
prinsəpəl/
noun

1. a fundamental truth or proposition that serves as the foundation for a system of belief or behavior or for a chain of reasoning.

• a rule or belief governing one's personal behavior.
• morally correct behavior and attitudes.
• a general scientific theorem or law that has numerous special applications across a wide field.
• a natural law forming the basis for the construction or working of a machine.

2. a fundamental source or basis of something.

• a fundamental quality or attribute determining the nature of something; an essence.

I see, you are asserting that the principle that we could do otherwise all other conditions remaining the same is axiomatic? Obviously I can't directly argue with axioms, but It seems odd to have an axiom acting upon a situation that could never occur. Perhaps more importantly, at what point do we axiomatically set the final 'could do otherwise', because if free will undermines rationality I'm not sure what we are buying...

Either way, we have a division that is worth thrashing out: is it an axiom, a thought experiment or just shoddy thinking. At this point, I can see a strong case for the axiom, but I rather suspect that it might cause problems elsewhere...

Nice start gents.

 

[PyramidHead]

What did you imagine this thought experiment achieving?

It describes the situation in which libertarian free willers claim that more than possible option for action is available and in which hard determinists claim there can only ever be one option available. It's what defines the difference between the two camps.

I'm not aware of any free will argument which relies on the actualization of more than one precise set of circumstances.

But that's precisely the point. When it is demonstrably logically impossible for such a situation to ever occur, the thought experiment fails, surely?

It's not logically impossible, just physically so. If someone said to you "if you didn't go to the movies yesterday you would have had time to mow the lawn," do you reply: "your statement makes no sense! The fact is I was at the movies, and it's impossible for me to be in two places at once!" Of course you don't, because you understand that it's still possible to use speculations about what could have been the case to talk about what actually was (or was not) the case. A thought experiment is something you accept counterfactually for the sake of argument.

 

[Subsymbolic]

But that's precisely the point. When it is demonstrably logically impossible for such a situation to ever occur, the thought experiment fails, surely?

It's not logically impossible, just physically so. If someone said to you "if you didn't go to the movies yesterday you would have had time to mow the lawn," do you reply: "your statement makes no sense! The fact is I was at the movies, and it's impossible for me to be in two places at once!" Of course you don't, because you understand that it's still possible to use speculations about what could have been the case to talk about what actually was (or was not) the case. A thought experiment is something you accept counterfactually for the sake of argument.

I'm not sure I agree, there's a big difference between an informal counterfactual conditional and a formal claim that one could have done otherwise all other conditions remaining the same. No one is objecting to the idea that you could have done otherwise if some other conditions are different.

For the counterfactual to be the case you would have to satisfy the criterion 'all other conditions remaining the same'. So you start off with a person(P1) at a specific space at a specific time doing something. To satisfy that criterion you would also have to have exactly the same person (P2) at exactly the same place and at exactly the same time, doing otherwise. If nothing else, the presence of P1 would preclude the presence of P2. To try to juxtapose the two states seems like a violation of the law of the excluded middle to me as you are asking for something to be in two states - what you didand the other thing you did - at the same time in the same place. I'm sure I can formalise that if you wish, but probably not until the weekend....


You could imagine a possible world scenario, but then it's a different world...

 

[Treedbear]

It's not a thought experiment. It's a statement of principle that under any specific circumstances there is more than one choice possible. It counters the determinist principle that there was no other choice possible.

I see, you are asserting that the principle that we could do otherwise all other conditions remaining the same is axiomatic? Obviously I can't directly argue with axioms, but It seems odd to have an axiom acting upon a situation that could never occur. Perhaps more importantly, at what point do we axiomatically set the final 'could do otherwise', because if free will undermines rationality I'm not sure what we are buying...

Either way, we have a division that is worth thrashing out: is it an axiom, a thought experiment or just shoddy thinking. At this point, I can see a strong case for the axiom, but I rather suspect that it might cause problems elsewhere...

Nice start gents.

Yes, it's axiomatic as the basis for the necessary existence of a God (or other spiritual derivative).

 

[Speakpigeon]

Yes, it's axiomatic as the basis for the necessary existence of a God (or other spiritual derivative).

Certainly in the case of an all powerful God such as the Christian God. I'm not so sure about Greek divinities for example.
EB

 

[Subsymbolic]

It's not a thought experiment. It's a statement of principle that under any specific circumstances there is more than one choice possible. It counters the determinist principle that there was no other choice possible.

I see, you are asserting that the principle that we could do otherwise all other conditions remaining the same is axiomatic? Obviously I can't directly argue with axioms, but It seems odd to have an axiom acting upon a situation that could never occur. Perhaps more importantly, at what point do we axiomatically set the final 'could do otherwise', because if free will undermines rationality I'm not sure what we are buying...

Either way, we have a division that is worth thrashing out: is it an axiom, a thought experiment or just shoddy thinking. At this point, I can see a strong case for the axiom, but I rather suspect that it might cause problems elsewhere...

Nice start gents.

Yes, it's axiomatic as the basis for the necessary existence of a God (or other spiritual derivative).

Why would someone who is trying to make sense of free will choose use an axiom that is about making a deity necessary? Not to mention the issues for freewill that postulating an all powerful God will drag up? I'm genuinely confused!

 

[Treedbear]

Yes, it's axiomatic as the basis for the necessary existence of a God (or other spiritual derivative).

Certainly in the case of an all powerful God such as the Christian God. I'm not so sure about Greek divinities for example.
EB

I think it was Aristotle who first came up with the concept of an uncaused cause. Here's an interesting article on "Free will in antiquity":

Tracing any particular sequence of events back in time will usually come to an accidental event – a "starting point" or "fresh start" (Aristotle calls it an origin or arche (ἀρχή) – whose major contributing cause (or causes) was itself uncaused.

Whether a particular thing happens, says Aristotle, may depend on a series of causes that

goes back to some starting-point, which does not go back to something else. This, therefore, will be the starting-point of the fortuitous, and nothing else is the cause of its generation.

... But following Aristotle, Epicurus thought human agents have the autonomous ability to transcend necessity and chance (both of which destroy responsibility), so that praise and blame are appropriate. Epicurus finds a tertium quid, beyond necessity (Democritus' physics) and beyond chance. His tertium quid is agent autonomy, what is "up to us".

...some things happen of necessity (ἀνάγκη), others by chance (τύχη), others through our own agency (παρ’ ἡμᾶς).

...necessity destroys responsibility and chance is inconstant; whereas our own actions are autonomous, and it is to them that praise and blame naturally attach.

Lucretius (1st century BC), a strong supporter of Epicurus, saw the randomness as enabling free will, even if he could not explain exactly how, beyond the fact that random swerves would break the causal chain of determinism.

 

[Treedbear]

Yes, it's axiomatic as the basis for the necessary existence of a God (or other spiritual derivative).

Why would someone who is trying to make sense of free will choose use an axiom that is about making a deity necessary? Not to mention the issues for freewill that postulating an all powerful God will drag up? I'm genuinely confused!

Not all dieties. An uncaused cause who creates man in his own image. There's also the issue of justice in the form of reward and punishment. I blame it on Plato with his philosophy that an elite aristocracy was required in order to interpret the perfect form. It's not what makes sense, but what is useful to society.

 

[Subsymbolic]

Yes, it's axiomatic as the basis for the necessary existence of a God (or other spiritual derivative).

Why would someone who is trying to make sense of free will choose use an axiom that is about making a deity necessary? Not to mention the issues for freewill that postulating an all powerful God will drag up? I'm genuinely confused!

Not all dieties. An uncaused cause who creates man in his own image. There's also the issue of justice in the form of reward and punishment. I blame it on Plato with his philosophy that an elite aristocracy was required in order to interpret the perfect form. It's not what makes sense, but what is useful to society.

I must be being slow. Can you explain why having an axiom that one 'could have done otherwise all other conditions remaining the same' is related to an omnimax God?

 

[PyramidHead]

You could imagine a possible world scenario, but then it's a different world...

All thought experiments are possible world scenarios.

 

[Subsymbolic]

You could imagine a possible world scenario, but then it's a different world...

All thought experiments are possible world scenarios.

Excuse my vagueness, I was vaguely gesturing towards the idea of a parallel world.