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What does it mean for something to be "logically possible"?

And this whole photon interaction thingy is far and away removed from what's going on. I'm not observing photons even when my eyes interact with them. It would take specialized equipment to actually observe a photon.

Now, you might assert that I am observing a massive amount of photons when observing the tree, but we ought not list that as perceptible during the quest to list observed data, as without instrumentation, such things cannot be ascertained.

We get to what's going on by reducing options to mimimums. The observer will report seeing to as little as the occurrence of five to seven photons interacting with rhodopsin in the retina. the observer will report hearing with as little as one angstrom displacement of the tympanic membrane or smelling with as little as two molecules by olfactory receptors. Shapes are 'sensed' by excitatory-inhibitory neural processing up the sensory pathway which result in perception of edges and enclosed neural spaces at the cortex.

Data input is processed. Photons are data in this sense. Sound waves are data, and odorant molecules are data. As for thermal sensitivity photons are again data.
 
And this whole photon interaction thingy is far and away removed from what's going on. I'm not observing photons even when my eyes interact with them. It would take specialized equipment to actually observe a photon.

Now, you might assert that I am observing a massive amount of photons when observing the tree, but we ought not list that as perceptible during the quest to list observed data, as without instrumentation, such things cannot be ascertained.

Herein lies the whole problem. You are sensing photons as few as five to seven leads an observer to report seeing or feeling heat. If not you'd never observe anything about your visual or warmth condition. Similarly you are observing sound waves, odorants, fly leg and wind touch, etc at very minimal physical stimuli levels. Most of this never becomes part of your consciousness yet you react to it.

See how the problem of observing re data is becoming more and more complex more and more subject to subjectivity. I say keep it simple. If it exists and can be observed it is data. Anything that exists has the capability of providing information and information is of what data is all about. One need not have a human arbiter for there to be communication.

All that need exist is a relation between sender and receiver where what is provided by one is received and reacted to by the other. Sunlight can can heat a rock to the point of cracking apart. Wind can move sand. On the other hand a sand dune forces moving air to change directions and a rock can block sunlight from being felt by stuff below the rock reflect light onto another object or the moon can come between the sun and earth and make the local area dark. While its not obvious the sun reacts to the motion of earth while the earth remains captured in a solar orbit and is distorted in shape. But I go on.

None of the above makes sense unless physical energy is data.

wow. Lunch let me respond to your post twice.
 
One can generalize from detection studies that humans can experience as the reception of as few as 5 photons. So, one photon, nope, a few photons eyup. The notion of experience is not really relevant here. What is relevant is that as few as the absorbtion of 5 photons by receptors in the eye can lead to a human responding she sees light. So the experience I see light is a yes for as few as 5 photons photons being absorbed by rhodopsin in rods in the eye.

Retinal cells are complex things. There are rhodopsin strands which when stimulated by light twist producing a negative potential on the outer membrane of the receptor cell which then induces chemicals to be released and carried down to down to other chemical sources which release more chemicals to bipolar cells which capture them resulting in a potential across to axonal processes induce another release more chemical to primary receptor neurons which then electro-chemically transmit 'light' message up to other processes.
 
One can generalize from detection studies that humans can experience as the reception of as few as 5 photons. So, one photon, nope, a few photons eyup. The notion of experience is not really relevant here. What is relevant is that as few as the absorbtion of 5 photons by receptors in the eye can lead to a human responding she sees light. So the experience I see light is a yes for as few as 5 photons photons being absorbed by rhodopsin in rods in the eye.

Retinal cells are complex things. There are rhodopsin strands which when stimulated by light twist producing a negative potential on the outer membrane of the receptor cell which then induces chemicals to be released and carried down to down to other chemical sources which release more chemicals to bipolar cells which capture them resulting in a potential across to axonal processes induce another release more chemical to primary receptor neurons which then electro-chemically transmit 'light' message up to other processes.

The human brain creates a "thing" for consciousness to experience.

If the human is conscious of the "thing".

A human cannot experience photons.

What a cell responds to and what a human is conscious of are not in any way the same thing.
 
Good. Photons as data when interacting sans mind and photons as facts when observed (interacting) with mind.

Given the probability that photons interact with things without minds almost exclusively I go with photons as data as default take on it's attributes.

In fact it takes a mind with memory and language to observe as fast and Speakpigeon assert.

A Manta Ray and a Sea Anemone have brains with little memory and no appreciable language so sensing and organizing photon reactions into shapes would still be a case of photons (data) interacting with things without mind.

The situation we are considering is exemplified in the development of statistical thermodynamics and Information theory with the development thermodynamic construct of S (entropy) and the information construct H. One reflects a physical probability and the other an information probability. See   Entropy in thermodynamics and information theory

Boltzmann's equation is presumed to provide a link between thermodynamic entropy S and information entropy H = −Σi pi ln pi = ln(W) where pi=1/W are the equal probabilities of a given microstate. This interpretation has been criticized also. While some say that the equation is merely a unit conversion equation between thermodynamic and information entropy, this is not completely correct.[19] A unit conversion equation will, e.g., change inches to centimeters, and yield two measurements in different units of the same physical quantity (length). Since thermodynamic and information entropy are dimensionally unequal (energy/unit temperature vs. units of information), Boltzmann's equation is more akin to x = c t where x is the distance travelled by a light beam in time t, c being the speed of light. While we cannot say that length x and time t represent the same physical quantity, we can say that, in the case of a light beam, since c is a universal constant, they will provide perfectly accurate measures of each other. (For example, the light-year is used as a measure of distance). Likewise, in the case of Boltzmann's equation, while we cannot say that thermodynamic entropy S and information entropy H represent the same physical quantity, we can say that, in the case of a thermodynamic system, since kB is a universal constant, they will provide perfectly accurate measures of each other.

Which is how I see the relationship between a physical fact and data.
You said, "photons as data."

Let's back up a little bit. One issue before us is "what is data?" There are other issues, but in this post, I'm going to address this, for if we continue to use the term with such variation, something is going to be lost in communication.

Also, why must we use such insanely small things in the example? Photons?

How about marbles! Before I get into what I think is data, I'll state some facts. We're in a room. The room has a window. There is light shining in the room. The light is composed of photons. We're breathing. The room is 20' by 40'. There is a table in the room. The table has five legs. The table is round. It's flat. There's a clock on the wall. There's a naked chick in the room. Okay, I got carried away with that one.

It's a typical room. It has a light switch. That's a fact. There is a floor. That's a fact. There's air in the room (to breath)--another fact. You're in the room. You're thinking. All of that--facts. Anything that can be said to be true about the current state of affairs is a fact. That you're hoping the chick is in the room is also a fact if and only if it's true you're hoping that.

At this point, there is no data! Even if theres something we could later consider data, it's not data.

Now, I walk into the room with two bags of marbles. One bag of marbles are twice the size of the other bag of marbles. Look, facts, facts, and more facts, but no data. We start discussing gravity and what not and I say that there is a higher likelihood for the smaller marbles to roll off the table than the larger marbles because gravity will slow their roll, and like expected, you disagree. So, we decide to do an experiment.

We haven't done the experiment yet, so guess what, there is no data. Facts galore. But data, not a one. We haven't started the experiment yet!

We set up some guidelines about how to conduct the experiment. There's sufficient marbles of both types, randomness is involved, and we argue over a few things, and the argument, well, that's a fact too!

When the first marble is dropped, it rolls off the table and onto the floor. Well, looky looky, data point number 1. The naked girl walks in with her pink highlighter and records the result. That written record is data representative of what happened with the first marble.

She and I leave. You stay to finish the experiment. You drop 299 more marbles before you realize that there is some factor not accounted for that we argued over and realized we needed a different and mechanical means of controlling the experiment. You're out of marbles anyway. You do have some data though. Raw data, as we haven't done any statistical analysis with it yet, but data nevertheless.

That there are photons in the room is a fact just as there are marbles in the room, but neither the photons nor the marbles is data. Do you see why I quoted what you said? You said, "photons as data." But, I want to make this example to do with marbles, so effectively, it's like you're saying "marbles as data."

Now, do we observe marbles? Yes! But, that alone isn't enough to go "yo yo, I'm observing something and therefore what I'm observing is data" We need to observe the marble in order to notate a record of our observation that there are marbles, but not even a notation that there are marbles constitutes data. It would just be a written record of the fact there are marbles. Moreover, if I wrote down the fact there is a light switch in the room, that would not be a written record of anything relevant to what I would consider data.

Now, what about what Cindy wrote down? That is her name btw, in case you were wondering. She recorded facts too (practically everything is a fact), but there was something particularly relevant to the experiment she wrote down, as she did record something I would regard as data. We still don't know the results of the experiment, as we haven't analyzed the data, but at least we have collected some. Um, you collected some. She's a blonde btw.

What facts should be considered data is highly context dependent. Others would argue that there is no data until it's recorded. For instance, lets go back to the first marble. Cindy wrote down what happened. Thats the point where there was first data. I'm flexible. I'd actually say the point the marble stopped moving on the table vs rolled off the edge of the table marks the point. You, well, you, oh my goodness, you mark it at the point the bag was opened an hour before we even began arguing. I think Cindy needs me. Later.
 
So how are sensory neuroscientists able to compute the number of photons captured required for a conscious report of "I see something" if photons are not data in that context.

In fact I think your entire construction is a strawman.

Obviously a structure has status of fact only because we know what it is from experience. The fact that we can observe that structure is only true if that structure is accessible to our senses which requires information about that structure to be communicated for our observation as data from which our brain reconstructs a representation which becomes part of our memory.
 
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So how are sensory neuroscientists able to compute the number of photons captured required for a conscious report of "I see something" if photons are not data in that context.

In fact I think your entire construction is a strawman.

Obviously a structure has status of fact only because we know what it is from experience. The fact that we can observe that structure is only true if that structure is accessible to our senses which requires information about that structure to be communicated for our observation as data from which our brain reconstructs a representation which becomes part of our memory.

A person is not experiencing photons.

You only know there are 5 photons, not 6, because of a machine capable of counting them.

Not by any subjective report.

It is only data AFTER the machine is built and they can be counted.

Data is a quantification or description of phenomena, not merely the phenomena.

It requires a human or something with human capacities.
 
So how are sensory neuroscientists able to compute the number of photons captured are required for a conscious report of "I see something" if photons are not data in that context.

It would be data in that context. "Data" is a very fitting word in that context. The problem is in continuing to use that very same word in contexts when 'computing neuroscientists' are taken out the equation.

Obviously a structure has status of fact only because we know what it is from experience.
Knowledge is not a necessary condition for facts--at least not in the sense others have been using the term. For instance, the planet we're on was around long before life arose here. It was a fact then even before people could speak the truth about truths of the world. The state of affairs prior to humanity is the broad sense of "fact" being used.

The fact that we can observe that structure is only true if that structure is accessible to our senses which requires information about that structure to be communicated for our observation as data from which our brain reconstructs a representation which becomes part of our memory.
Are you saying our brains receive data? That seems to me a completely different (metaphorical even) use of "data." People observe data. People swim. Brains don't observe data. Brains don't swim. We see. Our eyes don't see. We observe. Our brains don't. We analyze data. Our brains don't. We might say that computers think: "what's taking so long?" "The computer is thinking." No, it's not. Computers don't think. Brains don't think. People do.

Computers store data. People remember. Computers don't like Cindy. And you, well, you can't have her.
 
Are you saying our brains receive data? That seems to me a completely different (metaphorical even) use of "data." People observe data. People swim. Brains don't observe data. Brains don't swim. We see. Our eyes don't see. We observe. Our brains don't. We analyze data. Our brains don't. We might say that computers think: "what's taking so long?" "The computer is thinking." No, it's not. Computers don't think. Brains don't think. People do.

We strongly disagree here.

I'm not in the habit of saying the brain or NS does anything different from what it's components do or how they do it. If energy is taken in by receptors then data is being processed, if energy is filtered and conditioned by structures within the brain then data is being processed, if the nervous system is carrying out verbal or written control and processing then data is being processed.

It seems inescapable that what parts of the brain do are aggregated into what major portions of the nervous system does. the fact that the nervous system also builds a representation either as memory or self or personal theater changes nothing. The nervous system, brain, thalamus, neuron, receptor, generating and using data gathered from sensed and processed external and stored data. Subjective things, facts, are restricted to the personal theater and memory recall.

For the convenience of treating how we accomplish every day communication we can construct a data and fact and thing inventory and parse them according to whatever rationality reasonably provides as you have so well demonstrated.

However such partitions only get in the way of actual understanding of how we are doing what we do. My much more physics bound argument serves that purpose.
 
fromderinside said:
If energy is taken in by receptors then data is being processed, if energy is filtered and conditioned by structures within the brain then data is being processed, [...]

There's so much to say regarding this I'm not sure where to begin. I'm actually inclined to agree with you, but such an admission may highly confuse the casual reader.

Part 1:
There are those that say sentences are not true or false. What they say instead is that propositions expressed by sentences are true or false. However, the distinction is lost on most children and many adults; hence, when someone asks if the sentence, "the cat is on the mat" is true while pointing to a cat that is in fact on a mat, the typical response is yes.

I call that a lazy truth (or secondary truth) but not in a berating but rather forgiving sense. The truth is so elusive and the general acceptance so pervasive that I'm willing to concede, not necessarily because arguing is exhaustive but because of the evolution of meaning.

This shouldn't be confused with the new political snippet "alt-reality". Let's say the cat is not on the mat. The proposition expressed would be false, so I'm certainly not going to be so forgiving as to say the sentence is true, but I would allow latitude in the claim that the sentence is false.

Part 2
Same idea but different example

There are 3 groups of terms. Well, maybe I shouldn't count them, just to escape potential attempts of refutation based on classification. At any rate, here they are:

First, there are referring terms. An example is the term "chair." If I point to a chair, the term succeeds in referring. Now, how about the term, "unicorn?" To the uninitiated, this can be unintuitive, but the term "unicorn" is a referring term; the difference is that in the former case, the term succeeded while in the latter case, the term failed.

So far, we have 1a) referring terms that succeed and 2a) referring terms that fail.

We also have what are called nonreferring terms. An example would be the term, "although." It doesn't even try to refer. It has no reference. It has meaning, but not reference. The term unicorn at least tries.

Now, all of that just to dispute myself. Terms don't refer. People do. People use terms to refer. So, all that crap I just said is what? Bs? No, not really.

Like in the earlier example where I regard sentences as the kinds of things that are lazy truths or secondary truths--forgivables ... I won't beat people up over saying things like words refer even if such truths are derivative truths, but the moment people regard "cat" as a term that doesn't refer on the basis there are no cats, we's gots problems.

Part 3
Computers (damn computers)

How did we speak when computers first came out? What words did we use? What do we normally do when the perfect word isn't readily available? We do what we always seem to do, when an arrangement of other words just doesn't seem to cut it. We start using words in slightly altered ways to get across what we have in mind. Next thing you know, perfectly well understood words take on a life of their own. Before you know it, we have alterations in the breadth and scope in our common usage of the term.

Part 4
Language (and friggin' metaphors)

I won't go so far as to say a word means just what we say it means. You can mean "zebra" when you say "horse" all day long, and as stipulativly acceptable as that might be, if it veers too much in contrast to common usage, a lexical meaning I shall not consider it to be.

Part 5
Data

Fine, I concede. But, not only is it lazy and secondary but it's derivative and eaten up in metaphorical origins. Okay, maybe not all that, but damn it, I'm pouting :D
 
Yeah. Beginless moments have passed, not endless. There wasn't a beginning. There is no paradox: something always existed. Existence didn't start, it always was.

Absolutely no paradox, unless you claim something nonsensical like a beginning to eternal existence (not the same thing as a beginning of an endless existence in eternity- eternal existence > any existence that begins).

You can't surmount this paradox by simply labeling something "beginningless".

You can't surmount something that doesn't exist, so you're right. Your non-existent paradox is as insurmountable as the invisible, pink, no-clipping mod unicorn.

untermech said:
To surmount this paradox you have to define what it means for something to be "beginningless"...
Beginningless? It means without a beginning. You might, although I have my doubts about your ability to do so, be able to define "what it means" for something to be without a beginning.
untermech said:
Something you will never do. The only eternity you will ever know.
I will never define beginningless?
 
Part 1:
There are those that say sentences are not true or false. What they say instead is that propositions expressed by sentences are true or false. However, the distinction is lost on most children and many adults; hence, when someone asks if the sentence, "the cat is on the mat" is true while pointing to a cat that is in fact on a mat, the typical response is yes.

I call that a lazy truth (or secondary truth) but not in a berating but rather forgiving sense. The truth is so elusive and the general acceptance so pervasive that I'm willing to concede, not necessarily because arguing is exhaustive but because of the evolution of meaning.

This shouldn't be confused with the new political snippet "alt-reality". Let's say the cat is not on the mat. The proposition expressed would be false, so I'm certainly not going to be so forgiving as to say the sentence is true, but I would allow latitude in the claim that the sentence is false.

Part 2
Same idea but different example

There are 3 groups of terms. Well, maybe I shouldn't count them, just to escape potential attempts of refutation based on classification. At any rate, here they are:

First, there are referring terms. An example is the term "chair." If I point to a chair, the term succeeds in referring. Now, how about the term, "unicorn?" To the uninitiated, this can be unintuitive, but the term "unicorn" is a referring term; the difference is that in the former case, the term succeeded while in the latter case, the term failed.

So far, we have 1a) referring terms that succeed and 2a) referring terms that fail.

We also have what are called nonreferring terms. An example would be the term, "although." It doesn't even try to refer. It has no reference. It has meaning, but not reference. The term unicorn at least tries.

Now, all of that just to dispute myself. Terms don't refer. People do. People use terms to refer. So, all that crap I just said is what? Bs? No, not really.

There's an alternative way of looking at this and it takes care of this idea that words don't refer by themselves.

We can also observe that words don't mean anything by themselves, it's people who mean something by words. We can restrict the word "word" to utterances where the speaker does mean something. A cry of anguish is not a word, then.

A word is something people use to mean something. So I will use the word "chair" to mean the idea of chair. But, not to mean any particular chair. Not to mean all chairs either. Rather, it's the concept of chair, and a concept is an idea in somebody's mind. To mean some particular chair, I will have to add a least another word: "This chair". Or, possibly, more than one word: "the chair you are sitting on". By these words, I will mean a particular chair. Referring according to this analysis, becomes referring to a particular idea, i.e. the meaning. So, when I use the word "chair", I use it to refer to the concept of chair. I will use the expression "this chair" to refer to the idea in my mind of a particular chair. And so, most expressions we use will refer since they will normally refer to what we mean and we usually mean something.

There's no question of truth so far. Truth comes into the picture with statements of facts. So, for example, "you're sitting on my chair". This expression is a factual description. It works by relating several referring expressions to each other: "you" refers to the person I'm talking to, "you're sitting" refers to a property of this person, "my chair" refers to what I see as my chair. And finally, "you're sitting on my chair" put it all together using "on" to express the idea that the person the speaker is talking to is sitting on his chair and not somewhere else. Keep in mind that reference here is to the idea expressed by the speaker, i.e. his meaning. The statement "you're sitting on my chair" is used to refer to the speaker's idea that the person he is talking to is sitting on the speaker's chair.

So, truth? Well, you'll have to wait a bit for that. Clearly, the speaker believes it's true that the person he's talking to is sitting on his chair. He believes the statement "you're sitting on my chair" is true, i.e. that it refers to a true idea, or true meaning, i.e. a meaning true of the objective, or material, world. Now, just as possibly, the person he is talking to, if there is one, may believe differently and see this statement as patently false. So, two people, one statement, two views as to whether the statement is true or not.

All that these people really know are what they believe. The fact as to the chair, if there is any chair to begin with, is what we may call a metaphysical truth. Each of us may have an opinion, a belief, about particular metaphysical truths but usually it's unclear how we could effectively settle who is right and who isn't.

Not to say there are no known truths at all. I can say truthfully that I am sad or tired, or that whatever I'm looking at looks red to me. These are statements of subjective facts. Subjective facts are things within my own mind and having a mind is, if anything, knowing this kind of facts.

And, although we can't be absolutely certain about the truth of what we say about the objective world where chairs and people are supposed to exist, we have procedures and protocols to settle who is correct and who isn't. And if those fail then we just get to disagree about who is correct and we do do that a lot, don't we. Nothing new here.

I see the usual use of "reference" as a simplification of the actual situation. It's a pragmatic thing to do and why not but since you've gone a little bit further than people usually do in discussing how terms refer I think it's a good idea to consider a more accurate picture.
EB
 
Beginningless? It means without a beginning. You might, although I have my doubts about your ability to do so, be able to define "what it means" for something to be without a beginning.

You can't surmount this insurmountable paradox by invoking magical concepts you can't define. Why don't you just invoke a god and be done with it?

Restating something is not defining it.

Yes the magical concept of "beginningless" is conceptually the same thing as "without beginning".

Both are imaginary magical concepts that can't be explained or shown to be possible.

When you mature and see you are ignoring half of a paradox you will achieve a greater state of understanding.
 
What people believe to be the truth is not deterministic of consequence events. Rather it is their activities to what is actually happening around and to them that makes the table for the them. Truth is like etiquette. It's a model for staging. Staging however depends on antecedent and consequent events.

I think what I just wrote is a bit like your characterization of reference visa vis situation. Also I think you may be missing the point of fast's 'people do'. I would only add people 'interacting with their world' do.

We aren't discussing models we're discussing transactions.
 
I think what I just wrote is a bit like your characterization of reference visa vis situation. Also I think you may be missing the point of fast's 'people do'.

Of course fast didn't mean "people refer". Rather, he must have meant that people use words to refer. And I agree with that.

But what is it they are referring to?

I think what is referred to can only be things that these people actually know and in my view that's only their own sensory data, not whatever we think may exist in the world outside our mind.

Yet, it's really tricky to explain properly.

Basically, people take their sensory data not to be a mental image of the outside world but as the outside world itself. So, when they use words to refer to sensory data they believe they are referring to something in the outside world. So the intention is to refer to the outside world but we are fooled by our own perception system and all we can really refer to are sensory data because that's all we get to know. Obviously, we need to keep in mind that nonetheless the intention is to refer to things in the outside world. But when I say we are fooled by our perception system, this remains true even though we are now in this scientific age sophisticated enough to understand broadly what our situation must be. Even me, as I'm discussing this, I can look at my brand new laptop and really believe it's the actual real thing. I have to work really hard to convince myself that what I take to be my laptop is nothing but perception data that seem to be an actual computer.



I removed from your post the bits where you try to explain your perspective. Still, I take it that your view is that reference is really to the actual world, not to our perception data of it, and that reference is somehow achieved through the interactions humans have with their environment. It's also probably fast's view, as you seem to suggest.

The problem I have with this view is that humans themselves don't actually know whatever is being referred to. Since we are presumably all humans around here, none of us actually knows whatever our supposed interactions with the world might refer to.
We're talking about something none of us actually know anything about. We just mistake our perception data for the real world and we naively think our pronouncements about our perception data are pronouncements about the real world.

I'm sure it works well enough that we do survive but that doesn't mean this kind of metaphysical reference is a helpful concept. I prefer the my notion of epistemological reference whereby people use words to refer to what they actually know, which is our mental image of the world, that is high-level perception data, even if, in doing so, they are fooled by their perception system into believing this mental image is the actual real world itself.

Accepting this view, we can still assume that our understanding of the real world is good enough for what we have to do even though there's really no way to make sure of that.

Ultimately, we have to have faith that it will all work out Ok. But there's really no need to be so naïve about it.
EB
 
Say what?

I am hesitant. In fact, "hesitant" might be too light a word. I'm scared to use a term to characterize my perspective, and that's because (or mostly because) I don't have a well educated understanding of the terms. I always feel there's something I'm missing that's gonna aid to convey positions I don't have, but if I had to guess, I'd go with "metaphysical realism." The moon exists, and if we were to all perish at once, the moon would continue to exist.

I believe that's true--that moon part exemplifying the external world as being independent of the internal world. How we know that's true, or if anyone prefers, how we (uh, how some) think we know that's true is another matter entirely.

I will happily come aboard the data train and utilize "data" (the word) and speak of this sensory data that assists our brains into forming the perceptions we have. I am not fooled into conflating the sensory data with what the sensory data is sensory data of, nor am I fooled into confusing my perceptions gained from the sensory data with what my perceptions are perceptions of.

If it should be the case (and I doubt that it is the case) I am self deluded and merely think there is a reality external to my mind, then pray tell, speak more not of how we do or don't know but rather about the source of this sensory data being spoken of. It seems logical to me that if we do indeed have sensory data, then it was processed by a physical entity that exists as surely as does the physical glowing thing we call a moon.

On a completely different note, more specifically the issue of things people do, I am captured in awe over what some would call speech acts. I open my mouth and intentionally utter sounds, most of which that come out as something we call words, and I do so in hoping to communicate such that what's on my mind can somehow be shared with others.

People do, thus, use words. Thinking of them like tools, we use them to do things like expressing ideas and thoughts. However, there's a notion that needs to be juggled around so we can differentiate between two distinct modes or camps.

On the one hand, when people are loose with how they speak, they may say something like "the word, '"door' refers to the object between a door frame." An astute listenener from the other camp might make a wise crack and say, "how talented!" suggesting that it's preposterous to think words could do anything at all, let alone actually refer to things. It's hilarious to that second camp because they know it's people that have the functional capacity to act on intentionality, not words.

I am a member of both camps. That's probably a rare position, but there's a lot to be said on that. When I say that the tree was blowing in the wind, I'm not under the mistaken impression that trees have the mental capacity to perform acts any more than people think tires have mental faculties when they roll.

As I transition yet again but this time to the topic of meaning, I do hold the position that people use words to express meaning, but I also hold what I don't think is a competing position--that words have meaning. No, I don't mean to imply that the meaning of words are somehow inherent to them, and there's a lot more to say on that too, but in interest of brevity, I summarize that not only do I mean something when I speak, but additionally, when we speak, words mean something too.* If they didn't, we wouldn't use them to express what we mean to say when we speak.

*I meant for that to sound peculiar. It's a play on the ambiguity. It highlights the same ambiguity glossed over when people deny that words refer and then rush in to claim that people refer using words. Both are true, and we have to recognize that the referring that's going on when words refer is much unlike what's going on when people do.
 
Words don't refer to objects in the world. Each object that can be examined is singular and unique.

Words refer to concepts in the head. If they are understood.

Concepts that can change and evolve over time.
 
Words don't refer to objects in the world. Each object that can be examined is singular and unique.

Words refer to concepts in the head. If they are understood.

Concepts that can change and evolve over time.
But when I say, "hand me that book," I'm not saying to hand me that particular concept.

I get that that the particular book I'm ordering you to hand me is but a single instantiation (or can be examined, singular and unique, as you say) serving as a member of the overarching class, set, or group of all books, but (oh let's say) a request to burn all books in the room is not a request to burn all of something in the head.

A concept is like an understanding. I can ride a horse, and there's not a horse I can't ride, and given time, I can ride all the members of the set, but the entire group is physical, not mental. A concept I cannot ride. When I refer to horses and use the term "horses" to do so, the term succeeds in referring to what I'm using it to refer to.

If I said to explain your concept of a horse or horses, that would be distinctively different than if I asked you to explain horses (or the behavior or nature of horses).
 
Words don't refer to objects in the world. Each object that can be examined is singular and unique.

Words refer to concepts in the head. If they are understood.

Concepts that can change and evolve over time.
But when I say, "hand me that book," I'm not saying to hand me that particular concept.

I get that that the particular book I'm ordering you to hand me is but a single instantiation (or can be examined, singular and unique, as you say) serving as a member of the overarching class, set, or group of all books, but (oh let's say) a request to burn all books in the room is not a request to burn all of something in the head.

A concept is like an understanding. I can ride a horse, and there's not a horse I can't ride, and given time, I can ride all the members of the set, but the entire group is physical, not mental. A concept I cannot ride. When I refer to horses and use the term "horses" to do so, the term succeeds in referring to what I'm using it to refer to.

If I said to explain your concept of a horse or horses, that would be distinctively different than if I asked you to explain horses (or the behavior or nature of horses).

Embarrassingly enough, I have to multiquote myself here:

Speakpigeon said:
So I will use the word "chair" to mean the idea of chair. But, not to mean any particular chair. Not to mean all chairs either. Rather, it's the concept of chair, and a concept is an idea in somebody's mind. To mean some particular chair, I will have to add a least another word: "This chair". Or, possibly, more than one word: "the chair you are sitting on". By these words, I will mean a particular chair. Referring according to this analysis, becomes referring to a particular idea, i.e. the meaning. So, when I use the word "chair", I use it to refer to the concept of chair. I will use the expression "this chair" to refer to the idea in my mind of a particular chair.

Speakpigeon said:
people take their sensory data not to be a mental image of the outside world but as the outside world itself. So, when they use words to refer to sensory data they believe they are referring to something in the outside world. So the intention is to refer to the outside world but we are fooled by our own perception system and all we can really refer to are sensory data because that's all we get to know.

Speakpigeon said:
I prefer the my notion of epistemological reference whereby people use words to refer to what they actually know, which is our mental image of the world, that is high-level perception data, even if, in doing so, they are fooled by their perception system into believing this mental image is the actual real world itself.

We say "the horse to signify a particular horse but we talk of "the concept of horse", i.e. without any determiner ('all', 'this', 'the' etc.). We don't talk of the concept "of the horse", or the concept "of horses", etc. (132,000 hits on Google for "the concept of horse is"; see for example Frege: "... when we say things like 'The concept of horse is multiply instantiated' ..."; or see Saussure: "... where the concept of horse is what is signified ..."; I found only 4 hits for "the concept of horses", significantly all recent, of which three by the same guy with a Chinese name and one using an informal style; also, only 5 hits for "the concept of the horse".)
EB
 
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