One corollary of this definition that I just thought of, regarding the bolded.
In a society that imposes constraints on the individual, is our will actually free according to this definition?
So, updated definition of free-will:
But wait! There's more. We are also confined by our physical ability as a human being. We can only do that which a human being can do, and we can only act insofar as our available energy will allow. So here we go again:
Ok, sorry to do it again, but something else comes to mind now. Epistemology. We can only do that which we know how to do.
Maybe an unnecessary addition to the definition, but perhaps useful information?
The corollary of my additions:
A freer society, more biological ability (wealth), and more knowledge makes the subject more free.
Right, Harris states.."You cannot know something you do not know anymore than you can unknow what you know. I think the simplest creatures move of their own accord, but their ability to choose vs react moment to moment on instinct gives the illusion of free will. Clearly they do not have the ability to reason out their choices, yet the illusion is complete.
Free will vs Limited Will.
Is a lizard conscious? Is a cat conscious? Is a 3 year old human conscious?
Certainly, there is an experiencer present, but the experience is limited by the mind's content.
This is why I dislike when really smart people talk of 'automata'. If one human being is an automata, we all are. If lizards are automata, then we all are.
It's more accurate to say that humans have a will that is more free than that of a cat's.
I'm pretty good with that. Partially-free will. More degrees of freedom. More agency. Whatever.
I have reservations about using the bare term 'free will' for something that ultimately isn't, mainly because it seems to be at odds with and would likely be confused with what it is commonly believed to mean. I wouldn't readily rescue the word 'god' and use it to mean 'the natural universe' for similar reasons, even if it would, technically, mean that god exists.
The pros and cons of keeping or not keeping a term to define or describe something can be discussed. Daniel Dennett, for instance agrees that the commonly-held conception of free will is an illusion, but he wants to keep the name. He doesn't want to do the same for the word god, so I think he's inconsistent.
You could make a case for retaining both words (free will and god), on the basis that at some stage, if it is explained enough, people will eventually understand exactly what the words can or do mean to the user, in other words that the terms will lose their baggage. I don't see this happening for either any time soon, and so I prefer to change the terminology.
His motives are also....questionable (by me) in that he seems to want to keep the traditional word because bad things will happen if we tell people they don't have free will. This reminds me a bit of the idea that losing a belief in god will cause people to do bad things, or of a certain bishop's wife who, in 1860 so the story goes, upon learning that we are descended from apes said to her husband,
'‘My dear, descended from the apes! Let us hope it is not true, but if it is, let us pray that it will not become generally known."
I think what is most important, naming issues aside, is that we understand these things as being on a spectrum, not as a fixed binary 'have' and 'have not'.
Other phenomena might warrant this binary treatment. Perpetual motion for example. You can't, I don't think, usefully talk about partially perpetual. The word 'free', on its own, without the prefix 'complete', 'absolute' or 'total' does not seem to have to suffer from this restriction, imo.