What is the actual free will humans have?

[ruby sparks]

The freedom of the will is best expressed in the ideas we accept or reject after consideration.

Is choosing to not believe some story about the gods written 2000 years ago a reflex?

Or is it a free rational choice?

Dunno, but I might say that letting go, partially or completely, of some beliefs (including in this case belief in god, as an example) seems easier for humans than others (eg a belief in the self and its supposed capacities for free control).

I don't know why this 'persistence' of some beliefs might be (and I can't speak for others, who may disagree) but if it is the case I'd guess that it might have to do with how far back or how deeply embedded in our nature, our psychology, this or that belief goes. That would make sense if belief in god were more recent or not as deeply embedded.

Either way, I personally (and it has often been said by others) find it not too hard to mostly life my life from moment to moment as if god does not exist, but when it comes to free will and self, I find it very hard not to mostly live in what I believe is the illusion.

This is not defeatist, and I include the word 'mostly' above for non-trivial reasons. I do think that if a belief in something is even partially loosened or weakened, this will affect one's thinking and how one goes about one's life. This is true whether something is an illusion or isn't by the way, so it does not necessarily assume that god, self or free will are. Though personally I do think they are. And so my life is slightly affected. Mostly by the lack of belief in the former, as I said, because the other two are harder to shake off.

One of the main aspirations of those who advocate that beliefs in free will ought to be weakened is that we would moderate or lose at least some of our desires for retribution. And some studies (in which subjects have their beliefs in free will weakened by manipulation and suggestion) seem to bear this out.

That's the good news. Other studies do seem to suggest that people would be more likely to cheat.

There aren't, imo, enough studies to conclude much. One of the studies which showed the increased cheating, for example, was small, and all the subjects were practicing mormons.

All things considered, my guess is that a wide acceptance that traditional free will is probably an illusion would result in a mixed bag of outcomes, positive and negative.

Speaking for myself, I can't subscribe to just retaining a belief because of not wanting adverse consequences. Realising that there's probably no loving god and no life after death is, at times a bitter pill to swallow, but it seems silly to deny it.

 

[untermensche]

Is it just a belief a person can decide which ideas to accept and which to reject?

Or do people do it all the time?

Isn't that an aspect of maturity in the human?

Making choices based on reason, not reflex or emotion?

 

[ruby sparks]

Is it just a belief a person can decide which ideas to accept and which to reject?

Or do people do it all the time?

Isn't that an aspect of maturity in the human?

Making choices based on reason, not reflex or emotion?

Personally, I'd say our beliefs change quite a lot, even if only in terms of partial modifications over time. I don't think this is because we freely will them to change though.

As to reason, yes, I agree that our reasoning capacities are what allows for at least some more degrees of freedom. And this capacity will vary from individual to individual (from one meat robot system to another, if you like).

That said, I don't think our reasoning capacities are as impressive as we like to think they are, and it's not clear if conscious reasoning* plays as big a role as we think it does. So there may be illusory aspects to even that. It's very easy, even after accepting that we probably don't have free will, to slip towards reifying reason for reasons of vanity.




* You may want to say that the word reason implies consciousness, so in that case we could distinguish between conscious processing (reasoning) and non-conscious processing, with both being forms of thinking, where thinking is a synonym for brain activity.

 

[untermensche]

Reason does not limit freedom in any way.

Every moment we can choose to be guided by it or by something else.

 

[ruby sparks]

Reason does not limit freedom in any way.

Every moment we can choose to be guided by it or by something else.

That's two very bold claims, both of which I would query in certain ways (especially if the choosing in the latter implies free will choosing). As to the former point about reason, I would pick up on what I said about over-egging its role. But not right now. Right now I need to get back to real-world money-earning work, unfortunately. Maybe later.

 

[untermensche]

Reason does not limit freedom in any way.

Every moment we can choose to be guided by it or by something else.

That's two very bold claims, both of which I would query in certain ways (especially if the choosing in the latter implies free will choosing). As to the former point about reason, I would pick up on what I said about over-egging its role. But not right now. Right now I need to get back to real-world money-earning work, unfortunately. Maybe later.

I have no desire to force these ideas down your throat but I could defend them.

What forces you to earn money by doing some trick is not nature. It is all man-made.

The chains we have are economic chains and most are forced to wear them.

We don't wear mental chains.

Except the ones we for some reason place upon ourselves by accepting them without question.

 

[fromderinside]

Prove proximal cause and I'll prove no free will.

 

[Speakpigeon]

The ability to do what one wants without compulsion.

Wants is an important factor.

If you threaten me such that I will be punished or harmed unless I either refrain from some behavior or act on some demand, then I'm still acting of my own free will if what I do is indeed what I want to do.

For example, if I want to speed and you don't want to speed, then laws prohibiting my behavior have no effect on you acting of your own free will, but it does have an effect on me doing as I want to do of my own free will.

An objection might be that I am acting of my free will if I speed despite the prohibition, but that's a mistake. The mistake is in thinking compulsory pressure cannot be overcome. It can. If I hijack someone and their car, they could resist the pressure of conforming to my demands, but that doesn't negate the presence of the pressure.

Compulsion is an important factor.

I can compel through constraint (to) and restraint (from). If either shade of compulsion is present, it's a force against free will, but like I said, wants are also important. If I am locked behind bars, I am being kept from going about and doing as I might please, but if I'm perfectly content behind bars and have no desire to roam past the bars, then my staying is still of my own free will.

Yes, but.

If I want to speed and there's a speed limit, I can still exercise my free will by speeding beyond the limit. I may get a ticket or even go to prison but I will have exercised my free will. And doing it shows it's possible to do it.

Now suppose I refrain from speeding because of the speed limit and because of the possible consequences. This does not remove my free will in any way. In effect, I will have exercised my free will, i.e. by choosing not to overspeed, as I could very well have opted instead for speeding and even done some actual overspeeding. So, I will be presumed to possess free will even as I comply with external constraints not to overspeed and refrain to do as I please. In this case, in effect, I choose to comply. I want to comply. I suppose I want to comply with the speed limit more than I want to overspeed. And, in complying, I'm still exercising my free will.

So free will is not defined by what we actually do but by the fact that we can choose to do or not to do. Free will refers to our ability to choose, not to our actions or lack thereof, or to whether or not we like what we choose to do.

If I am forcefully prevented to act as I want to, then, yes, I cannot act according to my own free will. But the contraint prevents the action I want to carry out. It does not remove my free will. I am prevented from acting and therefore I am prevented from acting according to my own free will, but I still possess my own free will.

Can you agree with this?
EB

 

[fast]

If I want to speed and there's a speed limit, I can still exercise my free will by speeding beyond the limit.

I will respond to the remainder later, but while I have a moment, I want to express my disagreement.

Remember, my definition is from a compatibilist perspective, and as such, compulsion plays a critical role. It may indeed sidestep the original problem, but because there is a speed limit, there is a pressure in place that goes against freely doing what I want. Yes, in this instance, we have the ability to overcome the pressure and speed anyway, just as a high jack victim can overcome the pressure of the high jackers demands, but the pressure itself is still a compelling force, so when I drive the speed limit, I am constrained (and thus compelled) to do so. When I overcome the constraining pressure, I am not not doing as I please in the absence of compulsion.

 

[untermensche]

Prove proximal cause and I'll prove no free will.

Explain how the universe began or I won't believe it is there.

 

[none]

Prove proximal cause and I'll prove no free will.

Explain how the universe began or I won't believe it is there.

who said it began?

 

[fromderinside]

So free will is not defined by what we actually do but by the fact that we can choose to do or not to do. Free will refers to our ability to choose, not to our actions or lack thereof, or to whether or not we like what we choose to do.

EB

Ah, but actually what we do at some level is the only way to consider whether will is free or no. At the most reduced level that is true. If it be some sort of chemical activity, neuronal activity, or other relation between the way things were at time t defines whether what happens thereafter is with our without outside cause. So it is like I wrote "prove cause and I will prove lack of free will".

 

[untermensche]

Prove proximal cause and I'll prove no free will.

Explain how the universe began or I won't believe it is there.

who said it began?

Then explain how it is here without beginning. Either one.

We can actually experience the choices we make. We can experience how we make them.

Saying we need to know how they began is absurd.

 

[none]

Explain how the universe began or I won't believe it is there.

who said it began?

Then explain how it is here without beginning. Either one.

We can actually experience the choices we make. We can experience how we make them.

Saying we need to know how they began is absurd.

or what? that you are going to believe the universe began?
you are particularly rabid when challenged, doesn't mean the universe began or your denials are sane
you have a right to think what you think but that doesn't mean you are sane

 

[untermensche]

or what? that you are going to believe the universe began?

Are you going to say it didn't?

you are particularly rabid when challenged

Thanks for the compliment.

A great way to begin a discussion.

 

[none]

or what? that you are going to believe the universe began?

Are you going to say it didn't?

you are particularly rabid when challenged

Thanks for the compliment.

A great way to begin a discussion.

I'd say there is insufficient data to say for certain if the universe began or always existed
but I'm not sure why you'd care

 

[fast]

The ability to do what one wants without compulsion.

Wants is an important factor.

If you threaten me such that I will be punished or harmed unless I either refrain from some behavior or act on some demand, then I'm still acting of my own free will if what I do is indeed what I want to do.

For example, if I want to speed and you don't want to speed, then laws prohibiting my behavior have no effect on you acting of your own free will, but it does have an effect on me doing as I want to do of my own free will.

An objection might be that I am acting of my free will if I speed despite the prohibition, but that's a mistake. The mistake is in thinking compulsory pressure cannot be overcome. It can. If I hijack someone and their car, they could resist the pressure of conforming to my demands, but that doesn't negate the presence of the pressure.

Compulsion is an important factor.

I can compel through constraint (to) and restraint (from). If either shade of compulsion is present, it's a force against free will, but like I said, wants are also important. If I am locked behind bars, I am being kept from going about and doing as I might please, but if I'm perfectly content behind bars and have no desire to roam past the bars, then my staying is still of my own free will.

Yes, but.

If I want to speed and there's a speed limit, I can still exercise my free will by speeding beyond the limit. I may get a ticket or even go to prison but I will have exercised my free will. And doing it shows it's possible to do it.

Now suppose I refrain from speeding because of the speed limit and because of the possible consequences. This does not remove my free will in any way. In effect, I will have exercised my free will, i.e. by choosing not to overspeed, as I could very well have opted instead for speeding and even done some actual overspeeding. So, I will be presumed to possess free will even as I comply with external constraints not to overspeed and refrain to do as I please. In this case, in effect, I choose to comply. I want to comply. I suppose I want to comply with the speed limit more than I want to overspeed. And, in complying, I'm still exercising my free will.

So free will is not defined by what we actually do but by the fact that we can choose to do or not to do. Free will refers to our ability to choose, not to our actions or lack thereof, or to whether or not we like what we choose to do.

If I am forcefully prevented to act as I want to, then, yes, I cannot act according to my own free will. But the contraint prevents the action I want to carry out. It does not remove my free will. I am prevented from acting and therefore I am prevented from acting according to my own free will, but I still possess my own free will.

Can you agree with this?
EB

As to the rest:

If we had the opportunity to take a step back in time, then given only the information we had at the time and given the circumstance at the time, could we in fact have been able to make an alternative choice? Personally, I think yes, but the hard determinist says no because they hold that we live in a clock like universe where every event (both on the macro and micro level) were determined such that no event is a contingent event; thus to them, every event whether mental or otherwise is a necessary event. That's what gives rise to the notion that free will is an illusion.

 

[untermensche]

..I'd say there is insufficient data to say for certain if the universe began or always existed..

The data points to a beginning.

What would the data for "always existed" be?

How would any data point to that conclusion?

It is an assumption based on no data and no possible data.

A complete figment of the imagination.

 

[none]

..I'd say there is insufficient data to say for certain if the universe began or always existed..

The data points to a beginning.

What would the data for "always existed" be?

How would any data point to that conclusion?

It is an assumption based on no data and no possible data.

A complete figment of the imagination.

what data?

 

[Speakpigeon]

If I want to speed and there's a speed limit, I can still exercise my free will by speeding beyond the limit.

I will respond to the remainder later, but while I have a moment, I want to express my disagreement.

Remember, my definition is from a compatibilist perspective, and as such, compulsion plays a critical role. It may indeed sidestep the original problem, but because there is a speed limit, there is a pressure in place that goes against freely doing what I want. Yes, in this instance, we have the ability to overcome the pressure and speed anyway, just as a high jack victim can overcome the pressure of the high jackers demands, but the pressure itself is still a compelling force, so when I drive the speed limit, I am constrained (and thus compelled) to do so. When I overcome the constraining pressure, I am not not doing as I please in the absence of compulsion.

But this is confusing free will with freedom.

You think people living under some crackpot dictator should be said to be deprived of their free will?! That's definitely not the usual way we would describe the situation.

If there's a constraint, it's certainly going to affect your actions but you still retain your ability to make a choice, between either doing what you like, even at some cost for yourself because of the constraint, or not doing something you would have liked doing. In the latter case, you may not like what you're going to do but it's still the case that it's what you want to do because it's your decision to do it, hence free will even in this case.

Free will is a property of very nearly all human beings. What we all can very easily be deprived of is freedom. Our freedom can be removed by the smallest constraint, like getting a ticket for letting our dog foul the pavement. But even a prisoner in the darkest cachot in the most dire dictatorship retains his free will.
EB