What is the actual free will humans have?

[Speakpigeon]

That doesn't appear to address the testability of our assumption, if that's what it is, of the existence of an external objective reality/world and our inability to effect this reality purely through mental effort or will.

Why is it an assumption? We are born into a vast and complex world that to all appearances is not of our own making, or subject to our will, instead it is we who have to learn the rules and principles of the world and learn to negotiate within it according to its rules and principles and not something we may just assume.

Yes, but this only tells us that we're only very plausibly part of a larger world. We can't be sure. And we don't know what kind of world it is exactly.

As best as we can say, to be conscious is to be conscious of some processes inside our brain. For now at least, we're unable to assess how realistic, how faithful, how accurate, is the representation of the world provided by these processes. Assuming we are effectively surviving in this outside world, our representation would have to be good enough for us to so survive in it, but that in itself does not mean that the world out there is much like how it is represented inside our mind.

Anyway, that's how I think of it. You believe what you like.
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

Are we doing consciousness in the free will thread and free will in the consciousness thread?

 

[bilby]

Are we doing consciousness in the free will thread and free will in the consciousness thread?

We are free to do so, even though we don't appear to be conscious of having done so.

 

[Treedbear]

There seems to be a general agreement that we can only know the external world in a nominal sense, and therefore whether we have free will to choose one path of another is illusive, if not illusory. I'm beginning to loose track of what any of that has to do with free will. When lost in a forest it can be argued that we nevertheless have free will, even if we cannot know the path which leads us home. We might have hope, but misguided hope tends to get us lost even further. If free will is in any way based on what we think we know of our selves I think it's just such a delusion.

 

[Subsymbolic]

There seems to be a general agreement that we can only know the external world in a nominal sense, and therefore whether we have free will to choose one path of another is illusive, if not illusory. I'm beginning to loose track of what any of that has to do with free will. When lost in a forest it can be argued that we nevertheless have free will, even if we cannot know the path which leads us home. We might have hope, but misguided hope tends to get us lost even further. If free will is in any way based on what we think we know of our selves I think it's just such a delusion.

Freewill is about choosing, freedom is about acting.

Personally I’m never too excited when sceptical problems are deployed in anything other than sceptical arguments. My position is always that once you choose to deploy the universal acid of scepticism it invariably dissolves everything. Even if this were not the case, then the only rational option is to carry on as if it is false. I understand arguing all night because someone is wrong on the internet, but arguing all night because you are hallucinating that someone is wrong? That’s just wrong.

Of course, it’s also wrong because scepticism doesn’t allow anything more than the experience of the moment. You can’t form compound ideas because memory can’t be trusted. Alkahest, it’s a pain to handle.

So, freewill...

 

[DBT]

Decision making and free will: a neuroscience perspective.


Abstract

''A thorough analysis of the question of whether we possess "free will" requires that we take into account the process of exercising that will: that is, the neural mechanisms of decision making. Much of what we know about these mechanisms indicates that decision making is greatly influenced by implicit processes that may not even reach consciousness. Moreover, there exist conditions, for example certain types of brain injury or drug addiction, in which an individual can be said to have a disorder of the will. Examples such as these demonstrate that the idea of freedom of will on which our legal system is based is not supported by the neuroscience of decision making. Using the criminal law as an example, we discuss how new discoveries in neuroscience can serve as a tool for reprioritizing our society's legal intuitions in a way that leads us to a more effective and humane system.''

 

[Subsymbolic]

Decision making and free will: a neuroscience perspective.


Abstract

''A thorough analysis of the question of whether we possess "free will" requires that we take into account the process of exercising that will: that is, the neural mechanisms of decision making. Much of what we know about these mechanisms indicates that decision making is greatly influenced by implicit processes that may not even reach consciousness. Moreover, there exist conditions, for example certain types of brain injury or drug addiction, in which an individual can be said to have a disorder of the will. Examples such as these demonstrate that the idea of freedom of will on which our legal system is based is not supported by the neuroscience of decision making. Using the criminal law as an example, we discuss how new discoveries in neuroscience can serve as a tool for reprioritizing our society's legal intuitions in a way that leads us to a more effective and humane system.''

Surely that’s just a very posh way of arguing for psychological determinism?

 

[DBT]

Decision making and free will: a neuroscience perspective.


Abstract

''A thorough analysis of the question of whether we possess "free will" requires that we take into account the process of exercising that will: that is, the neural mechanisms of decision making. Much of what we know about these mechanisms indicates that decision making is greatly influenced by implicit processes that may not even reach consciousness. Moreover, there exist conditions, for example certain types of brain injury or drug addiction, in which an individual can be said to have a disorder of the will. Examples such as these demonstrate that the idea of freedom of will on which our legal system is based is not supported by the neuroscience of decision making. Using the criminal law as an example, we discuss how new discoveries in neuroscience can serve as a tool for reprioritizing our society's legal intuitions in a way that leads us to a more effective and humane system.''

Surely that’s just a very posh way of arguing for psychological determinism?

Psychology being shaped by neural architecture. The state of the hardware determining the expression of its own software, psychology, personality, character, within a self programming - inputs interacting with memory/past experience/learning - intelligent system.

 

[Subsymbolic]

Decision making and free will: a neuroscience perspective.


Abstract

''A thorough analysis of the question of whether we possess "free will" requires that we take into account the process of exercising that will: that is, the neural mechanisms of decision making. Much of what we know about these mechanisms indicates that decision making is greatly influenced by implicit processes that may not even reach consciousness. Moreover, there exist conditions, for example certain types of brain injury or drug addiction, in which an individual can be said to have a disorder of the will. Examples such as these demonstrate that the idea of freedom of will on which our legal system is based is not supported by the neuroscience of decision making. Using the criminal law as an example, we discuss how new discoveries in neuroscience can serve as a tool for reprioritizing our society's legal intuitions in a way that leads us to a more effective and humane system.''

Surely that’s just a very posh way of arguing for psychological determinism?

Psychology being shaped by neural architecture. The state of the hardware determining the expression of its own software, psychology, personality, character, within a self programming - inputs interacting with memory/past experience/learning - intelligent system.

Cool, in that case it's the same old metaphysical question: when thinking about a system's freewill, do we talk about the entire system or about some sort of Cartesian captain. Personally I think the whole Cartesian Captain is, at best, a user illusion and I really can't see a principled reason why the smallest unit that we can ascribe freewill to being the whole body. Personally I'm an externalist and a little suspicious of the boundaries of skin and skull, so I might want to go further, but there's a very strong temptation to think that skin and skull is a very natural boundary. I'm keen to hear the arguments for locating freewill more precisely than that.

 

[untermensche]

...Freewill is about choosing, freedom is about acting....

A choice is an action.

 

[DBT]

Psychology being shaped by neural architecture. The state of the hardware determining the expression of its own software, psychology, personality, character, within a self programming - inputs interacting with memory/past experience/learning - intelligent system.

Cool, in that case it's the same old metaphysical question: when thinking about a system's freewill, do we talk about the entire system or about some sort of Cartesian captain. Personally I think the whole Cartesian Captain is, at best, a user illusion and I really can't see a principled reason why the smallest unit that we can ascribe freewill to being the whole body. Personally I'm an externalist and a little suspicious of the boundaries of skin and skull, so I might want to go further, but there's a very strong temptation to think that skin and skull is a very natural boundary. I'm keen to hear the arguments for locating freewill more precisely than that.

There is no free will. We have decision making. We have the ability to act. Will is the impulse or drive to act upon decisions or desires that precede and shape will, hence we have will, but 'will' cannot be described as 'free will'

 

[Subsymbolic]

As you wish, intention then.

 

[DBT]

Yes, intention. We have intention. We have purpose. We have drive.

 

[ruby sparks]

To me, the term free will is...tricky. I think it carries a lot of baggage. I don't especially like using it. There is a case that could be made that it's the wrong term to describe our capacities for agency. That said, I am ok with partial free will or degrees of freedom. You might even catch me off guard using the term free will now and again.

Arguably the bigger question is actually, 'what is the nature of the agency we do have?' and/or, 'what implications does this have for ideas about (and social applications for) personal responsibility'?

As a side note, I think it is also worth noting that 'the person in the street' who has not given the issue a great deal of thought does not likely hold one particular, unconfused idea of what free will is. As far as I can gather, people generally have mixed notions which are, depending on particular scenarios, an intuitive mix of libertarianism, hard determinism and soft determinism (compatibilism). An interesting observation that has been made (through research) is that people, we, have more deterministic thinking when it comes to 'good deeds' than 'bad deeds' which suggests that concepts of free will are strongly related to justifying retributions.

As to the role of consciousness, I tend to think that it does play a role, particularly in deliberated decisions, that is to say those that we consciously deliberate about ahead of time, using our rather impressive (imo) capacity to step out of the moment and travel, mentally and consciously, backwards and forwards through time. Other types of decisions may be more, or in some cases wholly, non-conscious.

In principle then, once a system has (deterministically and/or randomly) churned up an alternate future possibility, this possibility then feeds into the processes and becomes part of the circumstances in which the decision is made. A system in which these alternative future possibilities are not generated has, imo, less freedoms and less agency.

Degrees of appropriateness for awarding personal responsibility depend, imo, on the degree of sophistication that a certain system has for agency and freedoms. I think that if, hypothetically (thought experiment coming up) we ever designed or made a system as complicated as the human system, we would (and this may sound controversial) be justified, and not just for pragmatic reasons, in awarding it at least some personal responsibility, the degree of which would depend on particular circumstances.

Ps I would have to add into the mix the capacity for memory, processing generally and especially machine learning that our systems have, when they are functioning well. If we weren't machines that could learn, we would imo be far less justified in awarding ourselves personal responsibility.

 

[ruby sparks]

Decision making and free will: a neuroscience perspective.


Abstract

''A thorough analysis of the question of whether we possess "free will" requires that we take into account the process of exercising that will: that is, the neural mechanisms of decision making. Much of what we know about these mechanisms indicates that decision making is greatly influenced by implicit processes that may not even reach consciousness. Moreover, there exist conditions, for example certain types of brain injury or drug addiction, in which an individual can be said to have a disorder of the will. Examples such as these demonstrate that the idea of freedom of will on which our legal system is based is not supported by the neuroscience of decision making. Using the criminal law as an example, we discuss how new discoveries in neuroscience can serve as a tool for reprioritizing our society's legal intuitions in a way that leads us to a more effective and humane system.''

That looks like an interesting paper. Thanks for posting. I wish I could get to read the whole thing.

Yes, courtrooms are one 'real world' setting in which the question 'do we or don't we have free will' arguably has to be addressed.

Though I think perhaps the best way to address it is by asking, 'what particular degree of personal* responsibility are we (other agential systems) justified in awarding this particular agential system (the one in the dock) in the particular circumstances'?

*ETA: we could say 'system responsibility' rather than 'personal responsibility' if we want to avoid the baggage of defining what a person is. Which is arguably a good idea. I have come to the conclusion that the more machine terminology we use, the better, and that it is also useful to talk and think in terms of degrees or points on a (complicated perhaps non-linear) spectrum rather than thinking in terms of binary do's and dont's.

 

[ruby sparks]

Try this:

So, one system (let's call it the 'parent system A' in this exchange) can communicate, in a shared language, to another system ('learner system B' in this exchange), 'didn't I tell you and didn't you understand that that was not permitted and what would happen if you did it?' and receive verification via the shared language, and, perhaps, reasonably expect the learner system, once it has learned some other stuff, like its own system-control, to begin to apply the knowledge and incorporate it into its processes, even imperfectly.

You can't currently do that with a car, as far as I know. Perhaps in the future.

And this expectation might warrant some degree, at least, of system-responsibility being assigned to the learner system.

That's a very general and simplistic illustration, of course, and not at all free will in the traditional or libertarian sense. In fact, it's fully or adequately determined, the whole way down. Indeterminism in the form of randomness might theoretically disrupt the capacities, if it can be shown to have played a part.

 

[ruby sparks]

Interesting (fairly short) paper on the 'internal'* system-control feature (called 'self-control' in human systems):

The Strength Model of Self-Control
http://www.elaborer.org/cours/A14/lectures/Baumeister2007.pdf



Stanford Marshmallow test on children:
[YOUTUBE]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yo4WF3cSd9Q[/YOUTUBE]

In other words, you may not be exercising fully free will when your system has learned about the benefits of deferred gratification and other applications of 'internal'* system control, but the capacity to learn and apply it/them (often using a mental or virtual time travel function) arguably adds to your agency and your degrees of freedom when making decisions that involve consciousness.

* (I pause before using the word autonomous and have to put inverted commas around 'internal' since no system is fully disconnected from ongoing interactions with a wider world).

 

[Speakpigeon]

Cool, in that case it's the same old metaphysical question: when thinking about a system's freewill, do we talk about the entire system or about some sort of Cartesian captain. Personally I think the whole Cartesian Captain is, at best, a user illusion and I really can't see a principled reason why the smallest unit that we can ascribe freewill to being the whole body. Personally I'm an externalist and a little suspicious of the boundaries of skin and skull, so I might want to go further, but there's a very strong temptation to think that skin and skull is a very natural boundary. I'm keen to hear the arguments for locating freewill more precisely than that.

I identify the source of free will with our relative isolation as living organism from the rest of the universe. We're not absolutely isolated so free will couldn't be absolute. You'd have to look at it as a practical question. Much in the same way as you would accept that a jar can contain a certain amount of water by virtue of its shape and of the physical laws applying. Any other view I conveniently deem ideologically motivated.

According to this, I identify the location of free fill to our physical body, especially our brain. However, it's not just our brain. The entity properly endowed with free will is the public personae. Free will is a political idea. The idea of free will underpins all our relations in the context of the human society. Free will is the default assumption whenever we have to deal with other human beings in any social context.

The basis for accepting this view as the default one is the realisation that we are limited as to the amount of informations we're able to obtain about other people. This limitation will always, in normal contexts, prevent us from knowing what it is other people may be up to and from controlling what other people do beyond crude physical coercion. It's a practical perspective. Free will is on a par with our idea of love and friendship. Could people live without love and friendship, do you think?
EB

 

[rousseau]

One corollary of this definition that I just thought of, regarding the bolded.

In a society that imposes constraints on the individual, is our will actually free according to this definition?

So, updated definition of free-will:



But wait! There's more. We are also confined by our physical ability as a human being. We can only do that which a human being can do, and we can only act insofar as our available energy will allow. So here we go again:



Ok, sorry to do it again, but something else comes to mind now. Epistemology. We can only do that which we know how to do.



Maybe an unnecessary addition to the definition, but perhaps useful information?

These additions are indeed entirely unnecessary.

They are effectively already covered by "not determined by anything beyond its own nature or being".
EB

So more the constraints on the freedom of our will.

It's interesting how people have an experience of essentially limitless freedom, and yet in practice their freedom is constrained by so much.

Perhaps it's the normalisation of their experience that does it. They know no other way, so it could be no other way, so the world is as it should be. The idea that they could be more free than they already are does not occur to them.

 

[ruby sparks]

So more the constraints on the freedom of our will.

It's interesting how people have an experience of essentially limitless freedom, and yet in practice their freedom is constrained by so much.

Perhaps it's the normalisation of their experience that does it. They know no other way, so it could be no other way, so the world is as it should be. The idea that they could be more free than they already are does not occur to them.

I largely agree. I think of our capacities for agency as very limited freedoms set against a backdrop of an enormous set of constraints, most notably the way the physical universe blindly operates without any (apparent) regard to what we feel about it.

As you say, I think we have a tendency to greatly overestimate our freedoms, especially when it suits us. At other times, such as when we might as a parent have jumped into the raging sea to rescue our drowning child, we are reasonably happy to modestly defer more towards determinism and say, 'I could not have done otherwise'.