“Reality Goes Beyond Physics,” and more

[pood]

Second, he overlooks Sapolsky’s demand that in order for us to have free will, we should demonstrate free will in an neuron, which is as confused as saying that to demonstrate that water is wet, we should demonstrate wetness in water molecules

This is something I find rather problematic insofar as I have asserted on multiple occasions that we DO see free will even in a single neuron, insofar as it reifies a structure of contingent action.

I refer you to the essay I linked on the Strong Free Will Theorem, which, if you have not yet read, you may find quite interesting, insofar as it discusses, among other things, the potential free will of an electron.

 

[pood]

Jerry Coyne quotes Riskin:

Science can’t prove there’s no free will because the question of free will is not a scientific question but a philosophical one.

Right.

To misrepresent it as a scientific question is a prime example of scientism—extending the claims of science beyond its bounds.

Right.

Here’s another from Sapolsky’s final chapter: “What the science in this book ultimately teaches is that there is no meaning.” This might sound like the opposite of saying that science shows there’s a divine intelligence behind the world-machine, but it’s the direct descendant of that earlier claim, and comes to the same evacuation of meaning and agency from the mortal world. This isn’t a scientific proposition. It remains what it has been from the beginning: a theology.

Right! But wait — remember earlier, Coyne was implying that Riskin was talking about Goddy or supernatural or something or other to justify her claims, but he entirely misconstrued her point. Coyne:

This is wrong. One can gather data for and against determinism. If, for example, we found out that people could move objects by thinking about them, that would suggest that there is some nonmaterial brain force that can actually influence events, buttressing (but not “proving”) the case for free will.

For libertarian free will. Anyhow:

And saying that determinism is “a theology” is also wrong, for theology in the West is involved in exegesis of the Bible and beliefs in a supernatural being.

But the real reason Riskin brought up God and theology is to point out that a lot of the historical debate (not all of it) about determinism and free will has roots in theology, and what she is saying here is what I have been saying: The hard determinist (as opposed to determinist) position very much sounds like a secularized version of Goddidit. More about this later.

 

[peacegirl]

duplicate

 

[pood]

Now Coyne writes:

What’s the alternative to determinism? Here Riskin is silent, though it looks from her frequent references to God and theology that she sees divine action as a possible counter to determinism and a buttressing of free will.

No, Jerry, no, you’ve got it completely bassackwards! She is laying out the case that hard (as opposed to soft) determinism comes off as a secularized version of theology, and she is NOT contending that any sort of theology is needed to defend free will.

(I can’t be sure of this, though, as Riskin doesn’t lay out what she sees as a viable alternative to determinism.)

She doesn’t, but she does imply the alternative, and it’s not theology. I’ll get to that later.

Riskin has described herself as a “Jewish atheist”, and given that she herself doesn’t see divine provenance out there, the onus on her is to admit that she is invoking some kind of supernatural but non-Goddy action.

LOL, no, Jerry, she has no such onus, you have completely misunderstood her argument! Crucially, she is not defending libertarian free will!

More later.

 

[Jarhyn]

Second, he overlooks Sapolsky’s demand that in order for us to have free will, we should demonstrate free will in an neuron, which is as confused as saying that to demonstrate that water is wet, we should demonstrate wetness in water molecules

This is something I find rather problematic insofar as I have asserted on multiple occasions that we DO see free will even in a single neuron, insofar as it reifies a structure of contingent action.

I refer you to the essay I linked on the Strong Free Will Theorem, which, if you have not yet read, you may find quite interesting, insofar as it discusses, among other things, the potential free will of an electron.

Well, electrons have their freedoms, as we can see all kinds of different reifications of "electrons".

While we can probably force this into the language too it has to be tortured to it's utmost to actually render that concept? Arguably any particle that has switch-like action (see also quantum logic gates, and the relation these have to standard logic gates) is so capable and any time where a property is reified which will "A if B else C" suffices.

I'm not much interested in the freedoms of things "smaller" than the large scale mechanical switch, though, since of all matter on that smaller level could be "switch-like". It would take a broad accident for that to arrange in any sensible way, and is supremely unlikely, as unlikely as left handed life arising in a right handed world or visa versa... There's too much destructive interference in random chaos like that.

Instead, I like to focus on larger scale switches with some insulation between them, since they're easier to work with. I would expect that a specific arrangement of switches can in fact "become" insulation. It would have to be possible in fact if it is switches and thus freedoms all the way down.

As an aside, I'm genuinely curious, pood, at your thoughts on the concept that a moving "gravity front" might contribute exactly the relativistic randomness we observe in a deterministic way.

 

[steve_bank]

So, in a deterministic universe some are [predetermined to be fools and assholes, others to be cool.

Some are predestined to be born to a father indoctrinated into an ideology and sp-ending a life trying to get it accepted.

Trump was preordained as was WWII.

The message.is kick back and don;tb worry, nothing can be done to change yoor path.. it is all redetermined.

 

[peacegirl]

First, in the above, Coyne slips up when he conflates determinism with hard determinism, when usually he is careful to append the “hard” modifier to his own brand of determinism. Remember, the compatibilist (whose position Coyne refuses even to entertain) does not deny determinism.

The only thing that counts in this debate is whether we "could have done otherwise" or "we could not have done otherwise" AFTER THE FACT. The rest is just superfluous jargon.

Second, he overlooks Sapolsky’s demand that in order for us to have free will, we should demonstrate free will in an neuron, which is as confused as saying that to demonstrate that water is wet, we should demonstrate wetness in water molecules.

I think he's just demonstrating that down to a simple neuron, it's impossible to argue that this neuron could do anything other than what it is programmed by its biology to do.

A neuron, also known as a nerve cell, is an excitable cell that sends and receives signals from the brain12345. Neurons have specialized projections called axons that allow them to transmit electrical and chemical signals to other cells1.

"Water is wet" is not a description of its function. Poor analogy.

wa·ter
[ˈwôdər, ˈwädər]
noun

1. a colorless, transparent, odorless liquid that forms the seas, lakes, rivers, and rain and is the basis of the fluids of living organisms:
   "sodium chloride dissolves in water" · "can I have a drink of water?"

Third, compatiblist free will (which Coyne refuses to consider for whatever reason) has high priors as well, and as a biologist Coyne ought to know this. The biggest “high prior’ of all is that brains evolved to weigh competing options and make informed choices.

What determinist is denying this Pood? You are making a false dichotomy between "hard" determinism (i.e., the fact that we can only go in one direction) and the attribute of contemplation itself, which we also have.

If we really have no choice in what we do, what would be the selective advantage in complex brains that consume vast energetic resources which could be better allocated to simpler stuff like claws and muscles? A world of hard determinism would seem better suited to evolving P-zombies at best.

Fourth, what does he mean by “material objects universally obey the laws of physics”? This is a crucial issue, especially for the neo-Humean compatibilist, and it also goes to Riskin’s invocation of God and theology in the discussion, which, again, I will more fully analyze later. The initial point here, as has been discussed by Norman Swartz and others, is that when anyone says material objects universally “obey” the “laws” of physics, this claim is a hangover from theology — the idea that God, the law giver, gave “laws” that “govern” the world. A more naturalistic take on this (and remember, Coyne is a naturalist) is that there are no laws of physics at all, but rather mathematical descriptions of universal regularities that we wrongly label as coercive laws.

Natural laws are not coercive or prescriptive, yet we are part of these laws and cannot escape them. Natural laws govern the boundaries of what we can and cannot do. If I try to go against gravity because I think I can fly like a bird, the law of gravity will quickly show me I don't have wings when I fall from a tree branch. Universal regularities are no different than natural laws (the difference in wording between "regularity" and "law" will only cause unnecessary confusion) because they do not force us to do what we don't want (you seem to forget this), yet we have no choice but to be governed by them. IOW, an object must obey the laws of nature. It is necessary that everything obey them, therefore it is impossible for them to be broken.

 

[pood]

Historically and theologically, there has been a tension between the claim that, on the one hand, God is omniscient and omnipotent, and on the other hand, that humans have free will and thus can be held morally accountable for their acts.

Given that God is omnipotent, is can be argued that he made people do what they do — that human’s are God’s puppets in some kind of metaphysical puppet show. But if that is so, how can this be reconciled with holding human’s morally accountable for acts that God himself instantiated?

Some, such as Calvinistic pre-destinationists, simply accept at face value God that predestined some people to be sinners and they will be punished and that is the end of it. This seems a monstrous injustice to say the least.

But a weaker claim is that God granted us free will, although, because of his omniscience, knew in advance everything that we would freely do.

But some have contended that God’s foreknowledge of our acts also precludes freedom, because it is impossible for us to do, other than what we do, if God knows in advance what we will do.

But this argument is wrong, and once again, modal logic shows why it is wrong.

This argument — sometimes called epistemic determinism — holds that:

Given that God knows we will do x, it is necessary that we do x.

Here again, as in the argument to hard determinism, the modal fallacy consists in applying the modal “necessity” operator to consequent of the antecedent, rather than conjointly to the the antecedent and the consequent. The corrected modal argument goes:

Necessarily, (if God knows we will do x, we will [but not MUST] do x).

What if we did y instead? In that case, God would foreknow y instead of x.

The modal upshot is that in this scenario, we are free to do either x or y, but we cannot evade God’s foreknowledge of our choice.

Notice how the logical structure of this argument is exactly parallel to the hard determinist/soft determinist dispute:

Hard determinist:

Given certain antecedents, it is necessary that we do x.

The above, again, commits the modal fallacy.

The modally corrected argument belongs to the soft determinist:

Necessarily (given certain antecedent, we will [but not MUST] do x).

Now, I think Riskin in her review, without delving into modal logic, is simply pointing out, quite correctly, that the hard determinist argument parallels the Calvinistic predestination argument, with “hard determinism” or “the big bang,” or some such, serving as a secular substitute for God.

Whereas the soft determinist position parallels the (modally corrected) version of the argument that God’s foreknowledge and human freedom are perfectly compatible. Just so, determinism and human freedom are compatible.

So Riskin has established, contra Coyne, a theological predestinationist parallel to hard determinism. And THAT was her point in introducing theology into her essay, and NOT the point that Coyne erroneously ascribes to her.

Will finish up later.

 

[Jarhyn]

Historically and theologically, there has been a tension between the claim that, on the one hand, God is omniscient and omnipotent, and on the other hand, that humans have free will and thus can be held morally accountable for their acts.

Given that God is omnipotent, is can be argued that he made people do what they do — that human’s are God’s puppets in some kind of metaphysical puppet show. But if that is so, how can this be reconciled with holding human’s morally accountable for acts that God himself instantiated?

Some, such as Calvinistic pre-destinationists, simply accept at face value God that predestined some people to be sinners and they will be punished and that is the end of it. This seems a monstrous injustice to say the least.

But a weaker claim is that God granted us free will, although, because of his omniscience, knew in advance everything that we would freely do.

But some have contended that God’s foreknowledge of our acts also precludes freedom, because it is impossible for us to do, other than what we do, if God knows in advance what we will do.

But this argument is wrong, and once again, modal logic shows why it is wrong.

This argument — sometimes called epistemic determinism — holds that:

Given that God knows we will do x, it is necessary that we do x.

Here again, as in the argument to hard determinism, the modal fallacy consists in applying the modal “necessity” operator to consequent of the antecedent, rather than conjointly to the the antecedent and the consequent. The corrected modal argument goes:

Necessarily, (if God knows we will do x, we will [but not MUST] do x).

What if we did y instead? In that case, God would foreknow y instead of x.

The modal upshot is that in this scenario, we are free to do either x or y, but we cannot evade God’s foreknowledge of our choice.

Notice how the logical structure of this argument is exactly parallel to the hard determinist/soft determinist dispute:

Hard determinist:

Given certain antecedents, it is necessary that we do x.

The above, again, commits the modal fallacy.

The modally corrected argument belongs to the soft determinist:

Necessarily (given certain antecedent, we will [but not MUST] do x).

Now, I think Riskin in her review, without delving into modal logic, is simply pointing out, quite correctly, that the hard determinist argument parallels the Calvinistic predestination argument, with “hard determinism” or “the big bang,” or some such, serving as a secular substitute for God.

Whereas the soft determinist position parallels the (modally corrected) version of the argument that God’s foreknowledge and human freedom are perfectly compatible. Just so, determinism and human freedom are compatible.

So Riskin has established, contra Coyne, a theological predestinationist parallel to hard determinism. And THAT was her point in introducing theology into her essay, and NOT the point that Coyne erroneously ascribes to her.

Will finish up later.

Well, it's nice to see someone else arguing this.

This is entirely why I involved Dwarf Fortress: because it reifies this fact.

Granted, I also do not know in advance what the dwarves will do without some event of them doing it in the way dwarves must, and this in turn leads to continuous causal responsibility rather than zero sum responsibility.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

"Water is wet" is not a description of its function. Poor analogy.

The point about wetness did not strike me as being intended to regard function. I read it as regarding the issue of emergent properties, which is to say macro-properties. "Free will" is usually regarded as just such a property, and the same is the case for wetness.

 

[peacegirl]

"Water is wet" is not a description of its function. Poor analogy.

The point about wetness did not strike me as being intended to regard function. I read it as regarding the issue of emergent properties, which is to say macro-properties. "Free will" is usually regarded as just such a property, and the same is the case for wetness.

How can it be proven that a neuron has the free will or the "emergent" (or macro-property) to change its function by doing other than what it is programmed to do? Where does free will enter into this at all? That was my point.

 

[Jarhyn]

"Water is wet" is not a description of its function. Poor analogy.

The point about wetness did not strike me as being intended to regard function. I read it as regarding the issue of emergent properties, which is to say macro-properties. "Free will" is usually regarded as just such a property, and the same is the case for wetness.

Well, wills and freedoms are intrinsic physical properties. Perhaps even meta-properties: properties of properties, which is why the whole conversation probably is somewhere in the realm of metaphysics.

That said "free will" is emergent because it is a will pertaining to the freedoms of other wills, which implies something necessarily larger than wills with their described freedoms.

 

[peacegirl]

More:

Riskin WANTS determinism to be proved …

Again, ad hom, because even if true, irrelevant. And the truth is the claim is not in evidence anyway. To see why this is an irrelevant ad hom fallacy, simply turn it around and say: “Jerry Coyne thinks hard determinism is true because he WANTS it to be true.” Would Coyne not object to that? Of course he would, and justifiably so, because he would point out that he has offered evidence and arguments for his position, which is true, feeble and misinformed though they are.

This is the whole essence of the ad hom fallacy: it not an insult, as some wrongly suppose, but rather to claim that someone is arguing for or against some proposition because of some particular characteristic or motivation of that person.

We see ad hom again and again from peacegirl, for instance, who repeatedly says — just to take one example — that those of us who reject her author’s claims about light and sight do so because those claims “make us angry” or “threaten our world views,” whereas the real reason we reject them is that those claims are demonstrably wrong and idiotic, and have been so demonstrated many times.

No they are not idiotic claims Pood. The claims do make people angry. The science is settled in their eyes. It cannot be challenged without ridicule. People can't imagine how we could see the Sun explode before we see each other which takes 8 minutes. You are no different than people who thought Galileo was crazy, or Nageli (the father of genetics at the time) who refused to investigate Mendel’s discovery because he believed the VERY CORE of his findings were wrong. But it turned out he was right!

 

[pood]

Alas, it looks like it will take at least a couple of more posts to deconstruct the confusion and incoherence that belongs to Coyne but that he projects onto Riskin.

Her only argument seem to be that because people look like they have “agency” (and they do in the trivial sense of being able to do things), this is evidence for free will. For example, this part seems deeply confused:

No, that is not her argument. But let’s go on to the part of Riskin’s argument that the deeply confused Coyne calls “deeply confused”:

It’s because the many factors influencing behavior, Sapolsky thinks, place the burden of proof on defenders of human agency. It’s they who need to show that neurons are “completely uninfluenced” by any external factors and that “some behavior just happened out of thin air.” But why must human behavior be either deterministic or impervious to any influence?

Good question!

Sapolsky doesn’t explain; he takes as given that to show any influence at all is to show a determining influence. Similarly, he writes that we have “no control” over our biology, culture, or environment. Sure, we don’t control these things, but there’s an important difference between not controlling something and having no effect on it, or at least so anyone with teenagers is inclined to hope. Biology isn’t insulated from behavior any more than behavior is from biology. As Sapolsky himself points out, virtually everything a person does has an effect on their physiology. And a wealth of empirical evidence from Aristotle to Oprah suggests that people can indeed have cultural influence.

All quite right. Now back to Coyne:

What is the sweating reviewer trying to say here?

What’s with the “sweating” business, Jerry? Can’t get your fill of petty ad homs and well-poisoning? In any event, the author doesn’t see to be metaphorically sweating in the least.

That there is some free will?

Um … yeah?? I mean, that is one way of putting it.

Coyne’s entire review comprises a bifurcation fallacy (among a number of other logical fallacies both formal and informal) in addition to being circular (question begging). The circular part is the assumption that incompatibilism is true (which must be argued for, and not asserted as a premise).

The bifurcation fallacy is that we have only two (incompatibilist) choices before us: hard determinism and libertarianism.

But when Riskin writes, “But why must human behavior be either deterministic or impervious to any influence?” she confronts the bifurcation fallacy head-on. What is this “some free will” called?

Umm … Compatibilism?? Ya think?

I mean, you can contest compatiblism if you want, but when someone completely ignores it and so doing sets up an argument based on a foundation of sand, consisting of circularity and bifurcation, I call bullshit.

And it’s weird that earlier Coyne raised, in passing, compatiblism, when he referred to Carroll and Dennett, and then simply dropped the matter!

More later. I really should get paid for taking the time and effort to supply such clarity to this topic. Maybe I’ll start a Go Fund Me page.

 

[peacegirl]

Alas, it looks like it will take at least a couple of more posts to deconstruct the confusion and incoherence that belongs to Coyne but that he projects onto Riskin.

Her only argument seem to be that because people look like they have “agency” (and they do in the trivial sense of being able to do things), this is evidence for free will. For example, this part seems deeply confused:

No, that is not her argument. But let’s go on to the part of Riskin’s argument that the deeply confused Coyne calls “deeply confused”:

It’s because the many factors influencing behavior, Sapolsky thinks, place the burden of proof on defenders of human agency. It’s they who need to show that neurons are “completely uninfluenced” by any external factors and that “some behavior just happened out of thin air.” But why must human behavior be either deterministic or impervious to any influence?

Good question!

Sapolsky doesn’t explain; he takes as given that to show any influence at all is to show a determining influence. Similarly, he writes that we have “no control” over our biology, culture, or environment. Sure, we don’t control these things, but there’s an important difference between not controlling something and having no effect on it, or at least so anyone with teenagers is inclined to hope. Biology isn’t insulated from behavior any more than behavior is from biology. As Sapolsky himself points out, virtually everything a person does has an effect on their physiology. And a wealth of empirical evidence from Aristotle to Oprah suggests that people can indeed have cultural influence.

All quite right. Now back to Coyne:

What is the sweating reviewer trying to say here?

What’s with the “sweating” business, Jerry? Can’t get your fill of petty ad homs and well-poisoning? In any event, the author doesn’t see to be metaphorically sweating in the least.

That there is some free will?

Um … yeah?? I mean, that is one way of putting it.

Coyne’s entire review comprises a bifurcation fallacy (among a number of other logical fallacies both formal and informal) in addition to being circular (question begging). The circular part is the assumption that incompatibilism is true (which must be argued for, and not asserted as a premise).

The bifurcation fallacy is that we have only two (incompatibilist) choices before us: hard determinism and libertarianism.

But when Riskin writes, “But why must human behavior be either deterministic or impervious to any influence?” she confronts the bifurcation fallacy head-on. What is this “some free will” called?

Umm … Compatibilism?? Ya think?

I mean, you can contest compatiblism if you want, but when someone completely ignores it and so doing sets up an argument based on a foundation of sand, consisting of circularity and bifurcation, I call bullshit.

And it’s weird that earlier Coyne raised, in passing, compatiblism, when he referred to Carroll and Dennett, and then simply dropped the matter!

More later. I really should get paid for taking the time and effort to supply such clarity to this topic. Maybe I’ll start a Go Fund Me page.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

"Water is wet" is not a description of its function. Poor analogy.

The point about wetness did not strike me as being intended to regard function. I read it as regarding the issue of emergent properties, which is to say macro-properties. "Free will" is usually regarded as just such a property, and the same is the case for wetness.

How can it be proven that a neuron has the free will or the "emergent" (or macro-property) to change its function by doing other than what it is programmed to do? Where does free will enter into this at all? That was my point.

As far as we know, a neuron is only - and functions only as - a conductor of impulses. If there is an actual condition typically referred to as "free will", that condition is undetectable and unobservable at or in a neuron. Instead, if there actually is this "free will" condition, it occurs at some place other than at a neuron, at some place above or beyond a neuron, and no change of a neuron functioning as a conductor is required. Likewise, wetness in its ordinary usage occurs at some place above and beyond a water molecule, and nothing about a water molecule has to change for there to be wetness. To say that the absence of a "free will" condition at a neuron is sufficient basis for denying the actuality of "free will" is akin to denying the actuality of wetness given the absence of wetness in the case of a water molecule. This is a problem for reductionism, and determinism need not be dependent on reductionism. It is, however, a problem for Sapolsky as a result of the way he frames the issue.

 

[pood]

Coyne:

I cannot tell.

Compatibilism.

In fact, her own confusion and incoherent arguments seem to be imputed to Sapolsky, as if he doesn’t know what he’s talking about. I’ve read the book, and I disagree. And “cultural influence” my tuchas! What does that have to do with refuting determinism?

Um … remember the time you complained that someone hit your parked car when you weren’t around and you bitched and moaned that they did not leave a note? What’s the point of bitching and moaning about what you claim someone was predestined to do? But then, I guess on your own metaphysics, you were predestined to bitch and moan. The point, however, is that when someone pointed out this inconsistency to you, you claimed that shaming the miscreant is a good way to adjust his behavior through cultural influence, though you may not have used that exact term. But that was the substance of what you meant.

Is there a god in this argument?

No, except for the apposite likening of hard determinism to religious pre-destination, a point you misconstrued.

The author makes the old “why is there something instead of nothing” argument:

Now quoting Riskin:

Sapolsky’s turtles are of course metaphorical; they stand for deterministic causes, and by “a turtle floating in the air” he means a magical event. We must accept a strictly causal chain extending back to the beginning of time or acknowledge that we believe in miracles. But why are these our only choices?

Good question!

And are they really so different? Wouldn’t a chain of deterministic causes imply a miracle of some sort at the beginning—the old infinite regress problem rearing its domed shell again?

In the above, Riskin is again metaphorically indicting hard determinism, and the miracle it would take for the big bang to compose a jazz improv piece, but once again, Coyne completely misses her point, when he writes:

Yes, and we don’t know why there is something instead of nothing, though there have been some scientific suggestions that do NOT involve miracles.

That was not her point. Huge eye roll here.

And obviously since Riskin is an atheist, she doesn’t believe in miracles. So what is her answer. She doesn’t tell us.

Tell us what, Jerry? I mean, what’s your question? She is not talking about how the world began, as a little reminder!

Again, more later. Must take a breather.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

"Water is wet" is not a description of its function. Poor analogy.

The point about wetness did not strike me as being intended to regard function. I read it as regarding the issue of emergent properties, which is to say macro-properties. "Free will" is usually regarded as just such a property, and the same is the case for wetness.

How can it be proven that a neuron has the free will or the "emergent" (or macro-property) to change its function by doing other than what it is programmed to do? Where does free will enter into this at all? That was my point.

As far as we know, a neuron is only - and functions only as - a conductor of impulses. If there is an actual condition typically referred to as "free will", that condition is undetectable and unobservable at or in a neuron. Instead, if there actually is this "free will" condition, it occurs at some place other than at a neuron, at some place above or beyond a neuron, and no change of a neuron functioning as a conductor is required. Likewise, wetness in its ordinary usage occurs at some place above and beyond a water molecule, and nothing about a water molecule has to change for there to be wetness. To say that the absence of a "free will" condition at a neuron is sufficient basis for denying the actuality of "free will" is akin to denying the actuality of wetness given the absence of wetness in the case of a water molecule. This is a problem for reductionism, and determinism need not be dependent on reductionism. It is, however, a problem for Sapolsky as a result of the way he frames the issue.

Oh, and there is no thinking at a neuron. There is no (sense of) self at a neuron. And on and on and on. So-called emergent properties/conditions are not to be quickly dismissed or ignored. That is another way of looking at the neuron-wetness remark.

 

[pood]

Final post on Coyne’s review.

Coyne quotes Riskin:

Sapolsky tells the story of Phineas Gage, who suffered a metal rod through the brain while working on a construction site in Vermont in 1848 and was never quite the same afterward. He offers Gage as evidence that people’s personalities depend on their “material brains,” which he thinks poses a challenge to anyone who wants to defend the idea of free will. But why should the fact that humans and their brains are made of material parts mean there’s no such thing as human agency?

Good question!

There’s a good answer, but it’s historical rather than scientific: because determinism retains crucial elements of the theology from which it arose, according to which the material world was a passive artifact lacking any agency of its own.

Which is a good answer, as discussed in previous posts by me.

Back to Coyne:

It would be nice if Riskin would tell us what she means by “agency”.

Compatibilism?

Real “I could have made either choice” agency or simply the appearance of agency?

How about compatibilism?

The intimation that determinism is a form of theology again arises, but denial of free will in the world is simply not theology. It’s analogous to denial of a supernatural being, which Riskin presumably does in her atheism.

Coyne keeps missing the point, as I discussed in previous posts.

I won’t go on here, as I don’t want to waste my time. I will simply say that Riskin sounds like she’s trying to be clever, but in so doing fails to confect a consistent argument against determinism. Her sniping at Sapolsky may occasionally hit home, but she comes nowhere close to dispelling determinism, simply because she doesn’t engage in the necessarily arguments.

Introduce yourself to a mirror. It is YOU who did not engage in the necessary arguments, by completely ignoring compatibilism.

Read for yourself how she throws in lots of historical figures like Darwin and Paley and Laplace to show her erudition, but doesn’t deal with what libertarian free will would really entail.

She doesn’t have to, because she isn’t defending libertarian free will.

Also, the cracks about her name-dropping are just cheap shots, from a guy who name drops all the time.

This egregious review also goes to show how far the mighty New York Review of Books has fallen. Yes, it likes cleverness and erudition, but in the old days it also liked substantive arguments in its reviews.

Coyne always does this, bemoaning how far this or that publication has “fallen” just because it publishes something he doesn’t like.

Riskin doesn’t provide any. But don’t take my word for it; if you’re interested in the topic, read the review and see if you can find any structure or coherence in it.

I did, and spelled it all out in my series of posts. It was your review of her review that lacks structure, coherence, or even basic comprehension of what she was saying as opposed to your straw man of it.

 

[peacegirl]

"Water is wet" is not a description of its function. Poor analogy.

The point about wetness did not strike me as being intended to regard function. I read it as regarding the issue of emergent properties, which is to say macro-properties. "Free will" is usually regarded as just such a property, and the same is the case for wetness.

How can it be proven that a neuron has the free will or the "emergent" (or macro-property) to change its function by doing other than what it is programmed to do? Where does free will enter into this at all? That was my point.

As far as we know, a neuron is only - and functions only as - a conductor of impulses. If there is an actual condition typically referred to as "free will", that condition is undetectable and unobservable at or in a neuron. Instead, if there actually is this "free will" condition, it occurs at some place other than at a neuron, at some place above or beyond a neuron, and no change of a neuron functioning as a conductor is required. Likewise, wetness in its ordinary usage occurs at some place above and beyond a water molecule, and nothing about a water molecule has to change for there to be wetness. To say that the absence of a "free will" condition at a neuron is sufficient basis for denying the actuality of "free will" is akin to denying the actuality of wetness given the absence of wetness in the case of a water molecule. This is a problem for reductionism, and determinism need not be dependent on reductionism. It is, however, a problem for Sapolsky as a result of the way he frames the issue.

Oh, and there is no thinking at a neuron. There is no (sense of) self at a neuron. And on and on and on. So-called emergent properties/conditions are not to be quickly dismissed or ignored. That is another way of looking at the neuron-wetness remark.

An organism is programmed to bring itself into homeostasis when it gets out of balance. My question is: Where does compatibilist free will enter into it? There is no compatibility here that gives this type of free will a pass. As you correctly said, neurons don't think or have a sense of self where they have the free will to do other than what they are programmed to do.