Therefore, there is a god

[phands]

How often do we have to go over this before realizing that the OP is shite, and the OPoster is intransigent?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

So, I reckon I have no good reason to suspect that Premise 1 is true. On the basis of that, I rationally reject Premise 1.

My approach is different. I'd be happy to stipulate P1 for the sake of argument.

What I hope to get across is this: The conclusion does not follow from the premises. Even if we stipulate to the premises, the conclusion does not follow.

But Premise 2 (which is true) logically implies that the consequent of Premise 1 is false (see the post of mine you replied to). If we further stipulate that Premise 1 is true, then Premise 1 is a true conditional with a false consequent. Thus, its antecedent is false. Thus, there is a god.

As I construed the argument in the post you just replied to, it is valid. Now, I think the way I construed the argument is the best as long as one assumes that Speakpigeon did not equivocate and used different types of conditionals. If Speakpigeon thinks my interpretation is incorrect, I hope she posts a correct one.

 

[Wiploc]

So, I reckon I have no good reason to suspect that Premise 1 is true. On the basis of that, I rationally reject Premise 1.

My approach is different. I'd be happy to stipulate P1 for the sake of argument.

What I hope to get across is this: The conclusion does not follow from the premises. Even if we stipulate to the premises, the conclusion does not follow.

But Premise 2 (which is true) logically implies that the consequent of Premise 1 is false

Wow!

(see the post of mine you replied to).

I'm on it.

If we further stipulate that Premise 1 is true, then Premise 1 is a true conditional with a false consequent. Thus, its antecedent is false. Thus, there is a god.

Does anyone here besides Angra and Speak think there's something to this?

As I construed the argument in the post you just replied to, it is valid. Now, I think the way I construed the argument is the best as long as one assumes that Speakpigeon did not equivocate and used different types of conditionals. If Speakpigeon thinks my interpretation is incorrect, I hope she posts a correct one.

Color me dumbfounded but curious.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Does anyone here besides Angra and Speak think there's something to this?

I don't think there is anything to this. There is absolutely no good reason for me to accept the first premise, even assuming that it is meaningful.

 

[Wiploc]

Premise 1: If there is no god, then it is not true that if Speakpigeon prays, then Speakpigeon's prayers will be answered.
Premise 2: Speakpigeon does not pray.
Conclusion: There is a god.
​

Patently invalid.

Let's rephrase a little:
Premise 1: Without gods, no one will answer prayers.
Premise 2: Nobody prays anyway, so no prayers will be answered regardless of whether there are gods.
C: Therefore, gods exist.

Do you still think it's valid?

How about Premise 1?

Premise 1 is a conditional. The antecedent is 'There is no god'. and the consequent is 'It is not true that if Speakpigeon prays, Speakpigeon's prayers will be answered.'

Thanks. The statement is so convoluted that I was going to have to ask how much of it you were regarding as the consequent.

I took an introduction-to-formal logic class around 1972. That's my entire exposure unless reading Planting's book on the free will defense counts. So, sometimes I may need a bit of coaxing. Let me know if I run off the rails somewhere.

Note: I still opine that the above syllogisms are still patently invalid.

Opine: What a lovesick opossum does.

It is apparent to me that the consequent of Premise 2 is false. [emphasis added]

I assume you mean premise 1.

In fact, the statement 'If Speakpigeon prays, then Speakpigeon's prayers will be answered.' is clearly true.

Yes, you're talking about P1.

Why? It is true because the statement in question is a conditional (again, by 'conditional' I mean material conditional here), and the antecedent 'Speakpigeon prays' is false. Any conditional with a false antecedent is true. [Emphasis added because I have to keep referring back to this, and the boldface makes it easy to find.]

If so, then these are both true:

- If 3 is larger than 4, there is a god.
- If 3 is larger than 4, there is no god.

Therefore, 'If Speakpigeon prays, then Speakpigeon's prayers will be answered.' is true.

Please, take into consideration that this does not tell us anything about entities that answer prayers. For that matter, the statement 'If Speakpigeon prays, then aliens from another planet invaded the Earth and exterminated humans in the year 1944' is true, in virtue of the fact that Speakpigeon does not pray.

So, in short, I reckon the statement 'If Speakpigeon prays, then Speakpigeon's prayers will be answered.' is clearly true.

Therefore, the statement 'It is not true that if Speakpigeon prays, Speakpigeon's prayers will be answered.' is false. In other words, Premise 1 has a false consequent.

Should I believe that Premise 1 is true?

Well, at this point, I know that Premise 1 is a conditional with a false consequent. Any conditional with a false consequent is true if and only if the antecedent is false. So, is the antecedent false?

I have no good reason to even suspect so. Now, granted, I don't know what 'god' means, so I don't know what the antecedent means (I'm just assuming for the sake of the argument that it means something at all), so I am in no position to reckon that the antecedent is true. However, I have no good reason to think that it is false, either. Moreover, if I consider hypothetical entities usually called 'god' in the context of discussing religion or philosophy, I still have no good reason to suspect that the antecedent of Premise 1 (namely, 'There is no god') is false.

So, I reckon I have no good reason to suspect that Premise 1 is true. On the basis of that, I rationally reject Premise 1.

Wow. That took me several readings. I'll go back and read your latest message again.

 

[Wiploc]

Okay, let me see if I can work thru this Angra's way.

We start with this:
P1: If there is no god, then it is not true that if I pray, my prayers will be answered.
P2: I don’t pray (stipulated)
C: Therefore, there is a god

P2 is stipulated true, which makes the "I pray" in P1 false. Thus, we get:

P1: If there is no god, then it is not true that if FALSE, my prayers will be answered.
P2: I don’t pray (stipulated)
C: Therefore, there is a god

Angra says any conditional with a false antecedent is true.

Since, "if FALSE, my prayers will be answered," is a conditional with a false antecedent, we get this:

P1: If there is no god, then it is not true that TRUE.
P2: I don’t pray (stipulated)
C: Therefore, there is a god

"It is not true that TRUE," is false, thus:

P1: If there is no god, then FALSE.
P2: I don’t pray (stipulated)
C: Therefore, there is a god

That makes P1 a conditional with a false consequent.

Angra says, A conditional with a false consequent is true if and only if the antecedent is false. Thus:

If P1 is true, then, "There is no god," is false!

Phrased differently:

If P1 is true, there is a god.

Thus, the only way to avoid the conclusion that god exists is to doubt the truth of P1.

Thank you Angra, that was quite a ride.

And my apologies to Speakpigeon.

---

What was P1 again?

P1: If there is no god, then it is not true that if I pray, my prayers will be answered.

If we're doubting P1, I become curious. In what ways can P1 be false?

First, P2 could be wrong; Speakpigeon could pray, thus the "I pray" in P1 could be true rather than false. I don't know what that would get us.

Second, things other than gods could answer prayers. Could we work our way around that, maybe change, "if I pray, my prayers will be answered," to, "If I pray to gods, my prayers will be answered by gods." Would that eliminate this second possible way for P1 to be wrong?

This is fun. I'm going to call it a night.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Premise 1: If there is no god, then it is not true that if Speakpigeon prays, then Speakpigeon's prayers will be answered.
Premise 2: Speakpigeon does not pray.
Conclusion: There is a god.

Patently invalid.

It is valid, though I think maybe you already got that?

Here's a formalization:

S1: There is a god.
S2: Speakpigeon prays.
S3: Speakpigeon's prayers will be answered (or whatever you like; it does not matter what S3 is).

Premise 1: ¬S1->¬(S2->S3).
Premise 2: ¬S2.
R1: ¬S2->(S2->S3) [this is a tautology, given that any material conditional with a false antecedent (in this case, S2) is true]
R2: S2->S3 [This is deduced from Premise 2 and R1].
R3: (¬S1->¬(S2->S3))->(¬¬(S2->S3)->¬¬S1). [this is a tautology]
R4: ¬¬(S2->S3)->¬¬S1. [this follows from Premise 1 and R3]
R5: (S2->S3)->¬¬(S2->S3). [this is a tautology]
R6: ¬¬(S2->S3). [this follows from R2 and R5]
R7: ¬¬S1. [this follows from R4 and R6]
R8; ¬¬S1->S1. [this is a tautology]
C: S1. [this follows from R7 and R8].

I assume you mean premise 1.

Yes, sorry.

If so, then these are both true:

- If 3 is larger than 4, there is a god.
- If 3 is larger than 4, there is no god.

That is correct.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Wiploc,

You're welcome.

If we're doubting P1, I become curious. In what ways can P1 be false?

I have no good reason to suspect that Premise 1 is true, given that I reckon that Premise 2 is true, and thus (by the argument I gave in the reply to Speakpigeon) I reckon that Premise 1 is true if and only if it has a false antecedent, i.e., if and only if there is a god.

First, P2 could be wrong; Speakpigeon could pray, thus the "I pray" in P1 could be true rather than false. I don't know what that would get us.

But I'm doubting Premise 1 because I reckon that Premise 2 is true. If I'm also doubting Premise 2, then I'm rejecting both premises ( I still would have no good reason to think Premise 1 is true).

Second, things other than gods could answer prayers.

I do not know what the word "god" means, but I'm trying to leave that aside (I already raised the objection that the word "god" was not clear enough, but Speakpigeon insisted on her argument, and I decided to focus my critique on other matters).

 

[Speakpigeon]

Speakpigeon,

I will try once more, with further details. Could you please address my reply?

First, I will assume for the sake of the argument that you are not equivocating, and so, all of the conditionals in your argument are material conditionals (if you meant to use a different kind of conditional all throughout your argument, I don't think that's going to make sense, but please let me know).

Second, I will assume for the sake of the argument that the word "god" has a meaning, even though I do not know what that meaning is (your answer that a god is "whatever answers prayers and that we call "god"." does not succeed, but I'll leave the reasons for that aside, since I'm trying to focus on a different reason for rejecting the argument).

That said, I will proceed to consider the argument.

If there is no god, then it is not true that if I pray, my prayers will be answered. I don’t pray; therefore, there is a god.

The "I" in the argument complicates matters (who's "I"? You, or I, or another reader or poster?), so I will use "Speakpigeon" instead. If you have any objection to that, please explain.
So, the argument is:

Premise 1: If there is no god, then it is not true that if Speakpigeon prays, then Speakpigeon's prayers will be answered.
Premise 2: Speakpigeon does not pray.
Conclusion: There is a god.
​

Should I accept Premise 2?
Given the information available to me, I reckon it is true. So, I accept premise 2. Speakpigeon does not pray.

How about Premise 1?

Premise 1 is a conditional. The antecedent is 'There is no god'. and the consequent is 'It is not true that if Speakpigeon prays, Speakpigeon's prayers will be answered.'
It is apparent to me that the consequent of Premise 2 is false. In fact, the statement 'If Speakpigeon prays, then Speakpigeon's prayers will be answered.' is clearly true. Why? It is true because the statement in question is a conditional (again, by 'conditional' I mean material conditional here), and the antecedent 'Speakpigeon prays' is false. Any conditional with a false antecedent is true. Therefore, 'If Speakpigeon prays, then Speakpigeon's prayers will be answered.' is true. Please, take into consideration that this does not tell us anything about entities that answer prayers. For that matter, the statement 'If Speakpigeon prays, then aliens from another planet invaded the Earth and exterminated humans in the year 1944' is true, in virtue of the fact that Speakpigeon does not pray.

So, in short, I reckon the statement 'If Speakpigeon prays, then Speakpigeon's prayers will be answered.' is clearly true. Therefore, the statement 'It is not true that if Speakpigeon prays, Speakpigeon's prayers will be answered.' is false. In other words, Premise 1 has a false consequent.

Should I believe that Premise 1 is true?

Well, at this point, I know that Premise 1 is a conditional with a false consequent. Any conditional with a false consequent is true if and only if the antecedent is false. So, is the antecedent false?

I have no good reason to even suspect so. Now, granted, I don't know what 'god' means, so I don't know what the antecedent means (I'm just assuming for the sake of the argument that it means something at all), so I am in no position to reckon that the antecedent is true. However, I have no good reason to think that it is false, either. Moreover, if I consider hypothetical entities usually called 'god' in the context of discussing religion or philosophy, I still have no good reason to suspect that the antecedent of Premise 1 (namely, 'There is no god') is false.

So, I reckon I have no good reason to suspect that Premise 1 is true. On the basis of that, I rationally reject Premise 1.

I seem to have understood what your argument was the first time round but I can be more explicit as to why I won't accept it just yet.

So, it seems to me that what you are doing here is pick and choose the parts of the truth table that suits your preconceptions or your intuition. You are carving your argument through the truth table. It's definitely clever and maybe it's the proper way to do it. My problem with this, though, is that I never ever saw anything anywhere that would suggest it's the way truth tables should be used, that you use the truth table by carving through it the bits you like. As I see it, the two premises are true. They certainly look intuitively true to me and I suspect they do to us all. And then the truth table says the main implication is true for all possible logical cases. That's it and as far as I know it's all you need for the argument to be valid and sound. Now, if you want to claim you know otherwise, you'll have to justify your claim. Again, I'm sympathetic to your argument and I'd be happy to concede you're right. But it looks to me like you've just made up a new procedure to deal with truth tables to fit your preconceptions. I definitely don't remember ever coming across such before. So, if you're sure your procedure comes from textbook logic then please provide the relevant sources or quotes. Short of that, I'll assume the jury is out and won't come in any time soon and I'll leave it at that.

As to interpretation, I'm not sure what your worry is. The argument should be understood in a minimalist fashion. A god is an all-powerful being. People can pray and a god if there is one can choose to answer prayers. So, if there is no god, it is not true that if I pray my prayer will be answered (by a god). I'm sure we all understand the idea and would all agree that it's true according to this usual interpretation. Again, I'm open to the idea there's a problem but what I don't have now, is textbook evidence that the truth table doesn't show the argument is valid and sound.

Also, I don't see there's any room for the kind of "counterfactual" interpretation of the truth table I would be guilty of according to you and Bomb#20. All I do is look at the truth table and the fact that the two premises look true (and I'm sure they look true to most people). I think that's all there is to it. Prove me wrong if you can.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

If there is no god, then it is not true that if I pray, my prayers will be answered. I don’t pray; therefore, there is a god

Syllogism 1
P1: If there is no god, then it is not true that if I pray, my prayers will be answered.
P2: I don't pray.
C: Therefore, there is a god.

Your first thread didn't get traction because you came across as a troll or a joker, someone who saw how stupid the argument was but shared it anyway for the humor, the same as you would share a video of a cat leaping away from a cucumber. You didn't come across as someone who believed your patently false argument, so nobody saw need to show you the flaw.

Sorry, I don't buy that. I re-read my post, it's clear it was about the logic of it. If you read something else into it, then you should perhaps look yourself in the mirror to find why.

The argument is obviously invalid to most of us here, maybe to everyone but you.

Let me perhaps help you here. The argument looks wrong to most of us. Invalid? No. Invalidity is a formal and rather tricky notion you won't get just by looking at the argument. So, no, I don't accept the argument really looks invalid. All we can see is that both premises seem true but somehow that ain't enough to make us feel confortable with the conclusion. So, the issue is whether you can explain why. That's what I've been asking all along. It's just too bad you're not willing to take my posts at face value.

But P1 is convoluted and full of negatives, which makes it hard for those of us who read just a little bit of formal logic some decades ago to render P1 into formal logic.

Sorry, but there's just one argument that's been proposed in the OP. You address that or I won't be interested.

The fact that you insult everyone who tries to help makes us disinclined to help.

I've been through the thread to see what could motivate your claim here. Can't find anything. I've been civil enough to you and generally responded in kind to every poster. Idiots and big mouths got their due. And I already asked you to justify a similar claim you made earlier, to no avail. See here:

You don't seem to understand the rules of forum talk. I started a thread and on my own terms.

The terms being that if people disagree with your nonsense, you will insult them and make unfounded claims about their states of mind.

So, again, please justify your unfounded claim about my state of mind.

But you've calmed down some, so I'm going to attempt this.

Too bad the rest of your post should be a derail. Again, there's just one argument proposed in the OP so either you address that one or you don't but if you don't I'm not going to be interested.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

So, the argument is:

Premise 1: If there is no god, then it is not true that if Speakpigeon prays, then Speakpigeon's prayers will be answered.
Premise 2: Speakpigeon does not pray.
Conclusion: There is a god.​

Patently invalid.

It is valid, though I think maybe you already got that?

Here's a formalization:

S1: There is a god.
S2: Speakpigeon prays.
S3: Speakpigeon's prayers will be answered (or whatever you like; it does not matter what S3 is).

Premise 1: ¬S1->¬(S2->S3).
Premise 2: ¬S2.
R1: ¬S2->(S2->S3) [this is a tautology, given that any material conditional with a false antecedent (in this case, S2) is true]
R2: S2->S3 [This is deduced from Premise 2 and R1].
R3: (¬S1->¬(S2->S3))->(¬¬(S2->S3)->¬¬S1). [this is a tautology]
R4: ¬¬(S2->S3)->¬¬S1. [this follows from Premise 1 and R3]
R5: (S2->S3)->¬¬(S2->S3). [this is a tautology]
R6: ¬¬(S2->S3). [this follows from R2 and R5]
R7: ¬¬S1. [this follows from R4 and R6]
R8; ¬¬S1->S1. [this is a tautology]
C: S1. [this follows from R7 and R8].

The guy just told you it's "patently" invalid. Who are you to pretend otherwise?

Good luck with that, though.
EB

 

[T.G.G. Moogly]

It is valid, though I think maybe you already got that?

Here's a formalization:

S1: There is a god.
S2: Speakpigeon prays.
S3: Speakpigeon's prayers will be answered (or whatever you like; it does not matter what S3 is).

Premise 1: ¬S1->¬(S2->S3).
Premise 2: ¬S2.
R1: ¬S2->(S2->S3) [this is a tautology, given that any material conditional with a false antecedent (in this case, S2) is true]
R2: S2->S3 [This is deduced from Premise 2 and R1].
R3: (¬S1->¬(S2->S3))->(¬¬(S2->S3)->¬¬S1). [this is a tautology]
R4: ¬¬(S2->S3)->¬¬S1. [this follows from Premise 1 and R3]
R5: (S2->S3)->¬¬(S2->S3). [this is a tautology]
R6: ¬¬(S2->S3). [this follows from R2 and R5]
R7: ¬¬S1. [this follows from R4 and R6]
R8; ¬¬S1->S1. [this is a tautology]
C: S1. [this follows from R7 and R8].

The guy just told you it's "patently" invalid. Who are you to pretend otherwise?

Good luck with that, though.
EB

Okay, so this thread demonstrates beyond question that "...therefore god is an argument."

 

[Tom Sawyer]

No, it's much more simple than that. There's an argument proposed in the OP. Can you prove it's wrong?

Well, it's clear you at least can't.

It's also not my "intuition" that the OP is wrong, it's my analysis. The value of logical systems is that they help us gain information about the real world. Therefore, if the results of your logic are false conclusions which conflict with the real world, you have bad logic - full stop. If it concludes that unused cans are always full of gasoline, that bags nobody eats from are always full of tomatoes and other conclusions which can be compared against the real world, then your system has bad logic.

In other words, since you're incapable of proving the logic wrong, you go for second best and go into blah-blah-blah. Well, your blah-blah-blah isn't going to convinced me. I'm not sensitive to blah-blah-blah.

On the substance of what you say here, your claim that the conclusion of the argument conflicts with the real world is really just pathetic. It sure conflicts with your opinion about the existence or otherwise of any god. Your opinion about the real world. Sure, you think there isn't any god and from there you go on claiming that it's a fact of the real world that there is no god. Pretty bad rhetoric , I would say.

If it was true, I would agree, but it's not true. You don't know the fact of the matter, i.e. whether there is a god. From there, you should try to prove the argument not valid, somehow, but that's what you're incapable of doing. Hence our resort to a false claim about the real world. Not good.

It doesn't matter if that logic is internally consistent and the conclusions you get follow directly from the premises because you are not using it internally. You are taking that conclusion and applying it externally to the real world to say "I just proved there is a god in the real world" and your logic doesn't support doing that.

I said multiple times it's not my argument. I don't mean to prove there is a god. I don't have any issue here. I proposed an argument I lifted from the Internet and it's a logical truth, i.e. it's true in all logical cases. In effect, it's a shocking logical truth, hence it's value. I'm interested in your intuition as to the argument and your proof that your intuition is correct. All you can offer, clearly, is your intuition. Thanks anyway.
EB

You're correct that I'm not proving the logic wrong. That's what it means when one says that the logic is internally consistent. What I'm saying is that the logic is worthless because it gives you no information outside of its own internal paradigm since the conclusions it reaches are false when one tries to apply them.

That's not because of any kind of "intuition" or whatever you're going on about with that. It's because this logical argument which you're presenting provides us with a testable prediction and those tests consistently come back as false. If you have a number of cans which you never use to fill a car's gas tank with, you can look in those cans and see that some of them are not filled with gasoline, despite this logical argument proving that they all are. If you have a bunch of bags which you never eat from, you can look in those bags and see that not all of them are filled with tomatoes, despite this logical argument proving that they all are.

You seem to be aware of this, because that's the only reason to plug a non-testable variable like "god" into the argument as opposed to the functionally infinite set of testable variables which would work just as well and show how pointless it is.

So yes, the logic is correct. It's just totally worthless because it can't be used for any type of logical analysis.

 

[Speakpigeon]

You're correct that I'm not proving the logic wrong. That's what it means when one says that the logic is internally consistent. What I'm saying is that the logic is worthless because it gives you no information outside of its own internal paradigm since the conclusions it reaches are false when one tries to apply them.

Sorry, I don't think anyone coud possibly make sense of that. Suppose you take A → B to be valid. Suppose now you definitely take B to be false. Wouldn't this tell you something about A? Well, if you're logical, you should infer that A must be false. And that's definitely one piece of information that in many context would be crucial. Maybe it would save your life. If you knew how to interpret the logical situation, that is.

So, if you accept the OP's argument is valid but the conclusion is false, you should infer from that that at least one of the premises is false. Well, look at them. Do they look false to you? They don't to me but maybe you're susceptible to seeing them as false. That is entirely a matter of your own choice, or possibly intuition. Normally, the first premise should be a matter of intuition. It should be a logical intuition.

That's not because of any kind of "intuition" or whatever you're going on about with that. It's because this logical argument which you're presenting provides us with a testable prediction and those tests consistently come back as false. If you have a number of cans which you never use to fill a car's gas tank with, you can look in those cans and see that some of them are not filled with gasoline, despite this logical argument proving that they all are. If you have a bunch of bags which you never eat from, you can look in those bags and see that not all of them are filled with tomatoes, despite this logical argument proving that they all are.

That piece of tedious reasoning should tell you the argument can't possibly be valid. But, hey, you've already admitted it was valid, so you're not going to contradict yourself, I guess.

You seem to be aware of this, because that's the only reason to plug a non-testable variable like "god" into the argument as opposed to the functionally infinite set of testable variables which would work just as well and show how pointless it is.

Well, except, me, I don't don't how the argument about the jerrycans would go. Jerrycans don't usually answer prayers even when they exist.

So yes, the logic is correct. It's just totally worthless because it can't be used for any type of logical analysis.

Other posters seem to disagree that the logic is correct. Valid, yes, sound, no. I take it the question is somewhat beyond your pay grade.
EB

 

[Tom Sawyer]

You seem to be aware of this, because that's the only reason to plug a non-testable variable like "god" into the argument as opposed to the functionally infinite set of testable variables which would work just as well and show how pointless it is.

Well, except, me, I don't don't how the argument about the jerrycans would go. Jerrycans don't usually answer prayers even when they exist.

Well, it's a long thread, so here it is again:

"If there is no gasoline in the gas can, then it is not true that if I fill my car's tank with it, my car will be able to drive. I don’t fill my car's tank with it; therefore, there is gasoline in the gas can".

It's the exact sentence you posted in the OP, with different values plugged in where you put the variables. Put that through how you've parsed out your example and tell me - have you just proven that there's gasoline in the gas can?

If you have proven that, you have an internally consistent logical analysis with a testable prediction which can be checked against reality and shown to be false. If you have not proven that, what is the difference between that sentence and the sentence you provided in the OP about God?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

It is valid, though I think maybe you already got that?

Here's a formalization:

S1: There is a god.
S2: Speakpigeon prays.
S3: Speakpigeon's prayers will be answered (or whatever you like; it does not matter what S3 is).

Premise 1: ¬S1->¬(S2->S3).
Premise 2: ¬S2.
R1: ¬S2->(S2->S3) [this is a tautology, given that any material conditional with a false antecedent (in this case, S2) is true]
R2: S2->S3 [This is deduced from Premise 2 and R1].
R3: (¬S1->¬(S2->S3))->(¬¬(S2->S3)->¬¬S1). [this is a tautology]
R4: ¬¬(S2->S3)->¬¬S1. [this follows from Premise 1 and R3]
R5: (S2->S3)->¬¬(S2->S3). [this is a tautology]
R6: ¬¬(S2->S3). [this follows from R2 and R5]
R7: ¬¬S1. [this follows from R4 and R6]
R8; ¬¬S1->S1. [this is a tautology]
C: S1. [this follows from R7 and R8].

The guy just told you it's "patently" invalid. Who are you to pretend otherwise?

Good luck with that, though.
EB

Actually, I persuaded him that it is valid, as you can see in his most recent posts.

I haven't been able to persuade you, though.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

So, it seems to me that what you are doing here is pick and choose the parts of the truth table that suits your preconceptions or your intuition.

That is not what I am doing. What I did was to carefully show that I have no good reason to accept that Premise 1 is true (by the way, when I said "It is apparent to me that the consequent of Premise 2 is false.", I meant It is apparent to me that the consequent of Premise 1 is false."; my bad, but it should be clear).

You are carving your argument through the truth table. It's definitely clever and maybe it's the proper way to do it. My problem with this, though, is that I never ever saw anything anywhere that would suggest it's the way truth tables should be used, that you use the truth table by carving through it the bits you like.

But that is not what I'm doing. I don't know how to be more clear.

As I see it, the two premises are true.

I have no good reason to believe that you are correct.
However, if the two premises are true, then there is, in fact, a god (whatever that might be, since I do not know what the word "god" means).

They certainly look intuitively true to me and I suspect they do to us all.

No, they certainly do not look intuitively true to me, especially not the first one (the second one is not intuitive, but I reckon it's true because of the information I have about you).
In my reply, I was assuming for the sake of the argument that you were not committing the equivocation that Bomb#20 already identified. But that's almost certainly a false assumption. That would explain why Premise 1 is intuitive to you. In fact, that also is clear from what you said in an earlier reply to me, namely:

???

You see no reason to think that if there is no god, it is not true that if you pray then your prayers will be answered?!

Please take some more time to think about it...

Your expression of disbelief and your rather dismissive reply is strong evidence that by "if there is no god, it is not true that if you pray then your prayers will be answered", you meant "If there is no god, it is not true that if you prayed, your prayers would be answered." That one would be true if "god" has a meaning and only a god possibly answers prayers (as you seem to believe). But of course, the modified argument

Premise 1: If there is no god, then it is not true that if Speakpigeon prayed, then Speakpigeon's prayers would be answered.
Premise 2: Speakpigeon does not pray.
Conclusion: There is a god.
​

is not valid.

And then the truth table says the main implication is true for all possible logical cases. That's it and as far as I know it's all you need for the argument to be valid and sound. Now, if you want to claim you know otherwise, you'll have to justify your claim.

I disagree. I would not have to justify my claim. I can simply say I obviously have no good reason to suspect Premise 1 is true (which is true), and there is nothing improper about that. However, I have justified my claim, repeatedly and in increasing detail. You have not been able to realize that, but that's not my fault.

Again, I'm sympathetic to your argument and I'd be happy to concede you're right. But it looks to me like you've just made up a new procedure to deal with truth tables to fit your preconceptions.

I did not do anything like that. But it's puzzling that you would think so. I don't know what else to try. I will try to think of something different later.

I definitely don't remember ever coming across such before. So, if you're sure your procedure comes from textbook logic then please provide the relevant sources or quotes. Short of that, I'll assume the jury is out and won't come in any time soon and I'll leave it at that.

I have no quotes. I only have logic. But it's basic logic, and it's decisive.

As to interpretation, I'm not sure what your worry is. The argument should be understood in a minimalist fashion. A god is an all-powerful being.

That is not what you said before, but okay, I can go with that. I would like to ask you a question: Why do you not believe that there is a god?. Given that you believe that you have a sound argument whose conclusion is that there is a god, and furthermore, you are aware that you believe it (just in case), it is puzzling to me that you fail to believe that there is a god.

People can pray and a god if there is one can choose to answer prayers. So, if there is no god, it is not true that if I pray my prayer will be answered (by a god).

By they might still be answered by an entity such as Odin or Zeus, who are not all-powerful but very powerful, and the premise does not stipulate that they can only be answered by a god.

Again, I'm open to the idea there's a problem but what I don't have now, is textbook evidence that the truth table doesn't show the argument is valid and sound.

The argument is valid. I have no good reason to suspect it is sound, since I have no good reason to suspect that Premise 1 is true. I have already shown that more than once, but you haven't been able to see that.

Also, I don't see there's any room for the kind of "counterfactual" interpretation of the truth table I would be guilty of according to you and Bomb#20.

See above. In brief, it seems you find the statement "If there is no god, it is not true that if you pray then your prayers will be answered." intuitive because you are reading it as "If there is no god, it is not true that if you prayed then your prayers would be answered.", but that would make the argument invalid.

All I do is look at the truth table and the fact that the two premises look true (and I'm sure they look true to most people).

Most people believe that there is a god (your latest definition), so it is unsurprising that Premise 1 looks true to them. But I would challenge a claim that it looks true to most nontheists, unless they understand the consequent of first premise counterfactually (but that would make the argument invalid, as I have already explained).

Now, I don't think this is working, so I would like to ask you again: Why do you not believe that there is a god? I'm sincerely curious, by the way (though I also want to use this later, to try to persuade you by different arguments).

 

[Jobar]

I wonder if Pigeon's argument is to be found in this comprehensive list? (To which I added #189, and several others.)

 

[phands]

How can I ignore this thread? The "thread tools" menu doesn't have the ignore option that it had in the past.

 

[Jobar]

Let's cancel out the double negative in the first statement and work from there. Others have done this I think, but it seems to me the clearest way to show the disconnect between premises and conclusion.

Premise 1: If there is {a prayer-answering} god, then it is true that if Speakpigeon prayed, then Speakpigeon's prayers would be answered.
Premise 2: Speakpigeon does not pray.
Conclusion: There is a god.

Obviously this tells us nothing, because the premise under examination (existence of a prayer-answering god) is not tested if Pigeon doesn't pray, and thereby perform an experiment to check out the truth of the initial premise.

No doubt Pigeon will insist the double negative is in some way vital to his point, but I just don't see it.