Jokes about prison rape on men? Not a fan.

[Angra Mainyu]

It's very odd that we are wrangling over this. I distinctly remember hypothetical scenarios (one for example about there being no one left in the universe except one psychopath on another planet, who then dies if I recall correctly) being constructed in previous discussions on other threads which involved trying to show that moral judgements were independent of thoughts and feelings (judgements, whatever) about them, effectively by eliminating all entities who could think, feel or make judgements. It appears there was common understanding about the issue then.

That did not seem to be the case. I presented several scenarios and arguments, but you kept misrepresenting the exchange and particularly my views (as B20 said, that's "beyond exasperating", and I've taken a lot more of that from you then he did), and still failing to see the point in the analogies and several of the scenarios, speaking about something you called 'independence' or 'independent', even after I challenged your usage of the term - but you did not seem to understand the challenge, and instead kept accusing me a number of bad things.

The situations you concocted literally did not show independence. That you concocted them to try to eliminate 'all entities capable of making a judgement' shows that at that time you essentially accepted and used the definition I am now using. And now you don't. You repeatedly move the goalposts in a variety of ways.

I would just invite readers to read our exchanges in the following threads:



https://talkfreethought.org/showthread.php?19934-The-Great-Contradiction


https://talkfreethought.org/showthread.php?20677-FORGIVENESS
https://talkfreethought.org/showthread.php?20647-RETRIBUTIVISM

 

[The AntiChris]

You're missing the point.

I don't think anyone has claimed that 'mind independent' can only mean one thing. I certainly haven't.

I do not know where you get that that sense is the most common one. In my experience, none is predominant (i.e., above 50% usage), and it's not clear to me which one is the first minority so to speak.

I can't possibly comment on what you claim is your experience, but I can tell you that on this discussion board, the only occasions, that I can find, on which mind independence (or very similar terms) has arisen in Morals and Principles , "independent of opinions or feelings" has been the intended meaning of the term every time and you have been involved in all of them.

That has not been my experience in that context,

Sorry, I don't understand this response.

 

[ruby sparks]

...ruby sparks does not mean the same as you do by 'mind-independent'.

How do you know that? And even if it were true, is it anything more than time-wasting hair-splitting? Maybe you find my meaning 'problematical'. Is that any more than time-wasting hair-splitting?

In any case, your standards are a moving target, so I wouldn't necessarily know which ones you are using at any one time.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

It does not depend at all on my evaluative attitudes, or on the attitudes of any other observer in her capacity as observer.

Of course it doesn't depend on your evaluative attitudes or those of an observer. I never said it did!

All that it means is that it depends on someone's judgement (thoughts, feelings, attitudes, etc) about it.

I actually am finding it hard to believe you now don't understand this not unusual meaning.

Great!
Suppose hypothetically that Street's constructivism as described it true (her actual position is more complex, but I'll go with that one). Then morality is mind-dependent, not objective, and so on. Yet, in the usual sense of the words, there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether, say, Trump is a good person. Now, if millions of people claim that he is, and millions of people claim that he is not, then millions of people are mistaken.

 

[ruby sparks]

Yet, in the usual sense of the words, there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether, say, Trump is a good person.

But there isn't really. And I would quibble about your use of the word 'usual sense' there. In any case, it's not mine.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Yet, in the usual sense of the words, there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether, say, Trump is a good person.

But there isn't really. And I would quibble about your use of the word 'usual sense' there. In any case, it's not mine.

Well, there is an objective fact of the matter. But what I was saying is that assuming for the sake of the argument that the constructivist view that Street describes is true, then there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether Trump is a good person, again in the usual sense of 'objective fact of the matter' (and if you want to quibble, sure, make your case). The point is that going by the definition of 'mind-independent' that you now embrace, a theory that yields morality mind-dependent is still a theory in which there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether Trump is a good person.

 

[ruby sparks]

Well, there is an objective fact of the matter.

You think there is.

The point is that going by the definition of 'mind-independent' that you now embrace, a theory that yields morality mind-dependent is still a theory in which there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether Trump is a good person.

You are talking to me about what I mean, not what Street means or what moral Constructivism entails. If all you are saying is that different meanings or theories can be taken from the same brief definition (by, for example, a moral Constructivist) then sure, that's semantics, theorising and varied interpretation for you, but it's not necessarily relevant to what I mean, which is not the above.

As such what I would therefore say (instead of what you said) is that going by the definition of 'mind-independent' that I now embrace, a theory that yields mind-dependent morality can be or is, according to some but not others (including me), a theory in which there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether Trump is a good person.

Incidentally, I consider the constructivist meaning of objective (as I understand it) to be another weak definition and a low bar, and I am also dubious about the appeal to an idealised or hypothetical process of supposed rational deliberation. Furthermore, since it involves thinking, it is not even exempt from the definition I am using anyway.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Here is a brief explanation of Street's constructivism as I understand it, and the main problem I see with it (apart from a number of errors in the arguments, but that's not central). I recommend the papers if anyone is interested - I'm not an expert on her theory, and I haven't read it in a while in detail. Still, I think I got the gist of it.

Briefly, Street seems to conflate morality with rationality, though the error goes back to other prominent philosophers. She argues against the idea - which is common enough - that an agent A may have reasons that are not dependent on the evaluative attitudes of A, though not necessarily the present ones, but rather, what A would have in a situation of 'reflective equilibrium'. But she equates something like 'A has reasons to X' (or 'A has overall reasons to X', though she often leaves that implicit) with 'A ought to X', and for the most part at least, she makes no distinction between 'all-things-considered' 'ought' and moral 'ought', though clearly she assumes that the 'all things considered' is a matter of rationality.

When one looks at it as a theory of rationality, it does seem to yield the right results:

When it comes to rationality, I would say it would be all-things-considered irrational of agent A to X if, given the information available to A (including processing capacity), it would be against A's final goals, ordered according to A's own evaluative attitudes (or preferences, in a general sense). Now Street's theory would say it would be irrational if and only if A in reflective equilibrium, aware of A's evaluative attitudes, would reckon that doing X would be irrational. That's kind of a weird way of saying it, and I suspect it has the direction dependence wrong depending on how she construes reflective equilibrium (but I'm not sure how she construes it), but still, with a good characterization of reflective equilibrium that gives the right results (one of my worries is that it might end up being tautological, but that might not be a bug).

But with those caveats, I would not claim the theory gets the wrong results when it comes to all-things-considered means-to-end rationality. The problem seems to be for morality. To use one of her examples, this theory holds that whether 'Hitler was morally depraved' is true depends on what Hitler's own assessments would have been, in reflective equilibrium. Leaving aside the issue of whether Street gets the direction wrong, it may well be true that Hitler's infamous actions (e.g., to start WW2, to commit genocite) were irrational on his part if and only if Hitler in reflective equilibrium would have reckoned so (I think something like that is true, though there is a risk it might be trivially true). But whether his actions were immoral - and whether he was morally depraved - does not depend on that (further caveat, though: Street is considering all sorts of aliens with alien minds, and that would require further consideration).

However, all of the above says Street's metathics theory is false. But it is a form of moral objectivism, in the usual sense of the word 'objective'. It is also a theory in which morality would be mind-independent, in one of the senses proposed in this thread. And to give an example,

https://philpapers.org/rec/WARDMM

A central feature of ordinary moral thought is that moral judgment is mind-independent in the following sense: judging something to be morally wrong does not thereby make it morally wrong. To deny this would be to accept a form of subjectivism.

One could nitpick (how about judging something morally praiseworthy? etc.), but that gets pretty close to another sense of mind-independence, according to which Street's theory would make morality clearly a mind-independent matter.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

You are talking to me about what I mean, not what Street means or what moral Constructivism entails.

Sure, but I am going by what you said about what you mean.

If all you are saying is that different meanings or theories can be taken from the same brief definition (by, for example, a moral Constructivist) then sure, that's semantics, theorising and varied interpretation for you, but it's not necessarily relevant to what I mean, which is not the above.

I am not sure I understand that. What I did was provide an example of a metaethics (and meta-normativity) theory that, according to your definition, would make morality mind-dependent and thus not objective, but under which there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether Trump is a good person.

As such what I would therefore say (instead of what you said) is that going by the definition of 'mind-independent' that I now embrace, a theory that yields mind-dependent morality can be or is, according to some but not others (including me), a theory in which there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether Trump is a good person.

Hmm... I think there might be a misunderstanding. Sorry if I was unclear. When I said "The point is that going by the definition of 'mind-independent' that you now embrace, a theory that yields morality mind-dependent is still a theory in which there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether Trump is a good person.", I by 'a theory' I did not mean 'any theory', but rather, I meant that there is an example of a metaethics theory that does just that. The point of this was to show that your usage of 'mind-independent' (and thus, of 'objective') is not the same as that proposed by The AntiChris, and not one that is in conflict with there being an objective fact of the matter about moral issues.

 

[ruby sparks]

I meant that there is an example of a metaethics theory that does just that.

Sure. And thanks for clarifying that that was what you meant.

The point of this was to show that your usage of 'mind-independent' (and thus, of 'objective') is not the same as that proposed by The AntiChris, and not one that is in conflict with there being an objective fact of the matter about moral issues.

I am still not clear as to whether my meaning differs from AntiChris's (or if so by how much or in what ways) but it is not something I am primarily concerned about. That said, it might be interesting to hear what AntiChris thinks on that.

By the way, my previous comments about it aside, I felt the paper by Street was very thought-provoking, so thanks for posting. If I recall correctly I had read it before at some time in the past. Generally speaking, I do agree with the suggestion (broadly put by B20 as I recall) that explanations about morality can be greatly enhanced by looking at biology, neuroscience, psychology, and evolution. If there are natural moral behaviours, 'rules' and norms (which I agree there are) I would expect them to be largely explainable in such terms. As such, discussions on Darwinism seem very relevant, and as regards Constructivism, while I might not go along with it entirely, or endorse its use of the word objective, I think it might at least in in some ways be on a useful track (a sort of middle road between moral realism and its counterparts) if coupled with the areas of study I have just mentioned.

And to repeat what I have said before, I do think that the theories, arguments and points that you are presenting are very stimulating and worthwhile indeed (otherwise I would not be engaging with you at such length about them) even if I have reservations about how far you appear to take them (towards conclusions about morality). So in other words, let's not lose sight of how much we agree, even while disagreeing. And when we stop discussing such issues, as we surely will at some point, I will be grateful to you for having stretched and challenged my thinking, which is, at the end of the day, mainly what I come to such discussions for.

 

[The AntiChris]

I am still not clear as to whether my meaning differs from AntiChris's (or if so by how much or in what ways) but it is not something I am primarily concerned about. That said, it might be interesting to hear what AntiChris thinks on that.

I'm not sure what you think I can add.

I'm reasonably happy with the idea that, in my view, 'objective' means independent of anyone's subjective opinions, attitudes or feelings. I'm in no position to comment on whether this precisely comports with your notion of objectivity.

 

[ruby sparks]

I'm in no position to comment on whether this precisely comports with your notion of objectivity.

No problem. I would say that I think it pretty much does. It was Angra rather than me who was more interested in the matter of whether or not there was a difference.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

By the way, my previous comments about it aside, I felt the paper by Street was very thought-provoking, so thanks for posting. If I recall correctly I had read it before at some time in the past.

No problem. Pre-prints of all of her papers used to be on her university webpage, but they were removed later for some reason, so now they are paywalled afaik. Luckily I downloaded them all when they were available.

Generally speaking, I do agree with the suggestion (broadly put by B20 as I recall) that explanations about morality can be greatly enhanced by looking at biology, neuroscience, psychology, and evolution.

I agree with that too of course.

Constructivism, while I might not go along with it entirely, or endorse its use of the word objective, I think it might at least in in some ways be on a useful track (a sort of middle road between moral realism and its counterparts) if coupled with the areas of study I have just mentioned.

In the sense in which Street uses the word 'objective', means-to-ends rationality is not objective: even if there is a fact of the matter as to whether it is rational for agent A to X, the fact of the matter depends on what A values, in one way or another.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

I'm not sure what you think I can add.


I'm reasonably happy with the idea that, in my view, 'objective' means independent of anyone's subjective opinions, attitudes or feelings. I'm in no position to comment on whether this precisely comports with your notion of objectivity.

I think either you are in a position to comment on that, or I vastly misunderstood what you mean by 'objective' - in which case, I would ask for clarification.

For example, you can take a look at the kind of constructivism I described, and check whether it is a form of objectivism according to the definition you propose. Then:

1. If the answer is 'yes', then you can tell that your definition does not comport precisely (or is even close to) the notion ruby sparks supports here (which does not mean he uses it intuitively in all contexts).

2. If the answer is 'no', then indeed you probably cannot tell whether your definition precisely comports with ruby sparks's. However, if the answer is 'no', then I would want to know, because in that case, I did not understand your definition at all - or even close.

Regarding point 2., I would like to stress that these two notions are not close to one another. They are very, very different. On one notion, crucially, rationality is not objective, whereas on the other, it is objective.

Perhaps, the most direct way of realizing the difference is as follows: When you say that "'objective' means independent of anyone's subjective opinions, attitudes or feelings", does that include the evaluative attitudes of the person whose behavior is being assessed? For example, suppose that whether it is rational for an agent A to X depends on the evaluative attitudes of A, but does not depend on the subjective opinions, attitudes or feelings of the people assessing whether it is rational for A to X, or anyone else for that matter. Would that mean rationality is objective, or not, going by your notion?

Just to avoid nitpicking: what if the person assessing whether it is rational of A to X is A herself? Well, in that case, her evaluative attitudes count but not in her capacity of assessor, but in her capacity of agent whose behavior is being assessed. Moreover, she can of course be mistaken, as she may not be aware at the time she makes the assessment about some of her evaluative attitudes (yes, this can happen because she can fail to put herself in some situations so to speak, among other reasons), or can be making an epistemically irrational assessment about probable consequences, and so on.

 

[The AntiChris]

I'm reasonably happy with the idea that, in my view, 'objective' means independent of anyone's subjective opinions, attitudes or feelings. I'm in no position to comment on whether this precisely comports with your notion of objectivity.

I think either you are in a position to comment on that,

Only if I were a mind reader.

or I vastly misunderstood what you mean by 'objective' - in which case, I would ask for clarification.

How on earth can what I mean by 'objective' bear on my ability to know what RS precisely means by 'objective'?

I get the idea that what RS means by 'objective' is broadly in line with my view but I can't possibly know if what he means comports precisely with my view.

I sometimes find your reasoning bewildering.

For example, you can take a look at the kind of constructivism I described, and check whether it is a form of objectivism according to the definition you propose.

I took a look and quickly lost the will to live (I'm afraid my eyes glazed over when attempting to make sense of "reflective equilibrium").

So, I really have no idea if Street's version of constructivism is consistent with my views. It follows therefore that RS's agreement (or otherwise) with Street has no bearing on my ability to know if RS's views comport with mine.

Basic logic.

 

[ruby sparks]

I agree with that too of course.

And as I said, I would agree that as a result, there are natural moral behaviours, 'rules' and norms. I tend to like trying to explain morality via this route than appealing to.....ideals.

My only caveat is that we have evolved to think up these moral ideals, which makes that thinking a part of natural morality also*.

In other words, even if there were, hypothetically, an objective moral fact, it would, I think, then become an 'is', and we would still have to grapple with getting an ought from it.

Yet another way to put it might be to say that we are being descriptive only when assessing 'rules' about morality. Normativity is another step.

In the sense in which Street uses the word 'objective', means-to-ends rationality is not objective: even if there is a fact of the matter as to whether it is rational for agent A to X, the fact of the matter depends on what A values, in one way or another.

That makes sense to me. I would tend not to think of rationality as being even capable of being what I would call objective.





*In other words, we may not necessarily be prisoners of our own extant nature, since that too can change. Imagine a hypothetical future creature that has evolved from us but is not us (think of the past example of homo australopithecus not being homo sapiens). That creature, let's call it 'homo futuris', might have different morals. More to the point, the change would likely happen very very gradually.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Only if I were a mind reader.

That reply is out of place. You cut my sentence is half, but it was an either-or.

How on earth can what I mean by 'objective' bear on my ability to know what RS precisely means by 'objective'?

Let us not change the subject. Remember, you told ruby sparks

I'm in no position to comment on whether this precisely comports with your notion of objectivity.

You did not make just the claim that you were in no position to know what ruby sparks precisely means by 'objective'. Rather, you claimed that you were in no position to tell whether your definition of 'objective' precisely comports with ruby sparks's notion. What I am saying is that either you are in a position to tell that your definition of objective does not comport - not even close - to that proposed in this thread by ruby sparks, or else I seriously misunderstood the definition that you proposed. The reasons are as explained earlier.

Of course, if you can figure out that your definition does not[/ b] comport - not even close - to ruby sparks's notion of objectivity, then that does not entail that you can figure out precisely what he means by 'objective' in the context of this thread and metaethical discussions (at least, the concept he proposes for this discussions).

I get the idea that what RS means by 'objective' is broadly in line with my view but I can't possibly know if what he means comports precisely with my view.

Well, either you can, or else I seriously misunderstood your position. And I already explained why. But let me put it in a different way:

1. I read your definition and your explanations involving it in your replies to B20 and to me.
2. I read ruby sparks's definitions and his explanations involving it in his replies to B20 and to me.

Even if I am not be able to tell precisely what either of you mean, I can easily tell that the two of you do not mean the same, or even something similar, unless I very seriously misunderstood what you meant. Since you have access to this thread as much as I do, then you are also in a position to compare ruby sparks's definition with your own, in particular in the example I provided. If I did not misunderstand your definition badly, then you should be able to tell that his proposed concept and yours are very different. On the other hand, if you cannot tell that his proposed concept and yours are very different, then I vastly misunderstood your definition, because the understanding of your definition that I have yields to the easy assessment that his and yours are very different.

I sometimes find your reasoning bewildering.

I am being pretty precise.

I took a look and quickly lost the will to live (I'm afraid my eyes glazed over when attempting to make sense of "reflective equilibrium").

The precise characterization of 'reflective equilibrium' part is not relevant when it comes to the question of whether this is an objective matter, unless I seriously misundertood your definition. But it's like the case of rationality. Now, whether it is rational of agent A to X depends of course - among other things - on A's values. But it does not depend on the values of anyone trying to assess whether it is rational of A to X. Of course, A can be mistaken about whether it is rational of A to X. Let me give you an example:

A=Joe.
X=Have lots and lots of casual unprotected sex for fun.

Joe reckons it is rational on his part to have lots and lots of casual unprotected sex for fun. Is Joe correct?
Well, that depends on the information available to Joe, and also on what he values.
For example, Joe might make an error of epistemic rationality and assing a much lower probability to the hypothesis that he gets a serious STD than he rationally should.
Or he makes the right probabilistic assessment about that, but fails to realize just how bad it would feel to get an illness like that, or how much it would matter to him to avoid the STD if he were properly considering how it feels.


Maybe he is correct, or maybe not. But regardless, whether it is rational on his part depends on his evaluative attitudes, values or whatever one calls them, even those he might not be aware of at the time he makes the assessment (e.g., because he fails to properly think about just how bad it would be to be in that situation - to have one of those diseases - and how much his own evaluative attitudes would tell him to avoid it, if he were considering the matter rationally). But the specific characterization should not matter when it comes to assessing whether it is a form of objectivism by your definition.

So, I really have no idea if Street's version of constructivism is consistent with my views. It follows therefore that RS's agreement (or otherwise) with Street has no bearing on my ability to know if RS's views comport with mine.

But I do not claim that you do know; rather, I claim that either you are in a position to tell (even if you choose not to because you lost your will to live), or else I seriously misunderstood your definition. But let me make it simpler:

Suppose epistemic theory T says that whether it is rational of an agent A to X depends on the values, evaluative attitudes, etc. of A, but it does not depend at all on the values, evaluative attitudes, etc. of anyone else. In particular, if B=\=A and B is assessing whether it is rational of A to X, then according to theory T, it does not depend on the values, evaluative attitudes, etc. of B whether it is rational of A to X. And it does depend on the values, evaluative attitudes, etc, of A, regardless of whether A ever ponders whether it is rational of A to X.

Is epistemic theory T a form of objectivism about rationality?
According to ruby sparks's notion of 'mind-independence', the answer to that would be no (as is the case with Street's theory). What about your notion? Can you tell?

 

[The AntiChris]

I'm in no position to comment on whether this precisely comports with your notion of objectivity.

You did not make just the claim that you were in no position to know what ruby sparks precisely means by 'objective'. Rather, you claimed that you were in no position to tell whether your definition of 'objective' precisely comports with ruby sparks's notion.

I have no idea what distinction you're trying draw here. Even more baffling is why this is so important to you.

What I am saying is that either you are in a position to tell that your definition of objective does not comport - not even close - to that proposed in this thread by ruby sparks, or else I seriously misunderstood the definition that you proposed.

As I tried to explain before, this makes no logical sense.

My ability to tell that my definition of objective does not comport with anyone else's definition cannot possibly be contingent upon your understanding of my definition.

This can't be what you mean. But I'm at a loss as to what could possibly mean.

 

[ruby sparks]

I can easily tell that the two of you do not mean the same, or even something similar...

To me it seems clear they are at least similar.

And I am also totally confused as to what your point is about it in any case.

 

[ruby sparks]

Angra, a more fruitful direction might be to explore how much we (you and I and anyone else who participates here) agree, on for instance, the existence of natural (biological/psychological/evolved) moral behaviours, 'rules' and norms. It may be that there certain things we will never agree on, so it might be interesting to try setting those aside, for a change if nothing else, and focus on agreement where possible. Common ground in other words. We would be covering much of what B20 previously said, and on which I agree with him, and with you too.