Compatibilism: What's that About?

[Copernicus]

To be clear, I mean that current versions of walking robots do watch their steps, but they don't necessarily teach themselves how to do that. They simply lack episodic memories and an ability to use those memories the modify future behavior. However, they can be programmed to dance and to navigate obstacle courses via nondeterministic programming methods.

I don't think there are nondeterministic programming methods. There may be choices that are unpredictable, but not causally indeterministic.

 Nondeterministic programming is a real, well-established method of programming, but the term "nondeterministic" here has a technical meaning that relates to programming flow in a running program. It is not really about determinism in free will debates. What it means is that a program only calculates decisions at choice points during runtime. It makes different decisions that depend on circumstances at choice points that are external to the program flow. That is what allows a robot to figure out how to navigate an obstacle course that it has never seen before. It might decide whether it needs to climb over, crawl under, or walk around an obstacle in its path.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

To be clear, I mean that current versions of walking robots do watch their steps, but they don't necessarily teach themselves how to do that. They simply lack episodic memories and an ability to use those memories the modify future behavior. However, they can be programmed to dance and to navigate obstacle courses via nondeterministic programming methods.

I don't think there are nondeterministic programming methods. There may be choices that are unpredictable, but not causally indeterministic.

 Nondeterministic programming is a real, well-established method of programming, but the term "nondeterministic" here has a technical meaning that relates to programming flow in a running program. It is not really about determinism in free will debates. What it means is that a program only calculates decisions at choice points during runtime. It makes different decisions that depend on circumstances at choice points that are external to the program flow. That is what allows a robot to figure out how to navigate an obstacle course that it has never seen before. It might decide whether it needs to climb over, crawl under, or walk around an obstacle in its path.

Back-tracking sounds like simply unwinding the stack, which would still seem deterministic to me.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Yes, “what will be, will be” is useless, but more, the hard determinist conflates “what will be, will be,” which is true but trivial, with, “what will be, must be,” which is untrue.

Look at Einstein’s moon metaphor, raised in the compatibilism thread. If the moon were sentient, it would either perceive itself to be “along for the ride,” or it would perceive itself to have choices. Suppose it decided to stop moving. If it found itself unable to stop moving despite its decision to do so, then that would be evidence that it lacked free will.

Yet when I decide to order either eggs or pancakes for breakfast, I do not find my decision to be thwarted. If I decide to order eggs I get eggs. If I decide to order pancakes I get pancakes. And later if I am walking on the street and decide to stop, I stop without any problem.

If I decided to order eggs but found my mouth forming the word “pancakes” against my will, or if I found myself walking on the sidewalk and decided to stop but found, to my shock, my legs refusing to obey me and continuing to move me forward, those would be evidences of a lack of free will. We never observe these things to happen, obviously, unless some external force like hypnosis or drugs or internal brain injury were to cause such things to happen.

Of course the hard determinist will argue that there is an external force that causes me both to desire to have eggs and successfully mouth the word “eggs.” On his account that force is causal determinism. But causal determinism isn’t a force, a reified entity. It is rather a list of descriptions of what happens in the world. As Norman Swartz noted, we don’t get to choose the charge on an electron or a great many other constants or laws of nature. But we do get to choose the color of the shirt we will wear today.

Schopenhauer said that we can do as we will, we just can’t will what we will. Fine. Even then I would say it’s a stretch to say that our will was determined by antecedent events. I would say it was influenced by them. But whether you wish to use the verb “determined” or “influenced” makes little difference, it seems to me. Obviously our desires are predicated upon the past.

If I decide not to touch a flame it is because I touched one in the past, and got burned, and so learn not to do that again. Or perhaps I refrain from touching it because someone warns me of the consequences of doing so. This is another form of past influence. Or perhaps I begin to touch the flame and feel the heat, which is unpleasant, and swiftly draw back. Again my behavior or desire is influenced or determined by past or present events. But my action is still my choice. Some people override such past influences and put their hand in a flame anyway. G. Gordon Liddy of Watergate infamy comes to mind.

Very good points. We believe we are in control because we witness ourselves controlling things. Einstein's "Conscious Moon", having never witnessed itself exercising any control, would never imagine itself in control of its path. So, Einstein's comment that if the moon had consciousness it would think it was in control is a bit of silly nonsense.

Schopenhauer comes up short by missing the fact that we often have several wants or desires, and we must choose what we will do. For example, I may want to finish this comment, but I may also want to eat, and I may also want to pee. It is up to me to decide what I will do. So, even though we may not control what we want or need to do, we most certainly do have control over our will. And choosing is the causal mechanism by which we exercise that control.

Cool reference to Liddy. I remember the story of him holding his hand over a flame to impress someone. Geez. We're getting old, ain't we.

 

[pood]

Yes, Marvin we are getting old! But sometimes age brings wisdom.

 

[DBT]

The reality of free will as an agency of change, veto or control must first be established.

Have you been to a restaurant lately? Choosing is a deterministic event in which two or more options are input, some criteria of comparative evaluation is applied, and a single choice is output.

We watch the people walk in, sit down, browse the menu, and place their order. At the end of the meal the waiter brings them the bill, holding them responsible for their deliberate act.

The waiter brings the bill to the agents of change, the persons who placed the order and ate the meal. He does not bring the bill to the customer's parents. He does not bring the bill to evolution. He does not bring the bill to the laws of nature. He does not bring the bill to the Big Bang.

It is obvious to the waiter who was responsible for ordering the meal and who ate it. It was the customer, and not any other object in the entire universe.

And, if the waiter brings the wrong meal to the customer, the customer will veto that meal and the waiter must find who ordered it, or return it to the kitchen.

Yes, but that is where compatibilism goes wrong, in regard to a determined system we are not talking about ''help me decide'' - the cause/effect actions of the world determine outcomes, determine where you sit, determine the food you select (developed preferences, menu, information processing/output). These are not aids, they fix your decisions and actions as a matter of brain activity/natural law/determinism.

Determinism is not our aid in making decisions, it necessitates/fixes all ctions and outcomes.

All types of behaviour within a determined system, be they described as deliberate or coerced are necessitated behaviours.

Yes! Now you're getting it. All events are equally causally necessary/inevitable from any prior point in time. Causal necessity makes no distinctions whatever between any two events.

Which is why defining non coerced actions as instances of free will is the point at which compatibilism goes wrong.

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''

 

[DBT]

Yes, “what will be, will be” is useless, but more, the hard determinist conflates “what will be, will be,” which is true but trivial, with, “what will be, must be,” which is untrue.

Look at Einstein’s moon metaphor, raised in the compatibilism thread. If the moon were sentient, it would either perceive itself to be “along for the ride,” or it would perceive itself to have choices. Suppose it decided to stop moving. If it found itself unable to stop moving despite its decision to do so, then that would be evidence that it lacked free will.

Yet when I decide to order either eggs or pancakes for breakfast, I do not find my decision to be thwarted. If I decide to order eggs I get eggs. If I decide to order pancakes I get pancakes. And later if I am walking on the street and decide to stop, I stop without any problem.

If I decided to order eggs but found my mouth forming the word “pancakes” against my will, or if I found myself walking on the sidewalk and decided to stop but found, to my shock, my legs refusing to obey me and continuing to move me forward, those would be evidences of a lack of free will. We never observe these things to happen, obviously, unless some external force like hypnosis or drugs or internal brain injury were to cause such things to happen.

Of course the hard determinist will argue that there is an external force that causes me both to desire to have eggs and successfully mouth the word “eggs.” On his account that force is causal determinism. But causal determinism isn’t a force, a reified entity. It is rather a list of descriptions of what happens in the world. As Norman Swartz noted, we don’t get to choose the charge on an electron or a great many other constants or laws of nature. But we do get to choose the color of the shirt we will wear today.

Schopenhauer said that we can do as we will, we just can’t will what we will. Fine. Even then I would say it’s a stretch to say that our will was determined by antecedent events. I would say it was influenced by them. But whether you wish to use the verb “determined” or “influenced” makes little difference, it seems to me. Obviously our desires are predicated upon the past.

If I decide not to touch a flame it is because I touched one in the past, and got burned, and so learn not to do that again. Or perhaps I refrain from touching it because someone warns me of the consequences of doing so. This is another form of past influence. Or perhaps I begin to touch the flame and feel the heat, which is unpleasant, and swiftly draw back. Again my behavior or desire is influenced or determined by past or present events. But my action is still my choice. Some people override such past influences and put their hand in a flame anyway. G. Gordon Liddy of Watergate infamy comes to mind.

Within a determined system, your decisions are not thwarted, the opposite is true, they are determined, necessitated, fixed. Actions Proceed, unfold, causal webs are also 'effect webs.' Being determined, nothing prevents your actions, they proceed without impediment. Nothing impedes the moon from orbiting the earth, nothing impedes the determined events of the world. Determinism means that what happens, happens necessarily. By definition, it can be no other way.

 

[DBT]

...

That's induction, he said - ''Practically, I am, nevertheless, compelled to act as if freedom of the will existed'' - which may be taken mean that the perception of free will is an illusion.... supported by his comment; ''If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was traveling its way of its own accord on the strength of a resolution taken once and for all.''

There is no contradiction, only perspective. The illusion of free will/agency where none exists within a determined system.

Are you sort of admitting that free will exists from the perspective of actors within the deterministic system? You, like Einstein, seem to be admitting that there is no practical consequence of defining free will as if it meant exactly what Marvin said. It is a fully determined process, and it makes perfect sense from the perspective of all of us sentient automatons interacting with each other. Sounds like that sense of free will is pretty compatible with determinism.

I thought I had made it clear, I'm saying that limited perspective may give the actor the impression of free will - if the actor believes free will to mean that they have regulative control, that they are freely selecting an option from a set of alternatives, that they could have chosen otherwise....which determinism, of course, does not allow. Which means, not free will, but the illusion of free will.

 

[DBT]

Just because you don't agree with Einstein doesn't mean that what he said is stupid. He was pointing out the undeniable consequences of determinism. It is compatibilism that fails to relate to the consequences of determinism, therefore fails as an argument.

Speaking of Einstein, his position on free will is incoherent. Consider this quote from the Saturday Evening Post many years ago:

"In a sense, we can hold no one responsible. I am a determinist. As such, I do not believe in free will. ... Practically, I am, nevertheless, compelled to act as if freedom of the will existed. If I wish to live in a civilized community,I must act as if man is a responsible being."
Page 114 of "The Saturday Evening Post" article "What Life Means to Einstein" "An Interview by George Sylvester Viereck" (Oct 26, 1929)

On the one hand, he says that being a determinist means that he does not believe in free will or responsibility, then he turns around and says he must act as if he does believe in them. Even Einstein was taken in by the paradox. So, you're certainly in good company.

That's induction, he said - ''Practically, I am, nevertheless, compelled to act as if freedom of the will existed'' - which may be taken mean that the perception of free will is an illusion.... supported by his comment; ''If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was traveling its way of its own accord on the strength of a resolution taken once and for all.''

There is no contradiction, only perspective. The illusion of free will/agency where none exists within a determined system.

Einstein is making up a story with no evidence. If the moon had self-consciousness, it would just as likely perceive itself as a passive entity enjoying the trip. It would not observe itself making choices, because the moon never makes any choices. So it would never have the notion of choosing what it will do next. Without choosing, it would never have the notion that it controls anything. But we can watch ourselves choosing what we will have for breakfast, or choosing which route we will take to work, or choosing all the other things we choose throughout the day. So, Einstein's analogy, like all analogies, is false.

Einstein was describing the inevitable, inescapable consequences of determinism. The moon does not make decisions. But, as with everything else within the system its actions are determined/fixed as a matter of natural law.

Complexity cannot alter, bypass or circumvent determinism. Yes, the activity of a brain is infinitely more complex than the orbit of the moon, but no less determined.

Complexity should not be confused with freedom of the will.

Again, the stumbling point of compatibilism:

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''

 

[Copernicus]

...

That's induction, he said - ''Practically, I am, nevertheless, compelled to act as if freedom of the will existed'' - which may be taken mean that the perception of free will is an illusion.... supported by his comment; ''If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was traveling its way of its own accord on the strength of a resolution taken once and for all.''

There is no contradiction, only perspective. The illusion of free will/agency where none exists within a determined system.

Are you sort of admitting that free will exists from the perspective of actors within the deterministic system? You, like Einstein, seem to be admitting that there is no practical consequence of defining free will as if it meant exactly what Marvin said. It is a fully determined process, and it makes perfect sense from the perspective of all of us sentient automatons interacting with each other. Sounds like that sense of free will is pretty compatible with determinism.

I thought I had made it clear, I'm saying that limited perspective may give the actor the impression of free will - if the actor believes free will to mean that they have regulative control, that they are freely selecting an option from a set of alternatives, that they could have chosen otherwise....which determinism, of course, does not allow. Which means, not free will, but the illusion of free will.

Yes, you made it clear that perspective my give the actor the impression of free will, but you just don't want to admit that the subjective impression of free will is what us actors are talking about when we use the expression "free will". We aren't talking about freedom from causal necessity in a deterministic reality. So your attempt to dismiss free will as an illusion is ultimately a self-refuting argument. You end up admitting that we are compelled to accept the reality of being responsible for our actions, even if we cannot step outside of the deterministic chaos that compels us to make the choices that we do. You aren't arguing that we should open up the jails and let everyone out on the grounds that none of the inmates could help themselves when they committed their crimes. Supposedly, we are compelled to keep them locked up. What does any of your argument buy us except intellectual bankruptcy?

 

[fromderinside]

I'll be more specific. In a determined world there is no choosing.

Choosing is a deterministic operation that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and outputs a single choice, usually in the form of an "I will X", where X is that which we have decided we will do.

And you're saying this never happens? Come with me to the restaurant. Watch the people walk in, sit at a table, browse the menu, and place their orders. How was the literal menu of options reduced to a single choice, if not by choosing?

If we stick around, we will notice the waiter bringing each person their bill, holding them responsible for their deliberate act.

Like all events, these events were causally necessary from any prior point in the past. Causal necessity does eliminate choosing, it assures it will inevitably happen.

One's own impression of what one is doing, or of what others are doing, is subjective.

Watching people in the restaurant reducing a menu of options into a single "I will have the chef salad, please", is an objective observation, not a subjective impression. That's why I use it. Everyone has seen people actually making choices in the real world.

Causation is objective.

And we just objectively observed choosing actually happening. Cool, huh?

Subjective isn't up to the task.

So, are you suggesting that we, as objective observers, were just imagining that people in the restaurant were making choices? We cannot see inside their heads. But we did see a menu of options going into it, and a single choice coming out of it. Choosing happens. It is a real deterministic event that occurs in the real world.

And why I choose software as an example. "Choice" as a concept, in fact the more general term "decision", requires no/very little "intelligence" at all, the intelligence of a single gate.

I think where people get lost is that logical structures can be imposed in the physical, and those logical structures may be then modeled, completely ignoring the physical substrate, to perform an act of literal thaumaturgy: to make happen so below, and then follow that determined path above in the other system that performs "the same".

I can see how such ideas got off the rails though... It's a short but fatal leap to where people in ancient times took it, in our modern understanding.

But, Body Rituals of the Nacirema and all that...

Geez, you're making me look up words like "thaumaturgy", which means working miracles. As a Humanist, I don't believe in miracles.

However it seems you do believe in ethics can be materially defined. Care to try?

See: https://americanhumanist.org/what-is-humanism/definition-of-humanism/

Humanism is a progressive philosophy of life that, without theism or other supernatural beliefs, affirms our ability and responsibility to lead ethical lives of personal fulfillment that aspire to the greater good. Whether you’re doing research, exploring a personal philosophy, or are simply curious about humanism, the resources here are a great place to start: […]*

* I've highlighted a few terms beyond humanism for which I'd like to see objective constructions.

 

[Bomb#20]

If you invoke other spatial dimensions you then have to derive an experiment that can bear that out.

Flatline Should Not Have Been Flat-Lined

Displacement without motion is impossible unless the particle goes into another dimension. A leap in your acceptable universe, going from A to B without traveling on the line AB, is explained by motion through the third dimension of height. So the quantum leap is itself the experiment that proves there must be another dimension. Your objection is no more valid than, "Prove that what just happened did happen."

Your answer illustrates the point that all empirical evidence is theory laden. In "the quantum leap", first we observe a particle at A and no particle at B, and then we observe a particle at B and no particle at A, and we can find no evidence of the particle being at an intermediate location. The reason you regard this as proof that there must be another dimension is because you take for granted that the particle observed at B is the same particle as the particle earlier observed at A. But "the same" is not an observable property of particles; it's a metaphysical labeling people choose to impose on their observations, or choose not to impose on them. If a particle at A ceases to exist, and a brand new particle forms at B, in accordance with quantum mechanical creation and annihilation operators, then there's no reason to postulate another dimension for the particle to have passed through. As Laplace said of God, "Sire, I had no need of that hypothesis."

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The reality of free will as an agency of change, veto or control must first be established.

Have you been to a restaurant lately? Choosing is a deterministic event in which two or more options are input, some criteria of comparative evaluation is applied, and a single choice is output.

We watch the people walk in, sit down, browse the menu, and place their order. At the end of the meal the waiter brings them the bill, holding them responsible for their deliberate act.

The waiter brings the bill to the agents of change, the persons who placed the order and ate the meal. He does not bring the bill to the customer's parents. He does not bring the bill to evolution. He does not bring the bill to the laws of nature. He does not bring the bill to the Big Bang.

It is obvious to the waiter who was responsible for ordering the meal and who ate it. It was the customer, and not any other object in the entire universe.

And, if the waiter brings the wrong meal to the customer, the customer will veto that meal and the waiter must find who ordered it, or return it to the kitchen.

Yes, but that is where compatibilism goes wrong, in regard to a determined system we are not talking about ''help me decide'' - the cause/effect actions of the world determine outcomes, determine where you sit, determine the food you select (developed preferences, menu, information processing/output). These are not aids, they fix your decisions and actions as a matter of brain activity/natural law/determinism.

Determinism is not our aid in making decisions, it necessitates/fixes all ctions and outcomes.

All types of behaviour within a determined system, be they described as deliberate or coerced are necessitated behaviours.

Yes! Now you're getting it. All events are equally causally necessary/inevitable from any prior point in time. Causal necessity makes no distinctions whatever between any two events.

Which is why defining non coerced actions as instances of free will is the point at which compatibilism goes wrong.

''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''

The fact that both a deliberate action and a coerced action are causally necessary does not change the fact that one action is deliberate and the other is coerced! We are held responsible, or not, based on whether our action was deliberate or coerced.

Causal necessity makes no meaningful distinctions, because it is always true of every event without distinction. It is a logical fact, but not a meaningful fact.

The only meaningful facts are our knowledge of the specific causes of specific effects. This knowledge, as to whether a person decided to rob the bank for their own profit, versus, whether they decided to rob the bank because their family was being held hostage and would be murdered if they didn't rob the bank, is a meaningful distinction!

Hard determinism would erase all meaningful distinctions! And that just wouldn't do.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

... Determinism means that what happens, happens necessarily. By definition, it can be no other way.

Fortunately, it need not be any other way. My choice is causally necessary, which means that my choosing it was also causally necessary.

It was causally necessary that I would be the only object in the physical universe that would be making that specific choice at that specific time.

And, it was also causally necessary that I would be making that choice according to my own goals and for my own reasons. Thus, it was causally necessary that I would be making that choice of my own free will.

Causal necessity changes nothing. Everything is necessarily just as it is and everything happens just the way it does.

To suggest that causal necessity is an entity that is making our choices for us creates a delusion.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

The reality of free will as an agency of change, veto or control must first be established.

Have you been to a restaurant lately? Choosing is a deterministic event in which two or more options are input, some criteria of comparative evaluation is applied, and a single choice is output.

We watch the people walk in, sit down, browse the menu, and place their order. At the end of the meal the waiter brings them the bill, holding them responsible for their deliberate act.

The waiter brings the bill to the agents of change, the persons who placed the order and ate the meal. He does not bring the bill to the customer's parents. He does not bring the bill to evolution. He does not bring the bill to the laws of nature. He does not bring the bill to the Big Bang.

It is obvious to the waiter who was responsible for ordering the meal and who ate it. It was the customer, and not any other object in the entire universe.

And, if the waiter brings the wrong meal to the customer, the customer will veto that meal and the waiter must find who ordered it, or return it to the kitchen.

Yes, but that is where compatibilism goes wrong, in regard to a determined system we are not talking about ''help me decide'' - the cause/effect actions of the world determine outcomes, determine where you sit, determine the food you select (developed preferences, menu, information processing/output). These are not aids, they fix your decisions and actions as a matter of brain activity/natural law/determinism.

Determinism is not our aid in making decisions, it necessitates/fixes all ctions and outcomes.

What your narrative leaves out is that people happen to be one of those causes, and their actions have effects in that restaurant. Their own choosing determines where they will sit, what food they will order, and what will show up on the bill that the waiter brings them.

Hard determinists keep pretending that determinism is an entity that is doing these things for them. It is not the customer choosing where to sit, but rather determinism is choosing where they will sit. It is not the customer choosing what they will eat, but rather determinism is choosing what they will eat.

So, how come the waiter brings the bill to the customer? Shouldn't determinism pay the bill? Oh, and where exactly is this guy determinism, and how did he get out of the restaurant without paying his bill?

There is a flaw in the hard determinist's argument. Do you see it yet?

 

[Marvin Edwards]

Just because you don't agree with Einstein doesn't mean that what he said is stupid. He was pointing out the undeniable consequences of determinism. It is compatibilism that fails to relate to the consequences of determinism, therefore fails as an argument.

Speaking of Einstein, his position on free will is incoherent. Consider this quote from the Saturday Evening Post many years ago:

"In a sense, we can hold no one responsible. I am a determinist. As such, I do not believe in free will. ... Practically, I am, nevertheless, compelled to act as if freedom of the will existed. If I wish to live in a civilized community,I must act as if man is a responsible being."
Page 114 of "The Saturday Evening Post" article "What Life Means to Einstein" "An Interview by George Sylvester Viereck" (Oct 26, 1929)

On the one hand, he says that being a determinist means that he does not believe in free will or responsibility, then he turns around and says he must act as if he does believe in them. Even Einstein was taken in by the paradox. So, you're certainly in good company.

That's induction, he said - ''Practically, I am, nevertheless, compelled to act as if freedom of the will existed'' - which may be taken mean that the perception of free will is an illusion.... supported by his comment; ''If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was traveling its way of its own accord on the strength of a resolution taken once and for all.''

There is no contradiction, only perspective. The illusion of free will/agency where none exists within a determined system.

Einstein is making up a story with no evidence. If the moon had self-consciousness, it would just as likely perceive itself as a passive entity enjoying the trip. It would not observe itself making choices, because the moon never makes any choices. So it would never have the notion of choosing what it will do next. Without choosing, it would never have the notion that it controls anything. But we can watch ourselves choosing what we will have for breakfast, or choosing which route we will take to work, or choosing all the other things we choose throughout the day. So, Einstein's analogy, like all analogies, is false.

Einstein was describing the inevitable, inescapable consequences of determinism. The moon does not make decisions. But, as with everything else within the system its actions are determined/fixed as a matter of natural law.

Einstein was drowning in his own metaphors. The moon does not make decisions because it has no brain nor any mechanism for carrying out its intentions.

Complexity cannot alter, bypass or circumvent determinism. Yes, the activity of a brain is infinitely more complex than the orbit of the moon, but no less determined.

Correct. Every event, including each thought and feeling we experience, is causally necessary from any prior point in time. But the most meaningful and relevant prior causes of our thoughts and feelings are located right here inside us. They are already a part who and what we are. And the choices that they cause are in fact our own choices.

Complexity should not be confused with freedom of the will.

Correct. Free will is not complex. It is the simple empirical case where a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

Reliable cause and effect, in itself, is not coercive and certainly not undue. It's an ordinary fact of life. And causal necessity is nothing more than a chain of prior events causing subsequent events. Nothing coercive or undue there either.

Only specific causes, like a guy holding a gun demanding our wallet, are coercive and extraordinary enough to force us to act against our own will.

Again, the stumbling point of compatibilism:
''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''

Since the compatibilist believes that all actions are equally a product of deterministic processes, nothing changes in regard to responsibility. If one uses the fact of causal necessity to excuse one thing, then it must excuse everything. If it excuses the pickpocket who stole your wallet, then it also excuses the judge who cuts off his hand.

"Responsibility" for a moral or criminal harm is assigned to the most meaningful and relevant cause of the harm. The pickpocket will be arrested for stealing your wallet. The judge will be arrested for inflicting "cruel and unusual punishment".

Causal necessity is never arrested for anything. The waiter in the restaurant gives the bill to the customer, not to causal necessity.

The hard determinist is confused about these matters, and leaves us with no one being held responsible for anything, and no cause that can actually be corrected.

 

[Marvin Edwards]

I'll be more specific. In a determined world there is no choosing.

Choosing is a deterministic operation that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and outputs a single choice, usually in the form of an "I will X", where X is that which we have decided we will do.

And you're saying this never happens? Come with me to the restaurant. Watch the people walk in, sit at a table, browse the menu, and place their orders. How was the literal menu of options reduced to a single choice, if not by choosing?

If we stick around, we will notice the waiter bringing each person their bill, holding them responsible for their deliberate act.

Like all events, these events were causally necessary from any prior point in the past. Causal necessity does eliminate choosing, it assures it will inevitably happen.

One's own impression of what one is doing, or of what others are doing, is subjective.

Watching people in the restaurant reducing a menu of options into a single "I will have the chef salad, please", is an objective observation, not a subjective impression. That's why I use it. Everyone has seen people actually making choices in the real world.

Causation is objective.

And we just objectively observed choosing actually happening. Cool, huh?

Subjective isn't up to the task.

So, are you suggesting that we, as objective observers, were just imagining that people in the restaurant were making choices? We cannot see inside their heads. But we did see a menu of options going into it, and a single choice coming out of it. Choosing happens. It is a real deterministic event that occurs in the real world.

And why I choose software as an example. "Choice" as a concept, in fact the more general term "decision", requires no/very little "intelligence" at all, the intelligence of a single gate.

I think where people get lost is that logical structures can be imposed in the physical, and those logical structures may be then modeled, completely ignoring the physical substrate, to perform an act of literal thaumaturgy: to make happen so below, and then follow that determined path above in the other system that performs "the same".

I can see how such ideas got off the rails though... It's a short but fatal leap to where people in ancient times took it, in our modern understanding.

But, Body Rituals of the Nacirema and all that...

Geez, you're making me look up words like "thaumaturgy", which means working miracles. As a Humanist, I don't believe in miracles.

However it seems you do believe in ethics can be materially defined. Care to try?

See: https://americanhumanist.org/what-is-humanism/definition-of-humanism/

Humanism is a progressive philosophy of life that, without theism or other supernatural beliefs, affirms our ability and responsibility to lead ethical lives of personal fulfillment that aspire to the greater good. Whether you’re doing research, exploring a personal philosophy, or are simply curious about humanism, the resources here are a great place to start: […]*

* I've highlighted a few terms beyond humanism for which I'd like to see objective constructions.

Hey! Thanks for sharing with everyone the link to the AHA.

You also ask whether ethics can be "materially" defined. Yes:

Ethics are a system of rules that guide behavior. The goal of ethics is to achieve a set of rules that provides the best good and the least harm for everyone. Which rules will best accomplish this are often a matter of debate, because the long term consequences of a given rule are often uncertain. So, groups, such as legislatures, research data and hear expert witnesses to inform their decisions. And they often argue over which rule will have the best results. After gathering information and discussion, they vote to establish a working rule that they implement. After it is implemented, we become better informed as to its actual consequences, and may modify, replace, or delete it.

But note that we have just stepped out of this thread and into this one: https://iidb.org/index.php?threads/morality-and-ethics.24777/

 

[Jarhyn]

The reality of free will as an agency of change, veto or control must first be established.

Have you been to a restaurant lately? Choosing is a deterministic event in which two or more options are input, some criteria of comparative evaluation is applied, and a single choice is output.

We watch the people walk in, sit down, browse the menu, and place their order. At the end of the meal the waiter brings them the bill, holding them responsible for their deliberate act.

The waiter brings the bill to the agents of change, the persons who placed the order and ate the meal. He does not bring the bill to the customer's parents. He does not bring the bill to evolution. He does not bring the bill to the laws of nature. He does not bring the bill to the Big Bang.

It is obvious to the waiter who was responsible for ordering the meal and who ate it. It was the customer, and not any other object in the entire universe.

And, if the waiter brings the wrong meal to the customer, the customer will veto that meal and the waiter must find who ordered it, or return it to the kitchen.

Yes, but that is where compatibilism goes wrong, in regard to a determined system we are not talking about ''help me decide'' - the cause/effect actions of the world determine outcomes, determine where you sit, determine the food you select (developed preferences, menu, information processing/output). These are not aids, they fix your decisions and actions as a matter of brain activity/natural law/determinism.

Determinism is not our aid in making decisions, it necessitates/fixes all ctions and outcomes.

What your narrative leaves out is that people happen to be one of those causes, and their actions have effects in that restaurant. Their own choosing determines where they will sit, what food they will order, and what will show up on the bill that the waiter brings them.

Hard determinists keep pretending that determinism is an entity that is doing these things for them. It is not the customer choosing where to sit, but rather determinism is choosing where they will sit. It is not the customer choosing what they will eat, but rather determinism is choosing what they will eat.

So, how come the waiter brings the bill to the customer? Shouldn't determinism pay the bill? Oh, and where exactly is this guy determinism, and how did he get out of the restaurant without paying his bill?

There is a flaw in the hard determinist's argument. Do you see it yet?

If you want to swap out the word "determinism" for "god", then I suppose then god does pay his own bill with his own hand and it's all a bunch of wank?

But that ignores the images operating among the objects.

 

[DBT]

The reality of free will as an agency of change, veto or control must first be established.

Have you been to a restaurant lately? Choosing is a deterministic event in which two or more options are input, some criteria of comparative evaluation is applied, and a single choice is output.

We watch the people walk in, sit down, browse the menu, and place their order. At the end of the meal the waiter brings them the bill, holding them responsible for their deliberate act.

The waiter brings the bill to the agents of change, the persons who placed the order and ate the meal. He does not bring the bill to the customer's parents. He does not bring the bill to evolution. He does not bring the bill to the laws of nature. He does not bring the bill to the Big Bang.

It is obvious to the waiter who was responsible for ordering the meal and who ate it. It was the customer, and not any other object in the entire universe.

And, if the waiter brings the wrong meal to the customer, the customer will veto that meal and the waiter must find who ordered it, or return it to the kitchen.

Yes, but that is where compatibilism goes wrong, in regard to a determined system we are not talking about ''help me decide'' - the cause/effect actions of the world determine outcomes, determine where you sit, determine the food you select (developed preferences, menu, information processing/output). These are not aids, they fix your decisions and actions as a matter of brain activity/natural law/determinism.

Determinism is not our aid in making decisions, it necessitates/fixes all ctions and outcomes.

What your narrative leaves out is that people happen to be one of those causes, and their actions have effects in that restaurant. Their own choosing determines where they will sit, what food they will order, and what will show up on the bill that the waiter brings them.

Hard determinists keep pretending that determinism is an entity that is doing these things for them. It is not the customer choosing where to sit, but rather determinism is choosing where they will sit. It is not the customer choosing what they will eat, but rather determinism is choosing what they will eat.

So, how come the waiter brings the bill to the customer? Shouldn't determinism pay the bill? Oh, and where exactly is this guy determinism, and how did he get out of the restaurant without paying his bill?

There is a flaw in the hard determinist's argument. Do you see it yet?

If you want to swap out the word "determinism" for "god", then I suppose then god does pay his own bill with his own hand and it's all a bunch of wank?

But that ignores the images operating among the objects.

... Determinism means that what happens, happens necessarily. By definition, it can be no other way.

Fortunately, it need not be any other way. My choice is causally necessary, which means that my choosing it was also causally necessary.

It was causally necessary that I would be the only object in the physical universe that would be making that specific choice at that specific time.

And, it was also causally necessary that I would be making that choice according to my own goals and for my own reasons. Thus, it was causally necessary that I would be making that choice of my own free will.

Causal necessity changes nothing. Everything is necessarily just as it is and everything happens just the way it does.

To suggest that causal necessity is an entity that is making our choices for us creates a delusion.

Not so, the very definition of freedom means having alternatives and freedom/agency to choose, to have done otherwise.

Determinism allowing no possible way except what is determined, no freedom of choice, decisions fixed at each moment of time, an agent having no realizable alternatives does precisely what is determined.

Will is determined.

Determinism is not free will.

Free; a. Not affected or restricted by a given condition or circumstance
b. Not subject to a given condition; exempt: income that is free of all taxes.
5. Not subject to external restraint: Unconstrained; unconfined:
*free; unrestrained; having a scope not restricted by qualification <a free variable>
7 a: not obstructed, restricted, or impeded.



If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

 

[DBT]

...

That's induction, he said - ''Practically, I am, nevertheless, compelled to act as if freedom of the will existed'' - which may be taken mean that the perception of free will is an illusion.... supported by his comment; ''If the moon, in the act of completing its eternal way around the earth, were gifted with self-consciousness, it would feel thoroughly convinced that it was traveling its way of its own accord on the strength of a resolution taken once and for all.''

There is no contradiction, only perspective. The illusion of free will/agency where none exists within a determined system.

Are you sort of admitting that free will exists from the perspective of actors within the deterministic system? You, like Einstein, seem to be admitting that there is no practical consequence of defining free will as if it meant exactly what Marvin said. It is a fully determined process, and it makes perfect sense from the perspective of all of us sentient automatons interacting with each other. Sounds like that sense of free will is pretty compatible with determinism.

I thought I had made it clear, I'm saying that limited perspective may give the actor the impression of free will - if the actor believes free will to mean that they have regulative control, that they are freely selecting an option from a set of alternatives, that they could have chosen otherwise....which determinism, of course, does not allow. Which means, not free will, but the illusion of free will.

Yes, you made it clear that perspective my give the actor the impression of free will, but you just don't want to admit that the subjective impression of free will is what us actors are talking about when we use the expression "free will". We aren't talking about freedom from causal necessity in a deterministic reality. So your attempt to dismiss free will as an illusion is ultimately a self-refuting argument. You end up admitting that we are compelled to accept the reality of being responsible for our actions, even if we cannot step outside of the deterministic chaos that compels us to make the choices that we do. You aren't arguing that we should open up the jails and let everyone out on the grounds that none of the inmates could help themselves when they committed their crimes. Supposedly, we are compelled to keep them locked up. What does any of your argument buy us except intellectual bankruptcy?

Are you saying that those who believe in free will, compatibilists, etc, accept that their concept of free will is an illusion? That free will as an illusion is not real? That free will is a false impression, an illusion of the mind? That the term is merely a verbal construct?

 

[DBT]

Einstein was describing the inevitable, inescapable consequences of determinism. The moon does not make decisions. But, as with everything else within the system its actions are determined/fixed as a matter of natural law.

Einstein was drowning in his own metaphors. The moon does not make decisions because it has no brain nor any mechanism for carrying out its intentions.

Determined behaviour has nothing to do with that. Everything being determined, it matters not whether something is conscious or not. Consciousness doesn't alter anything. Brain information processing is largely unconscious. Consciousness itself is determined.

Complexity cannot alter, bypass or circumvent determinism. Yes, the activity of a brain is infinitely more complex than the orbit of the moon, but no less determined.

Correct. Every event, including each thought and feeling we experience, is causally necessary from any prior point in time. But the most meaningful and relevant prior causes of our thoughts and feelings are located right here inside us. They are already a part who and what we are. And the choices that they cause are in fact our own choices.

That is true of all organisms. True of species that have no concept of morality or capacity for higher reasoning. It has nothing to do with freedom or will, just enablement through complex neural mechanisms.

Complexity should not be confused with freedom of the will.

Correct. Free will is not complex. It is the simple empirical case where a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

Reliable cause and effect, in itself, is not coercive and certainly not undue. It's an ordinary fact of life. And causal necessity is nothing more than a chain of prior events causing subsequent events. Nothing coercive or undue there either.

Only specific causes, like a guy holding a gun demanding our wallet, are coercive and extraordinary enough to force us to act against our own will.

Again, the stumbling point of compatibilism:
''An action’s production by a deterministic process, even when the agent satisfies the conditions on moral responsibility specified by compatibilists, presents no less of a challenge to basic-desert responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents. ''

Since the compatibilist believes that all actions are equally a product of deterministic processes, nothing changes in regard to responsibility. If one uses the fact of causal necessity to excuse one thing, then it must excuse everything. If it excuses the pickpocket who stole your wallet, then it also excuses the judge who cuts off his hand.

"Responsibility" for a moral or criminal harm is assigned to the most meaningful and relevant cause of the harm. The pickpocket will be arrested for stealing your wallet. The judge will be arrested for inflicting "cruel and unusual punishment".

Causal necessity is never arrested for anything. The waiter in the restaurant gives the bill to the customer, not to causal necessity.

The hard determinist is confused about these matters, and leaves us with no one being held responsible for anything, and no cause that can actually be corrected.

The justice system works through sending the message, if you break this law there are consequences, jail time, fines, etc, consequences that modify behaviour and act as a deterrent. Mostly effective, but there are exceptions:

On the neurology of morals
''Patients with medial prefrontal lesions often display irresponsible behavior, despite being intellectually unimpaired. But similar lesions occurring in early childhood can also prevent the acquisition of factual knowledge about accepted standards of moral behavior.''


Prefrontal Cortex damage:
1 - 'The 20-year-old female subject studied by Damasio et al. was intelligent and academically competent, but she stole from her family and other children, abused other people both verbally and physically, lied frequently, and was sexually promiscuous and completely lacking in empathy toward her illegitimate child. In addition, the researchers say, "She never expressed guilt or remorse for her misbehavior'' ''Both of the subjects performed well on measures of intellectual ability, but, like people with adult-onset prefrontal cortex damage, they were socially impaired, failed to consider future consequences when making decisions, and failed to respond normally to punishment or behavioral interventions. "Unlike adult-onset patients, however," the researchers say, "the two patients had defective social and moral reasoning, suggesting that the acquisition of complex social conventions and moral rules had been impaired." While adult-onset patients possess factual knowledge about social and moral rules (even though they often cannot follow these rules in real life), Damasio et al.'s childhood-onset subjects appeared unable to learn these rules at all. This may explain, the researchers say, why their childhood-onset subjects were much more antisocial, and showed less guilt and remorse, than subjects who suffered similar damage in adulthood.''