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The following is taken from Marvin Edwards' thread, Compatibilism: What's that About? It might help a little more I think it explains quite well the kind of Dennettian compatibilism I subscribe to.

This might help: Daniel Dennett - What is Free Will?

An "Adequate determinism" that isn't fully adequate is not adequate determinism - it's simply indeterminism (random events). I agree with hard determinists that there's no free will (libertarian or otherwise) to be found in random events.

I don't think this is quite correct. Compatibilist free will only requires Adequate Determinism (reliable cause and effect). I don't think anyone seriously denies 'Adequate Determinism' as described in the provided link.

Where are you going with this? Are you suggesting that indeterminism justifies a belief in free will? Compatibilist free will (as exemplified by Marvin Edwards in his thread "Compatibilism: What's that About?") actually requires Adequate Determinism.

I think I know what you're trying to say but what you say here is going to confuse a lot of people (compatibilism is not simply determinism in the literal sense).

I'm devastated. I felt sure you'd be persuaded.

Glad you liked the article. However. I don't think think your interpretation of this paragraph is correct. I'm pretty certain the author (Adam Piovarchy) is not suggesting that we are anything more than "physical beings ruled by our environment".

A good critique of Sapolsky's misguided views on free will: A Stanford professor says science shows free will doesn’t exist. Here’s why he’s mistaken

I think there might be a misunderstanding here. In philosophy, Wiki describes hard determinism as: DBT is a 'hard determinist'.

From the article: I don't think this would satisfy Marvin Edwards', or my, notion of compatibilist free will (Free will is when a person decides for themselves what they will do, while free of coercion and undue influence) and I doubt that it will impress DBT. This looks suspiciously, to me...

My understanding is that the only difference between hard determinism and [soft] determinism is that the former entails a belief that determinism is incompatible with freedom (choice and freewill) whilst the latter entails a belief (for whatever reason) that notions of freedom (choice and free...

:shrug:

I'm afraid it really isn't clear to me. I think you're saying I have got it right. Just to be sure, can you confirm that you do believe it is possible for something to be harmful even though nobody in existence is of the opinion that it is harmful?

I read it but unfortunately it was beyond me. Sorry.:shrug:

Can you answer my question?

It would seem to follow from this that you believe it's possible that even if no one in existence was of the opinion that X were harmful, X could still be harmful. Have I got this right?

You made no such distinction in your reply to me. You implied that all physical injury is immoral regardless of anyone's opinion. Of course there's harm in my opinion. But this doesn't support your claim that there's harm regardless of anyone's opinion.

Physical injures are commonplace in, for example, sports. Most wouldn't view these occurrences as necessarily immoral. I'd have thought that the assessment of what constitutes 'harm' is always subjective. If nobody considered X to be harmful (i.e. if nobody was of the opinion that X was...

When, in your opinion, is it not?