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That's a pretty unfair reading of the results, yadda yadda see what I did there yadda. "Less likely to care about" is not a synonym for "doesn't care about". And the belief in the existence of some inequivalence of moral worth is not the same as the denial of any possible equivalence of moral...

And what organ of the human creature secretes cultures and norms and conceptual schemes? The pancreas? When we are talking about whether or to what extent the truth of some beliefs is contingent on attitudes or conceptual schemes or preferences or cultural norms, we are talking about whether...

Well, then this rather puts paid to the claim that "'independence of mind' is a definition devoid of philosophical implications," doesn't it. Some set of truths being relativized to optional conceptual schemes or historically contingent social norms is, philosophically speaking, a real BFD. In...

As far as I can tell, my best empirical models include the diagnosis of schizophrenia as highly predictive of certain future observations, given past observations, so it is as built in to the fabric of the world as any other bit of ontology at the level of macroscopic description. 1) It is an...

Typical moves by nontheists claiming to present an objective morality are to either present something objective, but which on closer examination is clearly not morality, or something which is normative, but is not objective. E.g. "that which maximizes Darwinian fitness" and "do whatever fulfills...

Check those quantifiers. I do not say that all atheist use of the term is worthy of criticism. There is, however, a particular style of advocating for scare-quotes-moral-realism that is unique to atheists which alternates between irritating and pernicious. <snipping the hermeneutics of my...

The philosophical reasons for rejecting moral realism are nearly as strong as the moral reasons for rejecting atheists' attempts to sell people a defined-down simulacrum of the concept. An empirically adequate world model will contain no value judgments, only ascriptions of value judgments...