Definition of consciousness: 3rd Poll

[Speakpigeon]

Maybe it will be worth having this third poll on the two more successful definitions so far.
EB

 

[Juma]

Borh of the two first options are correct.

 

[ruby sparks]

There is overlap, imo.

The second has more to do with 'self-consciousness' specifically, as I see it. 'Bare' consciousness need not involve something as sophisticated as a model of the world or self.

And in fact doesn't, even for my experience of consciousness, as it varies during any one 24-hour period.

 

[T.G.G. Moogly]

If we're after consciousness, and consciousness is awareness, then what is awareness?

Awareness is the ability to connect. The degree to which that connectedness is expressed determines a level of consciousness.

So I went with the first choice.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Borh of the two first options are correct.

They're not saying exactly the same thing so maybe one is at least slightly better than the other? Can't you decide which is better?

Alternatively, you could perhaps offer a synthesis of the two?
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

There is overlap, imo.

I agree.

'Bare' consciousness need not involve something as sophisticated as a model of the world or self.

I would even say that bare consciousness DOES NOT involve any model of the world or self.

And, I think that the very notion of bare consciousness shows that the question of what may be 'represented', such as a model of the world, is irrelevant to the question of what is consciousness.

So, we're left with the problem of finding a definition for 'bare consciousness'!

Any takers?


Anyway, thanks to you for nudging the question forward!
EB

 

[Subsymbolic]

There is overlap, imo.

I agree.

'Bare' consciousness need not involve something as sophisticated as a model of the world or self.

I would even say that bare consciousness DOES NOT involve any model of the world or self.

And, I think that the very notion of bare consciousness shows that the question of what may be 'represented', such as a model of the world, is irrelevant to the question of what is consciousness.

So, we're left with the problem of finding a definition for 'bare consciousness'!

Any takers?


Anyway, thanks to you for nudging the question forward!
EB

Who, or perhaps what, would actually be aware of 'bare consciousness', and what would they (it?) be aware of? I've done the binding thing already, to little effect, so let's try approaching this from a less technical angle: Berkley's idealist question:

Surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park ... and nobody by to perceive them... The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden ... no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them.

While idealism makes less than no sense in the physical world, in the mental world, I think that there is a serious question to answer, which takes us back to binding. If a pain happens without binding to a sense of self, did the pain happen?

 

[Speakpigeon]

I agree.


I would even say that bare consciousness DOES NOT involve any model of the world or self.

And, I think that the very notion of bare consciousness shows that the question of what may be 'represented', such as a model of the world, is irrelevant to the question of what is consciousness.

So, we're left with the problem of finding a definition for 'bare consciousness'!

Any takers?


Anyway, thanks to you for nudging the question forward!
EB

Who, or perhaps what, would actually be aware of 'bare consciousness', and what would they (it?) be aware of? I've done the binding thing already, to little effect, so let's try approaching this from a less technical angle: Berkley's idealist question:

Surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park ... and nobody by to perceive them... The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden ... no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them.

While idealism makes less than no sense in the physical world, in the mental world, I think that there is a serious question to answer, which takes us back to binding. If a pain happens without binding to a sense of self, did the pain happen?

I think you've just effectively ignored what I said about being conscious without a sense of self. We disagree about what this means because we disagree about what is self. But if you want to understand what I say about consciousness, you'll need to take into account what I mean. Doing differently and insisting that what I say is somehow meaningless is just plain absurd. In effect, it's just you making sure you don't understand.

Enjoy if you can.
EB

 

[Subsymbolic]

I think you've just effectively ignored what I said about being conscious without a sense of self.

Well you tell me what is conscious of what and we are in business.

We disagree about what this means because we disagree about what is self.

How would you know? You don't know what my definition of self is.

But if you want to understand what I say about consciousness, you'll need to take into account what I mean.

I understand what you say well enough, I just disagree.

Doing differently and insisting that what I say is somehow meaningless is just plain absurd.

I'm arguing for a position that is different from yours. I was just pointing out a simple problem with your account. I suggest you have a go at rebutting that; engage with the ideas rather than the person.

In effect, it's just you making sure you don't understand.

Or just disagreeing with an idea that I disagree with, which is almost the same thing.

Enjoy if you can.

I usually do, thanks.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Well you tell me what is conscious of what and we are in business.

I already explained in detail and apparently that's what you've decided to ignore.
EB

 

[Subsymbolic]

Well you tell me what is conscious of what and we are in business.

I already explained in detail and apparently that's what you've decided to ignore.
EB

Splendid, where?

 

[Speakpigeon]

Well you tell me what is conscious of what and we are in business.

I already explained in detail and apparently that's what you've decided to ignore.
EB

Splendid, where?

You read it and then proceeded to forgot about it.

Never mind.
EB

 

[DBT]

I voted option 2. Though there is an overlap and consciousness in its simplest form probably does not include self awareness, consciousness as we experience it does entail self awareness.

 

[Subsymbolic]

Splendid, where?

You read it and then proceeded to forgot about it.

Never mind.
EB

I've politely asked where you think you explained in detail and you are refusing to do so. Perhaps I read it and didn't recognise it for what you think it is.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Splendid, where?

You read it and then proceeded to forgot about it.

Never mind.
EB

I've politely asked where you think you explained in detail and you are refusing to do so. Perhaps I read it and didn't recognise it for what you think it is.

Here it is. Please note it's both my explaining of the point and your reply. So as I said you did read it in due course and then apparently proceeded to forget about it:

So I will disagree with most of the philosophical community. Who are these people again?

And I fail to see how I could possibly be wrong whenever I think that I think. There's no sense of self involved as the "I" here does not point at a self, as would normally be the case. Descartes saying "I think" is really his thought thinking "I think". You're at liberty to dismiss this as vacuous but, personally, I couldn't.

In my example, I couldn't possibly have articulated any elaborate idea on the moment.

Do you not think that a self is an elaborate idea?

And, as I already pointed out, I had no sense of self during the episode. The narrative where I use the "I" came after the event, from memory, once I had woken up. It is also similar to saying "I had a dream". Although the "I" in this case is normally taken to mean the person, it is still the case that the person is only able to attribute the dream to herself on the basis that people take the memories they can recall as being about themselves.

You can see, I'm sure, the story, as you describe it, is not dissimilar to those told by people who have had near death experiences, 'night terror' alien encounters and so on. I'm surprised that you'd want to give a memory of something that occurred in the middle of the night while passed out from pain the same status as everyday mental states.

I just reported my experience as I can recall it. And I happen to think there's no difficulty whatsoever.

More to the point, you really don't seem to be responding to the repeated pointing out of the paradoxical nature of the claims like:

'I had no notion of my own identity'?

Do you not see the problem? Who had no notion of whose identity?

I think I understood your point alright. And I believe I have replied.

At the time, having no notion of self, I could not have thought in terms of "I". However, once I had recovered, I was able to remember what had gone through my mind during the episode. And I usually take the memories I have to be mine. So, I can only see the thing having this minimal thinking process during the episode as being me, even if my memory of this process doesn't feature any self data.

I really don't see an issue here.
EB

Cool, I get that. We disagree, but I don't think there's much milage in carrying on disagreeing. If you don't see a problem with being able to remember what had gone through your mind when you didn't have a sense of self, then I think we are done on that particular problem.


As such, I'll stop trying to pimp a bicameral thesis and have a go at selling my old mate Dan Dennett's theory of consciousness. Apparently this is explaining consciousness away. Fortunately, as an atheist, I think it should be really easy to convince you that his deflationary theory of consciousness explains everything that needs explaining. That will probably be more fun, don't you think?

So why (or how) is The Daniel explaining consciousness away?

I also note you said "we disagree" but without explaining why you disagreed. So, you do have a backlog of work to do before you could try to complain about anything.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

consciousness as we experience it does entail self awareness.

That's certainly true for consciousness as we experience most of the time but it's possible to be conscious without any self-awareness whatsoever.

That's at least my experience.
EB

 

[Subsymbolic]

I've politely asked where you think you explained in detail and you are refusing to do so. Perhaps I read it and didn't recognise it for what you think it is.

Here it is. Please note it's both my explaining of the point and your reply. So as I said you did read it in due course and then apparently proceeded to forget about it:

So I will disagree with most of the philosophical community. Who are these people again?

And I fail to see how I could possibly be wrong whenever I think that I think. There's no sense of self involved as the "I" here does not point at a self, as would normally be the case. Descartes saying "I think" is really his thought thinking "I think". You're at liberty to dismiss this as vacuous but, personally, I couldn't.

In my example, I couldn't possibly have articulated any elaborate idea on the moment.

Do you not think that a self is an elaborate idea?

And, as I already pointed out, I had no sense of self during the episode. The narrative where I use the "I" came after the event, from memory, once I had woken up. It is also similar to saying "I had a dream". Although the "I" in this case is normally taken to mean the person, it is still the case that the person is only able to attribute the dream to herself on the basis that people take the memories they can recall as being about themselves.

You can see, I'm sure, the story, as you describe it, is not dissimilar to those told by people who have had near death experiences, 'night terror' alien encounters and so on. I'm surprised that you'd want to give a memory of something that occurred in the middle of the night while passed out from pain the same status as everyday mental states.

I just reported my experience as I can recall it. And I happen to think there's no difficulty whatsoever.

More to the point, you really don't seem to be responding to the repeated pointing out of the paradoxical nature of the claims like:

'I had no notion of my own identity'?

Do you not see the problem? Who had no notion of whose identity?

I think I understood your point alright. And I believe I have replied.

At the time, having no notion of self, I could not have thought in terms of "I". However, once I had recovered, I was able to remember what had gone through my mind during the episode. And I usually take the memories I have to be mine. So, I can only see the thing having this minimal thinking process during the episode as being me, even if my memory of this process doesn't feature any self data.

I really don't see an issue here.
EB

Cool, I get that. We disagree, but I don't think there's much milage in carrying on disagreeing. If you don't see a problem with being able to remember what had gone through your mind when you didn't have a sense of self, then I think we are done on that particular problem.


As such, I'll stop trying to pimp a bicameral thesis and have a go at selling my old mate Dan Dennett's theory of consciousness. Apparently this is explaining consciousness away. Fortunately, as an atheist, I think it should be really easy to convince you that his deflationary theory of consciousness explains everything that needs explaining. That will probably be more fun, don't you think?

So why (or how) is The Daniel explaining consciousness away?

I also note you said "we disagree" but without explaining why you disagreed. So, you do have a backlog of work to do before you could try to complain about anything.
EB

I had indeed forgotten, but had I not it wouldn't malke any difference. As I said:

If you don't see a problem with being able to remember what had gone through your mind when you didn't have a sense of self, then I think we are done on that particular problem.

As such, when your account relies on you having enough sense of self to remember something happening to you but not enough sense of self to be a self that something happened to, then it's not an account that can be taken terribly seriously and so I was right in my surmise that I didn't recognise your garbled account of a putative mystical experience for serious philosophy. I'm sorry that I didn't make this explanation clear enough for you, but I hope this clears that up.

However, I'm starting to think this all has little to do with philosophy...

 

[Speakpigeon]

I had indeed forgotten, but had I not it wouldn't malke any difference. As I said:

If you don't see a problem with being able to remember what had gone through your mind when you didn't have a sense of self, then I think we are done on that particular problem.

And that you should think you don't need to explain yourself here explains why we're indeed done.

As such, when your account relies on you having enough sense of self to remember something happening to you but not enough sense of self to be a self that something happened to, then it's not an account that can be taken terribly seriously

I take the sense of self as just memorised autobiographical data, for example my name, people I know, who I am in society, what is my personality, what are the things I remember as having happened to me, etc. So, the sense of self as I think of it is something distinct from consciousness. It's essentially memorised data you may or may not remember.

So, I don't think of my sense of self as the something I would need to be conscious.

Or something I would have needed to have on the moment in order to remember the episode afterward.

And again, my attributing the episode to myself is something I did after the event, not during the episode.

So, in the experience I related, I remember having no sense of self in the sense just described. And, clearly, there's no problem in that.

Further, your failure to understand this fairly simple point shows there's no good reason trying to explain it further to you.

and so I was right in my surmise that I didn't recognise your garbled account of a putative mystical experience for serious philosophy. I'm sorry that I didn't make this explanation clear enough for you, but I hope this clears that up.

However, I'm starting to think this all has little to do with philosophy...

My "garbled account of a putative mystical experience"?!

Let's have a really good laugh here!

The reality is, there was nothing garbled, and nothing putative, and nothing mystical in my account. How about that?

How can you get that so entirely wrong? Who would need to talk to you, seriously?

Plus, the same extract shows you're starting to sound nastier by the minute.

So, we're done.
EB

 

[fromderinside]

Although with the additions of all those possible categories you've moved the definition from something one can materially defend - a position I demanded when I wrote the original - to a 'well, if this and this are thus it can be defended', it is still better than the second one.

I see no way of operationalizing sense if self. How does one find operations upon which to fix either a feeling or an perception of one which is really just a hand wave. Don't you see the other images in the mirrors? As far as constructing a self awareness I see an evolution of sense connectivity that can serve as a basis for such, maybe several such, impressions present in the waking and focused brain. For those not psychophysically trained one might look at the neuroscience of abnormalities like  Williams syndrome

 

[Speakpigeon]

Although with the additions of all those possible categories you've moved the definition from something one can materially defend - a position I demanded when I wrote the original - to a 'well, if this and this are thus it can be defended', it is still better than the second one.

I see no way of operationalizing sense if self. How does one find operations upon which to fix either a feeling or an perception of one which is really just a hand wave. Don't you see the other images in the mirrors? As far as constructing a self awareness I see an evolution of sense connectivity that can serve as a basis for such, maybe several such, impressions present in the waking and focused brain. For those not psychophysically trained one might look at the neuroscience of abnormalities like  Williams syndrome

Your proposal received only one vote, out of twelve... And, presumably, it was your own vote and no one else supported your definition.

And again, if we had to abide strictly by the strictures of good science, there's a load of shit we couldn't even have a decent conversation about. This is a place where people seek the warmth of other minds to comfort themselves against the biting cold of winter, not the staging operational centre for invading the world one way or the other.


I'll use this opportunity to congratulate all those still around for... still being around and having made it to the New Year in broadly one working piece. Let's enjoy that while we can in the New Deal of Trump's America.
EB