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It's the moral hazards

I gave a definition of a bubble and didn't have any difficulty coming up with one. A bubble is when asset prices are rising due to money creation or an increase in money velocity that exceeds the real growth in productivity. If you have a problem with that definition then you need to come up with one of your own. But, in any case, you should have not difficulty understanding what I mean when I use the term regardless of what others may or may not mean. I also noted that the difficulty in identifying a bubble is not identifying rising asset prices. That's pretty obvious. The difficulty is in identifying actual growth. Thus, Bernanke was unable to predict the real estate bubble meltdown because he claimed that the rising real estate prices were the result of real economic growth. So may the "vagueness" of the term is a problem for you understanding what others are saying, but it shouldn't be a problem with understanding what I am saying.

The retroactive look is cherry-picking what it wants to call real growth and fake growth. The US housing growth was real until people decided it wasn't only after it stopped growing. Canada, Australia, and China housing growth remains real to this day. These apparent contradictions show the concept is not accurate. I don't know what a "bubble that has no choice but to eventually pop" looks like, but I do know what a "bubble that doesn't pop because it wasn't really a bubble" looks like because we have examples in other countries. The theory for why these exist is pretty simple: NGDP isn't allowed to fall. Australia just keeps growing and growing and growing. Under the view that dominates the idea of the US housing bubble, Australia looks like it should have collapsed already. But it hasn't. It just keeps growing and all that RGDP growth remains RGDP instead of "magically" turning into fake-RGDP when people look back at plummets in RGDP that accompany NGDP plummets

Nobody accurately predicts these kinds of bubbles because they're not real

I never mentioned Zerohedge. Shadowstats is not making their figures up. They are not claiming that they have a better way of calculating inflation. They are simply using a previous government method of calculation. If you're going to compare apples to apples, you need to use the same method. And according to that method, we have been experiencing a level of inflation which, in the mid-1970's, was considered a serious level that needed to be addressed. Now, if Ben Bernanke had used that method he probably would have found that real growth in the economy was a whole lot less, adjusted for inflation, than the official figures that he was using, and then he wouldn't have been misled into believing that the housing prices were being fueled by real growth rather than by inflation, and he could have correctly predicted the housing bubble.

If that was true, why is there no evidence of inflation?

There's nothing secret about any of this. And what, by the way, is a "credible source" all those academics who failed to predict the housing bubble? An if academics are a credible source, then what does that make of the Fed since most of its policies are at odds with what academics recommend?

The Fed is professional and political economics. It operates under the consensus view of the professional world. This isn't strictly academics

Bernanke wasn't the problem. Inflation hawks and bubble hawks on the FOMC were the problem. Go read the September 08 transcripts or whatever was just released. The Fed was scared shitless of inflation despite the fact that they presented zero evidence of inflationary problems, and they created NGDP collapse because of it.
 
wufwugy writes:

The retroactive look is cherry-picking what it wants to call real growth and fake growth. The US housing growth was real until people decided it wasn't only after it stopped growing. Canada, Australia, and China housing growth remains real to this day. These apparent contradictions show the concept is not accurate. I don't know what a "bubble that has no choice but to eventually pop" looks like, but I do know what a "bubble that doesn't pop because it wasn't really a bubble" looks like because we have examples in other countries. The theory for why these exist is pretty simple: NGDP isn't allowed to fall. Australia just keeps growing and growing and growing. Under the view that dominates the idea of the US housing bubble, Australia looks like it should have collapsed already. But it hasn't. It just keeps growing and all that RGDP growth remains RGDP instead of "magically" turning into fake-RGDP when people look back at plummets in RGDP that accompany NGDP plummets
There were plenty of people who claimed that real estate was in a bubble and predicted a collapse. Ron Paul did so as early as 2003. Most of those who predicted the collapse were outside the mainstream, but even a few mainstream economists predicted it. (Nouriel Roubini comes to mind). Yes, most mainstream economists failed to predict it because they weren't looking at the right data. They were operating under a false economic model.

China is certainly in a real estate bubble at the present time. I can't discuss Canada or Australia because I have no data for them. I have no way to evaluate their monetary policies. But China's monetary policies have been quite expansionary, and they are definitely way over-developed in real estate. They have whole cities that are practically vacant because too much luxury housing was built there, but there just aren't enough people who can afford them. That bubble is about to pop.

Nobody accurately predicts these kinds of bubbles because they're not real

Simply not true.

If that was true, why is there no evidence of inflation?

There IS evidence of inflation. If you use the traditional measure, we have robust inflation. The new method understates inflation and it was deliberately created to do so because social security payments are indexed to inflation so they invented this new method to slow the growth in social security expenses. But it is not accurate. The new method incorporates the "substitution effect." This claims that if the price of beef rises, then people can buy pork instead. So we should substitute pork for beef or if pork rose too much too, then we can substitute turkey. Of course, what this means is that both beef and pork could rise in price, but if pork rose to a point that is still below where beef had been, then the CPI would show a decline in meat prices. It's like saying that I'm eating potato soup now because I can no longer afford steak, but since potato soup now costs the same as what steak once did, there is no inflation because, after all, I'm still eating.

Most significantly, the new method is simply too subjective. You can make inflation pretty much whatever you want it to be.

The Fed is professional and political economics. It operates under the consensus view of the professional world. This isn't strictly academics

Put the emphasis on "political." The Fed's policies are basically heresy for professional and academic economists. Few would argue that it was wise to expand the Fed balance sheet to the degree that the Fed has done so, and many raised the question early on, "Where's the exit strategy?" Now that you're doing all these QE's, how do you stop? So now they're trying the "taper." They've reduced QE by $10 billion a month for the last three months, and I guess they've just got their fingers crossed that the stock market, the real estate market, and the housing markets won't plummet in the face of rising interest rates. So far the movement in interest rates has been small, but then again, the taper has been small. But they have to do it because the Fed itself is approaching insolvency which is what the problem with the exit strategy was about to begin with.

The Fed's policies are not mainstream. They have been wildly experimental and the US economy is their laboratory.




Bernanke wasn't the problem. Inflation hawks and bubble hawks on the FOMC were the problem. Go read the September 08 transcripts or whatever was just released. The Fed was scared shitless of inflation despite the fact that they presented zero evidence of inflationary problems, and they created NGDP collapse because of it.

They were scared shitless of inflation because they were creating a trillion dollars and pouring it into the New York banks to bail them out! An economic collapse creates deflation. In a fiat money system, money is created when banks lend. When companies default or go bankrupt, that money disappears. So they were faced with a decline in the money supply. That's why they shouldn't have had any reason to fear inflation, not because of recent history. Recent his WAS inflationary. What do you think a housing bubble is? It's asset price inflation. Not all inflation takes the form of consumer price inflation. So they certainly did have a history of inflation to deal with, but the bursting of the real estate bubble took care of that. But now they wanted to do something about it so they created money to replace the money lost to bankruptcies. However, they were going far beyond that. They were also shoring up the banks to keep them liquid due to all those derivatives that hadn't yet gone bust but were worthless. This was the real bail-out, not TARP.

So they certainly had good reasons to fear inflation because they didn't want to let the banks fail, and yet the alternative was to print a lot of money. However, Bernanke came up with the tactic of paying interest on excess reserves and this, combined with the banks' own desire to have plenty of cash available because of their weak balance sheets, led to the banks keeping much of that money in excess reserves. Excess reserves are currently in the $1.5 to $2 trillion dollar range. Normally excess reserves are negligible. But that hasn't stopped inflation altogether. We've actually had about 7% inflation using the historical measurement, and much of our inflation today is exported because of our big balance of trade deficit, and the fact that the dollar is the world's reserve currency. And we've also got asset price inflation in the bond market and real estate and probably in the stock market as well. So there's lots of inflation out there, but not nearly as much as there would be if the banks lent out their excess reserves.
 
It seems my role on this board (the other board, duh) is to say something about economics that you guys hate then get pounced on and eventually retreat because I'm not looking for a big argument.

The board has no shortage of smart people, but it does have a shortage of certain perspectives and information. I know few agree with that -- I didn't until after I wandered elsewhere. Regardless, my goal is not to present an argument and successfully defend it (I couldn't, because I'm not an expert), but to occasionally make a point that doesn't get made and hope that others will tuck it away or investigate. The latest is countering the mainstream view that the housing crisis was a result of greed. I use to believe that argument through and through, but over time am seeing that it doesn't stand up well to the data and doesn't make much sense. Anyways, here's a good source that details the moral hazard role in creating the crisis

http://www.businessinsider.com/the-cra-debate-a-users-guide-2009-6

If you think the perspective is wrong, cool. I don't have near the level of expertise to argue with some of you, but there is absolutely a chunk of people with much higher expertise than anybody here who completely disagree with the mainstream view, and I just want to make sure that perspective gets its play

Economics is the most important issue. It is the only one that inserts its self into nearly every discussion. I don't think that you have anything to apologize for. Economics is presented as being extremely complex and it is bound tightly to our politics. If I met myself from say 15 years ago I would not agree with myself on anything economic.

And like all specialists economists have evolved a language of their own that has the effect of excluding others. It is frustrating to deal with even if you can understand econospeak. But finally the concepts behind it are pretty easy to understand, disarmingly so in some cases.

It is important for everybody to understand economics. it is the most important thing that our government does. It has the greatest impact on our lives.

The economy is so important that the very study of it has been influenced by politics and the so-called moneyed interests. The research that pleases these interests are the ones that attract more money for research. Some wag said that this means that currently in the US we study and teach the range of economic theory from "M" to "N."

And there are two hard and fast rules that you must follow to stay inside this narrow range where the money is.

  1. You must support the idea that there is a 100% natural free market that self-regulates and self-organizes.
  2. That all of the market failures are due to government interference in the operation of the market.

This explanation of the supposed role of the CRA is nothing but a nod to number 2. There are some alternatives to this argument, that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were responsible. Or that the Fed was. I even saw one that blamed FEMA which I can only blame on acronym overload, confusing FEMA for one of the mortgage purchasing GSE's.

But it wasn't caused by any of these. It was the old weakness of the financial markets, speculation that was the cause of the housing bubble, the role of the mortgage based securities, MBS's, and the failure of the government agencies, the appointed heads of which were all members in good standing of the free market cult, to reign in the bad behavior.

Deregulation, the explosive growth of shadow banking, the short term vision of banking executives concentrating only on their next bonuses and lax lending standards by mortgage brokers who had no risk after they sold the mortgages off to the investment houses who thought that they would gain more if the mortgagees defaulted. The American mortgage market made over in the predatory lending model.

Yes, the Fed helped by lowering interest rates and keeping them too low for too long. But this has happened before without causing the massive financial crisis that we had in the fall of 2008. And we have had housing bubbles before that popped without causing the kind of crisis that we saw in 2008.

What was different in this instance were the MBS's. They weren't designed to attract borrowed money, they were designed to attract some of the trillions of dollars of excess capital that we have built up over the last thirty years. Capital far in excess of what we could ever possibly use in the real economy. The excess capital that had built a couple of stock market bubbles, most recently the NASDAQ internet bubble.

The MBS's were what fueled the housing bubble. It was the money that was invested in them that was loaned out to the home owners, not money from the Fed. The Fed raised interest rates to 6.5% without causing even a small blip in the rise of home prices.

The MBS's were divided up into different categories, trances, dependent on the supposed risk of the loans in each trance. Needless to say the trances with the highest risk paid the highest return and were the most popular with the investors. Why not, despite the fact that the riskiest loans were in them the rating agencies, Moody's etc., rated them as low risk. Everyone knows that housing prices never go down.

It was the demand for these high return, high risk trances that provided the push to not only write the high risk loans but to pump up the value of those loans, not the CRA, not the GSEs and not the Fed.

The banks used their newly gained right to invest to use FDIC guaranteed deposits to buy MBS's. Both the SEC and the Fed had sufficient legal authority to stop the banks from investing in the MBS's. The SEC could have stopped the sales of the MBS's. Either could have stopped the non-conforming loans from being included in the mix of the MBS's. Neither acted because they believed the financial markets would self-regulate.

You have to think. Ireland, Iceland and Spain all had relatively larger housing bubbles than the US. Did they have their own versions of the CRA? Were their governments forcing the banks to write risky loans too? What those countries did have in common with the US was deregulation, explosive growth of shadow banking and lax lending standards. They had the same disease that the US and the UK had, an Anglo American dedication to faith in the never before seen, self-regulating free market. The largely imaginary free market.

Here is the best CRA debunking web site that I have seen. The last time I was there a search for "CRA" produced ~360 hits. If you think that you have solid arguments that the CRA caused the financial crisis of 2008 the owner of the site is willing to match your bet up to $100,000 that you don't.

http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/06/cra-thought-experiment/

.
 
It seems my role on this board (the other board, duh) is to say something about economics that you guys hate then get pounced on and eventually retreat because I'm not looking for a big argument. The board has no shortage of smart people, but it does have a shortage of certain perspectives and information. I know few agree with that -- I didn't until after I wandered elsewhere. Regardless, my goal is not to present an argument and successfully defend it (I couldn't, because I'm not an expert), but to occasionally make a point that doesn't get made and hope that others will tuck it away or investigate. The latest is countering the mainstream view that the housing crisis was a result of greed. I use to believe that argument through and through, but over time am seeing that it doesn't stand up well to the data and doesn't make much sense. Anyways, here's a good source that details the moral hazard role in creating the crisis

http://www.businessinsider.com/the-cra-debate-a-users-guide-2009-6

If you think the perspective is wrong, cool. I don't have near the level of expertise to argue with some of you, but there is absolutely a chunk of people with much higher expertise than anybody here who completely disagree with the mainstream view, and I just want to make sure that perspective gets its play
The idea that regulation alters incentives isn't particularly abstruse or unpopular. But, as others point out, it's hard to tell exactly what incentives the linked article means re the CRA thing.
 
The idea that regulation alters incentives isn't particularly abstruse or unpopular. But, as others point out, it's hard to tell exactly what incentives the linked article means re the CRA thing.

The only incentive in capitalism is money, profits and wages.

Of course, regulations alter incentives. That is their purpose. The CRA required that a bank that accepted deposits from low income areas would write loans equal to or greater than 50% of the amount of deposits that they accepted from low income areas in those low income areas. That is it. To put it the other way around, banks that accepted deposits from the poor could only take at most one half of those deposits and loan it to the non-poor, the middle class in suburban areas or to corporations, for example.

The reason that the regulation was written didn't have anything to do with racism. As I said most of the banks here in Atlanta that were affected by it were minority owned banks. It costs the banks the same amount of money to write and handle a $25,000 mortgage as it does to write and handle a $250,000 mortgage. So the bank has to write ten mortgages at ten times the handling costs of the lower amount loans. This means that they have a financial incentive to write the larger loans. By definition the low income areas that they got the deposits from will be the areas where the home values are the lowest and therefore the mortgages would be lower. As a result, even minority owned banks would move their low income area generated deposits to the areas where the home values were higher

The CRA didn't require the banks to loan any deposits that they had from other areas in the low income areas. The CRA expressly forbid the banks from lowering their lending standards to make the loans in the low income areas.

And what were the draconian penalties for not following the requirements of the CRA? If the banks didn't loan at least half of the poor's money back to the poor any application that the banks made to expand could take the failure to follow the CRA into account. From 1977 when the CRA went into affect and 2009 some 13,000 applications to expand were submitted by banks, of this number only 8 of them were held up because of failure to meet the provisions of the CRA. This was the iron fist of regulation that had the banks scared of the CRA.
 
And CRA did not apply to other mortgage lenders who were the prime culprits in "junk mortgages".
 
The only incentive in capitalism is money, profits and wages.

Of course, regulations alter incentives. That is their purpose. The CRA required that a bank that accepted deposits from low income areas would write loans equal to or greater than 50% of the amount of deposits that they accepted from low income areas in those low income areas. That is it. To put it the other way around, banks that accepted deposits from the poor could only take at most one half of those deposits and loan it to the non-poor, the middle class in suburban areas or to corporations, for example.

Agreed. On the surface, fine.

The reason that the regulation was written didn't have anything to do with racism. As I said most of the banks here in Atlanta that were affected by it were minority owned banks. It costs the banks the same amount of money to write and handle a $25,000 mortgage as it does to write and handle a $250,000 mortgage. So the bank has to write ten mortgages at ten times the handling costs of the lower amount loans. This means that they have a financial incentive to write the larger loans. By definition the low income areas that they got the deposits from will be the areas where the home values are the lowest and therefore the mortgages would be lower. As a result, even minority owned banks would move their low income area generated deposits to the areas where the home values were higher

Except that's why they charge loan origination fees.

The CRA didn't require the banks to loan any deposits that they had from other areas in the low income areas. The CRA expressly forbid the banks from lowering their lending standards to make the loans in the low income areas.

Except this is a catch-22. They have to lend the money to poor people whether or not there are qualified borrowers. The reality is there weren't. The government even lowered their standards for FHA mortgages to get more loans to those poor people.

Given that situation what would you expect the banks to do--lower their standards to what the Feds said was fine, pull out of the poor areas entirely (which would have gotten them crucified by Congress) or taken the CRA penalty (which would have gotten them crucified in the stock market.)

- - - Updated - - -

And CRA did not apply to other mortgage lenders who were the prime culprits in "junk mortgages".

Yeah, which is why I said it was the spark, not the whole cause. The attempts to get mortgages for poor people caused lowered standards. The scum then climbed on the bandwagon and ran it off the road.
 
wufwugy writes:


There were plenty of people who claimed that real estate was in a bubble and predicted a collapse. Ron Paul did so as early as 2003. Most of those who predicted the collapse were outside the mainstream, but even a few mainstream economists predicted it. (Nouriel Roubini comes to mind). Yes, most mainstream economists failed to predict it because they weren't looking at the right data. They were operating under a false economic model.

China is certainly in a real estate bubble at the present time. I can't discuss Canada or Australia because I have no data for them. I have no way to evaluate their monetary policies. But China's monetary policies have been quite expansionary, and they are definitely way over-developed in real estate. They have whole cities that are practically vacant because too much luxury housing was built there, but there just aren't enough people who can afford them. That bubble is about to pop.



Simply not true.



There IS evidence of inflation. If you use the traditional measure, we have robust inflation. The new method understates inflation and it was deliberately created to do so because social security payments are indexed to inflation so they invented this new method to slow the growth in social security expenses. But it is not accurate. The new method incorporates the "substitution effect." This claims that if the price of beef rises, then people can buy pork instead. So we should substitute pork for beef or if pork rose too much too, then we can substitute turkey. Of course, what this means is that both beef and pork could rise in price, but if pork rose to a point that is still below where beef had been, then the CPI would show a decline in meat prices. It's like saying that I'm eating potato soup now because I can no longer afford steak, but since potato soup now costs the same as what steak once did, there is no inflation because, after all, I'm still eating.

Most significantly, the new method is simply too subjective. You can make inflation pretty much whatever you want it to be.



Put the emphasis on "political." The Fed's policies are basically heresy for professional and academic economists. Few would argue that it was wise to expand the Fed balance sheet to the degree that the Fed has done so, and many raised the question early on, "Where's the exit strategy?" Now that you're doing all these QE's, how do you stop? So now they're trying the "taper." They've reduced QE by $10 billion a month for the last three months, and I guess they've just got their fingers crossed that the stock market, the real estate market, and the housing markets won't plummet in the face of rising interest rates. So far the movement in interest rates has been small, but then again, the taper has been small. But they have to do it because the Fed itself is approaching insolvency which is what the problem with the exit strategy was about to begin with.

The Fed's policies are not mainstream. They have been wildly experimental and the US economy is their laboratory.






They were scared shitless of inflation because they were creating a trillion dollars and pouring it into the New York banks to bail them out! An economic collapse creates deflation. In a fiat money system, money is created when banks lend. When companies default or go bankrupt, that money disappears. So they were faced with a decline in the money supply. That's why they shouldn't have had any reason to fear inflation, not because of recent history. Recent his WAS inflationary. What do you think a housing bubble is? It's asset price inflation. Not all inflation takes the form of consumer price inflation. So they certainly did have a history of inflation to deal with, but the bursting of the real estate bubble took care of that. But now they wanted to do something about it so they created money to replace the money lost to bankruptcies. However, they were going far beyond that. They were also shoring up the banks to keep them liquid due to all those derivatives that hadn't yet gone bust but were worthless. This was the real bail-out, not TARP.

So they certainly had good reasons to fear inflation because they didn't want to let the banks fail, and yet the alternative was to print a lot of money. However, Bernanke came up with the tactic of paying interest on excess reserves and this, combined with the banks' own desire to have plenty of cash available because of their weak balance sheets, led to the banks keeping much of that money in excess reserves. Excess reserves are currently in the $1.5 to $2 trillion dollar range. Normally excess reserves are negligible. But that hasn't stopped inflation altogether. We've actually had about 7% inflation using the historical measurement, and much of our inflation today is exported because of our big balance of trade deficit, and the fact that the dollar is the world's reserve currency. And we've also got asset price inflation in the bond market and real estate and probably in the stock market as well. So there's lots of inflation out there, but not nearly as much as there would be if the banks lent out their excess reserves.

Delusion. Only an Austrian could be so intentionally obtuse to the realities of economy and the banking system to write such stuff.

To just hit the low points,

Before the crisis of 2008 nearly 60% of the money in circulation was created by the so-called shadow banking system, Wall Street, out of any control of the Fed. This was essentially the wet dream of Austrian economics, free banking*. Wall Street had no reserve requirements, no capital requirements and with the quality of money that they produced little limits on the interest rates that they charged since they weren't dependent on borrowing reserves from the Fed at the Fed's fund rate. The vast majority of the money that the Fed produced after the crash was to replace this money which dried up over night as a source when no one knew how far the rot went in this exercise in free banking.

* I understand that only half of the Austrians favor free banking. The other half support highly restrictive banking with 100% reserves. The failure to resolve this difference is just another failure of Austrian economics and their methods and a useful measure of how far they are from any contact with reality. In my experience Austrian/Libertarians drift between the two extolling the virtues of each without acknowledging or even seemingly understanding the difference.

There are many different measurements of inflation because, surprise, inflation affects different parts of the economy differently. It is possible for some parts of the economy to be facing inflation while others are seeing deflation.

I understand that the primary attraction of Austrian economics is its simplistic nature. And to preserve its simple nature they had to come up with a simple definition of inflation as the increase in the money supply, period. I am assuming that is what you are referring to as the traditional method of measuring inflation? Simple but wrong.

Fun fact, do you know that the entire Austrian idea of inflation and money, the holy gold standard, is based entirely on the misunderstanding that money, in a fiat money system, that once it is created, can't be destroyed? This alone is enough to allow anyone to dismiss Austrian/Libertarian economics as a reasonable explanation of how our economy works.

No, it is not possible to just arbitrary define inflation as anything that you want. Inflation is a difference from year to year. It is not based on absolute prices, or numbers like your favorite, the money supply. No matter what prices you base your inflation index on you are going to measure the change in the prices over some time period. You will have no control over the prices, they will represent inflation or deflation of the underlying prices. For example, the S&P 500 is a dead accurate measurement of the inflation or deflation in the prices of those 500 stocks and a pretty good measurement of inflation or deflation in the stock market in general. It is not usually expressed as such because the according to the rules of the free market cult, which you Austrians are charter members, inflation is bad, but inflation in stock prices is good. I know that it doesn't make any sense, but they are not my rules.

The question that has to be asked of any inflation index is does it truly represent the segment of the market that it is suppose to represent. Does the core index, the consumer's price index or the capital goods index truly represent the inflation or deflation that they are suppose to represent?

Once again the truth is surprising. It doesn't much matter what consumer prices there are in the CPI, the consumers' price index as long as the prices are consumer's prices. This is because of what I said above. The index is measuring the change in prices over a time period. As long as consumer's prices go up more or less the same amount the index, like the S&P 500, is pretty accurate of the whole market.

The only time that I am aware of that political forces interfered with the CPI was the Brokin (sp?) commission, when the commission made up of conservatives that were on the public record as believing that the CPI overstated consumers' price inflation by at least 1% called only witnesses who were on the public record as believing that the CPI overstated consumers' price inflation by at least 1% and came to the conclusion that the CPI overstated consumers' price inflation by, surprise, 1.1%. They then ordered that the CPI was to be deflated by 1.1% in the future. This had the effect of lowering Social Security outlays, not raising them as you say.

Because of the phenomenon above they were not able to construct a consumers price index that supported their belief that the CPI overstated the year to year increase in prices. They made a point, for example, of saying that consumers could save money by shopping at discount stores which is true and is largely irrelevant to anyone who understands how an inflation index works, which you do now. I will leave to you to figure out exactly why they failed. Feel free to ask for help if you need it.

So the commission did what conservatives always do, they imposed their faith on reality.

The remainder of your post is of the same low quality. Again. We don't seem to be making any progress.

Further points that you have wrong.

The reserves that the Fed produced are in deposits in the Fed's reserve accounts of the member banks. It is still the Fed's money that they can withdraw at any time. Like the deposits you have in your bank they are liabilities for the banks, not assets. They don't balance the banks' books. The government balanced the banks books by buying the problem loans from them freeing their bank capital on their balance sheet.

No, when someone defaults on a loan the money that was created by the loan doesn't disappear. The money created by a loan disappears when the loan is paid off. This is the fundamental misunderstanding of what money is and how it is created and how it is destroyed that separates Austrians and Libertarians from reality. Or more properly, one of the many things that separates all of you from reality.

There are two types of money in the economy, base money created by the Fed and the government when it deficit spends and bank money created by private loans, made by banks. The economy needs both. There are different advantages to each one, bank money expands and contracts based on the demand for money in the economy. But it is formed by debt and there is a cost to it, the interest paid. Because of the interest, the pound of flesh, the amount of money that is destroyed when the loan is paid back is greater than the money that was created by the loan. Base money doesn't have this problem. It doesn't come with debt, except for the government debt that they have no intention of ever paying off, which is good for there is no practical way for the government to pay it off. Base money is permanent money.

Defaults on loans converts bank money into base money. Since it will never be paid back it will never be destroyed. This is why in the past civilizations had times when the King forgave all of the debts in the country. They didn't know how it worked but they knew that the economy improved for a long time until debts built up again. They were converting bank money, temporary money, into base money, permanent money.

A healthy economy much needs the following amount of base money every year to prevent the build up of private debt. The population growth + the nominal economic growth + the money that is paid in interest - the trade balance (minus any surplus, minus minus, or plus any trade deficit) - any defaults on loans. Surprisingly in a good economy the interest income on loans is somewhat greater than the default rate but close enough to it that those two terms are usually ignored. The trade balance should be obvious. If you have a trade surplus like Germany and China someone else is helping you by pumping money into your economy. If you have a trade deficit you have money leaving your economy to help another group of countries. The growth in population is actually the growth in the working age population.

You are again falling into the trap of trying to apply morality to economics. Debt is bad. Defaulting on loans is bad. Inflation is bad. Investing is good. Savings is good. All of these are what they are when they occur. Depending on the situation they can help the economy or hurt it. There are no absolutes. In the overall economy everything is a balance. One man's debt is another's asset. As I have pointed out the budget deficit is the increase in private savings to the penny, after accounting for the trade balance, a deficit in our case. So is it bad because it is a debt or is it good because it is savings? Do you see the limitations of applying moral judgements?

I will stop here because this getting so long. Unfortunately the economy is much more complex than the simple one that is explained by Austrian/Libertarian economics. And it continues to become more complex and further from the simplistic one of your economics.

I have never gotten an answer to my simple question, the economy described by Mises etc., is it suppose to be the economy that we have now or is it the economy of their imagination, the economy that they wish that we had?
 
SimpleDon writes:

Delusion. Only an Austrian could be so intentionally obtuse to the realities of economy and the banking system to write such stuff.

I have stated before that I am not committed to Austrian economics. I have very significant disagreements with some of the things that they claim. I do, however, tend to agree with classical economic analysis over modern economic schools, particularly the neo-Keynesians.



Before the crisis of 2008 nearly 60% of the money in circulation was created by the so-called shadow banking system, Wall Street, out of any control of the Fed. This was essentially the wet dream of Austrian economics, free banking*. Wall Street had no reserve requirements, no capital requirements and with the quality of money that they produced little limits on the interest rates that they charged since they weren't dependent on borrowing reserves from the Fed at the Fed's fund rate. The vast majority of the money that the Fed produced after the crash was to replace this money which dried up over night as a source when no one knew how far the rot went in this exercise in free banking.

I'm afraid that until you are prepared to show that this "shadow banking system" actually exists and how it succeeds in creating money at will, that I can make little sense of your claims. Generalities will not do. Say what you are referring to specifically. I suspect you are talking about derivatives, especially mortgage backed securities. But derivatives were just fine until the value of their underlying mortgages collapsed. So how did these derivatives serve as some kind of "shadow money?" They are simply bundles of mortgages. How is the fact that they were securitized relevant to the collapse of their value?


* I understand that only half of the Austrians favor free banking. The other half support highly restrictive banking with 100% reserves. The failure to resolve this difference is just another failure of Austrian economics and their methods and a useful measure of how far they are from any contact with reality. In my experience Austrian/Libertarians drift between the two extolling the virtues of each without acknowledging or even seemingly understanding the difference.

The problem is you've got it wrong. I'm not aware of any libertarians who oppose free banking. Some Austrians, notably Murray Rothbard, argued that in a totally free banking system, the those banks which practiced fractional reserve lending would lose out in the competition to banks that did not. But Rothbard, of all people, certainly never favored any legal restraints on fractional reserve lending. Personally, I'm not convinced of Rothbard's view. With free banking, it seems to me to be perfectly reasonable to expect that banks lending on a fractional reserve would be quite competitive. They might have to have a reserve of 50% or even more, but it seems likely to me that there would be a point where the profit from fractional reserve lending far outweighed the risk.

I personally do not favor free banking. I think it is likely that some regulation of the banking industry is beneficial. However, I do not think that the government should regulate interest rates. Those should be set by the market.


Fun fact, do you know that the entire Austrian idea of inflation and money, the holy gold standard, is based entirely on the misunderstanding that money, in a fiat money system, that once it is created, can't be destroyed? This alone is enough to allow anyone to dismiss Austrian/Libertarian economics as a reasonable explanation of how our economy works.

No. I did not know this, and I suspect that the reason I didn't know this is that it isn't true. Just what Austrian economist said that fiat money, once created couldn't be destroyed? It makes no sense at all within the Austrian model. Nor does it make any sense in any other model that I can think of. What about hyper-inflation? Doesn't that destroy fiat money? It brings its value down to zero!


No, it is not possible to just arbitrary define inflation as anything that you want. Inflation is a difference from year to year. It is not based on absolute prices, or numbers like your favorite, the money supply. No matter what prices you base your inflation index on you are going to measure the change in the prices over some time period. You will have no control over the prices, they will represent inflation or deflation of the underlying prices. For example, the S&P 500 is a dead accurate measurement of the inflation or deflation in the prices of those 500 stocks and a pretty good measurement of inflation or deflation in the stock market in general.

That's exactly true as long as you don't resort to the substitution method. But if you that X company rose by $10 a share on the S&P 500, but it didn't really go up that much in price because you could have bought a similar stock on the Dow Jones Index for the $5 a share less, then you simply have a non-sensical comparison. But that's what they currently do with the CPI.

The question that has to be asked of any inflation index is does it truly represent the segment of the market that it is suppose to represent. Does the core index, the consumer's price index or the capital goods index
truly represent the inflation or deflation that they are suppose to represent?

Once again the truth is surprising. It doesn't much matter what consumer prices there are in the CPI, the consumers' price index as long as the prices are consumer's prices. This is because of what I said above. The index is measuring the change in prices over a time period. As long as consumer's prices go up more or less the same amount the index, like the S&P 500, is pretty accurate of the whole market.

I explained how the new index works. Go back and read it, and I think you will see that what you have said here is probably irrelevant although I can't say for sure because I'm not quite sure what you are trying to say in the above quotation.


The only time that I am aware of that political forces interfered with the CPI was the Brokin (sp?) commission, when the commission made up of conservatives that were on the public record as believing that the CPI overstated consumers' price inflation by at least 1% called only witnesses who were on the public record as believing that the CPI overstated consumers' price inflation by at least 1% and came to the conclusion that the CPI overstated consumers' price inflation by, surprise, 1.1%. They then ordered that the CPI was to be deflated by 1.1% in the future. This had the effect of lowering Social Security outlays, not raising them as you say.

I'm not aware of this commission, but if they had done that, at least it would have been an honest way of going about it. As I recall, it was Daniel Moynihan, hardly a conservative, who wanted to reduce the index for social security to 50% of the CPI in order to reduce ss outlays (I don't recall claiming it would increase them. Where did I say that?) This was because he felt that the CPI didn't accurately reflect price increases for seniors. For example, in the '90's about half the CPI consisted of increases in the price of health care, but most of those increases were born by medicare and Medicaid rather than my senior citizens themselves. Again, this would have been a honest way of going about it.

Clinton wanted adjust the CPI, but Congress wouldn't go along so he changed it by executive order.

But all of this is irrelevant. What I stated and continue to state is that if inflation were calculated using the methods that were in use in the '70's that the current inflation rate would be in the middle to high single digits. I do not have a subscription to shadow stats so I do not know their exact figures, I only go by what I have heard referenced on other sites. But certainly, in the middle seventies, inflation was a significant campaign issue, and it was in the middle to high single digits. No amount of obfuscation can change this very simple fact. Our current levels of inflation are about half of what they were in the Carter years when it became not only significant, but very critical.

(Omitted due to lack of relevance as well as not entirely comprehensible).

The reserves that the Fed produced are in deposits in the Fed's reserve accounts of the member banks. It is still the Fed's money that they can withdraw at any time.

What! Where did you get that idea? Yes the Fed can withdraw the reserves from the banks if they want to return the assets that they bought with them.

Like the deposits you have in your bank they are liabilities for the banks, not assets.

If they are liabilities for the banks, what are the banks corresponding assets?

They don't balance the banks' books. The government balanced the banks books by buying the problem loans from them freeing their bank capital on their balance sheet.

Yes, the Fed bought, and is still buying, MBS's from the banks and taking them over at book value which means they will not be on the banks' book at (the much lower) market value if and when they dare to re-instate the "mark to market" rule. But what did the Fed give them in exchange? The credited their reserve account! So what you're telling me is that the Fed took over assets from the banks and replaced them with liabilities! I don't know how that would help the banks to balance their books.


No, when someone defaults on a loan the money that was created by the loan doesn't disappear. The money created by a loan disappears when the loan is paid off. This is the fundamental misunderstanding of what money is and how it is created and how it is destroyed that separates Austrians and Libertarians from reality. Or more properly, one of the many things that separates all of you from reality.

This has nothing to do with Austrianism or Libertarianism. It is accounting. Yes, in the case of a default, the money isn't immediately written off. After all, it might still be collected and sometimes at least part of it is. In a bankruptcy the entire amount usually isn't written off as the creditors are usually able to recover something even if it is only pennies on the dollar. But when the rest of the loan is written off, whether due to being paid off OR due to it being no longer collectable, the money disappears.

There are two types of money in the economy, base money created by the Fed and the government when it deficit spends and bank money created by private loans, made by banks.

What the hell are you talking about? Deficit spending does not create money unless the Fed buys the Treasury bonds. If China buys a hundred billion dollars of US Treasuries, no money is created. China simply returns some of the dollars it earned in trade with the US back to us and gets paid interest in return. The same thing happens if you buy a Treasury security. The government buys the money from the private market. Even if the Fed bought Treasury securities using money that it already had on hand, no money is created. But if the Fed buys Treasury bonds from the Treasury and creates the money to pay for them which the Treasury then uses to pay bills, new money is created. This would be quite directly inflationary. It would be the equivalent of the Fed simply printing money. I don't believe the Fed has yet engaged in such a practice, at least not on a very large scale.

The economy needs both. There are different advantages to each one, bank money expands and contracts based on the demand for money in the economy.

That would be true if you didn't have a Fed intervening.

But it is formed by debt and there is a cost to it, the interest paid. Because of the interest, the pound of flesh, the amount of money that is destroyed when the loan is paid back is greater than the money that was created by the loan.

What! Having you been reading social credit theory? That's one of the pieces of nonsense that they have been promulgating and is one of the reasons they're considered a crack-pot theory.

When the loan is paid off, the principle of the loan is written off. The interest doesn't get written off. When money is created, it is available to pay bills, and the same money is then available to someone else to pay bills, this include interest payments. The money circulates and never disappears until it is used to pay off a loan or the creditor has to write it off as a bad debt. Again, this isn't economics. This is accounting.

Base money doesn't have this problem. It doesn't come with debt, except for the government debt that they have no intention of ever paying off, which is good for there is no practical way for the government to pay it off. Base money is permanent money.

Base money doesn't come with debt because base money doesn't exist. Where did you get this idea? It's been a long time since I read Samuelson, but I don't think he said anything like this.

Defaults on loans converts bank money into base money. Since it will never be paid back it will never be destroyed. This is why in the past civilizations had times when the King forgave all of the debts in the country. They didn't know how it worked but they knew that the economy improved for a long time until debts built up again. They were converting bank money, temporary money, into base money, permanent money
.

It had nothing to do with non-existent "base money." The 49-year "Jubilee" worked because when people were freed of debts they now had money to spend and to invest. That's why bankruptcies and defaults work well for us too. That's why Andrew Mellon advised Hoover to "liquidate." Let the bankruptcies do their work. Let the debtors go under and be debt free and let the creditors take the hit and start over. It's painful for a short time as now the economy has to re-organize and re-structure, but don't prevent that from occurring. But Hoover had other ideas. He ignored Mellon and interfered with the process, thereby prolonging the depression.

A healthy economy much needs the following amount of base money every year to prevent the build up of private debt. The population growth + the nominal economic growth + the money that is paid in interest - the trade balance (minus any surplus, minus minus, or plus any trade deficit) - any defaults on loans. Surprisingly in a good economy the interest income on loans is somewhat greater than the default rate but close enough to it that those two terms are usually ignored. The trade balance should be obvious. If you have a trade surplus like Germany and China someone else is helping you by pumping money into your economy. If you have a trade deficit you have money leaving your economy to help another group of countries. The growth in population is actually the growth in the working age population.

I can make no sense of this. But why should I since base money simply doesn't exist.

You are again falling into the trap of trying to apply morality to economics. Debt is bad. Defaulting on loans is bad. Inflation is bad. Investing is good. Savings is good. All of these are what they are when they occur. Depending on the situation they can help the economy or hurt it. There are no absolutes.

Where do you get such ideas? Certainly this doesn't sum up Austrian economics or any other economics as far as I can see. Certainly, I don't see any advantages to a policy of inflation, but it is something that will occur naturally at times. Rents in North Dakota right now are really high. That's because there's a big demand for housing because a lot of people are moving into North Dakota because a lot of money is also moving there. So if you want housing to be built quickly, the high rents will promote that. As for the others, they are all good in the proper situation. Of course, they aren't always good for each and every individual, but they are good for the economy as a whole. And that certainly includes defaulting on a debt.

In the overall economy everything is a balance. One man's debt is another's asset. As I have pointed out the budget deficit is the increase in private savings to the penny, after accounting for the trade balance, a deficit in our case. So is it bad because it is a debt or is it good because it is savings? Do you see the limitations of applying moral judgements?

How do you conclude that the budget deficit is the increase in private savings "to the penny?" Are you suggesting that if we balanced the budget private savings would cease to exist? Or that it would dissipate into a trade deficit? Is in impossible to have both a trade surplus and a balanced budget? It don't think it's happened since the Eisenhower administration, but certainly it's possible.

I will stop here because this getting so long. Unfortunately the economy is much more complex than the simple one that is explained by Austrian/Libertarian economics. And it continues to become more complex and further from the simplistic one of your economics
.

Whatever the economy is, it certainly isn't as complex as you've tried to make it. As far as I can see, you don't understand money and banking at all, and your accounting is pretty weak too.

A quick course in money and banking: When a bank, operating under a fractional reserve system, takes in a deposit, it lends a fraction of that deposit out and keeps a fraction in reserve. (Before the Fed that reserve was typically about 30%. Now it is typically about 8%). Let's assume a fractional reserve of 10%. A man deposits $1000. The banks lends out $900 and keeps $100 in reserve. No money is created. But now the borrower deposits his $900 in another bank. So that bank has a $900 and can lend out $810. So now we see that the original loan has created money and this could go on until the original $1000 deposit could theoretically lead to as much as $10,000. So no bank creates money when it lends, but banking system as whole does. This is all explained in Samuelson so we're not talking "Austrian" theory here. But it isn't particularly Keynesian either. It's simply the way the system works.

However, the original $1000 deposit came from someone who saved it. It represented real productivity. Likewise the security behind the loan, let's say it was a mortgage, represents a real asset. And the interest rates reflect the supply and demand for money which is not unlimited but is constrained by the reserve requirement.

But now suppose the Fed decides to intervene. They decide to purchase assets from the bank. They can be any assets but typically they are US Treasury bonds which the banks have bought from the Treasury Department. So the Fed buys a $100 asset from the bank. But the Fed doesn't pay for it. Instead, it says that the bank now has an additional $100 on reserve at the Fed. So now the bank can lend out $900 against that $100 reserve. So now you have a thousand dollars of new money that doesn't represent any real productivity. And that thousand dollars call also multiply to as much as $10,000 in circulation. But there has been no real productivity behind any of it. And if the Fed bought a Treasury bond, then you have no real asset backing it up. Instead you've got debt backing up the money supply increase.

All of this is simple money and banking. It has nothing to do with Austrians or Keynesians or Supply-siders or what not. But until you've grasped at least this much. You shouldn't be talking about money and banking.

I have never gotten an answer to my simple question, the economy described by Mises etc., is it suppose to be the economy that we have now or is it the economy of their imagination, the economy that they wish that we had?

Mises described the way the economy functioned in the absence of government interference. Morally, he was a utilitarian. He said this will give you the optimum result in terms of material prosperity. If you choose to interfere, than you should recognize that you will pay a price for that. If you want to pay that price, that is an entirely different matter. If you choose to re-distribute wealth, you will have less wealth to re-distribute, so you'd better take that into account. But above all, if you interfere with the day-to-day operations of the economy, you will create far more inefficiencies, and if you seek to plan the economy entirely from the top down, you will not be able to do it at all. You will encounter untold difficulties. We saw this with the Soviet Union which couldn't plan their economy at all without allowing some domestic markets and without referencing international market prices even to gain the limited successes that they had.




[/QUOTE]
 
Great archive I found about bubbles (or the lack thereof)

http://www.themoneyillusion.com/?p=3906

Thanks for the link. But I don't see anywhere in what he has to say where he contradicts anything that I have said. He doesn't talk much about the US, but what he does say suggests that he acknowledges that we did have a housing bubble here, but that's really pretty undeniable.

I wouldn't disagree that you can't assume a bubble just because prices are rising. It depends upon whether or not the price increases are being fueled by real growth or just expanded credit opportunities. It's the real growth that is difficult to identify, not the price increases.
 
He's pointing out how the appearance of a bubble is a product of NGDP decline. Housing markets in other countries (and various states in the union) had (still have to this day) what looked like bubbles similar to the US housing bubble, yet they didn't pop, which means the bubble theory isn't accurate in the first place. Those that popped only did so when NGDP fell. One may counter with "well, the pop caused the NGDP to fall", but that isn't true since all those other countries haven't since popped. Not every place where there has been what looks like a bubble has there been a pop; however, every place where there has been an NGDP decline has also looked like a bubble pop. This strongly suggests that bubbles operate more as symptoms and illusions, not indicators of economic fundamentals
 
He's pointing out how the appearance of a bubble is a product of NGDP decline. Housing markets in other countries (and various states in the union) had (still have to this day) what looked like bubbles similar to the US housing bubble, yet they didn't pop, which means the bubble theory isn't accurate in the first place. Those that popped only did so when NGDP fell. One may counter with "well, the pop caused the NGDP to fall", but that isn't true since all those other countries haven't since popped. Not every place where there has been what looks like a bubble has there been a pop; however, every place where there has been an NGDP decline has also looked like a bubble pop. This strongly suggests that bubbles operate more as symptoms and illusions, not indicators of economic fundamentals

I don't quite follow the logic of your post, but let me respond with an example.

Prices have been rising like crazy in North Dakota lately. Why is that? Because money is flowing into North Dakota at a rapid rate. Investors are spending lots of money to drill for oil and gas. More importantly, the oil and gas is being sold and its being sold for money. So oil and gas is flowing out of North Dakota and money is flowing in. The result is higher prices for everything except, perhaps, oil and gas.

Now at some point this will reach a peak. Investors will quite spending money there. But the money brought in by the sale of oil and gas will continue. So the price increases will level off, and there might be a slight decline because some people will have made purchases and investments in anticipation of continued price increases. So you have all the appearance of a bubble. But the bubble didn't pop. It didn't pop because the whole thing has been financed through real wealth. We find rapid inflation, but there is no pop at the end because it wasn't a bubble. All that investment created real wealth. So we would find no decline in the NGDP of North Dakota.

Now suppose that Ben Bernanke decided that this was unfair to Montana which wasn't getting all of that money coming in so he decides to get into his helicopter and drop hundred bills over those mountains every Friday. What would happen? People would flock to Montana. Prices would skyrocket. NGDP would also climb. So this goes on for a few years until Ben's helicopter breaks a rotor and won't fly anymore and besides, he's bored with it.

Now what happens? There's no more money coming in. NGDP declines precipitously. People leave because there's no more money falling from the skies. Prices collapse. There's far more housing than people need. Supermarkets are now twice the size that they need to be. This is a financial bubble. There was no real wealth being created by all that money that flowed into Montana. Outsiders did not bring their wealth into Montana to invest it. Instead outsiders without money came in to grab what was free.

The difference between North Dakota and Montana in this example is also the difference between the US and Canada or Australia. In both cases, the economic data appear to be the same until the bubble in Montana or in the US pops. Then everyone realizes that it was a bubble.

But to recognize a bubble before it pops you have to look at more fundamental data. (In the case of helicopter drops a really big clue would probably come from the unemployment rate which would likely skyrocket since nobody needed to work. High unemployment doesn't correlate well with a booming economy).

In the case of real estate bubble, the failure of rents to increase in sync with housing prices should have been a big clue. Think of it. If there had been a real demand for housing, there should have been a big increase in rents as well since not everyone wants to own. And if there had been such an increase in rents, the housing bubble wouldn't have collapsed because investors would have been able to rent out their houses for enough to cover the mortgage and wouldn't have needed to sell or default. And if they did want to sell, the rents would have justified the sale price.

Another big clue that housing was in a bubble was the interest rate. Greenspan brought interest rates down from 6.5% to only 1%. What happens when interest rates fall (other factors equal)? Asset prices rise. When interest rates reach the lowest rate EVER, it should be a clue that that has something to do with increasing asset prices like real estate.

The housing bubble wasn't based on real growth. It was a bubble. North Dakota is not experiencing an energy bubble. They are experiencing a boom.
 
It looks like wufu has a very limited idea of the power of greed. His analysis starts with the government making the banks relax their "standards." Just who do you think was responsible for banking legislation of this kind? Banks! They used their bought and paid for legislators to force them to be greedy and crooked. Why engage in this circuitous explanation and then roll out the old "moral hazard" argument for banks, when the banks are completely immoral and have cleverly captured government and use it to rationalize their own greed? Truman was wrong. The buck stops at the big banks.

The result of the housing bubble was clearly predictable for many years before the housing crisis. Moral hazard...there is one moral hazard....greed.
 
It looks like wufu has a very limited idea of the power of greed. His analysis starts with the government making the banks relax their "standards." Just who do you think was responsible for banking legislation of this kind? Banks! They used their bought and paid for legislators to force them to be greedy and crooked. Why engage in this circuitous explanation and then roll out the old "moral hazard" argument for banks, when the banks are completely immoral and have cleverly captured government and use it to rationalize their own greed? Truman was wrong. The buck stops at the big banks.

The result of the housing bubble was clearly predictable for many years before the housing crisis. Moral hazard...there is one moral hazard....greed.

Greed is a constant. It's like blaming gravity for the fact that your plane crashed. The whole idea modern economics assumes that people will follow their own self-interest. Greed does not explain why we had a housing bubble in the last decade but not in the decade before or the decade after. The greed, after all, was still there. Regulatory capture is a problem. It is a problem that everyone advocating regulation has to address. If the unregulated system is bad, how is it improved by letting the dominant players in the field re-write the rules?

But that doesn't apply to the housing bubble. The government does not directly dictate lending standards for the banks. But it does regulate the amount of money available to lend. When money is easy to obtain, then banks will obviously seek to lend more, and one of the ways that they may seek to do that is by lowering lending standards. The CRA might encourage them to do this, and the willingness of secondary mortgage purchasers like Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to accept mortgages with low lending standards would explain why the bubble occurred in real estate. But the real culprit, still, is the Federal Reserve and it's "easy money" policies. If there was no encouragement to lend in real estate, there would still have been a big encouragement to lend to somebody, somewhere.

Easy money policies by the Fed have always turned out badly. The present Fed policy (which is far more easy than even normal easy money policies) is no exception. It's just a matter of time before it all blows up in some fashion or another.
 
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