steve_bank
Diabetic retinopathy and poor eyesight. Typos ...
Looks like the gist of it was an attempt to eliminate ambiguity by a set of rules. Science reduced to a rigid set of rules and procedures. Eliminating issues of meaning in language. make philosophy scientific.
In a sense science did that, the Systems International units and standards. The meter kilogram second system. No issues with interpretation or meaning. The definitions and units all reduce to repeatable physical experiment. All quantified scince is written in SI units. What something is can be demonstrated. Numerically math is not open to interpretation.
Sounds like it may be linked to EBs issues with logic and the inyectual foundations of math proofs and logic.
Don't see how that would work. The process is often chaotic and can depend on luck.
The link shows the scattered and unfocused manifestations of philosophy. One ism after the other. There is never agreement. Philosophers seem to want to create something that science will conform to rather than being relegated to the sideline. They want to have dominion over science. Science is really philosophy therefore philosophy is science and philosophers scientists. Heard that on the thread before.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_positivism
Logical positivism, later called logical empiricism, and both of which together are also known as neopositivism, was a movement in Western philosophy whose central thesis was the verification principle (also known as the verifiability criterion of meaning). Also called verificationism, this would-be theory of knowledge asserted that only statements verifiable through direct observation or logical proof are meaningful. Starting in the late 1920s, groups of philosophers, scientists, and mathematicians formed the Berlin Circle and the Vienna Circle, which, in these two cities, would propound the ideas of logical positivism.
Flourishing in several European centers through the 1930s, the movement sought to prevent confusion rooted in unclear language and unverifiable claims by converting philosophy into "scientific philosophy", which, according to the logical positivists, ought to share the bases and structures of empirical sciences' best examples, such as Albert Einstein's general theory of relativity.[1] Despite its ambition to overhaul philosophy by studying and mimicking the extant conduct of empirical science, logical positivism became erroneously stereotyped as a movement to regulate the scientific process and to place strict standards on it.[1]
After World War II, the movement shifted to a milder variant, logical empiricism, lead mainly by Carl Hempel, who, during the rise of Nazism, had emigrated to the United States. In the ensuing years, the movement's central premises, still unresolved, were heavily criticised by leading philosophers, particularly Willard van Orman Quine and Karl Popper, but even, within the movement itself, by Hempel. By 1960, the movement had run its course. Soon, publication of Thomas Kuhn's landmark book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, dramatically shifted academic philosophy's focus. By then, neopositivism was "dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes".[
Cognitive meaningfulness[edit]
Verification[edit]
The logical positivists' initial stance was that a statement is "cognitively meaningful" only if some finite procedure conclusively determines its truth.[18] By this verifiability principle, only statements verifiable either by their analyticity or by empiricism were cognitively meaningful. Metaphysics, ontology, as well as much of ethics failed this criterion, and so were found cognitively meaningless. Moritz Schlick, however, did not view ethical or aesthetic statements as cognitively meaningless.[19] Cognitive meaningfulness was variously defined: having a truth value; corresponding to a possible state of affairs; intelligible or understandable as are scientific statements.[20]
Ethics and aesthetics were subjective preferences, while theology and other metaphysics contained "pseudostatements", neither true nor false. This meaningfulness was cognitive, although other types of meaningfulness—for instance, emotive, expressive, or figurative—occurred in metaphysical discourse, dismissed from further review. Thus, logical positivism indirectly asserted Hume's law, the principle that is statements cannot justify ought statements, but are separated by an unbridgeable gap. A. J. Ayer's 1936 book asserted an extreme variant—the boo/hooray doctrine—whereby all evaluative judgments are but emotional reactions.
In a sense science did that, the Systems International units and standards. The meter kilogram second system. No issues with interpretation or meaning. The definitions and units all reduce to repeatable physical experiment. All quantified scince is written in SI units. What something is can be demonstrated. Numerically math is not open to interpretation.
Sounds like it may be linked to EBs issues with logic and the inyectual foundations of math proofs and logic.
Don't see how that would work. The process is often chaotic and can depend on luck.
The link shows the scattered and unfocused manifestations of philosophy. One ism after the other. There is never agreement. Philosophers seem to want to create something that science will conform to rather than being relegated to the sideline. They want to have dominion over science. Science is really philosophy therefore philosophy is science and philosophers scientists. Heard that on the thread before.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_positivism
Logical positivism, later called logical empiricism, and both of which together are also known as neopositivism, was a movement in Western philosophy whose central thesis was the verification principle (also known as the verifiability criterion of meaning). Also called verificationism, this would-be theory of knowledge asserted that only statements verifiable through direct observation or logical proof are meaningful. Starting in the late 1920s, groups of philosophers, scientists, and mathematicians formed the Berlin Circle and the Vienna Circle, which, in these two cities, would propound the ideas of logical positivism.
Flourishing in several European centers through the 1930s, the movement sought to prevent confusion rooted in unclear language and unverifiable claims by converting philosophy into "scientific philosophy", which, according to the logical positivists, ought to share the bases and structures of empirical sciences' best examples, such as Albert Einstein's general theory of relativity.[1] Despite its ambition to overhaul philosophy by studying and mimicking the extant conduct of empirical science, logical positivism became erroneously stereotyped as a movement to regulate the scientific process and to place strict standards on it.[1]
After World War II, the movement shifted to a milder variant, logical empiricism, lead mainly by Carl Hempel, who, during the rise of Nazism, had emigrated to the United States. In the ensuing years, the movement's central premises, still unresolved, were heavily criticised by leading philosophers, particularly Willard van Orman Quine and Karl Popper, but even, within the movement itself, by Hempel. By 1960, the movement had run its course. Soon, publication of Thomas Kuhn's landmark book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, dramatically shifted academic philosophy's focus. By then, neopositivism was "dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes".[
Cognitive meaningfulness[edit]
Verification[edit]
The logical positivists' initial stance was that a statement is "cognitively meaningful" only if some finite procedure conclusively determines its truth.[18] By this verifiability principle, only statements verifiable either by their analyticity or by empiricism were cognitively meaningful. Metaphysics, ontology, as well as much of ethics failed this criterion, and so were found cognitively meaningless. Moritz Schlick, however, did not view ethical or aesthetic statements as cognitively meaningless.[19] Cognitive meaningfulness was variously defined: having a truth value; corresponding to a possible state of affairs; intelligible or understandable as are scientific statements.[20]
Ethics and aesthetics were subjective preferences, while theology and other metaphysics contained "pseudostatements", neither true nor false. This meaningfulness was cognitive, although other types of meaningfulness—for instance, emotive, expressive, or figurative—occurred in metaphysical discourse, dismissed from further review. Thus, logical positivism indirectly asserted Hume's law, the principle that is statements cannot justify ought statements, but are separated by an unbridgeable gap. A. J. Ayer's 1936 book asserted an extreme variant—the boo/hooray doctrine—whereby all evaluative judgments are but emotional reactions.