Nihilism and its consequences

[PyramidHead]

The point is what it is that this construction of existentialism consists of. It doesn't appear to have any moral or practical implications.

Have you read the OP?

 

[Togo]

The point is what it is that this construction of existentialism consists of. It doesn't appear to have any moral or practical implications.

Have you read the OP?

Sure, but it seems like existential nihilism, as it is now being defined, is both consistent with treating people as if they have value, and also with treating people as if they do not have value. Which means, strictly speaking, that existential nihilism is largely consequence-free.

 

[PyramidHead]

Have you read the OP?

Sure, but it seems like existential nihilism, as it is now being defined, is both consistent with treating people as if they have value, and also with treating people as if they do not have value. Which means, strictly speaking, that existential nihilism is largely consequence-free.

Are you under the impression that, in order for the consequences of one worldview to differ from another, there must be a logical inconsistency between them? Both conservatism and liberalism are consistent with having a universal health care system (though for different reasons and with different details). Does that mean that adhering to liberalism or conservatism is largely consequence-free?

 

[Horatio Parker]

Sure, but it seems like existential nihilism, as it is now being defined, is both consistent with treating people as if they have value, and also with treating people as if they do not have value. Which means, strictly speaking, that existential nihilism is largely consequence-free.

Are you under the impression that, in order for the consequences of one worldview to differ from another, there must be a logical inconsistency between them? Both conservatism and liberalism are consistent with having a universal health care system (though for different reasons and with different details). Does that mean that adhering to liberalism or conservatism is largely consequence-free?

As I understand it, for your analogy to be correct, liberals and/or conservatives would both support and not support UHC.

If a nihilist values people some other way, what would that way be?

 

[Togo]

Sure, but it seems like existential nihilism, as it is now being defined, is both consistent with treating people as if they have value, and also with treating people as if they do not have value. Which means, strictly speaking, that existential nihilism is largely consequence-free.

Are you under the impression that, in order for the consequences of one worldview to differ from another, there must be a logical inconsistency between them?

Noi, I'm under the impression that, for Nihilism to have the kind of consequences that are discussed in the OP, it should be defined in a way that produces the kinds of consequences discussed in the OP. The discussion of existential nihilism seemed to suggest a form of nihilism which didn't necessarily include any consequences at all. That's a not a fault in the theory, but it's also not what we're looking for. Is it?

 

[PyramidHead]

Are you under the impression that, in order for the consequences of one worldview to differ from another, there must be a logical inconsistency between them? Both conservatism and liberalism are consistent with having a universal health care system (though for different reasons and with different details). Does that mean that adhering to liberalism or conservatism is largely consequence-free?

As I understand it, for your analogy to be correct, liberals and/or conservatives would both support and not support UHC.

If a nihilist values people some other way, what would that way be?

All I meant to convey in my reply was that worldviews may differ while nonetheless being consistent with some of the same behaviors. To put it another way, saying that nihilism about values and realism about values are both consistent with X is not enough to conclude: "strictly speaking, than existential nihilism is largely consequence-free." The actual picture could be a change in distribution or probability, associations between X and some other behavior that is not shared, for example.

That said, and I can only speak for myself, my existential stance has affected me in the ways I describe in the OP.

 

[PyramidHead]

Are you under the impression that, in order for the consequences of one worldview to differ from another, there must be a logical inconsistency between them?

Noi, I'm under the impression that, for Nihilism to have the kind of consequences that are discussed in the OP, it should be defined in a way that produces the kinds of consequences discussed in the OP.

Why? Isn't it enough that there is a view about the world that apparently has those consequences? Does everything need to be rigorously defined in order to be "a thing", as you call it?

The discussion of existential nihilism seemed to suggest a form of nihilism which didn't necessarily include any consequences at all. That's a not a fault in the theory, but it's also not what we're looking for. Is it?

The point of the OP was to show that (1) contrary to an opinion I have encountered time and time again, one does not need to believe that humans are suffused with inherent value in order to behave in a socially acceptable way; and as a corollary, (2) it may be the case that socially unacceptable behavior is more likely to arise in those who DO believe that humans are suffused with inherent value.

I am perfectly comfortable with this observation of mine falling short of being a theory, whatever that may mean.

 

[Horatio Parker]

As I understand it, for your analogy to be correct, liberals and/or conservatives would both support and not support UHC.

If a nihilist values people some other way, what would that way be?

All I meant to convey in my reply was that worldviews may differ while nonetheless being consistent with some of the same behaviors. To put it another way, saying that nihilism about values and realism about values are both consistent with X is not enough to conclude: "strictly speaking, than existential nihilism is largely consequence-free." The actual picture could be a change in distribution or probability, associations between X and some other behavior that is not shared, for example.

That said, and I can only speak for myself, my existential stance has affected me in the ways I describe in the OP.

Then there appears to be no connection between nihilism and valuing people, hence no advantage over traditional beliefs wrt to violence. That it is so for you tells us about you, but not about nihilism.

 

[PyramidHead]

All I meant to convey in my reply was that worldviews may differ while nonetheless being consistent with some of the same behaviors. To put it another way, saying that nihilism about values and realism about values are both consistent with X is not enough to conclude: "strictly speaking, than existential nihilism is largely consequence-free." The actual picture could be a change in distribution or probability, associations between X and some other behavior that is not shared, for example.

That said, and I can only speak for myself, my existential stance has affected me in the ways I describe in the OP.

Then there appears to be no connection between nihilism and valuing people, hence no advantage over traditional beliefs wrt to violence. That it is so for you tells us about you, but not about nihilism.

On what basis did you conclude there is no connection?

 

[Horatio Parker]

Then there appears to be no connection between nihilism and valuing people, hence no advantage over traditional beliefs wrt to violence. That it is so for you tells us about you, but not about nihilism.

On what basis did you conclude there is no connection?

What I understand about nihilism would so indicate, and nothing you've said applies outside yourself. A nihilist of course isn't precluded from valuing others; but by itself valuing others is only relevant by it's scope.

So your connection, by your own admission AFAICT ("no argument or theory"), although you don't state it that way, is more in the nature of a synchronicity. It works for you, you attribute that insight to nihilism, end of story.

 

[PyramidHead]

That may very well be the extent of it, but it's not a very charitable interpretation of what I wrote.

 

[Horatio Parker]

That may very well be the extent of it, but it's not a very charitable interpretation of what I wrote.

Apologies for that, not my intention, I'm just trying to understand the apparent contradiction. I appreciate your honesty.

 

[PyramidHead]

I don't really see the contradiction. Think of it this way: suppose the default position is that you need to believe that life is a sacred gift and everybody is a unique and wonderful snowflake, or else nothing will stop you from hurting people around you. That formulation assumes that the absence of ethical barriers is the only thing required for a person to start doing nasty things. I framed the issue starting from the opposite assumption, namely that people won't go out of their way to do hurtful things without a positive motivation. Proceeding from that assumption, I came to the conclusion that nihilism is not sufficient to compel hurtful behavior. On the contrary, perhaps there is more positive motivation to hurt people in the claim that humans are inherently worthy of respect, and some are objectively more valuable than others. I gave some personal examples of how ruminating on these things has changed how I approach my interactions with others. Maybe those examples say more about me than about they do about a specifically defined ideological stance, but I maintain there is more than a coincidental connection, and I see some evidence that supports this in the world at large.

This just occurred to me, but let's take the war on terror for example. I suspect, admittedly without a lot of empirical support, that the nature and magnitude of the USA's response to 9/11 was driven in some way by a belief in some non-relative measure of good versus evil. The attacks in New York were seen as besmirching the dignity of the American people, who are already self-identified as especially dignified and proud. It was not enough that we treat the criminal organization that carried out the attacks as a problem for international law enforcement; flags needed to be involved, at every step of the way affirming that we are the ones who matter. The enormous public and governmental support for the invasion of Iraq was, to my eyes looking back on it, not something that would have happened if those in power (and the majority of their constituents) didn't believe 9/11 to be an insult to our inherent value as Americans beyond simply being a criminal act that killed many people. I'm not trying to reduce all of the geopolitics behind the aftermath to one factor, don't get me wrong. It's just something I see around me, how this need to defend not just the practical survival of people in a society, but the unshakeable nobility of their character, leads to so much pointless suffering and loss of life. That's the closest I would come to a theory about nihilism in this regard, more of a hypothesis or a suspicion really, a guess based on personal experience and hanging around these forums too much.

 

[Unbeatable]

Is there any difference between this kind of nihilist and a non-nihilist, except for the amount of shrugging?

It seems to me that the difference between the categories of "existential nihilist" and "non-nihilist" would probably be that when asked the question "Does life have objective meaning/significance/value", the former answers "no" while the latter answers "yes".

Which depends on what you mean by 'objective value'. On it's face, 'objective value' is just the idea that other people will agree that something is valuable.

I would refer to that as "intersubjective value". To me, "objective value" is the idea that the value of something is not merely a mental projection of the valuer; that the question of whether something is valuable has a single true yes-or-no answer, not just a bunch of opinions. Also, the sort of objective value I'm thinking of isn't merely instrumental to some matter of personal taste. I would agree to countless value claims if they were phrased in the form "X could be considered valuable, given that one already holds [higher-order value Y]". I could follow a chain like that as far as it goes and always end up concluding that you don't have to value Y(though for various values of Y, most people just happen to due to biological similarities), whereas it seems to me that proponents of what I'm calling "objective value" will eventually stop at some particular Y and say "people who don't value Y have something wrong with them" or something like that, rather than merely agreeing to disagree.

What's interesting about an exisitential nihlist is how that changes their morals, principles, and interactions with the world. If we strip the definition down to the bare essentials, calling someone an existential nihilist tells us very little about them, and thus the amount we can conclude about someone from saying that they are an existential nihilist, approaches zero.

I'm not being clear - I suppose my concern is to be clear whether we are talking about a particular stance on morals and principles, or a simply a way of defining terms.

I didn't think that existential nihilism was a stance on morals and principles. If that's what you're looking for, it seems like my moral nihilism would have more direct relevance. Of course, moral nihilism's still just meta-ethics. I don't know if you're looking for some sort of actual first-order moral claims, but one of the consequences of my moral nihilism, in conjunction with my personal tastes, is that AFAIK, I don't make such claims.

 

[ontological_realist]

I do not understand what it means to say that something or someone is inherently or objectively valuable. A diamond is valuable to me because I can get lot of food, housing or respect of people for it. But is diamond inherently or objectively valuable? A human child may be very valuable to it's mother but is this child of the same value to a stranger walking in the street? The same thing or human animal may be of great value to A, moderate value to B, almost of no value to C and of definitely negative value to D. Do some people have less objective value than other people? Do some dogs have less objective value than other dogs or do all dogs have equal objective value? Do flies have more objective value than mosquitoes? What does objective value mean?

 

[ontological_realist]

Millions of people agree that Bin Laden was a very valuable human being and another millions of people agree that he was not. Was he objectively valuable?