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Compatibilism: What's that About?

The given definition of determinism doesn't allow the possibility of 'both ways' or taking a selected option. A progression of events that cannot deviate does not select from a range of options. With no alternate options to choose or to take, there is no choosing, hence no 'fact of choosing.'

The given definition of determinism is that every event will be the reliable result of prior events, such that everything that happens will have been causally necessary from any prior point in time, such that everything that happens inevitably must happen, without deviation.

We observe the people in the restaurant, choosing, from a menu of possibilities, what they will order for dinner. The people, the restaurant, the menu, the possibilities, the single chosen will ("I will have the Chef Salad, please"), were ALL causally necessary from any prior point in time and inevitably must happen.

They have no realizable alternatives to choose from. The list of options on the menu caters to different people with different tastes. Each ordering according to their own state and condition, each according to their own proclivities, wants, needs, etc.

Choice, by definition, requires possible alternatives. Determinism does not allow alternatives.


There is no honest way to say that these objects and events did not happen or were simply an "illusion".

The events happen as determined, but not because anyone present had multiple realizable options, and could have chosen something that was not determined.

That is the point. No alternatives. each and every action entailed by prior states of the system, no deviation.


Choosing, by definition, requires being presented with two or more realizable options where you free to take any one of them.

Each customer was presented with a menu of realizable options, and, they were free to order the one that they deliberately chose.

They ordered what they must necessarily order in that instance in time and place.

What Does Deterministic System Mean?
''A deterministic system is a system in which a given initial state or condition will always produce the same results. There is no randomness or variation in the ways that inputs get delivered as outputs.''



Determinism entails that ...

Determinism entails exactly what I said it entails: every event will be the reliable result of prior events, such that everything that happens will have been causally necessary from any prior point in time, such that everything that happens inevitably must happen, without deviation.

Choosing is one of those events that happens. Determinism entails that choosing inevitably must happen.

If the event of ordering a meal, or anything else, is entailed, fixed, set, long before the person comes to that point, the person has no choice, that action must proceed as determined, not freely chosen or freely willed.

If it's determined that Bob and his wife Janet go to a cafe at 11:30am and Bob must necessarily order Fish and Chips and Janet must necessarily order salad......how is that a free choice?

It's not a choice at all.

Your example is the system evolving as it must.

Damn straight.

Absolutely. Which of course negates freedom. All actions proceed as they must, not as they are chosen.

''Determinism means that events will proceed naturally (as if "fixed as a matter of natural law") and reliably ("without deviation"). - Marvin Edwards



Given the stipulation of 'no deviation,'' you must necessarily order salad for dinner in that instance in time and place, and that ordering steak must necessarily be impossible.

Given the circumstances (bacon and eggs for breakfast and a double cheeseburger for lunch), I would not order the steak at that point in time, even though I certainly could have ordered it.

If you ''could have,'' it's not determinism


Ordering the steak was never impossible. I've ordered the steak before and I'll likely order the steak again, if I have more fruit and vegetables at breakfast and lunch. If the steak were not on the menu, or if the restaurant ran out of steak, then ordering the steak would be impossible. But none of those conditions were present on the evening when I ordered the salad instead.

It's clearly stipulated to be impossible in the 'no deviation/fixed by antecedents' aspect of determinism. If it is possible to take alternate actions, it's not determinism.

Claiming that it is possible to take an alternate action, 'steak instead of salad' when ordering salad is the determined action, is breaking the terms and conditions of determinism.

The terms and conditions of determinism apply to what we will do, but not to what we can do. You are falsely conflating what we can do with what we will do. And this is a consistent error within the incompatibilist understanding of determinism.

'Will do' in relation to the given definition of determinism is inseparable from 'must necessarily do.'

Whatever is done, must necessarily be done.

What you must do, you inevitably will do. As defined (not because I say so), a fixed progression of deterministic events that unfold without deviation.
 
If you ''could have,'' it's not determinism
And still you fail to understand the context of "could".

We keep pointing this out to you, and you keep ignoring it so as to preach your false dichotomy as you faithfully learned it:

Could operates in "if SoA is ..."

SoA doesn't have to ever be "able to be". It just has to be true that IF it were, THEN... For "could" to be satisfied.

I feel just like I did when we were trying to explain to JC that there were alternatives besides "random" and "intelligent intent"
 
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The given definition of determinism is that every event will be the reliable result of prior events, such that everything that happens will have been causally necessary from any prior point in time, such that everything that happens inevitably must happen, without deviation.

We observe the people in the restaurant, choosing, from a menu of possibilities, what they will order for dinner. The people, the restaurant, the menu, the possibilities, the single chosen will ("I will have the Chef Salad, please"), were ALL causally necessary from any prior point in time and inevitably would happen.

They have no realizable alternatives to choose from.

Every item on the menu was a realizable alternative for each customer in the restaurant. Each customer was free to order whatever they chose to order and every item was realizable, even though each customer would choose to realize only one.

This is easily proven by taking any customer and asking them to order each item on the menu. Every item on the menu is realizable for every customer.

The list of options on the menu caters to different people with different tastes. Each ordering according to their own state and condition, each according to their own proclivities, wants, needs, etc.

Exactly. Each customer was free to order any of the items on the menu that suited "their own proclivities, wants, needs, etc.". The choice, in each case, was determined uniquely by each customer, according to their own wants and needs, their own goals and reasons, their own preferences and dietary goals. Thus, each choice was an example of both determinism and free will.

Choice, by definition, requires possible alternatives.

Correct. Choosing logically requires that there be two or more options to choose from, and that we are able to choose any of those options. The menu contained many options and each customer was able to choose each item, even though they only chose one item.

Determinism does not allow alternatives.

Obviously, determinism does allow alternatives, because there they are on the menu! It was deterministically inevitable, without deviation, that the menu of realizable possibilities would be there for each customer's consideration, and that each customer would consider it, and make the inevitable choice according to their own goals and reasons.

It is not determinism OR free will. It is determinism AND free will.

Determinism entails that every event will be the reliable result of prior events, such that everything that happens will have been causally necessary from any prior point in time, such that everything that happens inevitably must happen, without deviation.

Choosing is one of those events that happens. Determinism entails that choosing inevitably must happen.

If you ''could have,'' it's not determinism

Really? Prove it.

What you must do, you inevitably will do.

And, in the restaurant, what I must do is order something from the menu (otherwise I'll have no dinner tonight). And because I have dietary goals that include having vegetables and fruits daily, I must consider what I had for breakfast (bacon and eggs) and lunch (a double cheeseburger). So, for now, I must deny myself the juicy steak, and order the Chef Salad instead.

When a choice is made causally necessary by our own goals and reasons, it is determinism and it is free will.
 
If you ''could have,'' it's not determinism
And still you fail to understand the context of "could".

No, It's you. You still fail to understand the implications of your own definition of determinism....that whatever happens must necessarily happen as determined: no deviation.

That is according to your own definition.

We keep pointing this out to you, and you keep ignoring it so as to preach your false dichotomy as you faithfully learned it:

Your 'pointing out is flawed' because you fail to understand the terms and conditions of your own definition.
 
If you ''could have,'' it's not determinism
And still you fail to understand the context of "could".

No, It's you. You still fail to understand the implications of your own definition of determinism....that whatever happens must necessarily happen as determined: no deviation.

That is according to your own definition.

We keep pointing this out to you, and you keep ignoring it so as to preach your false dichotomy as you faithfully learned it:

Your 'pointing out is flawed' because you fail to understand the terms and conditions of your own definition.
No, I just refuse to accept your petulant demands that I take up your false dichotomy.

It's not my fault you cannot understand even a single layer of abstraction.

You are creating a false dichotomy and you, just like JC, are just so woefully unprepared for this discussion that you cannot see it.

"Could" allows inevitability. "Could" still has room for "won't".
 
The given definition of determinism is that every event will be the reliable result of prior events, such that everything that happens will have been causally necessary from any prior point in time, such that everything that happens inevitably must happen, without deviation.

We observe the people in the restaurant, choosing, from a menu of possibilities, what they will order for dinner. The people, the restaurant, the menu, the possibilities, the single chosen will ("I will have the Chef Salad, please"), were ALL causally necessary from any prior point in time and inevitably would happen.

They have no realizable alternatives to choose from.

Every item on the menu was a realizable alternative for each customer in the restaurant. Each customer was free to order whatever they chose to order and every item was realizable, even though each customer would choose to realize only one.

This is easily proven by taking any customer and asking them to order each item on the menu. Every item on the menu is realizable for every customer.

It's been pointed out that each action/item, if determined is necessarily 'realized,' that it can't be otherwise. If an item is 'chosen' it must be chosen.

Taking someone to a cafe -if determinism is true - is determined: it has to happen.

Asking them to choose an option from the menu has to happen as determined.

The item they choose has to happen as determined.

If the determined item in that instance in time and place is salad, salad must necessarily be ordered as determined.

If salad must be ordered as determined, there are no other options in that instance in time (or any other instance in time).

Salad it must be. Not steak or fish or scallops, linguini or spaghetti: salad.

There is no 'could have done otherwise.'

There are no other possibilities, everything within a deterministic system must unfold as determined, fixed, unchangeable, no deviation.

'Determined' does not equate to freely chosen or willed.

Hence free will is incompatible with determinism as it has been defined.



The list of options on the menu caters to different people with different tastes. Each ordering according to their own state and condition, each according to their own proclivities, wants, needs, etc.

Exactly. Each customer was free to order any of the items on the menu that suited "their own proclivities, wants, needs, etc.". The choice, in each case, was determined uniquely by each customer, according to their own wants and needs, their own goals and reasons, their own preferences and dietary goals. Thus, each choice was an example of both determinism and free will.

I didn't say that each customer is free to order any of the items on menu. If that was possible, it would not be determinism.

Each customer must necessarily take the option that is determined by all the underlying drives and elements in that moment and place.

Nobody chooses their own proclivities; nobody is aware of the information processing that sets the action into motion.

The customer feels the conscious urge to order the salad, as they must.

Unless we are now talking about Libertarian Free Will?

Really? Prove it.

It's entailed in your definition: no deviation;

''....in order for determinism to be true, it must include all events. For example, determinism cannot exclude the effects of natural forces, like volcanoes and tidal waves or a meteor hitting the Earth. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of biological organisms that transform their environments, like tree seedlings changing bare land into a forest. Determinism cannot exclude the effects of deliberate choices, like when the chef prepares me the salad that I chose for lunch.

All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.


Choice, by definition, requires possible alternatives.

Correct. Choosing logically requires that there be two or more options to choose from, and that we are able to choose any of those options. The menu contained many options and each customer was able to choose each item, even though they only chose one item.

If determined, a customer is not only able to order the determined item, but that it's inescapable, the customer must necessarily place the order precisely as determined: no deviation.

That necessity is stipulated in your definition.
What you must do, you inevitably will do.

And, in the restaurant, what I must do is order something from the menu (otherwise I'll have no dinner tonight). And because I have dietary goals that include having vegetables and fruits daily, I must consider what I had for breakfast (bacon and eggs) and lunch (a double cheeseburger). So, for now, I must deny myself the juicy steak, and order the Chef Salad instead.

When a choice is made causally necessary by our own goals and reasons, it is determinism and it is free will.

Every incremental step in the path of your ruminations is fixed by the system, including the workings of the brain (no exceptions) as it evolves from prior to current and future states.

''At this point certain questions need to be asked: Why does the coercion of a person by another, or the conditions of a brain microchip, or the conditions of a tumor, – nullify the “free will” ability? What part of the “ability” is being obstructed? This almost always comes down to a certain point of “control” that is being minimized, and where that minimized control is coming from (the arbitrary part).

The compatibilist might say because those are influences that are “outside” of the person, but this misses the entire point brought up by the free will skeptic, which is that ALL environmental conditions that help lead to a person’s brain state at any given moment are “outside of the person”, and the genes a person has was provided rather than decided.''

''The No Choice Principle implies that I cannot have a choice about anything that is an unavoidable consequence of something I have no control of.''

Which comes down to: Determinism makes it impossible for us to “cause and control our actions in the right kind of way'' to qualify as free will.

Hence, incompatibilism is justified.
 
Again DBT fails to understand the difference between "deviation" and "possibility".

You do not need a deviation from causality (as if that makes sense in the first place) to "be able to" do some thing that you will not do.

All that is required is the recognition that the words "able", "can" and "possible" all reference an unstated "if" which contextualizes this property in terms of "in a universe configured momentarily in some specific way".

Their inability to see this aspect of those usages would be hilarious if it were not so tragic.
 
It's been pointed out that each action/item, if determined is necessarily 'realized,' that it can't be otherwise.

No. The fact that events will not be otherwise does not imply that events cannot be otherwise. Either we are speaking of things that will happen or we are speaking of things that can happen. If we know for certain what will happen, then what can happen never comes up. It is only when we do not know for certain what will happen that we employ the notion of what can happen.

The incompatibilist is making a logical and semantic error when they conflate "can" with "will". And this error leads to a host of erroneous claims, for example, the claim that choosing does not happen when we are watching it happening right in front of us in the restaurant.

If an item is 'chosen' it must be chosen.

Exactly. If an item is chosen then choosing must be happening.

Taking someone to a cafe -if determinism is true - is determined: it has to happen.

My point exactly.

Asking them to choose an option from the menu has to happen as determined.

Correct.

The item they choose has to happen as determined.

And, how is that item determined? By the choosing process itself. A reliable series of prior events will bring about my choice to order the salad rather than the steak. This series of events includes my consideration of my dietary goals (to eat more fruits and vegetables) and my consideration of what I had for breakfast (bacon and eggs) and lunch (double cheeseburger). So, my choosing determined that I would order the salad, even though I could have ordered the steak.

If the determined item in that instance in time and place is salad, salad must necessarily be ordered as determined.

Correct. My choosing causally determined that I would order the salad rather than the steak for dinner.

If salad must be ordered as determined, there are no other options in that instance in time (or any other instance in time).

And that's where you go wrong. There were in actual physical reality, other options. There was the steak. I could have ordered the steak instead. However, given what I had for breakfast and lunch, it was inevitable that I would not order the steak.

Now, you have convinced yourself that the steak was not a "real" option, as if you thought that a "real" option had to be the one that I ended up choosing. But that is simply not what an option is. An option is something I can choose, if I want to, but it is not something that I must choose.

The fact that an option is not chosen does not make it any less a real option.

Salad it must be. Not steak or fish or scallops, linguini or spaghetti: salad.

Exactly. The salad was inevitably chosen. The steak, fish, scallops, linguini, and spaghetti were real options, but they certainly "would" not be chosen tonight, even they certainly "could" have been chosen.

There is no 'could have done otherwise.'

Obviously there were many things that I could have ordered other than the salad. So, there were plenty of "otherwises" that could have been done.

There are no other possibilities, everything within a deterministic system must unfold as determined, fixed, unchangeable, no deviation.

What you continue to fail to realize is that "determined, fixed, unchangeable, no deviation" applies as much to the inevitability of every other option I considered as it does to the single option that I chose. It was inevitable that I could choose the steak and that I could choose the salad. And, it was inevitable that I would order the salad even though I could have chosen the steak instead.

Determinism doesn't actually change anything. It simply asserts that everything will necessarily happen exactly as it does happen.

Each customer must necessarily take the option that is determined by all the underlying drives and elements in that moment and place.

Exactly. For example, my desire to eat a balanced diet and the fact that I had no fruits and no vegetables for breakfast or lunch, drove me to forego the steak dinner and choose the Chef Salad instead.

And I was free to do precisely what I wanted to do. Nobody forced me to eat the salad instead of the steak. I did that voluntarily, of my own free will (the freely chosen "I will have the Chef Salad, please").

Nobody chooses their own proclivities;

At some point in my life, I chose to pursue a more rational diet. On the other hand, I did not choose my biological drives to eat. So, I would say that you are half-right, but not entirely so. Many of the choices we make today are determined by other choices we made long ago.

nobody is aware of the information processing that sets the action into motion.

Again, you are only half-right. We are, for the most part, aware of the reasons for our actions. For example, I can easily explain why I chose the salad rather than the steak (I needed more vegetables that day). But I cannot provide a mapping of the neural signals that produced my experience of those thoughts.

The customer feels the conscious urge to order the salad, as they must.

Well, there was also a conscious urge to order that juicy steak. With two contradictory conscious urges, it was up to me to make a choice. So, I considered both options, and decided the salad would be the best option tonight.

It's entailed in your definition: no deviation;

"No deviation" means that events will happen just so and no other way. As I continue to point out, no deviation applies to all of the options that I considered on my way to choosing the salad. No deviation includes the menu of alternate possibilities, you know, the list of realizable options. and all of my thoughts and feelings about each one, that inevitably led to my choosing the salad.

"No deviation" means that it was inevitable that "I can order the steak" would be true by logical necessity. "No deviation" means that both "I will order the salad" and "I could have ordered the steak" would necessarily be true after choosing was completed.
 
Again DBT fails to understand the difference between "deviation" and "possibility".

That's you not understanding the implications of the given definition of determinism, including your own.

''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.


'No deviation' equates to 'no possibility of alternative actions.'

If something different can happen, there is the possibility of deviation, which contradicts the stipulated condition of 'no deviation'

As no deviation negates all possibility of alternate actions, there is no possibility of alternate actions as you, just as yourself have defined determinism;

Jarhyn - A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.

'No randomness' entails no deviation. If alternate actions were possible, the development of future states of the system would not be determined by prior states of the system, and your definition is rendered null and void, meaningless.
 
definition of determinism
Determinism does not define or imply that a universe with some definite quality laid upon it is immune to being understood within the laws of physics, even when that universe is not necessarily "ours".

This is what you continually fail to understand.

If I were to treat this on a much simplified level, let's take a bit field FieldA.

FieldA is a byte long.

FieldA is 01010000

The physics of FieldA, the momentary operation that happens on it, the only interaction this field undertakes is "read lowest bit, right shift 1, highest bit &= prior lowest bit."

This is a deterministic system.

As you operate it, it will tick, deterministically to
00101000, 00010100, 00001010, 00000101, 10000010, and so on.

This is "will".

Now let's do "could":

What frame is necessary to create 111011011 in frame 3?

This is "what the system could do if FrameA were instead FrameX

Now let's do "freedom": is the process of FrameA ever Free to produce 01110000?

How would FrameA have to be modified to produce this result?
 
It's been pointed out that each action/item, if determined is necessarily 'realized,' that it can't be otherwise.

No. The fact that events will not be otherwise does not imply that events cannot be otherwise.

It must. If events can go otherwise, that alternate actions are possible and may happen, your given definition of determinism is false

It's one or the other. Being mutually exclusive, a contradiction, both can't be true.


Either we are speaking of things that will happen or we are speaking of things that can happen. If we know for certain what will happen, then what can happen never comes up. It is only when we do not know for certain what will happen that we employ the notion of what can happen.

We don't have sufficient information to make absolute or even accurate or detailed predictions of future events.

Yet determinism - as it is defined - entails that all events must proceed without deviation. That all present and future events were entailed in past and current states of the system and that nothing strays from that incrementally fixed progression of events from past to present and future without deviation or alternate possibilities.


The incompatibilist is making a logical and semantic error when they conflate "can" with "will". And this error leads to a host of erroneous claims, for example, the claim that choosing does not happen when we are watching it happening right in front of us in the restaurant.

There is no error. The terms and conditions by which events unfold are set in your given definition;

''All of these events, including my choices, were causally necessary from any prior point in time. And they all proceeded without deviation from the Big Bang to this moment.'' - Marvin Edwards.

'Without deviation' as a condition of a deterministic system replaces 'can' and 'will' with 'must' - everything must proceed without deviation.
 
It must. If events can go otherwise, that alternate actions are possible and may happen, your given definition of determinism is false
And again, nobody is asking for "alternate actions" to "happen". You just continually fail to understand what is meant by the word "can" , "could", and "possible", arguing like Ion or JC as the case may be, with your false dichotomy.

This answers your trash and it's not even a few seconds old/ignored. You have a habit of posting past answers you don't seem to want to read or acknowledge.
definition of determinism
Determinism does not define or imply that a universe with some definite quality laid upon it is immune to being understood within the laws of physics, even when that universe is not necessarily "ours".

This is what you continually fail to understand.

If I were to treat this on a much simplified level, let's take a bit field FieldA.

FieldA is a byte long.

FieldA is 01010000

The physics of FieldA, the momentary operation that happens on it, the only interaction this field undertakes is "read lowest bit, right shift 1, highest bit &= prior lowest bit."

This is a deterministic system.

As you operate it, it will tick, deterministically to
00101000, 00010100, 00001010, 00000101, 10000010, and so on.

This is "will".(edit: as in shall)

Now let's do "could":

What frame is necessary to create 111011011 in frame 3?

This is "what the system could do if FrameA were instead FrameX

Now let's do "freedom": is the process of FrameA ever Free to produce 01110000?

How would FrameA have to be modified to produce this result?
 
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If events can go otherwise, that alternate actions are possible and may happen, your given definition of determinism is false
It's one or the other. Being mutually exclusive, a contradiction, both can't be true.

"I would inevitably order the salad" was true.
"I could have ordered the steak, but I didn't" is also true.

Your conclusion that "both can't be true", is false. They are clearly not "mutually exclusive".

What "will happen" is a subset of what "can happen". If something cannot happen, then it will not happen.
But what "can happen" is only limited by our imagination and our capability to make what we imagine happen.

If we know for certain what will happen, then what can happen never comes up. It is only when we do not know for certain what will happen that we employ the notion of what can happen.

We don't have sufficient information to make absolute or even accurate or detailed predictions of future events.

Exactly. And that is why we have the notion of "possibilities", things that "can" happen and things that we "can" choose to do.

Yet determinism - as it is defined - entails that all events must proceed without deviation.

And, of course, all events do proceed without deviation, so causal necessity is fully satisfied.

That all present and future events were entailed in past and current states of the system and that nothing strays from that incrementally fixed progression of events from past to present and future without deviation

And we've noticed that to be exactly what is happening. We do not observe any "uncaused" events. (In any case, it would be experimentally impossible to repeat such an event, because, in order to repeat the event, we would have to know how to cause it to happen!)

or alternate possibilities.

Tacking on the exclusion of "alternate possibilities" is a logical error. We know that all possibilities exist solely within the imagination, and that a "possibility" (something that "can happen" or something that we "can do") is a logical token that replaces the notion of what "will happen" or what we "will do" whenever we deal with a matter of uncertainty.

This is a semantic rule that allows us to keep what "can" happen distinct from what "will" happen. We can know with certainty what "can" happen, even though we are still uncertain as to what "will" happen. And we know with certainty that the single event that "will" happen will be one of the several events that "can" happen.

And, of course, each of the alternate possibilities that appear to us, for example on the restaurant menu, were mental events that would have always proceeded without deviation. Every "can" was just as inevitable as the single "will".
 
If the world is determined it is in a sense orderly. Saying something determined is orderly only reflects the sense that with determination comes order not sense.

Also saying some aspect of determined includes a mind also reflects the sense that with determinism comes order. Saying something determined includes mind does not make mind sensible. It too reflects the sense that with determination comes mind order not sense.

Order can be deterministically derived as can a mind be deterministically derived.

IOW one cannot presume determination is not orderly nor mindful.
 
If the world is determined it is in a sense orderly. Saying something determined is orderly only reflects the sense that with determination comes order not sense.

Also saying some aspect of determined includes a mind also reflects the sense that with determinism comes order. Saying something determined includes mind does not make mind sensible. It too reflects the sense that with determination comes mind order not sense.
Well, something certainly does lack some sense.

In fact this whole post referenced has none.

It is nonsense.
 
It must. If events can go otherwise, that alternate actions are possible and may happen, your given definition of determinism is false
And again, nobody is asking for "alternate actions" to "happen". You just continually fail to understand what is meant by the word "can" , "could", and "possible", arguing like Ion or JC as the case may be, with your false dichotomy.

The point being, that unless alternate actions can happen, that you have agency, that you are able to choose between multiple realizable, there is no freedom of will.

Actions fixed by antecedents are not freely willed. Your use of 'can, 'could' and 'possible' - being relative terms - related to appearance, not causality - is not relevant.

Again;
If you accept regulative control as a necessary part of free will, it seems impossible either way:
1. Free will requires that given an act A, the agent could have acted otherwise
2. Indeterminate actions happens randomly and without intent or control
3. Therefore indeterminism and free will are incompatible
4. Determinate actions are fixed and unchangeable
5. Therefore determinism is incompatible with free will

And of course, regulative control and the ability to choose otherwise is - for the given reasons - a necessary part of free will.

Look in the mirror Sweetie, and see the JC in yourself.


This answers your trash and it's not even a few seconds old/ignored. You have a habit of posting past answers you don't seem to want to read or acknowledge.

No, it's just that you don't have a clue. Never have. Never will, it appears that you cannot comprehend the implications of determinism, or references such as 'can, 'could' and 'possible' in relation to determinism.....which doesn't surprise me at all, JC.

''Although we don’t think we (now) have a choice about the past, we have beliefs about what was possible for us in the past. When called upon to defend what we did, or when we blame or reproach ourselves, or simply wonder whether we did the right thing (or the sensible thing, the rational thing, and so on), we evaluate our action by comparing it to what we believe were our other possible actions, at that time. We blame, criticize, reproach, regret, and so on, only insofar as we believe we had alternatives. And if we later discover that we were mistaken in believing that some action XX was among our alternatives, we think it is irrational to criticize or regret our failure to do XX.

Is determinism compatible with the truth of these beliefs? In particular, is it compatible with the belief that we are often able to choose and do more than one action?

Incompatibilists have traditionally said “No”. And it’s not hard to see why. If we think of ‘can’ in the “open future” way suggested by the commonsense view, then it’s tempting to think that the past is necessary in some absolute sense. And it’s natural to think that we are able to do otherwise only if we can do otherwise given the past; that is, only if our doing otherwise is a possible continuation of the past. If we follow this train of thought, we will conclude that we are able to do otherwise only if our doing otherwise is a possible continuation of the past consistent with the laws. But if determinism is true, there is only one possible continuation of the past consistent with the laws. And thus we get the incompatibilist conclusion. If determinism is true, our actual future is our only possible future. What we actually do is the only thing we are able to do.''

Keep in mind - JC ;) - that this is precisely what your definition of determinism entails.
 
The point being, that unless alternate actions can happen,
No, you're asking for nonsense and we all know it.

The "alternate actions" always could have happened but they did not.

Here is this statement expanded with compatibilist language:

"The point being that unless alternate actions can have happened if the universe had been different..."

Of course they can have happened if the universe had been different than it was, because that's the only way anything ever "can" even such that "it shall not"

In your usage in hard determinist lala-land, though you are saying "unless a different thing actually DID happen" which is fucking stupid.

Nobody cares that you insist that there is only one possible past and future of "physics", because you are wrong. Physics is an operation, and has no demand that the universe it operates on be "just so".

It is still entirely coherent to consider "what of all the rules of physics we know and love, but among this other state? What comes of it?"

And doing so is "can"
 
If events can go otherwise, that alternate actions are possible and may happen, your given definition of determinism is false
It's one or the other. Being mutually exclusive, a contradiction, both can't be true.

"I would inevitably order the salad" was true.
"I could have ordered the steak, but I didn't" is also true.

Your conclusion that "both can't be true", is false. They are clearly not "mutually exclusive".

It's not physically possible to order the salad and not order the salad in the same instance in time. It's a contradiction.

What "will happen" is a subset of what "can happen". If something cannot happen, then it will not happen.
But what "can happen" is only limited by our imagination and our capability to make what we imagine happen.

Our imagination - being a physical activity of a brain - is not exempt from causal determinism. Brain activity, thoughts, feeling, imaginations, are fixed, as by definition all events within the system must be.

We imagine and we do whatever is entailed by the system as it evolves from prior to current and future states - as defined - without deviation.

Imagination is not a loophole for free will.


If we know for certain what will happen, then what can happen never comes up. It is only when we do not know for certain what will happen that we employ the notion of what can happen.

All of these being relative perceptions and expressions coming from a limited understanding of the system as it evolves.

Watch a video - a deterministic system - enough times and you get to know everything that will be said and done in the movie, no deviation, no alternatives.

The lead character orders salad, rewind and he order salad, rewind and repeat any number of times, the lead character orders salad, no deviation, no could have done otherwise, no possible alternatives, all actions fixed by the information state of the system in every instance in time.

That's determinism.

And we've noticed that to be exactly what is happening. We do not observe any "uncaused" events. (In any case, it would be experimentally impossible to repeat such an event, because, in order to repeat the event, we would have to know how to cause it to happen!)

Yet we do have the given definition of determinism, and that is what we refer to and work with, including the implications outlined above and numerous other posts.


or alternate possibilities.

Tacking on the exclusion of "alternate possibilities" is a logical error. We know that all possibilities exist solely within the imagination, and that a "possibility" (something that "can happen" or something that we "can do") is a logical token that replaces the notion of what "will happen" or what we "will do" whenever we deal with a matter of uncertainty.

The brain gathers, processes and combines information and constructs any number of impossible worlds and scenarios. That itself being determined by information input, neural architecture, pattern recognition and rearrangement.

We may imagine Superman flying above the clouds while knowing full well that it is impossible.


This is a semantic rule that allows us to keep what "can" happen distinct from what "will" happen. We can know with certainty what "can" happen, even though we are still uncertain as to what "will" happen. And we know with certainty that the single event that "will" happen will be one of the several events that "can" happen.

And, of course, each of the alternate possibilities that appear to us, for example on the restaurant menu, were mental events that would have always proceeded without deviation. Every "can" was just as inevitable as the single "will".

These are perceptions and expressions emerging from a state of limited information, we don't know what can happen or will happen, what we see as possibilities are being presented, yet all events within a deterministic system must necessarily happen as determined, which makes our perception of multiple options in any given instance an illusion.

''And it’s natural to think that we are able to do otherwise only if we can do otherwise given the past; that is, only if our doing otherwise is a possible continuation of the past. If we follow this train of thought, we will conclude that we are able to do otherwise only if our doing otherwise is a possible continuation of the past consistent with the laws. But if determinism is true, there is only one possible continuation of the past consistent with the laws. And thus we get the incompatibilist conclusion. If determinism is true, our actual future is our only possible future. What we actually do is the only thing we are able to do.''
 
It's not physically possible to order the salad and not order the salad in the same instance in time. It's a contradiction.

In your usage in hard determinist lala-land, though you are saying "unless a different thing actually DID happen" which is fucking stupid.

Of course they can have happened if the universe had been different than it was, because that's the only way anything ever "can" even such that "it shall not"
 
"I would inevitably order the salad" was true.
"I could have ordered the steak, but I didn't" is also true.
Your conclusion that "both can't be true", is false.

They are clearly not mutually exclusive. In fact, they are mutually complimentary.

It's not physically possible to order the salad and not order the salad in the same instance in time. It's a contradiction.

And it is never the case that we must both order the salad and not order the salad in the same instance in time in order for both ordering and not ordering to be real possibilities for that instance in time.

A possibility exists solely within the imagination. We cannot walk across the possibility of a bridge. We can only walk across an actual bridge. But we cannot build an actual bridge without first imagining a possible bridge and how we could possibly build such a bridge.

It is never required that we must actually build that bridge in order for us to consider the possibility of building the bridge to be real.

Our imagination - being a physical activity of a brain - is not exempt from causal determinism. Brain activity, thoughts, feeling, imaginations, are fixed, as by definition all events within the system must be.

100% Correct.

We imagine and we do whatever is entailed by the system as it evolves from prior to current and future states - as defined - without deviation.

Also correct. But do keep in mind that the system we are talking about here is our own the central nervous system, operating deterministically, as it considers our possibilities, estimates the likely outcomes of our choices, and fixes the final inevitable choice to order the salad rather than the steak for dinner.

Imagination is not a loophole for free will.

Operational free will requires no "loopholes". It is 100% compatible with a perfectly deterministic world. That is the point.

If we know for certain what will happen, then what can happen never comes up. It is only when we do not know for certain what will happen that we employ the notion of what can happen.

Watch a video - a deterministic system - enough times and you get to know everything that will be said and done in the movie, no deviation, no alternatives. The lead character orders salad, rewind and he order salad, rewind and repeat any number of times, the lead character orders salad, no deviation, no could have done otherwise, no possible alternatives, all actions fixed by the information state of the system in every instance in time. That's determinism.

If we could rewind time, and replay it over and over, then in every replay there would be multiple options on the menu, each of which would be once again be a real possibility. I would have the same goal of eating a balanced diet, and the same reasoning that led me to reject the steak and choose the salad for dinner (due to the bacon and eggs for breakfast and the double cheeseburger for lunch). No deviation means that everything happens exactly as it did. All of the thoughts and feelings that occurred would happen in the same physical reality (if we could rewind time).

Yet we do have the given definition of determinism, and that is what we refer to and work with, including the implications outlined above and numerous other posts.

A false implication does not become a true implication by repetition, regardless who is stating it.

The fact of the matter is that a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect is fully compatible with operational free will. Always has been, always will be.

We may imagine Superman flying above the clouds while knowing full well that it is impossible.

Of course. But when we imagine ourselves ordering the steak, we know full well that it is something that we can do.

These are perceptions and expressions emerging from a state of limited information, we don't know what can happen or will happen, what we see as possibilities are being presented, yet all events within a deterministic system must necessarily happen as determined, which makes our perception of multiple options in any given instance an illusion.

An illusion is a false perception of reality. The reality is the people in the restaurant choosing for themselves what they will have for dinner, free of coercion and undue influence. Therefore, anyone claiming that this is not actually happening in physical reality would be having some kind of illusion.

The source of their illusion is the delusional notion that reliable causation is some kind of external entity that controls what people do, such that the people themselves are not controlling what they choose to do. They hold that it is causation, and not the person, that is responsible for what the person does. This is a delusional notion.

''And it’s natural to think that we are able to do otherwise only if we can do otherwise given the past; that is, only if our doing otherwise is a possible continuation of the past. If we follow this train of thought, we will conclude that we are able to do otherwise only if our doing otherwise is a possible continuation of the past consistent with the laws. But if determinism is true, there is only one possible continuation of the past consistent with the laws. And thus we get the incompatibilist conclusion. If determinism is true, our actual future is our only possible future. What we actually do is the only thing we are able to do.''

And I'm surprised that you fail to see the "carefully crafted" "wordplay" in that mess of sloppy thinking by the incompatibilist, something which you accuse the compatibilists of doing!

But I hope you can see now why the single actual future is not our only possible future. Within the domain of human influence (things we can make happen if we choose to), the single actual future will be chosen, by us, from among the many possible futures that we will imagine.

For example, the restaurant menu presents us with multiple possible futures. There is the future in which I order the steak for dinner. There is the future in which I order the salad for dinner. Due to my breakfast of bacon and eggs and my double cheeseburger for lunch, and my goal to eat more fruits and vegetables, I choose the future (what I "will" do) in which I order the salad for dinner. Multiple possible futures reduced to the single inevitable future by the deterministic process of choosing. This is how it works in the real world.
 
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