I just came across this 12 minute talk about how to evaluate voting methods. I pretty much agree with it, but what do you think?
It basically says that you can arbitrarily decide you like a voting system because it passes a certain criteria such as “clone independence”, “later no harm,” but the best way to evaluate a voting system is to test it out through many different simulations and calculate the Bayesian regret. When you do this, range voting and approval voting come out on top.I would rather read a 1-2 sentence summary first before I watch a 12-minute video.
The voters' preference values are generated randomly, using the C library function random(). In many of the runs, voter misinformation and confusion were simulated by adding random numbers to the preference values before calculating votes from them.A voter has some preference for every candidate. The preference ranges from total dislike to total like, represented as -1.0 to 1.0.
A voter's happiness with respect to the outcome of an election is equal to the voter's preference for the candidate that won the election.
It looks like the "Bayesian Regret" is actually "the difference between a person's range voting optimal candidate and the range voting winner", when subjected to a bunch of test elections with made up but "realistic" ballots.
So it's not so much that the voting methods are being evaluated independently and range and approval are coming out on top, it's that you're making the assumption that a range ballot most accurately captures voter intent, which is probably not a good assumption. (It only works if the voter accurately rates the degree of unacceptability or acceptability between sets of candidates. What would be my relative rankings on the mostly identical Green Presidential Candidate Jill Stein and Justice Party's Rocky Anderson?) Circular reasoning, basically.
- Each voter has a personal "utility" value for the election of each candidate. (E.g., if Nixon is elected, then voter Dan Cooper will acquire -55 extra lifetime happiness units.) In a computer simulation, the "voters" and "candidates" are artificial, and the utility numbers are generated by some randomized "utility generator" and assigned artificially to each candidate-voter pair.
- Now the voters vote, based both on their private utility values, and (if they are strategic voters) on their perception from "pre-election polls" (also generated artificially within the simulation, e.g. from a random subsample of "people") of how the other voters are going to act.
(Note. Some people here have gotten the wrong impression that this is assuming that voters will be "honest" or that we are assuming that honest range voters will use candidate-utilities as their candidate-scores. Other people thought we insisted on i.i.d. normal random numbers as utility values [or that some other specific randomized utility generator was insisted upon] . All those impressions are incorrect; these assumptions are not made.)- The election system E elects some winning candidate W.
- The sum over all voters V of their utility for W, is the "achieved societal utility."
- The sum over all voters V of their utility for X, maximized over all candidates X, is the "optimum societal utility" which would have been achieved if the election system had magically chosen the societally best candidate.
- The difference between 5 and 4 is the "Bayesian Regret" of the election system E, at least in this experiment. It might be zero, but if E was bad or if this election was unlucky for E, then it will be positive because W and X will be different candidates.
So one might conclude from this that the best system of government that humanity has ever devised is the parliamentary republic with its legislature elected by proportional representation.
Maybe, but one could confine one's attention to existing systems.So one might conclude from this that the best system of government that humanity has ever devised is the parliamentary republic with its legislature elected by proportional representation.
It is hard to determine. There are so many systems that could be tried, but are untested.
it's not so much that the voting methods are being evaluated independently and range and approval are coming out on top, it's that you're making the assumption that a range ballot most accurately captures voter intent...Circular reasoning, basically.
So one might conclude from this that the best system of government that humanity has ever devised is the parliamentary republic with its legislature elected by proportional representation.
I do wish people would take the time to read about a complex subject like this before making such arguments. I've had to explain this numerous times over the years.
Clay Shentrup
I agree that we need to reduce voter exhaustion. I think though that rating candidates is more intuitive than ranking them. I also think that at the moment, even rating is asking for too much from the voter and we shouldn't start with that as our first attempt at reform. Another fear I have with range voting is that different groups might have different methods of rating. Maybe some people would just decide to rate unknown candidates in the middle and some other people would automatically give unknown candidates a zero rating.Third, and this is intuitively the strongest theoretical objection, I think, did the test accurately blur in response to differential voter exhaustion? Absolute ranking on a scale takes slightly more mental effort than preference ranking, and moreso as the number of candidates goes up. Asking voters to do more work in this way may actually be source of diminishing returns.
The other objections I have are practical rather than theoretical. I'm still in favor of IRV over Condorcet and Range, although this discussion has moved Range ahead of Condorcet for me. Most voters are mathematically illiterate, and the one metric on which FPTP beats all other contenders is its comprehensibility to laymen. It may be that it is mathematically demonstrable that the more complex winner picking systems yield more desirable results, but how many voters will understand that when it's explained to them? Of those that do not understand, how many will believe the assurances of mathematicians that such and such a system is better? If most voters don't accept the system as legitimate, you're stuck in endless accusations of fraud and conspiracy, which is probably not preferable to the FPTP Duopoly, because Major Parties DO collapse completely from 3rd Party challenges from time to time. Range does beat Condorcet on the "can be explained to a moron" metric, but it doesn't beat out IRV because the algorithm is simpler.
I'm also inherently skeptical of people with the free time and enthusiasm to come onto TalkFreethought to defend their positions when not actually summoned by anyone and who appear therefore to be using some sort of Google Alert to pop up anywhere on the web their work is questioned. Apologies if one of the posters emailed you asking you to weigh in, but people watching the web for any contradiction of their position anywhere are generally ones to run away from very fast.
When has that happened?If most voters don't accept the system as legitimate, you're stuck in endless accusations of fraud and conspiracy, which is probably not preferable to the FPTP Duopoly, because Major Parties DO collapse completely from 3rd Party challenges from time to time.
Like what?As for the quality of proportional representation, this is a very complex subject, and much intuitive thinking is wrong.
http://scorevoting.net/PropRep.html
Because it is not applicable to single-seat elections.One major point there is that PR is irrelevant to single-winner offices like mayor/governor/senator/president/etc.
I'd like to see some explanations of those systems.Another is that if you use proportional representation, there are better PR systems, such as Proportional Score Voting or Asset Voting.
The world currently uses antiquated schemes like STV and MMP, which were not designed by experts. (Well, maybe they were experts in their day, but social choice theory has hugely advanced in the past few decades.)
Several countries use a two-ballot top-two runoff system, like France. Is that just as bad?Lastly, we have also never seen any country using a GOOD single-winner system, like score voting or approval voting. Most use plurality and some use IRV, both of which are poor. So it's not clear that PR really is the best approach.
Edit:
I'm also inherently skeptical of people with the free time and enthusiasm to come onto TalkFreethought to defend their positions when not actually summoned by anyone and who appear therefore to be using some sort of Google Alert to pop up anywhere on the web their work is questioned. Apologies if one of the posters emailed you asking you to weigh in, but people watching the web for any contradiction of their position anywhere are generally ones to run away from very fast.
I'm not sure why you think this is a bad thing for the original author to clarify his work on a thread that created specifically to discuss it.
What you describe about people not trusting a system that they don't understand – that actually happened in Burlington, Vermont when they implemented IRV. The Progressive Bob Kiss won the mayoral election even though he would have lost head to head with the Democrat. People thought they were being cheated and were pissed off so they voted to repeal IRV.
Another problem with IRV is that it is not additive. Ballots have to be recounted each round. You also can't restrict a recount to specific area that has a high spoiler rate for ballots like what Gore tried to do in 2000. A change in who gets eliminated first in the early rounds can necessitate a complete recount. Condorcet methods don't have this problem.
When has that happened?If most voters don't accept the system as legitimate, you're stuck in endless accusations of fraud and conspiracy, which is probably not preferable to the FPTP Duopoly, because Major Parties DO collapse completely from 3rd Party challenges from time to time.
There have been two major-party collapses in US history, and neither of them seem provoked by third parties, at least to me. The Federalists around 1820 and the Whigs around 1860. The Federalists were succeeded by the Whigs, and the Whigs by the Republicans.