“Reality Goes Beyond Physics,” and more

[Michael S. Pearl]

Pood said:

... the hard determinist says I could not choose

By the compatibilist reasoning you have put forth, that is also what the compatibilist means even if the compatibilist does not convey that meaning as succinctly or as coherently as does the hard determinist.

You say that when the compatibilist says could have done otherwise what is meant is would have done otherwise had conditions been different. As noted previously, the hard determinist could/would readily agree with the statement would have done otherwise had conditions been different.

But, given the assumptions of determinism in all of its usual forms, to mean would have done otherwise had conditions been different is also to mean could not have done otherwise because conditions were not different.

No, it doesn’t mean that. That’s the whole point. You are making a modal fallacy.

You are saying:

Given (antecedents x and y, Sam MUST [necessarily] do z.)

I am saying,

Necessarily, given (antecedents X and y, Sam WILL [but not MUST] do z.)

What I said can be reformulated, but your re-presentation is a mis-representation; hence, your re-presentation is false. Here is a more proper re-presentation:

If conditions had been different, then the person would have done otherwise.
If it is the case that conditions could not have been different, then there are no conditions in which the person would have done otherwise.

I did not say MUST, because I did not mean MUST. Maybe if we change the tense, the lack of MUST will be more easily appreciated (even though the following way of changing the tense does not bother to provide a good sense of context).

If conditions can be different, then the person can do otherwise.
If it is the case that conditions cannot be different, then the person cannot do otherwise (than what the person does or WILL do).

Insofar as a determinist asserts/assumes a context in which conditions are everywhere and everywhen set such that there is no effective indeterminateness, then the conditions which are ever actual are the only conditions which can and will ever be actual. Based on the previous sentence, that determinist position is aptly described as holding that the notion of otherwise is senseless since nothing otherwise is actualizable. Another way of putting it is that the notion of otherwise is incompatible with the aforesaid determinism. There is no MUST in any of that.

Oh, another way of putting it is that when it is asserted/assumed that conditions are everywhere and everywhen set such that there is no effective indeterminateness, then what is also being effectively asserted is that possibilities are illusions. Interestingly, and based upon the just explicated determinism, instead of saying If conditions had been different, then the person would have done otherwise, it is only from a non-determinist perspective that it makes any sense to say If conditions had been different, then the person might have done otherwise.

If you do not think that possibilities are illusions, then good for you. At least that would be right and correct.

 

[Jarhyn]

We are not talking about many worlds or there rather than here, which is just another lame excuse for observed reality. All you are doing is trying desperately to give determinism a bad rap due to your dislike for the implications.

This is classic ad hominem. I will start reporting all your ad hom posts if you keep this up.

To be fair, I was *really* mean to her earlier, and this whole skewt of discussion is a result of that meanness.

I would *rather* that the people I discuss this is with by in large actually know what they are talking about and have the capacity to reason, but the fact is that more and more I do understand this is a community.

I'm just struggling with finding better ways to fight tagalong defense of confused ideas.

I know for a fact that I'm not the best person to be talking about these things on the basis of my demeanor and inner motivations, but the fact is that you have a real job.

Peacegirl is wrong and she did everything she needed to to depose herself, but it was still kinda fucked up.

I'm just so done with Ion, may he never be reborn.

It is better to just block her and move on, and say as much when the advertising starts.

 

[steve_bank]

Clinical trials have shown that 8 out of 10 determinists choose Coke over Pepsi.

Ancient Zog points o an abject and says 'rock'. After a while the entire tribe is using the word for similar objects.

Point to something and say 'determinism'...

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Sam’s doing z is a relative necessity, not an absolute one. The necessity relation inheres jointly in the antecedent and the consequent of the proposition, and not solely in the consequent. This means that Sam’s choosing z is, was, and always will be, a contingent act — could have been otherwise.

Sam's doing z was unavoidable. If the context sequentially prior to Sam doing z is devoid of (relevant) indeterminateness, then Sam's doing z follows unavoidably - whether as a result, a sequela, a consequence, what have you. Sam's doing z is contingent upon the context in which or from which the doing of z occurred. That contingency is insufficient to establish an actual(izable) otherwise. In order for the contingent condition to establish an actualizable otherwise, there would have to be reference to some relevant indeterminateness. But, then, what happens to the determinism? It would need a little changing.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Except the past could have been utterly different because the past is an ongoing set of contingencies.

In order for the past to have been different, there would have to have been actual unsettledness about the sequence that would actually follow; i.e., we are once again referring to some instance(s) of relevant indeterminateness. There has to have been some initial unsettledness in order for there to be any contingency at all.

 

[steve_bank]

So,

Sorry, but I find your manner of expression unintelligible

Well, that tends to happen for some particular subset of folks. Given the fact that *peacegirl* is cheerleading you, I have little faith in your ability. Maybe you're going to surprise me but so far you haven't.

I could have done otherwise meaning I WOULD have done otherwise, had conditions been different

No, it means "that with me-property does otherwise when and where conditions are X"

It is not a statement that the immediate you exists in different conditions but that the *conditions* that define your actions, when presented different context, make different actions; or where some property is excluded from consideration.

This comes from the confused and ill-informed intent to try and treat set modalities as if they are uniquely positional.

This is literally the most tiresome and droll mistake that people approaching the topic of responsibility and causality make. Waves of people on Reddit make this error, as if born of the tides.

The waves come in. The waves go out. People commit the modal fallacy. The waves come in...

Your reference to peacegirl is - how can I put this as gently as possible? - a most unrespectable form of ad hominem remark. That does not speak well for you. It does not bode well for your possibilities. Be that as it may. You say that my statement, "I could have done otherwise [means] I WOULD have done otherwise, had conditions been different", does not mean what I say it means. pood said, "'I could have chosen otherwise,' means ... 'I WOULD have chosen otherwise, had conditions been different.'" Are you also saying that pood's statement does not mean what he says it means? If you assert that pood's statement means what he says it means, then it is incumbent upon you - i.e., it is necessary for you - to distinguish relevant differences between his statement and mine. To this point, I have no reason to think that you are at all familiar with modal logic - specifically with its utility.

Go to the Other Philosophical Discussions forum.

Read her 120 post long screed + advertisement wherein she spends most of the time defending her favorite author's "Efferent Vision" theory.

Go ahead.

Please.

I'll wait for you.

Oh, looks like I didn't have to. Now she's defending it here. It's probably not a great idea to continue engaging with that?

Anyway, yes, I am also saying Pood is wrong with their interpretation. "I would have done otherwise if conditions had been different" is a bad way of saying it if the goal is "precise correctness", because it just shifts where the modal operator on the subject is being applied invisibly still.

It is still taking the 'immediate subject' I, the looking at "different conditions" and then ignoring the fact that this necessarily means the subject is a non-local set. It still a statement not about an individual self 'I' but a statement about everywhere where some self-property exists elsewhere.

It's still a modally charged statement and will be so until you parse the apparent single-modal subject with the possible-modal packaging of the predicate to create the possible-modal subject.

It's wrong to unpack it quite like that specifically because it doesn't complete the conjugation of the sentence.

I think I am better understanding your manner of expression. Let us see.

Is the immediate subject-I always a local set? If so, is your objection/criticism based on the notion that the subject-I referenced in different conditions is not (maybe even possibly) the immediate subject-I?

Well, due to the nature we use to select the nonlocal set subject, the mmediate/local "set" is almost always (and perhaps *necessarily*) a member of the nonlocal version.

{} != {{},{{}}} is a basic intuition in math. The correct operator is to say {{},{{}}} *contains* {}, not that it *equals*...

If that is the case (or close enough to what you mean), would what you regard as a problem be avoided if the at issue determinism matter were addressed/expressed entirely from the local set immediate subject-I context?

Kind of? There are complications to it which...

For instance, do you think there is a problem with the question: Given a local set immediate subject-I, is it already determined how that set/subject is going to be?

Now we're getting into a slightly more useful conversation:

Given a local set immediate subject I, at time 0, it is not at that location determined how the subject is going to be at time 1, because the very action of the determination is motion from 0 to 1, and the site where it is so determined is 1.

0 is not locationally at 1.

Are you saying that, given local set immediate-I at 0, local set immediate-I at 0 is contained in local set immediate-I at 1? If local set immediate-I at 0 is NOT contained in local set immediate-I at 1, is that because local set immediate-I at 0 is somehow no longer contained/containable within any set? If that rendering of mine is at all close to accurate, and if local set immediate-I at 0 is contained in local set immediate-I at 1, then is there only one local set at 1? Or, are there multiple local sets at 1? If there are multiple sets at 1, do all of those sets contain local set immediate-I at 0, or do only some of the multiple sets at 1 contain local set immediate-I at 0?

No, and now I feel almost like you're just trying to find things (which I'm not saying) by going between only tangentially related parts of my post as if one was intended to represent some containerization in the next.

Your whole post is a confusion upon a confusion, so it's not even making sense at all trying to parse it in terms of what I actually said.

The first half of the post was a discussion about the first half of your post which was about a slightly different thing than the later half.

I'm saying, specifically *in the second half of my post*, that if you look at any point in block spacetime and ask "what is determined here" this is *equivalent* to "what is happening here, now".

What you see is is what you get, as far as my second nontrivial block: You don't see the future determined there because the future isn't determined there.

Instead, it's determined in the future by the things in preceding moment in the future which determine it and the transformation that happens when the thing that is here in 3d falls to there in 3d across a fourth time dimension.

Without doing the falling, without scribing the ark or transiting the viewer or whatever, you don't get to see the result, in the sort of deterministic system I envision the universe as.

"There is no preferred reference frame" is a very important insight here, I think. No one location "best" says what happens. Different "possibilities" exist, and when we look forward across the time dimension explicitly, we call these "outcomes".

But again I reiterate, the outcome of some earlier point isn't already at some earlier point; it's only and *exactly* at the outcome.

Jarhyn previously said:

Given a local set immediate subject I, at time 0, it is not at that location determined how the subject is going to be at time 1 ...

On the face of it, as expressed, the statement quoted immediately above seems to disavow determinism. I have reason to suspect that such a disavowal is not intended.

Jarhyn also previously said:

... the very action of the determination is motion from 0 to 1, and the site where it is so determined is 1.

Motion in the above remark might be intended to simply indicate/acknowledge that a given state/context at time 0 changes to (or is differentiated from) a different state/context at time 1 - albeit a different state/context which is, in a sense, dependent upon the initially considered, sequentially prior state/context.

Alternatively, motion in the cited remark could be intended to indicate an extreme reductive physicalist perspective which asserts that macrophysical change is reducible to microphysical motion/occurrences/action. But, even then, the first cited statement still seems to assert a disavowal of determinism. In order to remain consistent with the first cited statement, the motion statement ("motion from 0 to 1") must hold that the motion itself is not determined at time 0, because, if that motion were itself determined, then there would be no basis for the claim that the state/context is not determined until time 1.

In yet another alternative expression, instead of motion, explication can be in terms of differentiation. But, even then, the differentiation itself has to be not-determined if the state/context is not determined prior to time 1.

Therefore, if a disavowal of determinism is not intended, then modification or abandonment of the above quoted remarks is warranted.

Most recently Jarhyn said:

I'm saying, specifically *in the second half of my post*, that if you look at any point in block spacetime and ask "what is determined here" this is *equivalent* to "what is happening here, now".

What you see is is what you get, as far as my second nontrivial block: You don't see the future determined there because the future isn't determined there.

If you assume block spacetime, then you assume past, present, and future are all devoid of (relevant) indeterminateness and are all determined, because by assuming block spacetime you assume utter determinateness at all spacetime points. At "any point in block spacetime", the future is determined even though the future is not actual at (or from the perspective of) any pre-future spacetime point. Given the assumption of block spacetime, all future points are always determined regardless of whatever point is dubbed the present, but none of those determined future points are actual at the point referenced as present. Given the assumption of block spacetime, talk in terms of alternatives is feckless despite being constituent of block spacetime.

s = distance meters
t = time seconds
velocity v = ds/dt 1st derivative where d is delta or change.
acceleration a = dv/dt 2nd derivative change in velocity
jerk j = da/dt 3rd derivative

Steve Bank aka extreme psychical reductionist. Causality, change does not occur without a cause at any level. Macro Newtonian, micro quantum, or fast relativistic.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

The choice before me is absolutely real. I am free to choose Coke or Pepsi.

I agree. So what? That does not mean your viewpoint is compatible with the determinism which denies the actuality of ideterminateness.

 

[peacegirl]

I’d say that the term “nomological determinist” is redundant in this context, since it really just means physical or causal determinism, as distinct from other types of determinism such as epistemic, logical, or relativistic determinism.

As mentioned, if you want to invoke the concept of nomicity, I think the key question is whether nomological determinism entails nomological necessity. Such necessity, if it can be had, is what the hard determinist needs to support his claim that my choosing Coke over Pepsi is somehow necessitated. Logical necessity will not support the claim.

Are you of the opinion that — for example — your choosing the Packers to defeat the Lions in Week 14 was somehow nomologically necessary? And if so, how would you justify that claim? Simply appealing to hard determinism would be circular.

Again, determinism also does not dictate IN ADVANCE what a person must choose; it is descriptive, not prescriptive, remember?

Um … right. That has been my argument all along. Why don’t you tell that to DBT and other hard determinists, and not to me?

If that's what you believe, then there is something wrong with your "logical necessity" that allows for the free will to do otherwise, which is a contradiction. Logical necessity is a false proposition that you are using to justify all of your reasoning therefrom. Just because something is logically possible doesn't mean that I could have chosen Coke over Pepsi, especially if in my way of reasoning, the taste of Coke does not excite me because it's too sweet, which compels me, in my preference (which is the driving force of all of my decisions) to choose Pepsi. If it didn't matter to me which brand I chose, it would be like choosing A or A, which would be as simple as closing my eyes and pointing to one or the other. Any time there are meaningful differences, we are compelled to choose the one that is the most preferable in our eyes, not someone else's.

It forces nothing against our will.

Exactly right. Tell it to DBT.

DBT continues to say that our choices, our decisions, are all part of determinism. They don't fall outside. Compatibilism only refers to external forces acting upon us, but they fail to include the internal forces that drive our choices. He keeps bringing this up and you keep ignoring.

The problem, therefore, is with the modal fallacy that says that because we had options (which no one is denying), that "we could have chosen otherwise". We could have if we had desired to, but we didn't desire to, so we could not have.

We didn’t desire to, so we DID NOT do otherwise.

DID NOT DO OTHERWISE implies COULD NOT DO OTHERWISE.

Decline and Fall of All Evil

We are not interested in opinions and theories regardless of where they originate, just in the truth, so let’s proceed to the next step and prove conclusively, beyond a shadow of doubt, that what we do of our own free will (of our own desire because we want to) is done absolutely and positively, not of our own free will. Remember, by proving that determinism, as the opposite of free will, is true, we also establish undeniable proof that free will is false.”

Contingency only means we base our decisions on factors (conscious and subconscious) that have led up to our present actions. This contemplation is an inextricable part in the causal chain of events that play out in our individual lives.

Yeah. So? That is compatibilism.

No Pood, it is not. Freedom of the will means that another choice could have been made. We all know that contemplation is what aids us in making a choice, but that is not freedom of the will.

The term ‘free will’ contains an assumption or fallacy, for it implies that if man is not caused or compelled to do anything against his will, it must be preferred of his own free will. This is one of those logical, not mathematical, conclusions. The expression ‘I did it of my own free will’ is perfectly correct when it is understood to mean ‘I did it because I wanted to; nothing compelled or caused me to do it since I could have acted otherwise had I desired.’ This expression was necessarily misinterpreted because of the general ignorance that prevailed, for although it is correct in the sense that a person did something because he wanted to, this in no way indicates that his will is free. In fact, I shall use the expression ‘of my own free will’ frequently myself, which only means ‘of my own desire.’

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Steve Bank aka extreme psychical reductionist. Causality, change does not occur without a cause at any level. Macro Newtonian, micro quantum, or fast relativistic.

Herman Weyl: "The objective world is, it does not happen. Only to the gaze of my consciousness, crawling along the lifeline of my body, does a section of this world come to life as a fleeting image in space which continuously changes in time."

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

There is no determination of my choice until I determine it. I am part of the deterministic process.

Are those occasions where/when "[t]here is no determination" occasions at which there is indeterminateness? If yes, then I do not understand what is the compatibility you are claiming to have with determinism.

If, on the other hand, you simply mean that at least most of you what you do without you being coerced or made to do what you do despite the utter lack of (relevant) indeterminateness, then I think that your remark is compatible with (even hard) determinism, since you are concurring with the notion of there being no operative, effectual indeterminateness.

 

[peacegirl]

It's not a matter of indoctrination. A claim such as 'light at the eye/instance vision' simply has no merit and only serves to discredit the book. It doesn't work, not logically, not physically. That is why anybody who has even a basic understanding of physics and how the eye and brain functions in terms of vision cannot take it seriously.

You need to drop it.

No DBT, i will not drop it. You are being too quick to pass judgment. The review against him on Amazon was a misrepresentation of his claim. He never said light was not at the eye or that we don’t need light to see. This is crazy and has ruined interest even though this knowledge can actually change our world for the better. I asked you to please refrain from throwing his knowledge out without a thorough understanding of why he claimed what he did. Talk about throwing the baby out with [what you believe is] the bathwater and Is a perfect example of having a dogmatic hold where the mere mention that science may have gotten it wrong throws you into a tizzy. This is not being open-minded which is the hallmark of good science!

Passing judgement has nothing to do with it. Light at the eye/instant vision is false. Not because I pass judgement or I say so, but it's just not the way the world physically works. It's impossible. Being physically impossible, it doesn't do you any good to argue for it.

You are judging his claim prematurely whether you think so or not. There is nothing in his claim that violates physical laws, not when you understand how the brain works. You cannot see it because you keep thinking in terms of light having to bring the image to our eyes through space/time distance. This alternate view needs to be examined with rigor, not thrown out because you can't imagine how this could occur. That's exactly what you're doing and sadly dissing his entire work as a result. He knew this would happen, but he didn't know the extent of the resentment that would follow.

Many theories as to how world peace could be achieved have been proposed, yet war has once again taken its deadly toll in the 21st century. The dream of peace has remained an unattainable goal — until now. The following pages reveal a scientific discovery regarding a psychological law of man’s nature never before understood. This finding was hidden so successfully behind layers and layers of dogma and misunderstanding that no one knew a deeper truth existed. Once this natural law becomes a permanent condition of the environment, it will allow mankind, for the very first time, to veer in a different direction — preventing the never-ending cycle of hurt and retaliation in human relations. Although this discovery was borne out of philosophical thought, it is factual, not theoretical, in nature. Two other natural laws are also revealed in later chapters. It is demonstrated that because we never understood a PROJECTING FUNCTION OF THE BRAIN, words developed that allowed us to see, as on a screen, that half the human race is an inferior physiognomic production — homely, bad-looking, etc. But these words do not symbolize reality because people are not ugly or beautiful, just different, and when the truth is learned — the use of these words, and this kind of unjust, hurtful discrimination, must come to an end. The other law asks this question: With the Earth billions of years old, and with millions and millions of babies coming into the world since time immemorial, doesn’t it seem a strange coincidence and unbelievable phenomenon that YOU, OF ALL PEOPLE, were born and are alive at this infinitesimal fraction of time? The undeniable answer will make you very happy by removing any fears you might have regarding your own death.

It's not premature judgement, just physics. Where it isn't possible to see something before the light/ information reflected or radiated from the object is acquired by the eyes and processed by the brain.

Sorry, I missed this question. You are still thinking in terms of travel time and therefore you believe that we are seeing an object without the light reaching our eyes. This is not what he's saying or what it means for the eyes not to be a sense organ. I know it's hard to envision how we see an object instantly but that's only because of the way in which you are thinking about this concept. Once you realize that the requirement for efferent vision involves light being at the eye, you will see that physics is not violated.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

So tell me, who wrote the jazz improv piece? The Big Bang? How did the Big Bang manage that miracle?

Uh, the composer wrote (or improvised) it. Was that composing contingent upon the Big Bang? Yah, if the Big Bang was essential to there being the context in which the composing is done. Is that contingency sufficient for thinking that the composer could have done otherwise? No. Additional - let's say more recent and proximal - relevant indeterminateness would have to be actual for an otherwise.

 

[peacegirl]

Every single event you describe is contingent.

Every picosecond's attributes are "necessitated" by its precedent. This does not negate free will, and it doesn't enable us to predict stuff beyond probability limits. There's just too much going on at once that may effect us later (meaning more than 2 picoseconds). A single gamma particle from a long gone explosion striking a gamete and altering DNA... science fiction stuff is happening all the time, and it impinges on our "free will". Our will may be free, but that's an internal phenomenon. There are no guarantees on outcomes, other than that we will effect it somewhat*.

*we get better at it all the time, which may be our downfall. Or our savior.

“Necessitated” here is just a manner of speaking. What I am getting at in these discussions is the logical meaning of necessity, which means that if a car crashes occurs, there is no possible world at which it fails to occur. Now clearly that’s false. I can imagine a world without this particular car crash, and I can do so without bringing about a logical contradiction. I cannot, however, imagine a possible world where triangles have more or less than three sides. Such a world would be logically contradictory.

Which gets to my point: that particular car crash clearly wasn't necessitated *everywhere*. It was only in that one place (and perhaps others, I'd depending on how "normal" the universe is).

Not only can you imagine one without that car crash you can see one and walk over to one, since most of the "worlds" in this world didn't have the crash.

That car crash failed to happen across most of the universe. Can you really say it was "necessary"?

It was necessary that it happen at that instant because it already happened, and we cannot change that. But it certainly doesn't mean that it has to continue to happen or that it is necessary that it happen going forward. After all, human behavior is contingent on many factors that determine an outcome, and this is always subject to change.

 

[peacegirl]

Pood said:

"The only form of necessity I recognize is logical necessity ..."

Okay, then you surely realize that there is no sort of necessity (logical, entailment, or otherwise) in your earlier statement: "if you replayed a series of events, with the exact same antecedents, then some person P would always choose X." A closer to necessity form of that statement would be "if you replayed a series of events, with the exact same antecedents, then some person P would always do X." It is closer to necessity in the sense that it is more trans-perspectival. The revised statement is more trans-perspectival in that it is a statement which is coherent both from the modal determinism and the nomological determinism viewpoints. The revised statement also avoids begging the question with regards to those who regard the act of choosing as presuming an actual indeterminateness which provides for actual (and, typically, actualizable) alternatives.

But, then, there is this earlier statement: "The compatibilist is simply pointing out, however, that there there is no necessity in this choice — the choice x was, is, and always will be, contingent — which automatically means it could have been otherwise."

Just because something is contingent doesn't mean it isn't necessary. Contingent implies necessity when it is understood to mean the antecedents that a contingent decision is based on necessarily push us in one direction or another.

First of all, given that the modal approach is not logically necessary, the cited statement is more accurately expressed as "... there is no modal necessity in this choice". Secondly, the remark "contingent ... automatically means it could have been otherwise" is also not logically necessary. From the nomological determinism perspective, even granting the contingency, it is false that "it could have been otherwise" insofar as "otherwise" at least implies there having been the very sort of indeterminateness which is denied under nomological determinism.

For that matter, and certainly from the perspective of the nomological determinists, there is nothing about the modal perspective which necessarily entails that "it could have been otherwise" within the context of this universe.

To me, “nomological determinism” just means “physical determinism,” and that is what determinism is — physical. A more intriguing life of thought is whether there exists nomological, or physical, necessity, and that is what I deny, though it seems to be what the hard determinist requires for his argument to go through. I agree with Wittgenstein that only logical necessity exists.

To say, “it could have been otherwise,” or, “I could have chosen otherwise,” means, to the compatibilist using modal logic, “I WOULD have chosen otherwise, had conditions been different.” Even though he DID NOT choose otherwise, he COULD have done so.

Don't you see that saying "it could have been otherwise" or "he could have chosen otherwise" had the conditions been different is not the argument? The argument is that had the conditions been THE SAME, according to your logic, he COULD have chosen otherwise because he had the option to do so. This is a huge fallacy. IOW, to then say, even though he DID NOT choose otherwise, he COULD have done so, is contradicting the very compatibilist definition of determinism that you are defending. No determinist is denying that he could or would have chosen otherwise had the conditions been different, but given what the conditions were, he COULD NOT HAVE RESPONDED DIFFERENTLY THAN WHAT HE, IN FACT, DID. This argument of yours is a strawman.

Of course he could have, he just did not.

He could have IF HE HAD WANTED TO. It is the "wanting to" or the "desiring to" that determines our choices. In this case he didn't want to, therefore he could not have (after the fact, not before) because it would have been less satisfying, and we can only move in the direction of "greater" not "less" satisfaction.

 

[Jarhyn]

The choice before me is absolutely real. I am free to choose Coke or Pepsi.

I agree. So what? That does not mean your viewpoint is compatible with the determinism which denies the actuality of ideterminateness.

Excepting of course that we have demonstrated that it IS in fact compatible with determinism.

As I've been putting it elsewhere, freedoms are attached to properties.

I may define a property, some state among some collection of stuff, this property explicitly being "subtract register and branch if less than or equal to register value" property, and things that have this property also have the property of *Turing completeness*.

Turing completeness describes a whole family of freedoms, all the freedoms of the software engineer in fact!

Stuff that has that freedom CAN branch, depending on the register value. The thing has been specifically engineered to have this property.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Not at all. In the block world my actions past, present and future determine, in part, what has/does/will happen.

This block world stuff is called relativistic determinism, because it is a determinism that arises from the Minkowski interpretation of relativity theory, and it founders on the entheymematic premise that in order to have free will, one must be able to change something, including the present and the future if not the past. Compatibilist free will does not require us to change anything. Nor libertarian free will, for that matter.

Despite the Not at all, your remark does not seem actually responsive to my having said:

If you assume block spacetime, then you assume past, present, and future are all devoid of (relevant) indeterminateness and are all determined, because by assuming block spacetime you assume utter determinateness at all spacetime points. At "any point in block spacetime", the future is determined even though the future is not actual at (or from the perspective of) any pre-future spacetime point. Given the assumption of block spacetime, all future points are always determined regardless of whatever point is dubbed the present, but none of those determined future points are actual at the point referenced as present. Given the assumption of block spacetime, talk in terms of alternatives is feckless despite being constituent of block spacetime.

Your past, present, and future actions are constituents of the block world, but being constituents is not sufficient basis for claiming that those actions are what determine that world as a block world eternally devoid of the previously - and often - referenced indeterminateness. I have no idea with specifically what you imagine you are disagreeing.

Oh, and why bring up - in reply to me - free will and changing the future? I know that you know that I have not been expressing with such clearly unnecessary terms.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Excepting of course that we have demonstrated that it IS in fact compatible with determinism.

As I've been putting it elsewhere, freedoms are attached to properties.

I may define a property, some state among some collection of stuff, this property explicitly being "subtract register and branch if less than or equal to register value" property, and things that have this property also have the property of *Turing completeness*.

Turing completeness describes a whole family of freedoms, all the freedoms of the software engineer in fact!

Stuff that has that freedom CAN branch, depending on the register value.

You all have not even come close to demonstrating the compatibility. Your [if( < || ==){} else {}] effects a range definition; that is not sufficient to establish the actuality of the asserted compatibility. It does not matter in the least that software engineers call that freedom. Except that it is kind of funny that that's what they call it. Oh, I hope they find it funny.

 

[pood]

Pood said:

... the hard determinist says I could not choose

By the compatibilist reasoning you have put forth, that is also what the compatibilist means even if the compatibilist does not convey that meaning as succinctly or as coherently as does the hard determinist.

You say that when the compatibilist says could have done otherwise what is meant is would have done otherwise had conditions been different. As noted previously, the hard determinist could/would readily agree with the statement would have done otherwise had conditions been different.

But, given the assumptions of determinism in all of its usual forms, to mean would have done otherwise had conditions been different is also to mean could not have done otherwise because conditions were not different.

No, it doesn’t mean that. That’s the whole point. You are making a modal fallacy.

You are saying:

Given (antecedents x and y, Sam MUST [necessarily] do z.)

I am saying,

Necessarily, given (antecedents X and y, Sam WILL [but not MUST] do z.)

What I said can be reformulated, but your re-presentation is a mis-representation; hence, your re-presentation is false. Here is a more proper re-presentation:

If conditions had been different, then the person would have done otherwise.
If it is the case that conditions could not have been different, then there are no conditions in which the person would have done otherwise.

But it is not the case that conditions could not have been otherwise.

And the person CAN do otherwise, even under the same conditions, he just WILL NOT, give those same conditions.

Philosophers get all worked up about this yet in daily life no one misunderstands what is being said. Last night I had a big dinner, so this morning I decided to skip breakfast. Had I not eaten so much last night, I would have had breakfast this morning.

We reason counterfactually all the time without blinking an eye, and most people never think they had no choice in some particular matter. Leave it to philosophers to do that.

Of course I have a choice between having, and not having, breakfast. Nothing is stopping me from making breakfast. It’s just that I don’t do it because I am still full from last night.

 

[peacegirl]

We are not talking about many worlds or there rather than here, which is just another lame excuse for observed reality. All you are doing is trying desperately to give determinism a bad rap due to your dislike for the implications.

This is classic ad hominem. I will start reporting all your ad hom posts if you keep this up.

You and your damn ad homs. You are no saint Pood. You have done more to purposely hurt me in the last decade than I could ever do to you. Your threats don’t scare me. I still am trying to understand your apparent unwillingness to see why logical necessity, according to modal logic, does not mean anyone, given the same exact circumstances, could do otherwise, which is what this whole argument is centered on.

Do not do ad hominem again, or I will start reporting all your ad hom posts. There have literally been dozens of them.

Go for it if it gives you greater satisfaction.

 

[pood]

We are not talking about many worlds or there rather than here, which is just another lame excuse for observed reality. All you are doing is trying desperately to give determinism a bad rap due to your dislike for the implications.

This is classic ad hominem. I will start reporting all your ad hom posts if you keep this up.

You and your damn ad homs. You are no saint Pood. You have done more to purposely hurt me in the last decade than I could ever do to you. Your threats don’t scare me. I still am trying to understand your apparent unwillingness to see why logical necessity, according to modal logic, does not mean anyone, given the same exact circumstances, could do otherwise, which is what this whole argument is centered on.

Do not do ad hominem again, or I will start reporting all your ad hom posts. There have literally been dozens of them.

Go for it if it gives you greater satisfaction.

And doing what gives me greater satisfaction — that is, doing what I want to do, free of coercion or restraint, including from external forces or the past — is … compatibilism.