“Reality Goes Beyond Physics,” and more

[pood]

“Hard determinism made me do it” is just as silly as “the devil made me do it.”

If someone holds a gun to my head and makes me choose Pepsi even though I prefer Coke (in reality I almost never drink either), then my free will is balked. Otherwise …

After all, what an I supposed to do? Choose what I don’t prefer, to demonstrate that I am no prisoner of hard determinism? But a hard determinist — specifically, Jerry Coyne, in this case — had a handy-dandy answer: hard determinism made me pick what I don’t prefer because hard determinism made me test hard determinism. That hard determinism fellow is even more meddlesome than the devil or God! And, like the latter two, he doesn’t exist, either.

 

[Elixir]

There was a guy at the NYT forums (shut down a couple decades ago) going by “goodold_lucifer” who argued that all sensations were instantaneous, totally accurate representations of the environment. Asserted that distant galaxies are seen exactly as they currently are, etc.

The thing I remember best was that someone registered with the name “goodold_1ucifer” and because of the NYT San serif font, it was visually indistinguishable from “goodold_lucifer”
The impersonator was genius; he kept making the same bad arguments as the “real” poster, but in terms that highlighted the stupidity of his assertions. The fun really began when both the original and the imposter started calling each other the imposter. It was hilarious.
Soon thereafter, NYT closed its fora.

I leave it to the reader to assess the relevance of this anecdote to the discussion above.

 

[peacegirl]

Pood said:

... the hard determinist says I could not choose

By the compatibilist reasoning you have put forth, that is also what the compatibilist means even if the compatibilist does not convey that meaning as succinctly or as coherently as does the hard determinist.

You say that when the compatibilist says could have done otherwise what is meant is would have done otherwise had conditions been different. As noted previously, the hard determinist could/would readily agree with the statement would have done otherwise had conditions been different.

But, given the assumptions of determinism in all of its usual forms, to mean would have done otherwise had conditions been different is also to mean could not have done otherwise because conditions were not different.

No, it doesn’t mean that. That’s the whole point. You are making a modal fallacy.

You are saying:

Given (antecedents x and y, Sam MUST [necessarily] do z.)

I am saying,

Necessarily, given (antecedents X and y, Sam WILL [but not MUST] do z.)

What I said can be reformulated, but your re-presentation is a mis-representation; hence, your re-presentation is false. Here is a more proper re-presentation:

If conditions had been different, then the person would have done otherwise.
If it is the case that conditions could not have been different, then there are no conditions in which the person would have done otherwise.

But it is not the case that conditions could not have been otherwise.

And the person CAN do otherwise, even under the same conditions, he just WILL NOT, give those same conditions.

Philosophers get all worked up about this yet in daily life no one misunderstands what is being said. Last night I had a big dinner, so this morning I decided to skip breakfast. Had I not eaten so much last night, I would have had breakfast this morning.

We reason counterfactually all the time without blinking an eye, and most people never think they had no choice in some particular matter. Leave it to philosophers to do that.

Of course I have a choice between having, and not having, breakfast. Nothing is stopping me from making breakfast. It’s just that I don’t do it because I am still full from last night.

Who is saying you don't have a choice? Choice is not a dirty word. It only means the weighing of options. It is contingent on factors that help you make the preferential choice given to you at any given time. In this case, you were not hungry from last night's dinner. Determinism does not say you must eat breakfast. You are constantly choosing the best option based on contingent events that play into what you will do next.

 

[pood]

Pood said:

... the hard determinist says I could not choose

By the compatibilist reasoning you have put forth, that is also what the compatibilist means even if the compatibilist does not convey that meaning as succinctly or as coherently as does the hard determinist.

You say that when the compatibilist says could have done otherwise what is meant is would have done otherwise had conditions been different. As noted previously, the hard determinist could/would readily agree with the statement would have done otherwise had conditions been different.

But, given the assumptions of determinism in all of its usual forms, to mean would have done otherwise had conditions been different is also to mean could not have done otherwise because conditions were not different.

No, it doesn’t mean that. That’s the whole point. You are making a modal fallacy.

You are saying:

Given (antecedents x and y, Sam MUST [necessarily] do z.)

I am saying,

Necessarily, given (antecedents X and y, Sam WILL [but not MUST] do z.)

What I said can be reformulated, but your re-presentation is a mis-representation; hence, your re-presentation is false. Here is a more proper re-presentation:

If conditions had been different, then the person would have done otherwise.
If it is the case that conditions could not have been different, then there are no conditions in which the person would have done otherwise.

But it is not the case that conditions could not have been otherwise.

And the person CAN do otherwise, even under the same conditions, he just WILL NOT, give those same conditions.

Philosophers get all worked up about this yet in daily life no one misunderstands what is being said. Last night I had a big dinner, so this morning I decided to skip breakfast. Had I not eaten so much last night, I would have had breakfast this morning.

We reason counterfactually all the time without blinking an eye, and most people never think they had no choice in some particular matter. Leave it to philosophers to do that.

Of course I have a choice between having, and not having, breakfast. Nothing is stopping me from making breakfast. It’s just that I don’t do it because I am still full from last night.

Who is saying you don't have a choice? Choice is not a dirty word. It only means the weighing of options. It is contingent on factors that help you make the preferential choice given to you at any given time. In this case, you were not hungry from last night's dinner. Determinism does not say you must eat breakfast. You are constantly choosing the best option based on contingent events that play into what you will do next.

Which is … compatibilism.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

But it is not the case that conditions could not have been otherwise.

And the person CAN do otherwise, even under the same conditions, he just WILL NOT, give those same conditions.

Philosophers get all worked up about this yet in daily life no one misunderstands what is being said. Last night I had a big dinner, so this morning I decided to skip breakfast. Had I not eaten so much last night, I would have had breakfast this morning.

We reason counterfactually all the time without blinking an eye, and most people never think they had no choice in some particular matter. Leave it to philosophers to do that.

Of course I have a choice between having, and not having, breakfast. Nothing is stopping me from making breakfast. It’s just that I don’t do it because I am still full from last night.

It makes no sense to say that conditions could have been otherwise while also saying that it is always already (meta)physically settled that the conditions would be not-otherwise. There is no such problem with saying that conditions would never be otherwise, but they can be imagined as being otherwise. Imagining is the basis for counterfactual reasoning.

And, yes, even hard determinists reason counterfactually. From the determinism perspective, that is effectively imagining from a non-determinism perspective. That's a good thing and not to be reflexively hammered as errant for being an inconsistency. Actually, the real problems show up with attempts to play like not having apprehended the inconsistency or to absorb the inconsistency such as by invoking illusionism or epiphenomenalism, or resorting to charges of modal fallacy when there has actually been no such occurrence, for example.

I do not see that modal philosophy is at all effective for a broad compatibilism apologetics. The greatest usefulness of modal philosophy is in the help it can provide in identifying - and, to whatever extent possible, controlling for - assumptions and variables. It is usefully employed in the process of expression development.

 

[pood]

But it is not the case that conditions could not have been otherwise.

And the person CAN do otherwise, even under the same conditions, he just WILL NOT, give those same conditions.

Philosophers get all worked up about this yet in daily life no one misunderstands what is being said. Last night I had a big dinner, so this morning I decided to skip breakfast. Had I not eaten so much last night, I would have had breakfast this morning.

We reason counterfactually all the time without blinking an eye, and most people never think they had no choice in some particular matter. Leave it to philosophers to do that.

Of course I have a choice between having, and not having, breakfast. Nothing is stopping me from making breakfast. It’s just that I don’t do it because I am still full from last night.

It makes no sense to say that conditions could have been otherwise while also saying that it is always already (meta)physically settled that the conditions would be not-otherwise. There is no such problem with saying that conditions would never be otherwise, but they can be imagined as being otherwise. Imagining is the basis for counterfactual reasoning.

And, yes, even hard determinists reason counterfactually. From the determinism perspective, that is effectively imagining from a non-determinism perspective. That's a good thing and not to be reflexively hammered as errant for being an inconsistency. Actually, the real problems show up with attempts to play like not having apprehended the inconsistency or to absorb the inconsistency such as by invoking illusionism or epiphenomenalism, or resorting to charges of modal fallacy when there has actually been no such occurrence, for example.

I do not see that modal philosophy is at all effective for a broad compatibilism apologetics. The greatest usefulness of modal philosophy is in the help it can provide in identifying - and, to whatever extent possible, controlling for - assumptions and variables. It is usefully employed in the process of expression development.

It is a modal fallacy to say that logically I cannot do other than what I do. True propositions are either necessarily or contingently true. No proposition can be a little bit necessary or a little bit contingent. If it is not logically impossible for me to choose Pepsi instead of Coke — and it isn’t — then my choosing Coke was a contingent fact about the world and could have been otherwise.

 

[Elixir]

my choosing Coke was a contingent fact about the world and could have been otherwise.

… absent the factors that compelled (“determined”) your choice of Coke, yeah. But such factors exist(ed) with or without your (or anyone else’s) awareness.

 

[pood]

my choosing Coke was a contingent fact about the world and could have been otherwise.

… absent the factors that compelled (“determined”) your choice of Coke, yeah. But such factors exist(ed) with or without your (or anyone else’s) awareness.

Yes, and crucially among those deterministic factors is me.

 

[pood]

To return to one of the papers I linked in the OP, and updating Aristotle, we could say that under soft determinism, I am the efficient and final cause of what I choose. Otherwise one ends up arguing, whether they wish to acknowledge it or not, that the big bang chose Coke for me.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

If it is not logically impossible for me to choose Pepsi instead of Coke — and it isn’t — then my choosing Coke was a contingent fact about the world and could have been otherwise.

If it is supposedly situationally impossible for you to choose Pepsi instead of Coke even with both Pepsi and Coke within your able reach, then does the question of logical possibility/impossibility matter at all?

 

[bilby]

It makes no sense to say that conditions could have been otherwise while also saying that it is always already (meta)physically settled that the conditions would be not-otherwise.

That is true, if (and only if) "could" and "would" are synonyms.

 

[bilby]

...does the question of logical possibility/impossibility matter at all?

Only if you make a living as a philosopher.

No part of this interminable debate matters. Peacegirl's father's desparate and laughable effort to build a world-changing utopian structure upon its shifting sands notwithstanding.

 

[pood]

But it is not the case that conditions could not have been otherwise.

And the person CAN do otherwise, even under the same conditions, he just WILL NOT, give those same conditions.

Philosophers get all worked up about this yet in daily life no one misunderstands what is being said. Last night I had a big dinner, so this morning I decided to skip breakfast. Had I not eaten so much last night, I would have had breakfast this morning.

We reason counterfactually all the time without blinking an eye, and most people never think they had no choice in some particular matter. Leave it to philosophers to do that.

Of course I have a choice between having, and not having, breakfast. Nothing is stopping me from making breakfast. It’s just that I don’t do it because I am still full from last night.

It makes no sense to say that conditions could have been otherwise while also saying that it is always already (meta)physically settled that the conditions would be not-otherwise.

But it does make sense. If the future is already settled, as it is under the block world interpretation, it makes perfect logical sense to say that the future could be otherwise even though it won’t be. This is no different than looking to an event in the past and saying that it could have been otherwise, even though it wasn’t. It could have been that the dinosaurs did not die out, even though they did. By contrast, it could never have been, and could never be, that triangles lack three sides.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

It makes no sense to say that conditions could have been otherwise while also saying that it is always already (meta)physically settled that the conditions would be not-otherwise.

That is true, if (and only if) "could" and "would" are synonyms.

I am trying to maintain (without too much effort) pood's dependency relationship between could and would from back when he said:

To say, “it could have been otherwise,” or, “I could have chosen otherwise,” means, to the compatibilist using modal logic, “I WOULD have chosen otherwise, had conditions been different.” Even though he DID NOT choose otherwise, he COULD have done so.

So, they are clearly not synonyms, but I think I have maintained pood's perspective/intent/meaning based on a dependency (to which he might have referred as a presuming).

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

... it makes perfect logical sense ...

Does it make sense in context? Does it make sense in all contexts? If it does not make sense in some context, can it still be logical in that context? Is it logical to say that something makes perfect logical sense and that it does not make sense in some of the same context(s) in which it makes perfect logical sense?

 

[pood]

If it is not logically impossible for me to choose Pepsi instead of Coke — and it isn’t — then my choosing Coke was a contingent fact about the world and could have been otherwise.

If it is supposedly situationally impossible for you to choose Pepsi instead of Coke even with both Pepsi and Coke within your able reach, then does the question of logical possibility/impossibility matter at all?

Because you have not demonstrated any such “situational impossibility.” This would just be another name for what I talked about upthread, the concept of nomological, as opposed to logical, necessity. Unless one can establish nomological necessity, the hard determinist stand does not stand.

 

[pood]

... it makes perfect logical sense ...

Does it make sense in context? Does it make sense in all contexts? If it does not make sense in some context, can it still be logical in that context? Is it logical to say that something makes perfect logical sense and that it does not make sense in some of the same context(s) in which it makes perfect logical sense?

Not sure what post of mine you are referring to here.

 

[peacegirl]

We are not talking about many worlds or there rather than here, which is just another lame excuse for observed reality. All you are doing is trying desperately to give determinism a bad rap due to your dislike for the implications.

This is classic ad hominem. I will start reporting all your ad hom posts if you keep this up.

You and your damn ad homs. You are no saint Pood. You have done more to purposely hurt me in the last decade than I could ever do to you. Your threats don’t scare me. I still am trying to understand your apparent unwillingness to see why logical necessity, according to modal logic, does not mean anyone, given the same exact circumstances, could do otherwise, which is what this whole argument is centered on.

Do not do ad hominem again, or I will start reporting all your ad hom posts. There have literally been dozens of them.

Go for it if it gives you greater satisfaction.

And doing what gives me greater satisfaction — that is, doing what I want to do, free of coercion or restraint, including from external forces or the past — is … compatibilism.

No, that is not the definition used in this debate. This is a bait and switch effort to confuse. Free will is the ability to choose otherwise, not the freedom (no external restraint) to weigh options. Free of coercion can be used to mean "free of external force" which is only half of the definition. Compatibilism leaves the internal part out which is the most important because we all know that having a gun to our head gives us little choice to do what we are told if we want to survive. Our internal thought process is based on conscious and unconscious factors that drive our preferences. Free of coercion is a colloquial expression used by the general public but when analyzed it is superficial at best. Superficial appearances are often wrong, and it is wrong to think that there is no compulsion to choose that which is the most preferable when the very act of contemplation proves this to be the case or we wouldn't contemplate, ponder, ruminate, reflect, or think over our options. What would be the point? Through this weighing of alternatives, there can only be one possible choice at any given moment. This is the reason free will is a realistic mirage.

“You must be kidding? Here you are in the process of demonstrating why the will of man is not free, and in the same breath you tell me you’re doing this of your own free will.”

This is clarified somewhat when you understand that man is free to choose what he prefers, what he desires, what he wants, what he considers better for himself and his family. But the moment he prefers or desires anything is an indication that he is compelled to this action because of some dissatisfaction, which is the natural compulsion of his nature. Because of this misinterpretation of the expression ‘man’s will is free,’ great confusion continues to exist in any discussion surrounding this issue, for although it is true that man has to make choices, he must always prefer that which he considers good, not evil, for himself when the former is offered as an alternative.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

... it makes perfect logical sense ...

Does it make sense in context? Does it make sense in all contexts? If it does not make sense in some context, can it still be logical in that context? Is it logical to say that something makes perfect logical sense and that it does not make sense in some of the same context(s) in which it makes perfect logical sense?

Not sure what post of mine you are referring to here.

#133

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

If it is not logically impossible for me to choose Pepsi instead of Coke — and it isn’t — then my choosing Coke was a contingent fact about the world and could have been otherwise.

If it is supposedly situationally impossible for you to choose Pepsi instead of Coke even with both Pepsi and Coke within your able reach, then does the question of logical possibility/impossibility matter at all?

Because you have not demonstrated any such “situational impossibility.” This would just be another name for what I talked about upthread, the concept of nomological, as opposed to logical, necessity. Unless one can establish nomological necessity, the hard determinist stand does not stand.

Incorrect. Logically, modally, hard determinism has not been demonstrated to be not possibly true. Likewise, it is proper to regard a situational impossibility as possibly true.