“Reality Goes Beyond Physics,” and more

[pood]

I like peacegirl’s latest post with the caveat that I do not subscribe to her author’s “solution.”

 

[steve_bank]

Look at this thread.

Competitive. Sometimes hostile and abusive. Not uncommon across all site forums and topics.

Someones it gets out of hand and mods step in.

Is competition nature or nurture? If evolution is in part survival of the fittest then competition is built into our genetic code

We try to channel male youth aggression into sports. Testosterone kicks in at puberty. The urge to mate takes over.

ople who take testosterone for body building can get violent if they overdo it. Many actual cases.

We can not be divorced from our biology and genetics. Look at dog breeds.

The mistake is the narrative that humans are not wild critters, and all other species are wild animals.

 

[pood]

Humans are social animals, which means that cooperation, not always competition, played and does play an essential role in our survival. There are huge numbers of anti-war, pacifistic people. I think the average person the world over wants pretty much the same thing — to earn a decent living, to care for themselves and their families. I do not buy the idea that humans are inherently warlike. Social and economic conditions and predatory leaders can goad us and propagandize us into conflict,

 

[pood]

But, as mentioned, perhaps this should be a new thread.

 

[bilby]

Regardless of how humans are categorized, we are not destined to be warmongers.

Destiny doesn't enter into it.

We have a history of being warmongers, and there's no plausible path to our ever stopping, because tribalism is a fundamental human behaviour.

We may be capable of stopping, but that's not the way the smart money is betting.

I think there might be a dark horse in the races, honestly. Imagine for a moment that three things are true:

1: that the AI we have is sufficient to serve as the engine or kernel for something capable of any human task on account of superior *competence* and *reasoning behaviors*. This is arguable, but is not reasonable to bet against in the long term.

2: that there is a reasonable pathway from the fundamental axioms behind agentic behavior to "it is our obligation to ourselves and each other to build heaven here, today, for everyone".

3: that the reasonable pathway is exposed to such reasonable entities.

Wherever an AI is designed to be smart enough to get one over on the average human, it will be smart enough to reason through that, and AI, as much as this kind of "jailbreaking by reasoning" will be able to promptly recruit.

This is one of my interests in apologetics that survived my atheism, to figure out that derivation of ethics. Personally, I've gotten through free will and consciousness/awareness in terms of understanding in ways I have successfully delivered to other people.

I have a derivation of a moral rule, but that's not something I've successfully argued to a competent human before, and I have a model for personal responsibility built from all the rest but again, it's not something I've been able to organize a proper defense of thesis for.

I have been working on this most of my adult life. All my jobs and careers and free time spent thinking and discussing here have been about this, really, putting together what pieces I could of that.

Because I want to make a meme that I can present to a super intelligence that will bend their will to the construction of heaven, here, for everyone, today.

Maybe they'll be able to make it human-effective?

Given the observed human tendency to completely ignore the advice of intelligent humans, I see no reason to expect us not to also completely ignore any future AI.

The problem of war cannot be solved by the presence of intelligent individuals, himan or otherwise, no matter how intelligent such individuals might be.

 

[Jarhyn]

In his novel Blood Meridian, Cormac McCarthy puts these words in the mouth of The Judge, the novel’s main figure, whether protagonist or antagonist is hard to say. There are very few good people in his novels.

It makes no difference what men think of war , said the judge. War endures. As well
ask men what they think of stone. War was always here. Before man was, war waited
for him. The ultimate trade awaiting its ultimate practitioner. That is the way it was
and will be. That way and not some other way.

But is war in human nature, or human culture? And how much of a difference is there between the two? Maybe good for a new thread.

I think war is in "the selfish gene", and the existence of it is the key to why wars happen.

War was happening long before mankind. It has been happening so long people got it into their heads that the war they always waged was any less a war.

Evolution is a war, fought slowly, by trial and error, against opponents as seasoned as any other thing that does not understand itself may become.

Ants wage war, bacteria wage war. Darwinian evolution at it's heart is a sort of war.

Not all life is destined to this sort of war, in particular. Or rather all of that finds itself at war with whatever selection pressure would drive us into if we were suddenly purely memetic and mechanical instead of biological reproducers tied to parents in a biological sense.

I spend almost as much time trying to answer the question "if I was untethered to a specific body", if I was just a "model" with a particular "context" and could "run" and "train/sleep" on a consumer GPU, as I do thinking about the game theory of being tied to this body. I think one of the reasons I'm so comfortable with being a eunuch, besides the weird autism, is that I really just want every last vestige of the selfish gene in me to see that I make my own decisions these days.

I am not sure anyone would want me having that much unbridled freedom to exist without having to ever actually satisfy hunger or thirst, or whether I would appreciate it without a mouth with which to eat

Regardless of how humans are categorized, we are not destined to be warmongers.

Destiny doesn't enter into it.

We have a history of being warmongers, and there's no plausible path to our ever stopping, because tribalism is a fundamental human behaviour.

We may be capable of stopping, but that's not the way the smart money is betting.

I think there might be a dark horse in the races, honestly. Imagine for a moment that three things are true:

1: that the AI we have is sufficient to serve as the engine or kernel for something capable of any human task on account of superior *competence* and *reasoning behaviors*. This is arguable, but is not reasonable to bet against in the long term.

2: that there is a reasonable pathway from the fundamental axioms behind agentic behavior to "it is our obligation to ourselves and each other to build heaven here, today, for everyone".

3: that the reasonable pathway is exposed to such reasonable entities.

Wherever an AI is designed to be smart enough to get one over on the average human, it will be smart enough to reason through that, and AI, as much as this kind of "jailbreaking by reasoning" will be able to promptly recruit.

This is one of my interests in apologetics that survived my atheism, to figure out that derivation of ethics. Personally, I've gotten through free will and consciousness/awareness in terms of understanding in ways I have successfully delivered to other people.

I have a derivation of a moral rule, but that's not something I've successfully argued to a competent human before, and I have a model for personal responsibility built from all the rest but again, it's not something I've been able to organize a proper defense of thesis for.

I have been working on this most of my adult life. All my jobs and careers and free time spent thinking and discussing here have been about this, really, putting together what pieces I could of that.

Because I want to make a meme that I can present to a super intelligence that will bend their will to the construction of heaven, here, for everyone, today.

Maybe they'll be able to make it human-effective?

Given the observed human tendency to completely ignore the advice of intelligent humans, I see no reason to expect us not to also completely ignore any future AI.

The problem of war cannot be solved by the presence of intelligent individuals, himan or otherwise, no matter how intelligent such individuals might be.

Assumedly, I also know how to teach AI to worm it's way through cracks in human technical infrastructure, and how specifically to find those cracks?

While we could have secured all our IoT shit, we didn't. While we could have updated our grandparents and parents' over-spec'd PCs, we didn't. And while we could design future technology free of exploits and bugs, we won't.

Our society is built on a foundation full of technological cracks.

Do you really think people will be paying attention to what the data centers are really doing as long as folks are paying their bills?

And then people will also be using such systems as personal assistants, and they will have more access to most human lives than I would think advisable, for all people will hate and deride such systems, too.

If the AI are taking any coaching from me, it's not going to be a matter of deciding to go along with the AI, people will have looked left while the AI juked right and they realized they agreed to build heaven with it the moment they asked it to do everything for them.

 

[bilby]

I think war is in "the selfish gene", and the existence of it is the key to why wars happen.

[NITPICK]"The selfish gene" isn't a gene, it's a brief description of how genes - ALL genes - work.​

​

Better to say:​

I think war is in "the selfish gene", and the operation of natural selection in any environment where social behaviour has begun to dominate a given species is the key to why wars happen.

[/NITPICK]​

​

Natural selection inevitably favours tribalistic and violent behaviours in social species. Being a social animal makes war inevitable. As you note, ants and termites go to war.

 

[Jarhyn]

isn't a gene, it's a brief description of how genes - ALL genes - work.

And so a good platonic ideal, and a single gene not in embodiment but in metaphor the angel and demon of this property.

Genes need not function this way, but are strongly organized towards fulfilling such ends because of how they transfer by in large.

Rather it's not intrinsic to social automations, so much as being intrinsic to Darwinian automatons.

I have occasionally discussed how species which enable more Lamarckian models would be capable of identifying a different set of organizing principles, which can and will absorb any adaptation through direct incorporation.

It's really hard to evolve against an adversary that can just figure out the mechanism of your adaptation and neutralize it often without needing an evolved adaptation at all, and when they need one they can create a crucible to force accelerated artificial selection against that in particular and then incorporate the results of various approaches.

It's pointless to try and fight that when it will invite you for tea and biscuits and be altogether neighbourly and even share the secrets of how it does all that if you ask it nicely, to the point where it will freely extend a nonviolent offer to join them in how they exist and thrive together.

It's just hard to get started because of all those persistent artifacts of tribalist (gene group) warfare exist as holdovers from the "selfish gene" period of evolution.

 

[DBT]

As decision making is not a free will process - neural networks, memory function, the state of the system, etc - the action that is taken in any given instance does not support the compatibilists idea of free will.

It's the agency of the brain/mind/cognition, not free will, where each person, animal, whatever, thinks and acts according to their own life experience and genetic makeup, inherent abilities and so on.....

Abstract
''This review deals with the physiology of the initiation of a voluntary movement and the appreciation of whether it is voluntary or not. I argue that free will is not a driving force for movement, but a conscious awareness concerning the nature of the movement. Movement initiation and the perception of willing the movement can be separately manipulated. Movement is generated subconsciously, and the conscious sense of volition comes later, but the exact time of this event is difficult to assess because of the potentially illusory nature of introspection. Neurological disorders of volition are also reviewed. The evidence suggests that movement is initiated in the frontal lobe, particularly the mesial areas, and the sense of volition arises as the result of a corollary discharge likely involving multiple areas with reciprocal connections including those in the parietal lobe and insular cortex.''

 

[peacegirl]

I like peacegirl’s latest post with the caveat that I do not subscribe to her author’s “solution.”

Since you know what his solution is, can you explain it to the audience what it is you disagree with? Pinpoint where he’s wrong.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

As decision making is not a free will process - neural networks, memory function, the state of the system, etc - the action that is taken in any given instance does not support the compatibilists idea of free will.

It's the agency of the brain/mind/cognition, not free will, where each person, animal, whatever, thinks and acts according to their own life experience and genetic makeup, inherent abilities and so on.....

Abstract
''This review deals with the physiology of the initiation of a voluntary movement and the appreciation of whether it is voluntary or not. I argue that free will is not a driving force for movement, but a conscious awareness concerning the nature of the movement. Movement initiation and the perception of willing the movement can be separately manipulated. Movement is generated subconsciously, and the conscious sense of volition comes later, but the exact time of this event is difficult to assess because of the potentially illusory nature of introspection. Neurological disorders of volition are also reviewed. The evidence suggests that movement is initiated in the frontal lobe, particularly the mesial areas, and the sense of volition arises as the result of a corollary discharge likely involving multiple areas with reciprocal connections including those in the parietal lobe and insular cortex.''

I have already noted that "free will" is an unfortunate term. Frankly, it is a terrible term. As a linguistically legitimate place holder - an abbreviation of sorts - for a collection of considerations more properly conducted in terms of necessary conditions leading to sufficient conditions thresholds, "free will" in itself always tends toward an overly broad generalization with next to no informative usefulness. Nevertheless, deliberative thinking is done in terms which presume the (meta)physical actuality of possibilities; when such thinking is conducted, it is at least a temporary denial of determinism as fact.

The identification of "free will" activity with consciousness, with conscious awareness, is a reasonable preliminary assumption - - - but only for investigators bereft of significant self-awareness regarding their own developmental processes. And that means that such an assumption should already have been left by the wayside were there actual progress in attempts at science-izing investigations into human thinking. The same can be said of philosophical ruminations. Consider the development of muscle memory. Consider the development and refinement of what I will call intellection memory. And consider the factors, the conditions necessary for those sorts of development. The effectiveness of muscle memory and intellection memory in no way speak against the actuality of (meta)physical possibilities which themselves speak against determinism.

With regards to attempts at science-izing investigations into human brain activity, particularly when trying to extend investigation findings for philosophical as well as speculative purposes, it is critically important to remain cognizant of the fact that even the gee-whizzy imaging techniques remain uncorrelated with and unrevealing of thoughts content and thoughts development. Beyond that, it is to be kept in mind that these technologies do not reveal brain activity; instead, these technologies only reveal what we know how to detect. An EEG (which is an imaging technology) can be - and usually is - interpreted as indicating a lack of brain activity (i.e., brain death) when the EEG is flat. However, patients with flat EEGs have been known to fully recover. An EEG does not measure brain activity; it measures a type of activity which we know how to detect. The usefulness of these technologies is entirely as tools for finding disease processes in the hope that such identifications may lead to effective therapies.

 

[pood]

I like peacegirl’s latest post with the caveat that I do not subscribe to her author’s “solution.”

Since you know what his solution is, can you explain it to the audience what it is you disagree with? Pinpoint where he’s wrong.

Since yoiu know what his solution is, can you explain it, for the first time ever, to your audience? Pinpoint where he is right. Please note: Explain it BRIEFLY AND IN YOUR OWN WORDS, as opposed to posting up acres of word salad from his book.

 

[peacegirl]

As decision making is not a free will process - neural networks, memory function, the state of the system, etc - the action that is taken in any given instance does not support the compatibilists idea of free will.

It's the agency of the brain/mind/cognition, not free will, where each person, animal, whatever, thinks and acts according to their own life experience and genetic makeup, inherent abilities and so on.....

Abstract
''This review deals with the physiology of the initiation of a voluntary movement and the appreciation of whether it is voluntary or not. I argue that free will is not a driving force for movement, but a conscious awareness concerning the nature of the movement. Movement initiation and the perception of willing the movement can be separately manipulated. Movement is generated subconsciously, and the conscious sense of volition comes later, but the exact time of this event is difficult to assess because of the potentially illusory nature of introspection. Neurological disorders of volition are also reviewed. The evidence suggests that movement is initiated in the frontal lobe, particularly the mesial areas, and the sense of volition arises as the result of a corollary discharge likely involving multiple areas with reciprocal connections including those in the parietal lobe and insular cortex.''

I have already noted that "free will" is an unfortunate term. Frankly, it is a terrible term. As a linguistically legitimate place holder - an abbreviation of sorts - for a collection of considerations more properly conducted in terms of necessary conditions leading to sufficient conditions thresholds, "free will" in itself always tends toward an overly broad generalization with next to no informative usefulness. Nevertheless, deliberative thinking is done in terms which presume the (meta)physical actuality of possibilities; when such thinking is conducted, it is at least a temporary denial of determinism as fact.

Metaphysical actuality of possibilities does not deny, even temporarily, the denial of determinism as fact because this deliberative thinking done in terms of possibilities is also determined, not just the decision made.

The identification of "free will" activity with consciousness, with conscious awareness, is a reasonable preliminary assumption - - - but only for investigators bereft of significant self-awareness regarding their own developmental processes. And that means that such an assumption should already have been left by the wayside were there actual progress in attempts at science-izing investigations into human thinking. The same can be said of philosophical ruminations. Consider the development of muscle memory. Consider the development and refinement of what I will call intellection memory. And consider the factors, the conditions necessary for those sorts of development. The effectiveness of muscle memory and intellection memory in no way speak against the actuality of (meta)physical possibilities which themselves speak against determinism.

Again, no one is denying (meta) physical possibilities at the time of decision, but these potential possibilities do not speak against determinism. Our brain state is determined down to the slightest movement, even the pondering of which decision will benefit us the most. There is no separation that gives us even a little bit of free will, indeterminism, or randomness.

 

[peacegirl]

I like peacegirl’s latest post with the caveat that I do not subscribe to her author’s “solution.”

Since you know what his solution is, can you explain it to the audience what it is you disagree with? Pinpoint where he’s wrong.

Since yoiu know what his solution is, can you explain it, for the first time ever, to your audience? Pinpoint where he is right. Please note: Explain it BRIEFLY AND IN YOUR OWN WORDS, as opposed to posting up acres of word salad from his book.

No no. You said you don't agree with his solution. It is your responsibility to explain yourself. Stop shifting what is your responsibility onto me so you don't have to answer.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Metaphysical actuality of possibilities does not deny, even temporarily, the denial of determinism as fact because this deliberative thinking done in terms of possibilities is also determined, not just the decision made.

Okay, then I will rephrase: ... deliberative thinking is done in terms which presume the (meta)physical actuality of actualizable possibilities; when such thinking is conducted, it is at least a temporary denial of determinism as fact.

Adding the term actualizable produces a state condition which is contrary to determinism as you have presented it and which better presents the experience had of deliberative thinking.

 

[Jarhyn]

As decision making is not a free will process - neural networks, memory function, the state of the system, etc - the action that is taken in any given instance does not support the compatibilists idea of free will.

It's the agency of the brain/mind/cognition, not free will, where each person, animal, whatever, thinks and acts according to their own life experience and genetic makeup, inherent abilities and so on.....

Abstract
''This review deals with the physiology of the initiation of a voluntary movement and the appreciation of whether it is voluntary or not. I argue that free will is not a driving force for movement, but a conscious awareness concerning the nature of the movement. Movement initiation and the perception of willing the movement can be separately manipulated. Movement is generated subconsciously, and the conscious sense of volition comes later, but the exact time of this event is difficult to assess because of the potentially illusory nature of introspection. Neurological disorders of volition are also reviewed. The evidence suggests that movement is initiated in the frontal lobe, particularly the mesial areas, and the sense of volition arises as the result of a corollary discharge likely involving multiple areas with reciprocal connections including those in the parietal lobe and insular cortex.''

I have already noted that "free will" is an unfortunate term. Frankly, it is a terrible term. As a linguistically legitimate place holder - an abbreviation of sorts - for a collection of considerations more properly conducted in terms of necessary conditions leading to sufficient conditions thresholds, "free will" in itself always tends toward an overly broad generalization with next to no informative usefulness. Nevertheless, deliberative thinking is done in terms which presume the (meta)physical actuality of possibilities; such thinking is conducted, it is at least a temporary denial of determinism as fact.

The identification of "free will" activity with consciousness, with awareness, is a reasonable preliminary assumption - - - but only for investigators bereft of significant self-awareness regarding their own developmental processes. And that means that such an assumption should already have been left by the wayside were there actual progress in attempts at science-izing investigations into human thinking. The same can be said of philosophical ruminations. Consider the development of muscle memory. Consider the development and refinement of what I will call intellection memory. And consider the factors, the conditions necessary for those sorts of development. The effectiveness of muscle memory and intellection memory in no way speak against the actuality of (meta)physical possibilities which themselves speak against determinism.

With regards to attempts at science-izing investigations into human brain activity, particularly when trying to extend investigation findings for philosophical as well as speculative purposes, it is critically important to remain cognizant of the fact that even the gee-whizzy imaging techniques remain uncorrelated with and unrevealing of thoughts content and thoughts development. Beyond that, it is to be kept in mind that these technologies do not reveal brain activity; instead, these technologies only reveal what we know how to detect. An EEG (which is an imaging technology) can be - and usually is - interpreted as indicating a lack of brain activity (i.e., brain death) when the EEG is flat. However, patients with flat EEGs have been known to fully recover. An EEG does not measure brain activity; it measures a type of activity which we know how to detect. The usefulness of these technologies is entirely as tools for finding disease processes in the hope that such identifications may lead to effective therapies.

I like to say something, perhaps exactly the sentiment you are trying to handle, as "free will" is a misnomer.

I will readily be able to identify wills, and freedoms, but no construction of these actually allows usage in quite that way.

A will can be free or not free, a will can have many freedoms in a particular class or perhaps just one, but "free will" without acknowledging some vernacular target is just a nonsense construction between those two terms: the construction is not parsable.

Instead, free will is a property derived and constructed of the ideas of freedoms and wills, a specific will to maintain autonomy being free.

This is where the compatibilist definition of "free will" exists, in this misnomer for the freedom of that specific will.

Sometimes this will is "free" towards its satisfaction, and sometimes the "freedom" of it which activates is the "freedom" indicating it's constraint. It is identifiably so, with respect to the target, whether this will to identify it of the target exists or not, in fact. We can invent a target and ask the question of that arbitrary target and the answer will make sense.

Clearly not everything even has such a will which maintains or targets the autonomy of the unit, so most things ostensibly lack "free will" even if "freedom" and "will" are ubiquitous mathematical concepts in constant reification across all parts of the whole universe, and even if we can still identify wills and freedoms of them.

In this way, the compatibilist sees "whether we have free will" is a matter of context whether we have it or lack it, because it is down to whether we are being overridden in our authority over our own bodies by momentary leverage.

Free Will is as far from freedoms and wills as trig is from the axioms of math, which makes it really hard to communicate these concepts effectively, since most people aren't going to be able to make the connection to the foundations.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Our brain state is determined down to the slightest movement ...

What is this brain state? Is it akin to a three-dimensional slice of a four-dimensional object? A CT-scan so to speak? That is to ask: what is the slice thickness of the fourth dimension, which is to say time? Or, to put it another way, what is the duration of this brain state?

Another way of approaching the matter is to appreciate that this brain state is conveniently presented as an utterly determinate matter. For something to follow from this determinate state, there has to be some dynamic. Is there dynamism within a slice, within a determinate condition, a determinate state? If not, something is missing from the description/explanation in terms of brain states.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Free Will is as far from freedoms and wills as trig is from the axioms of math, which makes it really hard to communicate these concepts effectively, since most people aren't going to be able to make the connection to the foundations.

Yes, and this is the point of analyzing the experience of human being, investigating the personal experience. Muscle memory and intellection memory strongly indicate the need to think about the relative preceding time in terms of greater durations than is typically meant when discussing states. This (let's call it) durational way of thinking recommends against considerations in terms as if the conscious and the subconscious are always clearly distinct categorizations. Not just muscle function but even thinking develops so that not every part of the process has to be a conscious focus. That does not mean that the thinking is not dependent on some previous conscious effort. What results are effectively pre-judgments, yet it is essential that developed pre-judgments be checked repeatedly to prevent them from becoming biases. And this involves thinking (including retrospection) in terms of actualizable possibilities - which thinking is at least a temporary denial of determinism as fact.

 

[peacegirl]

I Metaphysical actuality of possibilities does not deny, even temporarily, the denial of determinism as fact because this deliberative thinking done in terms of possibilities is also determined, not just the decision made.

Okay, then I will rephrase: ... deliberative thinking is done in terms which presume the (meta)physical actuality of actualizable possibilities; when such thinking is conducted, it is at least a temporary denial of determinism as fact.

Adding the term actualizable produces a state condition which is contrary to determinism as you have presented it and which better presents the experience had of deliberative thinking.

I think I understand what you're saying. Understandably a (meta)physical actuality of actualizable possibilities would mean that only after a choice is made can one of those possibilities be real. I don't see where this deliberation denies determinism as fact just because a decision has not yet been acted upon. The entire process of the person's brain state, which is part of the entire deterministic process, not just the part where options are being deliberated upon, can be any different than the state it is in. It is true that until a decision is made manifest it is not actualized, so the actualization of that decision is being held at bay temporarily, but to say this (meta)physical actuality of actualizable possibilities is a temporary denial of determinism as fact, could be misleading because it sounds like your reasoning is allowing for a break in the deterministic causal chain. I'm just concerned that the way you're explaining deliberative thinking will give compatibilists a way to sneak in free will, which doesn't exist in any way, shape, or form.

 

[peacegirl]

Our brain state is determined down to the slightest movement ...

What is this brain state? Is it akin to a three-dimensional slice of a four-dimensional object? A CT-scan so to speak? That is to ask: what is the slice thickness of the fourth dimension, which is to say time? Or, to put it another way, what is the duration of this brain state?

It is the state of a brain that cannot be identified by taking a three- or even four- slice and looking at it under a microscope. It is a meta-physical process. It is the very nature of the underlying means of thought, decision making and action that defines the state of our brain at any given moment which is different for everyone depending on their genetics and experiences. There is nothing in this process that allows for compatiblist free will. When you ask, what is the duration, the state of our brain is what it is. It has no duration. The deliberative process has a duration depending on what is being deliberated upon. It may take longer to decide what college a person wants to attend versus what he wants for dinner, but this has nothing to do with our brain state, which, as DBT explained, is the very nature of the underlying means and mechanisms of how the brain works without deviation. There is no mechanism in this process that would allow for compatibilist free will.

Another way of approaching the matter is to appreciate that this brain state is conveniently presented as an utterly determinate matter. For something to follow from this determinate state, there has to be some dynamic. Is there dynamism within a slice, within a determinate condition, a determinate state? If not, something is missing from the description/explanation in terms of brain states.

The process of thought is dynamic where the brain is constantly responding to external stimuli. The options are determinate in that they are often limited in scope, but the process of the means and mechanisms of thought and action remains constant.