Philosophy Of Science

[steve_bank]

I did not agree with all of it, but I ffound Popper useful.

https://mercaba.org/SANLUIS/Filosofia/autores/Contempor%C3%A1nea/Popper/Objective%20knowledge.pdf

file:///C:/Users/srank/Downloads/KARLPOPPER.pdf

Objective Knowledge: Karl Popper: 8601417215470: Amazon.com: Books

Objective Knowledge [Karl Popper] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Objective Knowledge

www.amazon.com

Philosopher Karl Popper was a critic of instrumentalism, the view that scientific theories are merely useful tools for making predictions, not necessarily true representations of reality. While instrumentalism sees theory utility as the measure of success, Popper argued that science progresses through falsification, where theories are tested and rejected if they produce false predictions. He believed that theories, though never truly verified, are still abstract and represent something about reality, contrasting with instrumentalism's focus on practical utility over truth.

What is Instrumentalism?

Theories as Tools:
.

Instrumentalism holds that scientific theories are like tools or instruments whose primary value lies in their effectiveness in explaining phenomena and making accurate predictions, not in their literal truth or correspondence to reality.
Focus on Prediction:
.

For instrumentalists, the success of a theory is measured by its ability to generate correct predictions, rather than by any underlying factual accuracy.

Popper's Stance on Instrumentalism

Critique of Instrumentalism:
.

Popper argued against instrumentalism, asserting that it was insufficient to explain the nature of scientific theories.
Reality of Theories:
.
He believed that theories, while conjectural, are not just computational rules or mere instruments; they are abstract and offer insight into reality.
Falsification vs. Utility:
.
Unlike instrumentalism, which emphasizes practical utility, Popper's philosophy, known as critical rationalism, prioritizes testing theories through falsification to eliminate false ones.
Pragmatic Utility is Not Truth:
.
Popper maintained that a theory being useful or successful in predicting events does not make it true, a key disagreement with the instrumentalist view that utility is the ultimate measure of a theory's worth.

 

[steve_bank]

I am on the instrumentalist side. The only thing we know objectively is the result of an experiment. The rest is interpretation and it becomes progressively subjective.

A lot of speculation arose out of experiments in quantum mechanicss.

That an electron is a discrete particle is interpretation of experiment. Theories based on the electron are predictive. Whether an electron exists as we imagine it is not knowable.

a pragmatic philosophical approach which regards an activity (such as science, law, or education) chiefly as an instrument or tool for some practical purpose, rather than in more absolute or ideal terms.

Instrumentalism - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

In philosophy of science and in epistemology, instrumentalism is a methodological view that ideas are useful instruments, and that the worth of an idea is based on how effective it is in explaining and predicting natural phenomena. According to instrumentalists, a successful scientific theory reveals nothing known either true or false about nature's unobservable objects, properties or processes.[1] Scientific theory is merely a tool whereby humans predict observations in a particular domain of nature by formulating laws, which state or summarize regularities, while theories themselves do not reveal supposedly hidden aspects of nature that somehow explain these laws.[2] Instrumentalism is a perspective originally introduced by Pierre Duhem in 1906.[2]

Rejecting scientific realism's ambitions to uncover metaphysical truth about nature,[2] instrumentalism is usually categorized as an antirealism, although its mere lack of commitment to scientific theory's realism can be termed nonrealism. Instrumentalism merely bypasses debate concerning whether, for example, a particle spoken about in particle physics is a discrete entity enjoying individual existence, or is an excitation mode of a region of a field, or is something else altogether.[3][4][5] Instrumentalism holds that theoretical terms need only be useful to predict the phenomena, the observed outcomes.[3]

There are multiple versions of instrumentalism.

 

[steve_bank]

Popper's three worlds - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Popper's three worlds is a theory developed by Karl Popper in the late 1960s. It involves three interacting worlds. World 1 is the material realm, World 2 is the mental realm, and World 3 is the cultural realm. Popper's goal was to defend his notion of objective knowledge against the rising notion that knowledge is a belief that must be justified and true. This theory supported his old view that theories need not be verified by induction. In his approach, the methodological rules as well as the logical content of science belong to World 3. The theory is evolutionary. Popper was a strong advocate of a theory of emergence in which each world is not predetermined by previous ones.

Objective knowledge and justified true belief

Popper's main objective in introducing World 3 in the late 1960s was to "provoke" those whom he called "belief philosophers", those who are "interested in our subjective beliefs, and their basis or origin". In the early 1960s, reinforced by Tarski's semantic theory of truth, which he saws as a way to describe a correspondence theory of truth, he contrasted the subjective or psychological theory of knowledge with an objective theory of knowledge, in which direct correspondence with reality is a "regulative principle".[19] This correspondence was not a tool for justification, but it clarified the notion of objective knowledge. In the same period, especially after Gettier presented two simple counterexamples to the notion of knowledge as justified true belief,[20][21] the problem of the logical validation of our knowledge, then essentially identified with scientific knowledge,[22] shifted to that of the analytical definition of knowledge in terms of its components: beliefs, truth, justification, and, possibly, other requirements.[20] Musgrave wrote "Epistemologists interested in certainty, in justified true belief, were bound to find the rich speculations of natural science extraordinarily problematic. In the vain pursuit of certainty, epistemologists were forced to withdraw from the world of natural science."[23] As early as the late 1950s, Popper expressed the idea that the most interesting problems in epistemology concerned scientific knowledge, not knowledge in general or ordinary knowledge, which he considered too narrow.[24] David Miller noted that, for Popper, knowledge is neither justified nor believed, and that, generally, scientific knowledge is not true (in any logical sense).[25][26] Musgrave wrote that "Popper’s theory of science, and his cure for relativism, rest upon his rejection of the traditional theory of knowledge as justified true belief."[27]

 

[pood]

I thought philosophy bakes no bread?

Einstein, when asked what he’d say if his relativity theory were falsified, replied: “Then I should be sorry for the dear lord, because the theory is correct.”

Popper appears to have dreamed up falsificationism for two reasons: first, to reliably demarcate between science and nonscience or pseudoscience, and second, to meet the challenge of Hume’s Problem of Induction, which seems to threaten science (and rationality itself) with the claim that there is no way to justify induction within induction, or by any other means. And science is an inductive enterprise.

Falsificationism sidesteps the Problem of Induction by saying if scientific theories are falsified, we can discard them.

Problems immediately arise: If falsificationism demarcates between science and nonscience or pseudoscience, then, as the science philosopher John D. Norton points out:

Flat earth is science.

Dowsing is science.

Creationism is science.

Why? Because all three are falsifiable, and in fact have been falsified (or have they? About which more later, in a future post).

Not science, according to Popper:

String theory.

Superdeterminism.

QM many worlds.

QM Copenhagen.

QM relational.

QM pilot wave.

And so on.

Why? Because none are not falsifiable.

It strikes me as daft to say that string theory is not science but creationism is.

What about continental drift? It was falsified by lack of evidence for a mechanism, until later on its falsification was falsified by plate tectonics.

What about atomic theory? It dates to antiquity, but until the 20th century it was unfalsifiable. Then it became falsifiable. Does that mean it changed its ontic status from not-science to science? That seems weird.

As the aforementioned Norton points out, the Cosmological Principle is important to science, stating that that universe is roughly uniform in matter/energy distribution over large scales. However, as Norton explains, if the universe is spatially infinite, as the evidence suggests that it is, then the Cosmological Principle is unfalsifiable. Does that mean it’s suddenly not science?

What about string theory? It’s filled with all sort of beautiful maths that explain all sorts of beautiful stuff (or so I read), but it is wholly unfalsifiable. It appears to be untestable even in principle.

But wait! String theory posits at least 10 or 11 dimensions of space. But we observe only three. So string theory is falsified.

Not so, say the string theorists. The other seven or eight dimensions are rolled up, or “compactified,” into subatomic scales so we can’t observe them. This can’t be falsified or verified, either.

Newton’s theory could not account for perturbations in the orbit of Mercury. A new planet, Vulcan, orbiting closer to the sun than Mercury, was proposed to resolve the problem — an example of “saving the appearances” of a theory. The planet was not found. The Mercury inconsistencies were explained by general relativity. So Newton’s theory was strictly falsified.

But was it? One can invent all sorts of thus-far unobserved phenomena that would salvage Newton. This is theory underdetermination by data alone. One can also recast GR in classical terms through lots of hoop-jumping.

More later. But thanks for staring this thread. It’s a welcome relief from futilely yammering about Gaza and Trump.

 

[steve_bank]

Well pood, what in philosophy is not 'imaguned up'?

Do you agree with instrumentalist? Do you believe the imagined BB event actually happened or is it theoretical? I think it is a good theory, but not necessarily true.

As to string theory some considered it philosophy because there was no way to test it.

Is String Theory Testable?

I’ve been traveling in Italy for the past ten days, and gave talks in Rome and Pisa, on the topic “Is String Theory Testable?”. The slides from my talks are here (I’ll fix a…

www.math.columbia.edu

I would not say Newton was falsified. There are working models that work within bounds. Newtonian gravity works fine for putting a probe on the Moon. Relativity is a better approximation.

That leads to the question, philosophically, do science theories and model reflect raeality as it really is?

Models for transistors have multiple levels depending on what you are trying to do.

I prefer using model instead of theory.

 

[Learner]

Well pood, what in philosophy is not 'imaguned up'?

Interestingly (not arguing.. just a thought)...

...I have always thought that lots of scientific discoveries were stemmed from imagination, or philosophical 'what if'' ideas. I'm with pood here.

Do you agree with instrumentalist? Do you believe the imagined BB event actually happened or is it theoretical? I think it is a good theory, but not necessarily true.

A good theory but not necessarily true... I quite agree.

I suppose the BB theory will likely just end up, let say, under the "Hubble Cosmology" category , as one terms 'Newtonian Physics'. Since after the launch of the latest telescope, new theories (or rehashed alternatives ideas to the BB) is imaginatively, philosophically being rethought. These theories would appropriately be under the category of 'James Webb Cosmology'.

 

[pood]

Well pood, what in philosophy is not 'imaguned up'?

Do you agree with instrumentalist? Do you believe the imagined BB event actually happened or is it theoretical? I think it is a good theory, but not necessarily true.

As to string theory some considered it philosophy because there was no way to test it.

Is String Theory Testable?

I’ve been traveling in Italy for the past ten days, and gave talks in Rome and Pisa, on the topic “Is String Theory Testable?”. The slides from my talks are here (I’ll fix a…

www.math.columbia.edu

I would not say Newton was falsified. There are working models that work within bounds. Newtonian gravity works fine for putting a probe on the Moon. Relativity is a better approximation.

That leads to the question, philosophically, do science theories and model reflect raeality as it really is?

Models for transistors have multiple levels depending on what you are trying to do.

I prefer using model instead of theory.

In one of his last books, maybe his last, Stephen Hawking advocated for “model dependent realism,” which is really a form of instrumentalism. In the book, on the very first page, he declared “philosophy is dead,” but model-dependent realism just IS a philosophical concept, but the irony escaped him. Perhaps he meant “metaphysics is dead,” as opposed to philosophy as a whole (which, after all, has many other branches, like logic, ethics, etc.) but even that is wrong because model-dependent realism is a metaphysical notion.

But I think we should probably stop talking about theories and falsification or verification and such things because they are too limiting and they fail to capture the complexities of reality. Newton is an example. You can argue that Newtonian mechanics works to a limit, but becomes false after that limit, when it enters the domain of relativity and quantum mechanics. So we have an example of something that, at best, has only been partly falsified. As you say, Newton is fine to get us to the planets. So Newtonianism should perhaps be reclassified not as a falsifiable theory in the Popperian sense, but rather as an instrumentally useful model that works to a limit and then stops working.

And we know that the models that replaced it beyond its limit — general relativity and quantum mechanics — do not agree with each other. So at least one and possibly both work only to a limit, and then break down and become false beyond that limit.

There is a good introductory book to the philosophy of science I found online. Unfortunately, for some strange reason, the bar at the top with all the “to do” elements, including inserting links, is grayed out for me, so I cannot imbed the link. So I will just copy and paste it:

https://personal.lse.ac.uk/robert49/ebooks/philsciadventures/index.html

So far I’ve read the first ten chapters and it’s quite decent, covering a lot of ground, but not very in depth. Maybe it gets in depth later.

One of the chapters discussed the pessimistic meta-induction, which counsels that since all past scientific theories have strictly been false, we should expect that are current theories are false too. The clash between relativity and QM is evidence of this.

In one of the chapters the author discusses current (philosophical, of necessity) ideas of what science actually is. There are three leading candidates:

The syntactic view

The semantic view

The mechanisms program.

He discusses them in this chapter: https://personal.lse.ac.uk/robert49/ebooks/philsciadventures/lecture4.html

As he notes, there is no consensus view of the leading candidates, because all have their flaws. This underwrites the view that it may never be possible to say exactly what science is, because there can never be a firm demarcation between it and non-science or so-called pseudoscience. This is the demarcation problem.

We should probably think that science does not track truth, but only gives us provisionally useful models that allow us to make successful predictions. Very possibly the way the world really is, if it really is any particular way, is beyond scientific reach.

As an example, Sabine Hossenfelder proposes superdeterminism as a replacement theory for quantum mechanics. I think this is because she, like Einstein, is ideologically (as opposed to scientifically) committed to determinism as being true. In the book I linked above, the author discusses ideological commitments in science, and tellingly notes that the clash between Galileo and the church over heliocentrism was not really a clash between science and religion, as it is usually portrayed, but actually a clash between the ideological commitments of old science as represented by Ptolemy and new science as represented by Copernicus.

Anyway, superdeterminism is completely beyond either strong or weak verification (also discussed in the linked book) and is also unfalsifiable. So does it even count as science, or as an ideological defense, against current evidence, of full determinism at work in the world?

Worse, superdeterminism requires discarding the assumption of statistical independence, which, as many scientists have pointed out, would completely undermine the whole scientific enterprise.

 

[steve_bank]

Philosophy still bakes no bread.

An airplane flies and a computer works regardless of how you philosophize about it. Or believe a god is involved.

 

[steve_bank]

Whether deterministic(philosophically) is true or not is irreverent.

Experimentally regardless of whether philosophical determinism is true systems experimentally are deterministic or probabilistic.

In a deterministic system plug in warbles and you get a predicable output.

distance = speed * time is deterministic. If you know any two values the third is fixed.

When a customer enters or leaves a store is probabilistic. A stochastic system. You can't predict the exact time a customer will enter a store.

I had to look up superdeterminism.

 

[pood]

Well pood, what in philosophy is not 'imaguned up'?

Interestingly (not arguing.. just a thought)...

...I have always thought that lots of scientific discoveries were stemmed from imagination, or philosophical 'what if'' ideas. I'm with pood here.

Absolutely. Newton — and it seems, only Newton, in the history of the world — had the insight of earth accelerating toward a falling body. He did not use science or math to think of this — it came to him.

In the same way Einstein dreamed up relativity, by first imagining chasing and then catching a bean of light. Only later did he apply the maths and later still it was it tested. He also dreamed up general relativity. Lots of science are works of the imagination,

 

[pood]

Philosophy still bakes no bread.

An airplane flies and a computer works regardless of how you philosophize about it. Or believe a god is involved.

It’s puzzling that you would revert to disparaging philosophy when this thread, which you yourself started, is about the philosophy of science, and Popper is all philosophy — flawed philosophy, at that.

Falsifiability is philosophy. Instrumentalism is philosophy. Model-dependent realism is philosophy.

If the goal of philosophy were to make an airplane fly or a computer work, it would be sadly unsuited to the task. Fortunately, that is not its goal. For that matter, it’s not the goal of science either; rather, an airplane flying and a computer working are secondary consequences of the work of science.

Making an airplane fly and a computer work are engineering issues, and engineers are not scientists any more than philosophers are. But the work of both engineers and philosophers of science are informed by science,

The purpose of the philosophy of science is to study, bring out, and evaluate that conceptual underpinnings of the scientific disciplines, to see how they can be refined, improved, or replaced, to the betterment of scientific practice. Some time back I started a thread that gave a number of examples of how philosophy informed scientific practice,

In sum, good philosophy bakes the bread that science eats.

 

[pood]

Another useful philosophical tool for scientific investigations is the Duhem-Quine thesis, which holds that scientific theories cannot be tested or falsified in isolation, but require attention to, and when possible testing of, background or auxiliary assumptions. If a theory is found to be false — or seemingly corroborated or verified, for that matter — it may be due to flawed background assumptions, inadequate equipment, etc. It’s another reason why Popper’s falsifiability is so tenuous as a scientific standard.

Newston’s mechanics worked beautifully, but were based on flawed auxiliary assumptions that were later exposed by Einstein, namely: that space and time are absolute (they are not) and that space is Euclidean (It’s not).

 

[pood]

One of several ways to think of a philosopher of science’s relation to science is that of a critic to a work of art, say a play. The critic may point out various flaws in the plot, acting, etc.; and those staging the play make take cognizance of a good critique and adjust accordingly.

A scientist unfamiliar with Duhem-Quine may end up falsifying a correct theory or weakly verifying an incorrect one,

 

[pood]

Whether deterministic(philosophically) is true or not is irreverent.

The relevance to the topic of this thread is obvious.

Blind ideological commitment to a certain scientific world view may hamper scientific progress.

It seems Einstein then, as Hossenfelder is today, was ideologically committed to a world that was fully deterministic Hence he fought the very QM he helped insipire and develop.

Hossenfelder is pushing a hopelessly untestable “theory,” superdeterminism, just because she is ideologically committed to full determinism.

This mirrors the dispute over Ptolemy and Copernicus, when a dogmatic refusal to give up geocentrism in the face of evidence — including the refusal of some to even look through a telescope — culminated in the trial of Galileo.

 

[pood]

Newton was troubled by his own idea that gravity was a “force.” He wondered what kind of “force” could reach across space to form gravity. This means that he himself was already philosophizing about his own science, Einstein later cleared up the matter.

Had Duhem-Quine been around back then, they might have suggested to him that he re-examine his background assumptions.

 

[pood]

A good paper from the aforementioned John D. Norton on the flaws of falsibiability.

 

[steve_bank]

Philosophy still bakes no bread.

An airplane flies and a computer works regardless of how you philosophize about it. Or believe a god is involved.

It’s puzzling that you would revert to disparaging philosophy when this thread, which you yourself started, is about the philosophy of science, and Popper is all philosophy — flawed philosophy, at that.

Falsifiability is philosophy. Instrumentalism is philosophy. Model-dependent realism is philosophy.

If the goal of philosophy were to make an airplane fly or a computer work, it would be sadly unsuited to the task. Fortunately, that is not its goal. For that matter, it’s not the goal of science either; rather, an airplane flying and a computer working are secondary consequences of the work of science.

Making an airplane fly and a computer work are engineering issues, and engineers are not scientists any more than philosophers are. But the work of both engineers and philosophers of science are informed by science,

The purpose of the philosophy of science is to study, bring out, and evaluate that conceptual underpinnings of the scientific disciplines, to see how they can be refined, improved, or replaced, to the betterment of scientific practice. Some time back I started a thread that gave a number of examples of how philosophy informed scientific practice,

In sum, good philosophy bakes the bread that science eats.

I like your last line, nice snappy comeback.

What do you mean exactly by science and philosophy?

Both terms are top level categories with subcategories.

Antone with a science degree is a scientist? Pele who just work on new heorues as the icnic Eisenstein did are very few. Chemists, biologists, and physicists out workings in the greater world function much as engineers do.

I worked in a small group at Lockheed. I was the electrical engineer. Along with me was a chemist, physicist, and materials engineer. We did some research on materials and infrared sensors.

There is no hard boundary between science and engineering.

In all my time I never heard anyone discuss philosophy. The practice of science and engineering is a learned skill, partly learned by textbook knowledge and partly from working with experienced people. And a bit of trial error, making mistakes.

It can not be reduced to a metaphysical philosophy.

I see it the other way around. Science feeds philosophy more than philosophy informs science.

There are notable people in history that are quoted, you can call them philosophers but to me that tag means nothing. Descartes and his malformation of 'the method'.

In science classes there was no philosophy. There were labs where we learned to set up experiments, make measurements., and document it. Learning to derive an external error.

The basic methodology;gy ad structure.

The methods of science evolve. Trail and error. hat which works gos forward, that which does not work is forgotten.

One of te first thng I learned on te job was hitngs are done in certain ways becuase they are the ways shown to wiork bteter thanh other ways,.

 

[steve_bank]

Well pood, what in philosophy is not 'imaguned up'?

Interestingly (not arguing.. just a thought)...

...I have always thought that lots of scientific discoveries were stemmed from imagination, or philosophical 'what if'' ideas. I'm with pood here.

Do you agree with instrumentalist? Do you believe the imagined BB event actually happened or is it theoretical? I think it is a good theory, but not necessarily true.

A good theory but not necessarily true... I quite agree.

I suppose the BB theory will likely just end up, let say, under the "Hubble Cosmology" category , as one terms 'Newtonian Physics'. Since after the launch of the latest telescope, new theories (or rehashed alternatives ideas to the BB) is imaginatively, philosophically being rethought. These theories would appropriately be under the category of 'James Webb Cosmology'.

It is all imagination. I read AE's bio.

He said he did a lot in dreams. Imaging what it would be like traveling at the speed of light next to a light wave.

In science imagination is expressed in math using units of measure resulting in a physical experiment.

 

[pood]

Philosophy still bakes no bread.

An airplane flies and a computer works regardless of how you philosophize about it. Or believe a god is involved.

It’s puzzling that you would revert to disparaging philosophy when this thread, which you yourself started, is about the philosophy of science, and Popper is all philosophy — flawed philosophy, at that.

Falsifiability is philosophy. Instrumentalism is philosophy. Model-dependent realism is philosophy.

If the goal of philosophy were to make an airplane fly or a computer work, it would be sadly unsuited to the task. Fortunately, that is not its goal. For that matter, it’s not the goal of science either; rather, an airplane flying and a computer working are secondary consequences of the work of science.

Making an airplane fly and a computer work are engineering issues, and engineers are not scientists any more than philosophers are. But the work of both engineers and philosophers of science are informed by science,

The purpose of the philosophy of science is to study, bring out, and evaluate that conceptual underpinnings of the scientific disciplines, to see how they can be refined, improved, or replaced, to the betterment of scientific practice. Some time back I started a thread that gave a number of examples of how philosophy informed scientific practice,

In sum, good philosophy bakes the bread that science eats.

I like your last line, nice snappy comeback.

What do you mean exactly by science and philosophy?

Both terms are top level categories with subcategories.

Antone with a science degree is a scientist? Pele who just work on new heorues as the icnic Eisenstein did are very few. Chemists, biologists, and physicists out workings in the greater world function much as engineers do.

I worked in a small group at Lockheed. I was the electrical engineer. Along with me was a chemist, physicist, and materials engineer. We did some research on materials and infrared sensors.

There is no hard boundary between science and engineering.

In all my time I never heard anyone discuss philosophy. The practice of science and engineering is a learned skill, partly learned by textbook knowledge and partly from working with experienced people. And a bit of trial error, making mistakes.

It can not be reduced to a metaphysical philosophy.

I see it the other way around. Science feeds philosophy more than philosophy informs science.

There are notable people in history that are quoted, you can call them philosophers but to me that tag means nothing. Descartes and his malformation of 'the method'.

In science classes there was no philosophy. There were labs where we learned to set up experiments, make measurements., and document it. Learning to derive an external error.

The basic methodology;gy ad structure.

The methods of science evolve. Trail and error. hat which works gos forward, that which does not work is forgotten.

One of te first thng I learned on te job was hitngs are done in certain ways becuase they are the ways shown to wiork bteter thanh other ways,.

You ask what I mean by science and philosophy. Isn’t that part of the whole point of the discussion? The demarcation problem shows the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of demarcating between science and nonscience.

There are no hard boundaries between science and engineering? Likewise, there are no such hard boundaries between science and philosophy. Science started out as natural philosophy.

In this thread I showed several ways philosophy informs science, and did so in another thread as well. I don’t think you ever addressed them.

You say you had no philosophy in your science courses. Your loss. A holistic general education includes science, philosophy, the arts and humanities.

 

[pood]

Well pood, what in philosophy is not 'imaguned up'?

Interestingly (not arguing.. just a thought)...

...I have always thought that lots of scientific discoveries were stemmed from imagination, or philosophical 'what if'' ideas. I'm with pood here.

Do you agree with instrumentalist? Do you believe the imagined BB event actually happened or is it theoretical? I think it is a good theory, but not necessarily true.

A good theory but not necessarily true... I quite agree.

I suppose the BB theory will likely just end up, let say, under the "Hubble Cosmology" category , as one terms 'Newtonian Physics'. Since after the launch of the latest telescope, new theories (or rehashed alternatives ideas to the BB) is imaginatively, philosophically being rethought. These theories would appropriately be under the category of 'James Webb Cosmology'.

It is all imagination. I read AE's bio.

He said he did a lot in dreams. Imaging what it would be like traveling at the speed of light next to a light wave.

In science imagination is expressed in math using units of measure resulting in a physical experiment.

Well, that’s not how Einstein dreamed up relativity or Newton his theory of gravity. So I guess they were no real scientists then?