According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[Michael S. Pearl]

I basically agree, except that I am arguing that we WOULDN’T act differently under the same circumstances, not that we COULDN’T. The latter is the modal fallacy — modal collapse, confusing contingency with necessity.

In this video, starting at around 31:15, Carrier says, "It's physically necessary. It's deterministically necessary. Like, if you reason from a premise to a conclusion, logically the conclusion is a necessary outcome. It's not only a logically necessary outcome, it's a physically necessary outcome, as long as you are reasoning logically."

Does he commit the modal fallacy?

No.

Because he is NOT "confusing contingency with necessity."

When Carrier refers to physical necessity, he is not claiming or implying modal necessity, because he is not denying the contingency of the physical. He takes (or could take) that physical contingency for/as granted. When he talks about a logically necessary outcome, he is not referring to a modally necessary outcome; instead, he is simply saying that, given entirely physical description as (presumably) sufficient albeit contingent and given logic in terms of that same supposedly sufficient physical description (at least for a relatively specific and restricted context beyond the quantum level), there is but one physical outcome to occur, and that outcome is also a necessity of logic about and applied to the contingent physical. This means that the necessity to which Carrier refers is properly recognized as, described as, and referred to as a contingent necessity - a type of necessity that is distinct from modal necessity.

The physical necessity to which Carrier refers describes a common version of determinism. What he describes captures well enough the sort of physicalist determinism which incompatibilists here have in mind when they insist that this determinism - if it is a sufficiently good generalization about reality - precludes there being a possibility for human free will or freedom.

Carrier is a compatibilist because he emphasizes there being a lack of coercion and the lack of an external control when a person acts in accord with the person's wants, desires, inclinations, what have you. The incompatibilist contention is (or should be) that the lack of coercion and external control - as real as that apparently and experientially is - does not sufficiently characterize the freedom at issue.

In this article, Carrier castigates the notion that since all events are causally determined, and we don't control the past, we don't control the future; therefore, we don't have free will. Carrier says that way of thinking "depends on the equivocation fallacy, switching from beginning to end between entirely different definitions of 'control.'"

Most relevant to the modal fallacy discussion in this thread is the "switching" to which Carrier refers: not the switching from the incompatibilist conditions for freedom to the compatibilist conditions (even though such a switching is apparently quite common); rather, the switching from the physical world context of Carrier's and the incompatibilists' contingently "physically necessary" to the modal world context without which there could be no appeal to the modal fallacy. The modal world context has possibilities that are supposedly not actual/real in the physical world context, and that renders the switching from physical context to modal context as dubious - if that switching is not an outright equivocation.

Essentially, then, the modal fallacy charge ends up doing no definitive work, although it is worthwhile and to be appreciated as constructive and informative.

 

[BSilvEsq]

OK. I have read the SEP entries you identified (for the umpteenth time, actually). They do not change my view of what I have been writing...

You've lost sight of what we (you and I) were discussing.

I initiated this current exchange in order to draw attention to your clearly mistaken belief about what compatibilists claim:

classical Compatibilists (as contrasted with the pseudo-Compatibilists in this thread) claim to accept the same definition of Free Will or Freedom as is used by Incompatibilists,.

Compatibilists do not claim to accept the same definition of free will as used by incompatibilists - that would be nonsensical. I provided supporting evidence and in response, rather than attempt to defend you original claim, you chose to write at length about what you see as the failings of compatibilism.

You should either admit you were mistaken or present evidence in support of your claim (quoted above). You need to understand that I'm not presenting a case for compatibilism I'm simply pointing out errors in your criticism of compatibilism.

As can be seen, you begin the post quoted above (Post No. 1,817) with the statement that "You've lost sight of what we (you and I) were discussing." I disagree.

For purposes of orientation, your post of which you claim I have lost sight is Post No. 1,789, and my allegedly misplaced reply is Post No. 1,816 (which quotes Post No. 1,789 in its entirety, so as not to be accused of misstating Post No. 1,789).

And, to specifically reframe the issue, your Post No. 1,789 begins by quoting a snippet from my prior Post No. 1,787, which stated: ". . . classical Compatibilists (as contrasted with the pseudo-Compatibilists in this thread) claim to accept the same definition of Free Will or Freedom as is used by Incompatibilists . . ." For purposes of context, yy unedited statement in Post No. 1,787 was the following:

I like the way you have framed the issue as being that the central difference between Compatibilists and Incompatibilists lies in their respective definitions of Free Will or Freedom -- although I will add that classical Compatibilists (as contrasted with the pseudo-Compatibilists in this thread) claim to accept the same definition of Free Will or Freedom as is used by Incompatibilists, but draw a different conclusion respecting the compatibility of that concept with determinism.

After quoting the snippet from my Post No. 1,789, you began Post No. 1,816 with the following retort: "You're mistaken. They don't." You then paraphrased two discussions from SEP, which you claim to support your assertion that Incompatibilism and Compatibilism define Free Will differently.

In support of your assertion that Incompatibilism and Compatibilism employ different definitions of Free Will, you principally relied upon the following statement

Classical Compatibilism at its most basic is the unencumbered ability of an agent to do what she wants - so understood, free will is compatible with determinism since the truth of determinism does not entail that no agents ever do what they wish to do unencumbered (SEP).

The above-quoted definition of Free Will within Classical Compatibilism -- i.e., "the unencumbered ability of an agent to do what she wants" -- is entirely consistent with the definition of Free Will within Incompatibilism. Using that definition, the difference between Incompatibilism and Classical Compatibilism is that (i) Incompatibilism reasons that Free Will (as so defined) cannot exist if Determinism is true, and (ii) Classical Compatibilism asserts that Free Will (as so defined) can exist notwithstanding the truth of Determinism -- just as I stated in Post No. 1,787, when I wrote that "classical Compatibilists (as contrasted with the pseudo-Compatibilists in this thread) claim to accept the same definition of Free Will or Freedom as is used by Incompatibilists, but draw a different conclusion respecting the compatibility of that concept with determinism." The fact is that Classical Compatibilism and Incompatibilism utilize the same definition of Free Will, but then employ different reasoning -- the main difference being that the reasoning of Incompatibilism is sound, and the reasoning of ClassicalCompatibilism is fallacious. As explained by the SEP discussion you identified:

Despite the classical compatibilists’ ingenuity, their analysis of could have done otherwise failed decisively. The classical compatibilists wanted to show their incompatibilist interlocutors that when one asserted that a freely willing agent had alternatives available to her—that is, when it was asserted that she could have done otherwise—that assertion could be analyzed as a conditional statement, a statement that is perspicuously compatible with determinism. But as it turned out, the analysis was refuted when it was shown that the conditional statements sometimes yielded the improper result that a person was able to do otherwise even though it was clear that at the time the person acted, she had no such alternative and therefore was not able to do otherwise in the pertinent sense (Chisholm 1964, in Watson (ed.) 1982, pp.26–7; or van Inwagen 1983, pp. 114–9).

and

So even if an unencumbered agent does what she wants, if she is determined, at least as the incompatibilist maintains, she could not have done otherwise. Since, as the objection goes, freedom of will requires freedom involving alternative possibilities, classical compatibilist freedom falls.

Although you limited your post to the definition of Free Will advanced by Classical Compatibilists, post-Classical Compatibilists have advanced multiple other definitions of Free Will in an effort to cure the failure of the definition of Free Will you provided to refute Incompatibilism, as identified in the quotes above from SEP. Incompatibilists, however, are willing to each and every one of those alternative definitions of Free Will and continue to contend that none of them overcomes the logical fallacy of claiming Free Will (howsoever it has been defined) to exist if Determinism is true. The only definition of Free Will that an Incompatibilist would accept as being logically compatible with the truth of Determinism is a definition of Free Will by which Free Will exists so long as humans "feel" as if they have Free WIll, even though their thoughts, decisions, and/or actions are fixed by antecedent activity over which they have no control, whatsoever. Not even the most ardent Compatibilist, however, is willing to accept the mere illusion of Free Will as being the equivalent of the actual existence of Free Will.

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the difference between Incompatibilism and Compatibilism (whether Classical or post-Classical) has nothing to do with the definition of Free Will, which was your original point in Post No. 1,789 of which I have not lost sight.

The other approach of post-Classical Compatibilism to refute Incompatibilism is to reject the Incompatibilist definition of Determinism -- as is being done regularly on this board by posters who identify as Compatibilists who assert that human thought, decision, and/or activity is not fixed by antecedent activity, and is only fixed upon occurrence. If one were to define Determinism as a process that involves human thought, decisions and/or activity that are not fixed by antecedent activity, and is only fixed upon occurrence, that would defeat the logic of Incompatibilism. It would do so, however, in a manner that avoids the logical fallacy of the Compatibilism syllogism (both Classical and post-Classical) by throwing out one of the two foundational propositions (i.e., the Incompatibilist definition of Determinism) and replacing it with a different proposition that is reverse engineered to support the otherwise fallacious Compatibilist conclusion. Again, that is why James wrote that all efforts of Compatibilists to defeat Incompatabilism are "a quagmire of evasion," because:

"The issue . . . is a perfectly sharp one, which no eulogistic terminology can smear over or wipe out. The truth must lie with one side or the other, and its lying with one side makes the other false."

At rock bottom, and as evidenced by the many posts of the posters on this thread who identify as Compatibilists, the difference between Incompatibilism and Compatibilism is NOT in the definition of Free Will. Rather the difference in the classical debate is in the reasoning, and the difference in the more modern debate is in the definition of Determinism. In essence, Compatibilists have been unable to come up with a logically coherent reconciliation of Classical Determinism with any version of Free Will they posit (other than one that is admittedly illusory) and have resorted to refining Determinism into something that is actually incompletely deterministic -- and they tend to rely upon Quantum Physics / Quantum Mechanics to support their approach. Even that approach fails for multiple reasons, but that is beyond the original point of Post No. 1,789 -- of which I have not lost sight.

If, as in the past, you want to deride this post as pontification, that is your prerogative. It will not, however, advance the discussion. What will advance the discussion is to address the points of this post with which you disagree with an explanation for the disagreement that challenges the stated assertions head on and does not disparage the person who asserts them or the manner in which you perceive the assertions to be asserted. For example, if you believe there is a sentence or passage of SEP or other authoritative literature that states, in words or substance, that "the difference between Incompatibilism and Compatibilism has nothing to do with the definition of Free Will," it would be helpful to present that statement with reference to the authority, so that it can be evaluated on this thread. Otherwise, I understand and accept that to be your personal view of the matter, and we can leave it at that.

 

[BSilvEsq]

I basically agree, except that I am arguing that we WOULDN’T act differently under the same circumstances, not that we COULDN’T. The latter is the modal fallacy — modal collapse, confusing contingency with necessity.

In this video, starting at around 31:15, Carrier says, "It's physically necessary. It's deterministically necessary. Like, if you reason from a premise to a conclusion, logically the conclusion is a necessary outcome. It's not only a logically necessary outcome, it's a physically necessary outcome, as long as you are reasoning logically."

Does he commit the modal fallacy?

No.

Because he is NOT "confusing contingency with necessity."

When Carrier refers to physical necessity, he is not claiming or implying modal necessity, because he is not denying the contingency of the physical. He takes (or could take) that physical contingency for/as granted. When he talks about a logically necessary outcome, he is not referring to a modally necessary outcome; instead, he is simply saying that, given entirely physical description as (presumably) sufficient albeit contingent and given logic in terms of that same supposedly sufficient physical description (at least for a relatively specific and restricted context beyond the quantum level), there is but one physical outcome to occur, and that outcome is also a necessity of logic about and applied to the contingent physical. This means that the necessity to which Carrier refers is properly recognized as, described as, and referred to as a contingent necessity - a type of necessity that is distinct from modal necessity.

The physical necessity to which Carrier refers describes a common version of determinism. What he describes captures well enough the sort of physicalist determinism which incompatibilists here have in mind when they insist that this determinism - if it is a sufficiently good generalization about reality - precludes there being a possibility for human free will or freedom.

Carrier is a compatibilist because he emphasizes there being a lack of coercion and the lack of an external control when a person acts in accord with the person's wants, desires, inclinations, what have you. The incompatibilist contention is (or should be) that the lack of coercion and external control - as real as that apparently and experientially is - does not sufficiently characterize the freedom at issue.

In this article, Carrier castigates the notion that since all events are causally determined, and we don't control the past, we don't control the future; therefore, we don't have free will. Carrier says that way of thinking "depends on the equivocation fallacy, switching from beginning to end between entirely different definitions of 'control.'"

Most relevant to the modal fallacy discussion in this thread is the "switching" to which Carrier refers: not the switching from the incompatibilist conditions for freedom to the compatibilist conditions (even though such a switching is apparently quite common); rather, the switching from the physical world context of Carrier's and the incompatibilists' contingently "physically necessary" to the modal world context without which there could be no appeal to the modal fallacy. The modal world context has possibilities that are supposedly not actual/real in the physical world context, and that renders the switching from physical context to modal context as dubious - if that switching is not an outright equivocation.

Essentially, then, the modal fallacy charge ends up doing no definitive work, although it is worthwhile and to be appreciated as constructive and informative.

Superbly stated. I am, however, confident that the clarity and logic of the explanation will be unable to penetrate the barrier that contains the closed minds of the posters who identify as Compatibilists on this thread -- the problem being that they insist upon evaluating everything from the position of science, which they claim to reject that the universe operates in the manner you have described as the foundational premise of Determinism, and they rule out the possibility that (i) their application of science is wrong, or (ii) reliance upon science, itself, is a matter of faith in one of many possibilities.

Any respectable scientist will acknowledge that science is based entirely upon inductive reasoning, which is used to form foundational premises upon which conclusions can be deduced. As such, any argument that science can produce a premise or a conclusion that is necessarily correct, and definitively rules out contrary possibilities, is the result of a modal fallacy -- which hoists the Compatibilist posters with their own petard.

Plainly, if we were to accept a definition of Determinism that does not preclude macrophysical or microphysical indeterminism (even at the quantum level), the possibility of Free Will could exist in harmony with that form of Determinism, and a form of Incompatibilism that accepts that form of Determinism would be a logically false construct. Contrary to the assertion of the posters in this thread who identify as Compatibilists, however, there is no necessarily correct (or true) basis for rejecting the possibility that there is no macrophysical or microphysical indeterminism (even at the quantum level) in the universe in which we seemingly exist -- which is the foundational (and hypothetical) premise of Incompatibilism. When the foundational (and hypothetical) premise of Incompatibilism is accepted (for purposes of argument), Compatibilism fails because the existence of Free Will depends upon the possibility of macrophysical or microphysical indeterminism of some sort.

Of course, the possibility of macrophysical or microphysical indeterminism is simply a necessary condition to Free Will, but not a sufficient condition. If the only macrophysical or microphysical indeterminism in the universe were purely random, Free Will would be no more sustainable in that universe than would Free Will be sustainable in a universe that lacks macrophysical or microphysical indeterminism -- as thoughts, decisions and/or activities are not "free" in the "Free Will" sense if they are either (i) constrained by Determinism, or (ii) purely random. Rather, for true Freedom of Will to exist (whether Libertarian, Compatibilist or otherwise), it must be the case that human thought, decision, and/or activity is self-controlled, and neither the fixed or inexorable consequence of antecedent activity nor random. Therein lies the ultimate conundrum for Compatibilism -- it ultimately relies on a quasi-religious Cartesian duality between the mind and the brain -- i.e., a ghost in the machine.

 

[Jarhyn]

It's physically necessary. It's deterministically necessary. Like, if you reason from a premise to a conclusion,

The problem you seem to be missing here is that he is not saying it is necessary innthe sense that "because God forsaw it that way it must be that way" but rather "from a premise".

The necessitation is only as "present" as the premise, parts of which are local context, meaning that it is not "necessary" in the sense that you would want it to be: to the left, it is not as such, nor before, nor after.

 

[DBT]

If we have no power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature, and the facts of the past entail every fact of the present and in turn the future (ie, determinism is true), free will is an illusion.

1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature.
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true).
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future.


1-You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are.
2-In order to be ultimately responsible for what you do, you have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are—at least in certain crucial mental aspects.
3-But you cannot be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.
4-So you can’t be ultimately responsible for what you do. - Galen Strawson.

 

[The AntiChris]

At rock bottom, and as evidenced by the many posts of the posters on this thread who identify as Compatibilists, the difference between Incompatibilism and Compatibilism is NOT in the definition of Free Will. Rather the difference in the classical debate is in the reasoning, and the difference in the more modern debate is in the definition of Determinism.

So you're still insisting that "classical Compatibilists (as contrasted with the pseudo-Compatibilists in this thread) claim to accept the same definition of Free Will or Freedom as is used by Incompatibilists".

Here's the definition of incompatibilist free will that you accept:

Incompatibilists hold that free will and determinism are mutually exclusive and, consequently, that we act freely only if determinism is false (SEP). In other words we only act freely if our choices are not determined by prior causes.

I fully concur with that first proposition, which is consistent with everything I have posted in this thread (and elsewhere) about Incompatibilism.

You're effectively saying that classical compatibilists (and "many posters on this thread") hold that free will and determinism are mutually exclusive! You surely realise that anyone holding such a view would not be a compatibilist by definition. If you're not saying this then you have to accept that compatibilists and incompatibilists do not share the same definition of free will.


I suspect that what you're trying to claim, if you fully understood the terminology, is that some (most?) compatibilists believe in some form of contra-causal free will (i.e. the ability to have acted differently in exactly the same circumstances contrary to physical laws). I don't doubt such compatibilists do exist but I've never encountered any and no one on this thread has defended such a position and it's certainly not a feature of classical compatibilism.

You're arguing against a strawman version of compatibilism.

 

[Jarhyn]

I will note that DBT is yet again committing a modal fallacy: that you do not in the present have power over the facts of the past is not necessary for the you of the past to have had power over the present and the future.

People in the present have power over future facts.

Or does not need to go the other way.

The facts of the past entailed this power over the present and the future.

You were right there in the past making decisions about the future. You do not need power over the past for that to be true.

All you need for freedom is relative autonomy in any given present moment from other actions of that present moment in making those decisions so as for those decisions to be made there, on that time, by you, the autonomous thing.

Free will doesn't require power over the past in the first place.

I would invite him to take a software engineering course and learn the hard logic of debugging and identifying responsibilities for failures in logic?

 

[BSilvEsq]

At rock bottom, and as evidenced by the many posts of the posters on this thread who identify as Compatibilists, the difference between Incompatibilism and Compatibilism is NOT in the definition of Free Will. Rather the difference in the classical debate is in the reasoning, and the difference in the more modern debate is in the definition of Determinism.

So you're still insisting that "classical Compatibilists (as contrasted with the pseudo-Compatibilists in this thread) claim to accept the same definition of Free Will or Freedom as is used by Incompatibilists".

Here's the definition of incompatibilist free will that you accept:

Incompatibilists hold that free will and determinism are mutually exclusive and, consequently, that we act freely only if determinism is false (SEP). In other words we only act freely if our choices are not determined by prior causes.

I fully concur with that first proposition, which is consistent with everything I have posted in this thread (and elsewhere) about Incompatibilism.

You're effectively saying that classical compatibilists (and "many posters on this thread") hold that free will and determinism are mutually exclusive! You surely realise that anyone holding such a view would not be a compatibilist by definition. If you're not saying this then you have to accept that compatibilists and incompatibilists do not share the same definition of free will.


I suspect that what you're trying to claim, if you fully understood the terminology, is that some (most?) compatibilists believe in some form of contra-causal free will (i.e. the ability to have acted differently in exactly the same circumstances contrary to physical laws). I don't doubt such compatibilists do exist but I've never encountered any and no one on this thread has defended such a position and it's certainly not a feature of classical compatibilism.

You're arguing against a strawman version of compatibilism.

The quoted definition of Incompatibilism -- with which I agree -- says nothing about the definition of Free Will employed by Incompatibilists or Compatibilists. It simply states that Incompatibilists hold the two concepts to be logically incongruent. You, however, go on to add that Incompatibilists believe that "we only act freely if our choices are not determined by prior causes."

You also offered a definition of Free Will that is held by Classical Compatibilists, and which SEP explains to have "failed" in the face of Determinism. You have offered no other definition of Free Will. Rather, you have simply stated what you mistakenly believe I contend to be Free Will and you reject that definition that I have not offered.

What I am saying is that no definition of Free Will is compatible with Determinism, because every definition of Free Will involves both (i) the existence of alternatives (which do not exist within Determinism), and (ii) a human being capable of making a decision / choice that is not fixed by antecedent activity (which does not exist within Determinism). Incompatibilists do not assert that the Determinism is true -- only that the truth of Determinism (if true) forecloses the existence of Free Will in every manner in which it has been defined by Compatibilists. Hence, Incompatibilists and Compatibilists share a common definition of Free Will -- unless, as I previously stated, Compatibilists are willing to define Free Will as the mere feeling of freedom that is an illusion / delusion.

I had forgotten that some folks who identify as a Compatibilist on this thread subscribe to the syllogism below, which is a logical, albeit tautological, syllogism that has no substance:

Premise 1: Free Will (whatever it means) does, in fact, exist.

Premise 2: Any philosophical construct, to be true, must be compatible with the existence of Free Will.

Therefore:

Conclusion: Determinism (whatever it means), to be true, must be compatible with the existence of Free Will.

Accepting the premises of the syllogism renders the notion of Incompatibilism illogical. As noted above, however, it also is an empty syllogism, devoid of substance.

Also, I agree that I am arguing against a strawman, but that is because Compatibilists construct their philosophy out of straw on their own, lacking any material of greater substance.

If you disagree with the foregoing, perhaps you can define Free Will in a manner that is compatible with a definition of Determinism in which (i) there is one and only one decision / thought / activity that can occur in any moment and which is fixed by antecedent activity, and (ii) the very act of thinking / deciding / acting is governed by the same laws of nature that eliminate all alternatives to the one decision / thought / activity that is fixed by antecedent activity. SEP offers multiple examples, and none that I can tell has a logically sound foundation, which, again, is the basis for William James' criticism.

 

[pood]

Premise 1: Free Will (whatever it means) does, in fact, exist.

Premise 2: Any philosophical construct, to be true, must be compatible with the existence of Free Will.

Therefore:

Conclusion: Determinism (whatever it means), to be true, must be compatible with the existence of Free Will.

Not a single person here has made this ridiculous question-begging argument. Everyone (or at least most) people posting in this and other free will/determinism threads (they grow like topsy) is very well aware that you do not assume your conclusion in any of the premises.

Please do better. This is embarrassing.

 

[Jarhyn]

What I am saying is that no definition of Free Will is compatible with Determinism, because every definition of Free Will involves both (i) the existence of alternatives

And you keep failing (quite ironically) to recognize that alternatives don't have to exist at the same place to be alternative to one another, and that...

a human being capable of making a decision / choice that is not fixed by antecedent activity

... Human beings are part and parcel with the action of generating the decision. The decision itself is not fixed by the antecedent, it's fixed by the antecedent and the present state. As we are there in the present, it's a human making the decision, not the antecedents.

And then you keep on rattling off more bullshit.

Of course, we keep asking you to take a class and learn about autonomy, and why it matters, but you don't.

 

[pood]

1. Broadly, determinism is the thesis that antecedent events, in conjunction with natural law, entail all future events including human acts (all events and acts are necessary)
2. But “natural law” is a descriptive and not a prescriptive process, knocking out one of the two pillars of the assigned definition of determinism. See: Neo-Humean compatibilism and regularity theory.
3. Moreover, no contingent events or acts can also be necessary events or acts. That is a modal fallacy.
4. Broadly, compatibilism is the thesis that given a set of antecedents I will [but not MUST] do a particular thing. To claim that I MUST do a certain thing is a modal fallacy.
5. Necessarily true propositions are true at all possible worlds (modal logic).
6. Contingently true propositions are true at some possible worlds and not true at others (modal logic).
7. Choosing A over B is contingent and not necessary. So human choices are contingent.
8. Compatibilism also holds that my acts are free insofar as they are not balked by external circumstances, such as someone holding a gun to my head.
9. People empirically make free compatibilist choices all the time, unless their will is balked. Thus, empiricism establishes the truth of P8.
10. C: Therefore, compatibilist free will holds.

Notice that nothing in the above contains a question-begging premise. Of course one can challenge the truth of the premises to discredit the argument as unsound, but to claim that people here are presenting circular arguments is a figment of someone’s imagination.

 

[pood]

I have a choice between Coke or Pepsi. (I keep using this example because it is convenient; in reality I rarely if ever drink either, but that is my choice!)

What are the options here?

I can choose one or the other or refrain from choosing either.

Hard determinism, as a first premise, defines WHATEVER I choose or refrain from choosing as pre-determined.

From this we can see that hard determinism is actually the question-begging argument, and not compatibilism.

 

[Jarhyn]

all events and acts are necessary

To agree with you: the events are not "necessary". They are necessary only within a specific context of time and space.

I can describe at least some whole "universes" where those events are completely absent.

Because the events and acts are contingent entirely on the context where they are observed (that momentary state), this context means they cannot be "necessary"; "necessary" in this sense requires a truth to hold regardless of context which is lost (or shifted out of focus) with a mere step to the left or right.

As I said, this is nothing more than a silly little trick where someone attempts to hide "it's that way because God said so" in the folds of the argument, and then hope it's buried so deep nobody can spot it.

Necessitation happens under context, and any time where someone tries to point to necessitation free of context it indicates an error.

 

[Jarhyn]

I think an important philosophical recognition is that of the absurd.

The absurd is not necessary. In fact, that which is absurd is the logical diametric opposite of that which is necessary.

The absurd is, in this discussion, that which IS but has no fundamental purpose for its existence. Why do drive on the left side and not the right side? Absurdity! Why does a cesium ion emit different amounts of particles from one end than another end? Absurdity! Why is the Fine Structure Constant ≈ 1/137? Absurdity!

Now, once you provide some absurdities, like some axioms or some starting conditions, once you propose something so absurd, necessities follow from the absurdities... but we cannot ever forget the fact that it started with the abjectly unnecessary -- absurdities.

In fact ALL necessity is first built on absurdity, and the universal nature of the Modal Fallacy seems to be the inversion of necessity and absurdity, of naming the absurd necessary.

 

[BSilvEsq]

1. Broadly, determinism is the thesis that antecedent events, in conjunction with natural law, entail all future events including human acts (all events and acts are necessary)
2. But “natural law” is a descriptive and not a prescriptive process, knocking out one of the two pillars of the assigned definition of determinism. See: Neo-Humean compatibilism and regularity theory.
3. Moreover, no contingent events or acts can also be necessary events or acts. That is a modal fallacy.
4. Broadly, compatibilism is the thesis that given a set of antecedents I will [but not MUST] do a particular thing. To claim that I MUST do a certain thing is a modal fallacy.
5. Necessarily true propositions are true at all possible worlds (modal logic).
6. Contingently true propositions are true at some possible worlds and not true at others (modal logic).
7. Choosing A over B is contingent and not necessary. So human choices are contingent.
8. Compatibilism also holds that my acts are free insofar as they are not balked by external circumstances, such as someone holding a gun to my head.
9. People empirically make free compatibilist choices all the time, unless their will is balked. Thus, empiricism establishes the truth of P8.
10. C: Therefore, compatibilist free will holds.

Notice that nothing in the above contains a question-begging premise. Of course one can challenge the truth of the premises to discredit the argument as unsound, but to claim that people here are presenting circular arguments is a figment of someone’s imagination.

First of all, I was not including you among the folks who have, as their foundation basis for Compatibilism, the tautological syllogism I spelled out. There are, however, some who do subscribe to that syllogism, whether they are able to see it or not -- and one of them is AntiChris.

Second, your 10 point statement of Compatibilism holds together so long as every one of the 10 points is accepted for purposes of the argument. Determinists and Incompatibilists reject your 3rd point and have, as a foundational premise, that there is no indeterminate activity that permits anything beyond that which must be / occur. Thus, the thesis of compatibilism broadly stated in your 4th point fails in the face of Determinism, and yields to Incompatibilism.

I accept that you reject the foundational premise of Determinism, claiming it to be a modal fallacy. As I have explained multiple times, a foundational premise cannot be fallacious. I have a very difficult time believing that you do not understand that to be so. I get that you believe that the foundational premise cannot be the logical conclusion of any argument you are willing to accept. But, that is not a modal fallacy. It is a rejection of a premise -- which is a factual position you are entitled to assert.

The point of all of this is that Compatibilism, as you have described it, is not a thesis that Determinism, as defined by Incompatibilists, can be harmonized with Free Will (as you have defined it). Rather, your version of Compatibilism is simply a belief in Free Will and an abject rejection of Determinism as defined by Incompatibilists. As such, your position does not assert that Free Will is "compatible" with Determinism as defined by Incompatibilists, so much as your position is simply that the Incompatibilist definition of Determininism is a false construct, which you reject, and that humans do, in fact, have free will. Come to think of it, that is not far removed (if removed at all) from the tautological syllogism you disclaim.

The simple question of Incompatibilism is whether the following two propositions (which I take from your own 10 point analysis) can be harmonized without changing or rejecting either proposition:

Proposition 1: "antecedent events, in conjunction with natural law, entail all future events including human acts (all events and acts are necessary)"

Proposition 2: "given a set of antecedents I will [but not MUST] do a particular thing"

I fail to see how these two propositions can be harmonized without changing or rejecting either proposition. Your 10 point analysis rejects Proposition 1. That is fine, but that is not harmonizing the two propositions.

I cannot understand what is so difficult about accepting that the two propositions stated above (which are taken verbatim from your own 10 point analysis) are incompatible, and why you (and others) insist upon evading that logical conclusion by rejecting the truth of Proposition 1.

The question of Incompatibilism and Compatibilism is not a truth exercise. Rather, it is a simple exercise in logic. Neither Incompatibilism nor Compatibilism involves a belief in the truth of falsehood of Determinism or the existence or non-existence of Free Will. Rather, the question of Incompatibilism and Compatibilism is simply whether it can be the case that the construct of Determinism could be true and the construct of Free Will could exist concurrently in the same universe and at all dimensions (however few or many there may be). I am confident that you agree that the two concepts (as defined) are at odds; I accept that you reject even the theoretical potential for the first concept to be true; and I cannot understand your reluctance to acknowledge the incompatibility of the two concepts (as defined).

The issue is no different than seeking to determine the compatibility or incompatibility of Perpetual Motion and the Laws of Thermodynamics. One or the other is untrue, but they cannot be harmonized without changing the meaning of one or the other or both.

It seems to me that you have a different definition of Determinism than is employed by Incompatibilists. Your definition of Determinism is the Newtonian version, which is a scientific concept that has been refined over time by some (but not all) physicists to reject the absolute absence of physical indeterminism (at least at the quantum level). But that is not the definition of Determinism employed by Incompatibilists. It may be, as you seem to contend, that Incompatibilist Determinism is a Perpetual Motion Machine in the face of the a person who believes in the truth of the Laws of Thermodynamics (although, by your own logic, it would seem that those laws are merely descriptive and not prescriptive of a future in which they may, but will not necessarily, apply). But, that does not harmonize Determinism and Free Will. It simply sidesteps the incongruity of the two concepts by rejecting the truth of one in favor of the other -- which is precisely what the Incompatibilist says is necessary to sustain a belief in the possibility of Free Will.

This truly is not rocket science. It is simply logic at its most basic level.

 

[Jarhyn]

Determinists and Incompatibilists reject your 3rd point and have, as a foundational premise,

Which is the problem and why we accuse you of modal fallacies, because you just admit here that you don't understand the nature of the words "contingent" and "necessary".

 

[BSilvEsq]

Determinists and Incompatibilists reject your 3rd point and have, as a foundational premise,

Which is the problem and why we accuse you of modal fallacies, because you just admit here that you don't understand the nature of the words "contingent" and "necessary".

You are correct that a "contingent event" is never a "necessary event" and that it is a modal fallacy to move from one to the other. As such, my rejection of Point 3 was imprecise. Point 3 is a non-sequitur with respect to Incompatibilism and Determinism. As Pood stated in Point 1:

Broadly, determinism is the thesis that antecedent events, in conjunction with natural law, entail all future events including human acts (all events and acts are necessary)

In other words, the foundational premise, and not the logical conclusion, of determinism is that there are no contingent events -- only necessary (or, as Michael Pierce says, "eternal") events.

I may have been imprecise in my most recent post, but I have made this point repeatedly over prior posts. Again, it is not a modal fallacy to posit a premise that "all events and acts are necessary" -- and, therefore, there are no "contingent events."

I understand that you claim such a proposition to be a contradiction (by which I assume you mean a "self-contradiction" and not simply a contradiction to something different that you believe to be so) -- but I have yet to understand how you get there. Moreover, and as I noted in my last reply to Pood, it does not matter whether you reject the proposition (as contradictory or otherwise), because the question of Incompatibilism and Compatibilism is not whether Determinism (as defined in the manner you claim to be a contradiction) is true or false or whether Free Will (however you wish to define it) exists or does not exist. Rather, the the question of Incompatibilism and Compatibilism is simply whether it can be the case that the construct of Determinism could be true and the construct of Free Will could exist concurrently in the same universe and at all dimensions (however few or many there may be). Just as I replied to Pood, I am confident that you agree that the two concepts (as defined) are at odds; I accept that you reject even the theoretical potential for the first concept to be true; and I cannot understand your reluctance to acknowledge the incompatibility of the two concepts (as defined).

I do not require any further education in English, Logic, Autonomy, Math, Science, Physics, Computer Science or any other field or endeavor to understand that the following two propositions (as articulated by Pood) are irreconcilable without rejecting or redefining one or the other or both:

Proposition 1: "antecedent events, in conjunction with natural law, entail all future events including human acts (all events and acts are necessary)"

Proposition 2: "given a set of antecedents I will [but not MUST] do a particular thing"

That is the question of Incompatibilism and Compatibilism. The exploration of the truth or falsehood (or even the validity or invalidity) of one or the other of the two quoted propositions is a different inquiry, which is far more complex, nuanced and worthy of undertaking. Before that undertaking can even begin to occur, however, it is necessary to agree upon the meaning of the concepts being explored, and appreciating the incongruity of the two concepts is an important starting point.

 

[Jarhyn]

In other words, the foundational premise, and not the logical conclusion, of determinism is that there are no contingent events -- only necessary (or, as Michael Pierce says, "eternal") events

No, that's the foundational premise of Fatalism, and because it's a premise that includes a contradiction with the very definition of "necessary" and "contingent" it is at the outset fallacious.

It gets rejected further on in Pood's post.

Of course, you would understand this if you went back to actually take some classes on the subject (and I have recommended a few).

I have shown multiple times WHY this is a problem based entirely on the primitive nature of the terms: necessitation flows from assumptions and assumptions are absurdities.

The modal fallacy is the inversion of this.

At any rate, you don't pay me enough to educate you on this as you ought be.

 

[BSilvEsq]

In other words, the foundational premise, and not the logical conclusion, of determinism is that there are no contingent events -- only necessary (or, as Michael Pierce says, "eternal") events

No, that's the foundational premise of Fatalism, and because it's a premise that includes a contradiction with the very definition of "necessary" and "contingent" it is at the outset fallacious.

It gets rejected further on in Pood's post.

Of course, you would understand this if you went back to actually take some classes on the subject (and I have recommended a few).

I have shown multiple times WHY this is a problem based entirely on the primitive nature of the terms: necessitation flows from assumptions and assumptions are absurdities.

The modal fallacy is the inversion of this.

At any rate, you don't pay me enough to educate you on this as you ought be.

You really are spinning out of control, going round and round without stop. You should sit down before you fall from being dizzy.

I can accept that the words "contingent" and "necessary" are contradictory. That is why I reject the use of "contingent" in what I wrote above. Thus, there is no contradiction within the assertion that all future activity is the necessary effect of antecedent activity. You may not like that thought, and you may prefer to brand it "Fatalism," but it is not a contradiction, and it is, in fact, the Determinism of Incompatiblism.
As Karl Popper explained:

“The metaphysical doctrine of determinism simply asserts that all events in this world are fixed, or unalterable, or predetermined. It does not assert that they are known to anybody, or predictable by scientific means. But it asserts that the future is as little changeable as is the past. Everybody knows what we mean when we say that the past cannot be changed. It is in precisely the same sense that the future cannot be changed, according to metaphysical determinism.”

See also, Mark Balaguer, "Why the Classical Argument Against Free Will is a Failure," published by the NIT Reader Press, at https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/determinism-classical-argument-against-free-will-failure/. In that article, while arguing for Free Will and against Determinism, the author writes:

If determinism is true, then as soon as the Big Bang took place 13 billion years ago, the entire history of the universe was already settled. Every event that’s ever occurred was already predetermined before it occurred. And this includes human decisions. If determinism is true, then everything you’ve ever done — every choice you’ve ever made — was already predetermined before our solar system even existed. And if this is true, then it has obvious implications for free will.

After accurately describing Determinism (above), the author rejects that Determinism is true -- but only after explaining that the truth if Determinism would preclude the existence of Free Will -- exactly what I have said time and time again in this forum.

To repeat, there is no modal fallacy, or any other type of fallacy, in positing that the future is fixed. There is simply a question of whether that proposition is factually accurate or inaccurate. It is, however, accepted by all knowledgeable and respectable philosophers, scientists, physicists, etc. that Determinism (as explained above) is neither provable nor falsifiable. The same is true of Free Will. All we can do is acknowledge that the two concepts are contradictory to one another (which you come close to doing with your constant refrain that contingency and necessity are contradictory) and pick a side for whatever reason or remain agnostic. You cannot, however, rationally accept both (which, again, you seem to say as well) -- whether it is because you reject Determinism as a false construct (as you do) or for some other reason. In the end, the two concepts are Incompatible and the only way to harmonize them is to reject one or the other or both -- which is not harmonizing them at all, but is tacitly conceding they are incompatible while refusing to acknowledge doing so (i.e., James' "quagmire of evasion").

Contrary to not being able to pay you enough for your putative lessons, I cannot possibly pay you too little as any payment at all would be incompatible with the value you provide.

 

[Elixir]

Whatever happens was either the only thing that was ever possible, or not.*
It all depends simply upon what you accept as the definition of “possible”, not upon any actual characteristic of the universe.