According to Robert Sapolsky, human free will does not exist

[Jarhyn]

We have all discussed this at length, and the fact that DBT doesn't understand what randomness is, how super-determinism works, or how that relates to determinism in the first place.

But honestly, this feels so very par for the course, where adults try to have discussions about things and children keep banging 2000 year old pots and pans and insisting that it's beautiful music.

 

[steve_bank]

The debates in philosophy outside of perhaps logic and a few other areas are about definitions.

The word randomness as invoked to me is murky and ill defined. A talkng point.

More developed is the stochastic system model. Given a system of state variables in one state the next state is statistic. At all state transitions cauality applies.

I do not think causality infers deterministic.

Given the inverse is one state the next state is not entirely rando random, the next stat depends on the previous state. But the next state is not deterministicaly predicable. As the universe presses the next only has a limited set of possibilities.

Consider evolution. As far as humans have come, it is unlikely we will evolve wings and fly.

BTW Jaryn, over years and thousands and thousands of posts the free will determinism compatibilist debate has not fundamentally changed. The debates are generalized assertions.

Is the next state of the universe deterministically predetermined? I tend to think not.

To say that once a choice is made it could not have been any other way is sophistry.

 

[Jarhyn]

To say that once a choice is made it could not have been any other way is sophistry

Well, yeah, that's quite the point. While both sides assert definitions and premises and such, one side is going further and committing a number of fallacious statements in asserting then necessity of those statements as true.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

gratuitous and unnecessary use of "macrophysical"

As it stands the conclusion does not follow from the premise. There's a hidden (unstated) premise. The unstated premise is that free will cannot exist in a truly deterministic universe.

This is a straightforward and clear example of the logical fallacy of begging the question - Michael (and you) assume the truth of the very thing that is in dispute.

False.

Nothing is hidden.

There is no question begging.

An honest and capable person would take account of the actual presented context: that describing the experience which some humans have.

On occasion, such as when deliberating (as typically occurs during the choosing event), some humans think they have the experience of reality being such that what they are to do is not already set/fixed/settled/determined. This is to say that some persons think they experience there being actual physical - not just logical - indeterminateness.

Human experience is at the macrophysical level; reference to the macrophysical is neither "gratuitous" nor "unnecessary", because this reference to "macrophysical" reiterates the human experience context and distinguishes the alleged indeterminateness experienced at the human level from the indeterminateness allowed at the quantum level.

Do determinists hold that there is ever such actual physical indeterminateness at the human, macrophysical level?

If determinists do so hold, then determinists also hold that what a person is to do is not already set/fixed/settled/determined.

If determinists deny that there is ever such actual physical indeterminateness at the macrophysical level (specifically that which some humans think they detect/experience), then those macrophysical indeterminateness-denying determinists hold/assume/assert such indeterminateness to be incompatible with determinism.

In that case, if compatibilists are determinists, then compatibilists hold that the physical indeterminateness which some humans think they experience on occasion is incompatible with compatibilist determinism.

Previously, in response to the possibility presented as "If compatibilism is a determinism", The Anti-Chris said, "It's not."

When it was subsequently pointed out that if compatibilism is simply the belief that free will is possible whether or not the universe is deterministic "then compatibilism would simply be the belief that free will were possible", The Anti-Chris replied, "Yes, Compatibilist free will is the ability to act on one's own desires, motives, or will without external coercion or impediment and this ability exists regardless of the deterministic/indeterministic nature of the universe."

But that response is nothing more than an attempt to avoid/evade/ignore the specific described context of some humans thinking they experience actual indeterminateness at the macrophysical level. This specified and experienced context was already noted to be other than and in addition to that of being free-from "external coercion or impediment". The specified and experienced context now at issue regards whether persons are free-to settle an actually unsettled reality.

It is possible to be free-from without being free-to. It is possible to be free-from "external coercion or impediment" without it being possible to be free-to determine the not-yet-determined - for instance, if there is no actual unsettledness yet to be determined.

Although The Anti-Chris holds that compatibilism is simply the belief that persons are free when free-from "external coercion and impediment" and able to act according to their own desires regardless of whether determinism is the case or not, there is another possible and more common way of describing compatibilism.

Here is one common way of describing compatibilism: "Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible". Here is another: "Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism." This common way of associating compatibilism with determinism makes sense of the compatibility aspect of compatibilism whereas The Anti-Chris description of compatibilism as simply being free-from external coercion or control has no similarly necessary compatibility association.

Regardless, the issue which The Anti-Chris insists on avoiding is whether persons are free-to settle the unsettledness which those persons perceive as actual in light of a determinism which denies that there is ever any such actual macrophysical unsettledness or indeterminateness. The Anti-Chris can take full satisfaction in ever being free-from external coercion and control, but to insist that such is all there need be for freedom to be actual is to beg the question against those persons who think they experience actual macrophysical indeterminateness and include that being free-to as a necessary aspect of freedom.

Obviously, if there is no such unsettledness or indeterminateness, persons are not free-to settle such unsettledness. If determinism denies that there is any such actual unsettlednesss, then determinism is incompatible with persons being free-to settle such unsettledness which they think they experience. Persons could still be free-from external coercion and control, and persons could still have the experience of acting in accord with their desires; persons can be free-from without ever being free-to, but a determinism which denies the experienced indeterminateness is an incompatibilism with regards to that aspect of freedom for which macrophysical indeterminateness is experienced as a necessary condition.

 

[Jarhyn]

Nothing is hidden.

There is no question begging.

I mean, you say that, but the fact is that "necessitation" outside of "contingence" is exactly a transparently begged question.

And what Antichris was pointing out about your egregious use of "macrophysical" is that you don't really seem to understand the actual terms of the discussion at all.

But that response is nothing more than an attempt to avoid/evade/ignore the specific described context of some humans thinking they experience actual indeterminateness at the macrophysical level

And then those humans are fools, by in large.

As stated, the intuition that leads humans to this conclusion that what they are feeling is "indeterminateness" is either because of fools who think that the natural perception of autonomous freedom is "indeterminateness" rather than "the natural perception of autonomous freedom" and corrupt their intuitions; or they naturally confuse chaotic decisions making with rational decision making.

Now there are plenty of situations where you can put a ball on the top of a hill and use the chaos of which way it breaks to make a decision to let whatever chaotic thing make a decision for you: letting a dice make a decision. But that's deciding to make some other agency (and a far less rational one) decide; such an action has nothing to do with "freedom" in this sense, other than the choice to defer your own choice to something else.

Still, once someone understands these sorts of differentiations, one can point to the distinction between the human perception of "indeterminateness", which comports to things like dice rolls and pulling rules for behavior from chaotic and entropic systems, and the perception of freedom, which more attaches to our autonomy.

Compatibilists come to the idea of compatibility as a conclusion, though, rather than a premise.

Of course, everyone here with a background in science and logic is quite ready to point out that it begs a question to say "you couldn't merely because you didn't".

Please for the love of fuck actually take some classes on the subjects of software engineering, math, and psychology, people. You will NEVER understand behavior without the benefit of having all the early mistakes laid out for you to study and avoid and you fatalists seem to just step on them one after the other.

 

[The AntiChris]

Although The Anti-Chris holds that compatibilism is simply the belief that persons are free when free-from "external coercion and impediment" and able to act according to their own desires regardless of whether determinism is the case or not, there is another possible and more common way of describing compatibilism.

Here is one common way of describing compatibilism: "Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible". Here is another: "Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism." This common way of associating compatibilism with determinism makes sense of the compatibility aspect of compatibilism whereas The Anti-Chris description of compatibilism as simply being free-from external coercion or control has no similarly necessary compatibility association.

Logic doesn't appear to be your strong suit.

The claim that free will is possible regardless of whether determinism is the case or not, necessarily entails that free will must be compatible with determinism.

Obviously, if there is no such unsettledness or indeterminateness, persons are not free-to settle such unsettledness. If determinism denies that there is any such actual unsettlednesss, then determinism is incompatible with persons being free-to settle such unsettledness which they think they experience. Persons could still be free-from external coercion and control, and persons could still have the experience of acting in accord with their desires; persons can be free-from without ever being free-to, but a determinism which denies the experienced indeterminateness is an incompatibilism with regards to that aspect of freedom for which macrophysical indeterminateness is experienced as a necessary condition.

Is this an example of the "precision of your writing" which so impressed BSilvEsq (post #1447)?

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Please for the love of fuck actually take some classes on the subjects of software engineering, math, and psychology, people. ... you fatalists seem to just step on them one after the other.

Had you ever developed a sufficient reading comprehension ability, and had you managed to learn anything about composition, you would have developed the thus far unrealized ability to analyze your thoughts and your expressions.

Here is a brief lesson for you.

Proper composition requires that you support your assertions. You should support your assertion that I am what you call a "fatalist" by referring to specific statements I have made; you should quote my statements. Of course, you should, for the sake of composition, want to be certain to capture the contexts - you know, just to make sure you're not a repugnant dissembler.

Go ahead. Don't be lazy. Give it a try. It's good exercise. You will fail, but that will be an occasion from which you can learn to become a better thinker. In order for your ability to think to actually improve, you will have to learn how to think more thoroughly in terms of alternatives. Then you will have to learn how to apply thinking in terms of alternatives to your own thoughts and expressions. How likely are you to succeed at that? Do you want me to tell you your future?

I mean, you say that, but the fact is that "necessitation" outside of "contingence" is exactly a transparently begged question.

Same lesson. But, then, repetition is an essential aspect of early-stage learning. So, quote statements I have made to support your above quoted remark. Here's a little help for you: notice the many ifs used. What does if mean? What does if indicate? Can you figure out how that little help should actually help you? If not, then from my silence you will know that I've gone back to leaving you to the catharsis I reckon you get from your frequently unintelligible mere spewing.

 

[steve_bank]

The pedantic who when all else fails criticizes grammar.

One can go to extremes on form and still be speaking nonsense. Structured wordy bullshit is still wordy bullshit.

On ty foum I make an effort to be reasonably organized and consistent most of the time, but I do not worry about it.

In the work environment I was formal when it mattered, informal the rest of the time.

 

[Jarhyn]

Proper composition requires that you support your assertions

Oh, the fucking irony.

This is exactly the reason why all arguments including any manner of "necessitation" in the premise automatically fail as arguments

This is exactly why you have to base necessitation on contingent facts, not the other way around!

Of course, AntiChris has been doing a fantastic job of it, as has Steve, as have I, as has Pood.

Because this whole argument comes down to the "must" in the sea battle, though, and because that is a transparent modal fallacy, we can usually just trace it all the way back to the injection of a "necessitation absent contingency".

The most insane part is that Bruce and you have both directly questioned my rejection of the idea of necessitation absent contingency, and BOTH of you have called this rejection modally fallacious because I reject the possibility of (checks notes), that's right! IMPOSSIBILITY.

Things don't need to happen at the same place and time for them to be valid possibilities/alternatives/differences, and people have regulatory control over themselves over time via their autonomy and the fact that their autonomy allows them to autonomously self-modify.

 

[steve_bank]

"Beware the Jabberwock, my son! The jaws that bite, the claws that catch! Beware the Jubjub bird, and shun. The frumious Bandersnatch!”

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

Although The Anti-Chris holds that compatibilism is simply the belief that persons are free when free-from "external coercion and impediment" and able to act according to their own desires regardless of whether determinism is the case or not, there is another possible and more common way of describing compatibilism.

Here is one common way of describing compatibilism: "Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible". Here is another: "Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism." This common way of associating compatibilism with determinism makes sense of the compatibility aspect of compatibilism whereas The Anti-Chris description of compatibilism as simply being free-from external coercion or control has no similarly necessary compatibility association.

Logic doesn't appear to be your strong suit.

The claim that free will is possible regardless of whether determinism is the case or not, necessarily entails that free will must be compatible with determinism.

Obviously, if there is no such unsettledness or indeterminateness, persons are not free-to settle such unsettledness. If determinism denies that there is any such actual unsettlednesss, then determinism is incompatible with persons being free-to settle such unsettledness which they think they experience. Persons could still be free-from external coercion and control, and persons could still have the experience of acting in accord with their desires; persons can be free-from without ever being free-to, but a determinism which denies the experienced indeterminateness is an incompatibilism with regards to that aspect of freedom for which macrophysical indeterminateness is experienced as a necessary condition.

Is this an example of the "precision of your writing" which so impressed BSilvEsq (post #1447)?

Should I address your vacuousness, your limp pettiness, or should I point out that you are still begging the question against those persons who think they experience actual macrophysical indeterminateness and include that indeterminateness as a necessary condition for there to be the free-to aspect of freedom?

Oh, I did the pointing out. As to your vacuousness and pettiness, well, that is as ignorable as it would be if you hadn't continued begging the question.

Anyhow, and has been noted previously, those persons who think they experience actual macrophysical indeterminateness and include as a necessary aspect of being free the being free-to settle that indeterminateness also acknowledge being free-from external coercion and control as a similarly necessary but not sufficient aspect of being free.

So, you see, you are the one begging the question. But it's actually worse than that. Begging the question sounds so innocent, whereas you have been intentionally avoiding the matter of the thinking which holds the indeterminateness necessary for being free-to as a necessary condition for persons to be free.

 

[Jarhyn]

Anyhow, and has been noted previously, those persons who think they experience actual macrophysical indeterminateness and include as a necessary aspect of being free the being free-to settle that indeterminateness also acknowledge being free-from external coercion and control as a similarly necessary but not sufficient aspect of being free

And the people that think they experience the God of the universe telling them how things work and who experience the knowledge of flat triangles with more than 180° to the sum of their angles are equally mistaken.

You yourself with your Intuition and a feeling of the lack of freedom or whatever are just as wrong.

At any rate, you repeatedly demonstrate an inability to even describe or understand autonomy or why it is sufficient for being "free", so why do you insist on wasting our time?

You could easily take a class on the subject.

We have all repeatedly asked you to do so, or at least implied it.

 

[Michael S. Pearl]

At any rate, you repeatedly demonstrate an inability to even describe or understand autonomy or why it is sufficient for being "free", so why do you insist on wasting our time?

I keep wasting your time because I find you to be fascinating specimens. Your very restricted abilities to comprehend and to think in combination with your pretensiousness makes for a never-ending interesting study.

Take, for instance, this notion of "autonomy ... is sufficient for being 'free'". The being free-from external coercion and control was long ago acknowledged as a necessary condition for being free-to and, as a consequence, for being free.

You cannot logically establish that being free-from as sufficient for being free. Instead, you simply dismiss the experience some persons have of there being actual indeterminateness subject to being settled by what those persons choose out of the possibilities they recognize.

It matters not at all to me if you are dismissive. Dismissive types are painfully common. What is interesting is that you think you are being logical when by means of sheer dismissiveness you proclaim from on high the sufficiency of being free-from.

It is also interesting that you are less free than are those persons who have developed - and continue to develop - the ability to recognize actually available alternatives. That is simply fascinating.

 

[Jarhyn]

I keep wasting your time because I find you to be fascinating specimens. Your very restricted abilities to comprehend and to think in combination with your pretensiousness makes for a never-ending interesting study

Says the man who needs to find a mirror...

Take, for instance, this notion of "autonomy ... is sufficient for being 'free'". The being free-from external coercion and control was long ago acknowledged as a necessary condition for being free-to and, as a consequence, for being free

I didn't say "necessary" I said "sufficient".

You cannot logically establish that being free-from as sufficient for being free

Read what you say.

Being free-* is sufficient for being "free" because being "free" is established inside what established being (free)-*

Being free from requires an operational notion of free.

It is, however, not begging the question insofar as we have already established observationally the Newtonian concept of an object remaining in motion unless somehow acted upon.

We have observed and supported this principle quite vigorously, because it is quite visibly physically sound for most intents and purposes, and it is a function of broadly deterministic nature.

The thing that is most telling insofar as this broadly deterministic nature specifically of the human mind, and why "undefined behavior" is so unlikely to be part of our free will, is in fact down to the nature of various logistics functions.

THE logistics function ends up being parameterized such that it can range from a very sharp, snappy, square-ish structure of Boolean Logic, all the way to a nice, relaxed thing that looks almost like a flat line for all the ends trend towards different numbers.

In most engineering problems, one of the primary goals of structuring such a curve is to inter-relate systems in a logical way, and that doesn't happen when the curve is "sloppy" around the available activation levels of the system: useful logistics structures will generally not contain structures which are "flat" around 0 such that small physical fluctuations or quantization errors or whatever source of "wiggly" numbers can "wiggle" the result.

This is how we develop "environmentally" random numbers for the sake of making encryption keys, but that's an entirely different subject, and the concepts of "random" around that are about statistical correlation between behaviors of different numerical systems: something is "more random" when it correlates to a higher difficult or impossibility of statistical testing or prediction based on available information.

This is clearly something a system can demonstrably do even just using digital math, however the whole reason we do this is specifically to make decisions for reasons in a crazy way because of another interesting fact of parity: ANYTHING (XOR) "unrelated craziness" = even more obscurely crazy and unrelated craziness. But also, that more crazy craziness (XOR) "earlier craziness" = the original "anything".

This allows us to use craziness to hide things. It is one of the most important things that you will learn in the first week of a cryptography course.

But Hiding Things doesn't enter into the discussion of autonomy until way later. That's like 350-level of a 4 year degree on just that one subject. That's a "deep in the weeds" subject of adversarial game theory.

Right now, in this thread with you, we are much closer to a "spherical frictionless cow" level, and in the development of the thoughts which actually matter for what they contain (rather than what they don't), we try to narrow that "edge" space around 0 rather than flattening it.

Biological neurons have a rather curious activation curve, where the curve generally shoots up almost asymptotically from the "low", and then has a linear component across "high", so it's hesitant to activate, but when it does, it provides a commensurate response.

This is further supported by the fact that most LLMs can have their "weights" "quantized" to even to "single bit" precision and they tend to lose very few of their "capabilities". This means reducing what (for a digital computer anyway) looks like a sigmoid curve composed of tiny little digital stairsteps at the quantization points of the process to a single binary "square" "curve" (at least assuming a fully powered board).

Of course, you can compose much more efficient "physically mediated computations" using the composite activation curve biological neurons do, because it means being able to accomplish linear arithmetic adder/counter/measure with far fewer apparent parts.

This all does not change the fact that systems with broad flat activation curves don't really stand out as a requirement for any kind of "true" freedom.

In fact many such systems even include a "hysteresis" mechanism or even latches. A "hysteresis" mechanism is a mechanism that causes a system to activate once it is over a threshold, but the deactivation energy is set to be significantly less than what activated it; as a result, a system with "play" or "noise" will only change states due to the "noise" when the "noise" exceeds the gap of the hysteresis mechanism. A Latch is similar, but such that only second whole action will free the system from the activated state (the button on a click pen is a "latch"; you have to let it go back up before a push will un-latch it. It actually includes a number of latch states).

But all this time, I have been using the word "free", because it is so primitive in the concept of any system of functional change, and nowhere is randomness associated with it.

To be "free to, should you so choose", is to be "free to", and the internalness, the autonomy, is the Hallmark of responsibility in the decision.

 

[Jarhyn]

In a very real way, you have to actually be able to express what you mean, but most of us have studied this more than people who just want to appear smart on the internet.

It's not a good topic for pseudo-intellectuals.

Of course, I'm being accused of, ironically, not accepting alternatives when... The alternative is to accept a contradiction, which I won't, because that's fucking stupid.

 

[DBT]

We have all discussed this at length, and the fact that DBT doesn't understand what randomness is, how super-determinism works, or how that relates to determinism in the first place.

But honestly, this feels so very par for the course, where adults try to have discussions about things and children keep banging 2000 year old pots and pans and insisting that it's beautiful music.

It's not that I fail to understand randomness, but that you fail to understand that randomness is not a part of determinism.

Not according to how it is defined, or how the system works according to how it is defined.

What's worse, even as you yourself define it to be.

Need I remind you? Jarhyn - ''A deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.''

I suggest that you take a course on basic logic.

And at least try to keep in mind that compatibilism is related to determinism, not randomness.

 

[Jarhyn]

It's not that I fail to understand randomness, but that you fail to understand that randomness is not a part of determinism.

No, this just means you do not understand randomness, or the senses I was using it in on the discussion all those years ago.

At this point, I think you're just Sayed or Learner but with Fatalism instead of Islam or Christianity.

 

[DBT]

It's not that I fail to understand randomness, but that you fail to understand that randomness is not a part of determinism.

No, this just means you do not understand randomness, or the senses I was using it in on the discussion all those years ago.

At this point, I think you're just Sayed or Learner but with Fatalism instead of Islam or Christianity.

For heaven's sake, are you not able to understand that randomness is irrelevant to Compatibilism?

Do you not understand that Compatibilism is the position that free will is compatible with determinism, as it is defined, and not randomness?

Compatibilism
''Compatibilists argue that determinism is compatible with human freedom, and that indeterminism is not compatible or at best incoherent. They feel (correctly) that there must be a deterministic or causal connection between our will and our actions.''

The only question being, is it a sound argument or a valid definition of free will? For the given reasons, it is not.

Please stop trotting out your randomness defense. It has no merit.

 

[Jarhyn]

Compatibilism is

Your insistence on what other people mean by compatibilism, determinism, and randomness are entirely the problem here because these things do not mean what you think they mean.

Please stop trotting out your ignorance as if it's knowledge.

I tried explaining this to you with the discussion of aperiodic systems and the undecidability of location and context, but it seems to entirely escape you.

 

[BSilvEsq]

Obviously, if there is no such unsettledness or indeterminateness, persons are not free-to settle such unsettledness. If determinism denies that there is any such actual unsettlednesss, then determinism is incompatible with persons being free-to settle such unsettledness which they think they experience. Persons could still be free-from external coercion and control, and persons could still have the experience of acting in accord with their desires; persons can be free-from without ever being free-to, but a determinism which denies the experienced indeterminateness is an incompatibilism with regards to that aspect of freedom for which macrophysical indeterminateness is experienced as a necessary condition.

Is this an example of the "precision of your writing" which so impressed BSilvEsq (post #1447)?

YES! It is but another example. Michael has deeply considered these issues, developed a terminology that is very helpful in discussing the subject (once you make the effort to understand the terminology, which can be accomplished by reading Michael's earlier posts from which he continues to build his discussion), and presents clear arguments that are logically sound based on their articulated premises -- which leaves only fools to challenge the validity of the conclusions as opposed to attacking the truth of the premises, which are not asserted as truths in the first instance.

The problem with many of the defenders of Compatibilism on this thread is that they are so opposed to the possible truth of the foundational hypothetical premises and definitions of Determinism used in debate (which is a classical debate that has raged for multiple millennia and does not belong to the posters on this thread) that they refuse to evaluate the logic of the argument that flows from the foundational hypothetical premises and definitions of Determinism. Many of the defenders of Compatibilism on this thread have a different view of the meaning of Determinism than is the used in the classical debate, and they utilize that different definition to chastise the logic of the argument that Determinism and Free Will are incompatible. In so doing, however, they commit the logical fallacy of rejecting the logic of a syllogism because by challenging the truth of a premise of the syllogism.

The validity of the logic of a syllogism does not depend upon the truth of the premises of the syllogism. Rather, the logic turns on whether the asserted conclusion does or does not follow from acceptance of the truth of the premises. While the logic of a syllogism can be defeated by substituting a different premise for one or both of the two premises of the syllogism, the logic is not defeated by defeating the truth of a premise (even where it is possible to do so). Take, for example, the following syllogism: "If (1) all all swans are white, and If (2) If the bird I have in a crate is a swan, Then (3) it follows that the bird I have in the crate is white." That logic of that syllogism is valid and unassailable. There also is no "truth statement" in the syllogism, because the premises are presented as "if" statements. As such, it is not a sound reply to argue that the syllogism is unsound because there are, in fact, black swans. Indeed, that assertion would not even defeat the logic of the following modified syllogism: "(1) All swans are white, and (2) the bird I have in a specified crate is a swan, therefore (3) The swan I have in the specified crate is white." The modified syllogism does contain truth statements, but it is logically sound without regard to the whether the truth statements are correct (or true) or incorrect (or false). More specifically, the modified syllogism is logically sound even if it is indisputably false that "All swans are white" because we agree without hesitation that there are some swans that are black. It also may be false that I have a swan in a specified crate. I may actually have a duck or a dog or nothing at all. I may not even have a crate. None of that matters with respect to the question of whether the syllogism is logically sound.

Proof that a truth statement in a syllogism is incorrect (or false) might provide a basis for responding with something to the effect that "That is an interesting syllogism, but what is its value to us given that we know for a fact that the first premise is false." If we do know and agree that the first premise is false (as is the case with the hypothetical modified syllogism provided in the example above), a reasonable reply might be "Well, it is just an exercise to show how logic operates, and it is not intended to make any statement about the true color of swans."

But, what if we don't know and agree about the truth or falsity of a premise in a logically sound syllogism. Take, for example, the following syllogism: "(1) Schrodinger has a living cat that he has been keeping in a sealed box for the past hour, and (2) a cat cannot remain alive without oxygen for more than three minutes, therefore (3) there must have been oxygen accessible to the cat in the sealed box in which Schrodinger has been keeping the cat for no less than the past 57 minutes and some fraction of a second." Again, the syllogism is logically sound without regard to whether it is true or false that Schrodinger has a living cat that has been keeping in a sealed box for the past hour. It may well be that Schrodinger has a dead cat that he has been keeping in a sealed box for some or all of the past hour, or Schrodinger may have lied about having a cat in the crate at all or even about having a crate. Those facts, however, would not alter the fact that the logic of the syllogism, which is sound without regard to the truth or falsity of premises. Moreover, in the case of Schrodinger's car, we do not know and cannot agree on the truth or falsity of the factual assertion that "Schrodinger has a living cat that he has been keeping in a sealed box for the past hour." As such, this syllogism is more than simply an interesting exercise in logic. Rather, it is a subpart of a thought experiment that is considered to be of grand significance to the evolution of the understanding of physics -- just as were certain syllogisms underlying Einstein's general theory of relativity.

The syllogism of Incompatibilism is the following: "(1) If the truth of Determinism would mean that all human activity, including thought, is fixed in advance of its occurrence by antecedent activity of the universe such that no activity that has not yet occurred can occur any differently than it will occur as a result of antecedent activity, and (2) If humans have Free Will if and only if they are able to think, if not act, in a manner that is not fixed in advance of its occurrence by antecedent activity of the universe such that at least some human activity is free to occur in more than one possible manner, (3) Then the truth of Determinism would mean that humans do not have Free Will." Like the first swan syllogism offered above, the syllogism of Incompatibilism is both logically sound and contains no truth statements. As, such, it is not a sound reply to argue that the syllogism is unsound because Determinism does not mean that all human activity, including thought, is fixed in advance of its occurrence by antecedent activity of the universe such that no activity that has not yet occurred can occur any differently than it will occur as a result of antecedent activity. It may or may not be the case that all human activity, including thought, is not fixed in advance of its occurrence. But that has nothing to do with the validity of the syllogism.

Even if the syllogism of Incompatibilism were modified to convert the "if" statements to truth statements (which is the syllogism of Hard Determinism and not the syllogism of Indeterminism, which is based exclusively upon "if" statements), the syllogism still would be logically sound. Moreover, unlike the modified syllogism about white swans, and like the syllogism about Schrodinger's cat, we do not know whether or not "all human activity, including thought, is fixed in advance of its occurrence by antecedent activity of the universe such that no activity that has not yet occurred can occur any differently than it will occur as a result of antecedent activity." Rather, that is a hypothetical foundational premise that is incapable of being proven true or falsified. Nor, for that matter, do we know whether humans do or do not have Free Will -- even in a universe that is not entirely deterministic.

The only way a defender of Compatibilism is capable of advancing a logically sound argument that supports the compatibility of Free Will and Determinism n the face of the syllogism of Incompatibilism is by altering the definition(s) of Determinism and/or Free Will used in the syllogism of Incompatibilism -- which William James describes as a "quagmire of evasion." So long as Compatibilism and Incompatibilism accept the same definition of the terms Free Will and Determinism, then one of the other of Compatibilism or Incompatibilism has to rest upon a logically unsound or invalid syllogism. To quote William James once again: "The issue . . . is a perfectly sharp one, which no eulogistic terminology can smear over or wipe out. The truth must lie with one side or the other, and its lying with one side makes the other false.”