Human Instinct and Free Will

[untermensche]

The mind can't be simplified beyond something that arises as a result of brain activity.

I don't see why not. Why can't the activity be the experience?

For there to be experience there has to be something having the experience.

There can just be experience.

Assuming you meant "There can't just be experience", why not?

Imagine that there is only an experience. What would be different?

What is having the experience?

 

[ryan]

For there to be experience there has to be something having the experience.

There can just be experience.

Assuming you meant "There can't just be experience", why not?

Imagine that there is only an experience. What would be different?

What is having the experience?

Just to clarify, I think you are saying that there is material in a process, and the process has C (consciousness). And more specifically, you seem to be saying that C and the process exist simultaneously.

So, I guess what I am trying to get at is whether or not you believe a philosophical zombie would be different than its twin human.

 

[untermensche]

The question is serious.

What is having the experience?

A dynamic process?

 

[ryan]

The question is serious.

What is having the experience?

A dynamic process?

I am trying to minimize the components here, so I suppose the space and time that the experience occupies is having the experience. Or can't I say that the rest of the body beyond the process has the experience?

 

[untermensche]

The question is serious.

What is having the experience?

A dynamic process?

I am trying to minimize the components here, so I suppose the space and time that the experience occupies is having the experience. Or can't I say that the rest of the body beyond the process has the experience?

There is nothing added to the process by saying it produces something.

It is still just a process.

There is no necessity to try to minimize this beyond a process that produces an effect. There is no logical or scientific necessity.

 

[ryan]

I am trying to minimize the components here, so I suppose the space and time that the experience occupies is having the experience. Or can't I say that the rest of the body beyond the process has the experience?

There is nothing added to the process by saying it produces something.

It is still just a process.

There is no necessity to try to minimize this beyond a process that produces an effect. There is no logical or scientific necessity.

Then are you saying that the consciousness is produced after the process? This would agree with the Libet experiments.

 

[untermensche]

There is nothing added to the process by saying it produces something.

It is still just a process.

There is no necessity to try to minimize this beyond a process that produces an effect. There is no logical or scientific necessity.

Then are you saying that the consciousness is produced after the process? This would agree with the Libet experiments.

The process produces consciousness. They are simultaneous.

But obviously the process that is producing consciousness is only one of many processes going on.

As far as Libet, if you care, here's a philosophical examination of the experiment.

http://tap.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/10/15/0959354312460926.full.pdf+html

From our analyses in this article, we may conclude that the results of Libet’s study and
more recent Libet-type experiments do not permit strong (in particular, causal) claims
about the relation between neurological processes, conscious free will, and motor activity.
Instead, these experiments are better characterized as “exploratory experiments” (cf.
Steinle, 1997), which help to chart a developing area of intriguing neuroscientific research.
We are claiming, therefore, not that the experiments do not contribute at all to the debate
on neuroscience and free will, but rather that at present this contribution is still explora-
tory instead of providing a convincing test for or against the existence of free will.

 

[ryan]

Then are you saying that the consciousness is produced after the process? This would agree with the Libet experiments.

The process produces consciousness. They are simultaneous.

But obviously the process that is producing consciousness is only one of many processes going on.

As far as Libet, if you care, here's a philosophical examination of the experiment.

http://tap.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/10/15/0959354312460926.full.pdf+html

From our analyses in this article, we may conclude that the results of Libet’s study and
more recent Libet-type experiments do not permit strong (in particular, causal) claims
about the relation between neurological processes, conscious free will, and motor activity.
Instead, these experiments are better characterized as “exploratory experiments” (cf.
Steinle, 1997), which help to chart a developing area of intriguing neuroscientific research.
We are claiming, therefore, not that the experiments do not contribute at all to the debate
on neuroscience and free will, but rather that at present this contribution is still explora-
tory instead of providing a convincing test for or against the existence of free will.

So would you say that there is a difference between me and a zombie twin of me that does everything exactly as I do?

 

[Juma]

So would you say that there is a difference between me and a zombie twin of me that does everything exactly as I do?

First show that such s zombie twin is possible. I dont think so.

 

[ryan]

So would you say that there is a difference between me and a zombie twin of me that does everything exactly as I do?

First show that such s zombie twin is possible. I dont think so.

That's not the point. The point is if a zombie could exist, what would be the difference? If there is no effect on the body from the mind, then can't we imagine taking away the mind?

 

[Juma]

First show that such s zombie twin is possible. I dont think so.

That's not the point. The point is if a zombie could exist, what would be the difference? If there is no effect on the body from the mind, then can't we imagine taking away the mind?

If i could defy gravity what would be the difference?

The zombie thought experiment is begging the question.

It is completely possible that such a zoombie could not exist and then your thought experiement is worthless.


I agree with Marvin Minsky as cited by wikipedia in the article on philosophical zoombies:

Marvin Minsky sees the argument as circular. The proposition of the possibility of something physically identical to a human but without subjective experience assumes that the physical characteristics of humans are not what produces those experiences, which is exactly what the argument was claiming to prove.

 

[untermensche]

The process produces consciousness. They are simultaneous.

But obviously the process that is producing consciousness is only one of many processes going on.

As far as Libet, if you care, here's a philosophical examination of the experiment.

http://tap.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/10/15/0959354312460926.full.pdf+html

From our analyses in this article, we may conclude that the results of Libet’s study and
more recent Libet-type experiments do not permit strong (in particular, causal) claims
about the relation between neurological processes, conscious free will, and motor activity.
Instead, these experiments are better characterized as “exploratory experiments” (cf.
Steinle, 1997), which help to chart a developing area of intriguing neuroscientific research.
We are claiming, therefore, not that the experiments do not contribute at all to the debate
on neuroscience and free will, but rather that at present this contribution is still explora-
tory instead of providing a convincing test for or against the existence of free will.

So would you say that there is a difference between me and a zombie twin of me that does everything exactly as I do?

There is no such thing as a zombie twin.

Another empty rat hole to crawl into.

There is nothing to be gained in understanding of consciousness by pursuing imaginary nonentities.

But maybe I'm wrong.

What purpose is served in looking at imaginary "zombies"?

Especially when you have a very well written, although not so easily understood because it is complicated philosophical examination of the Libet experiments and the erroneous conclusions that seem to have become religious dogma in some circles.

The fields of cognitive science and AI have turned out so far to be major disappointments. Riddled with absolute rubbish and attempts to pass off preliminary research as the final word.

 

[fromderinside]

My point three was an answer to whether there was a physiology of consciousness. Obviously there is such study. Your
Trump-like hand waving offers no information upon which one can respond or inform except to note it as hand waving.

OK. You waved your hands.

As for quantum speculating effects as possible when its obvious that those supposed effects are already accounted in macro deterministic observations you wind up with another hand wave. Its funny that you make fun of your own remark. Definitely Trump-like.

Using the word "Trump" amounts to an argument to some.

Since there is no physical explanation for consciousness I wonder what those people looking at the evolution of consciousness are looking at.

Probably their navels.

You should start with Moruzzi and Magoun, 1948. Its about source of wakefulness/somnolence. Then read Sokolov 1962 its about ascending reticular activating system. Then there are a few thousand articles on the cerebral arousing system arising from  Locus coeruleus. The stuff by Crick et all is about the evolution of what is necessary for beings to discriminate things from noise and outside from within.

Yeah, their navels. Thanks Trump.

Please tell us again how "I" is the same for seeing and deciding, with appropriate hand wave of course.

 

[ryan]

That's not the point. The point is if a zombie could exist, what would be the difference? If there is no effect on the body from the mind, then can't we imagine taking away the mind?

If i could defy gravity what would be the difference?

The zombie thought experiment is begging the question.

It is completely possible that such a zoombie could not exist and then your thought experiement is worthless.


I agree with Marvin Minsky as cited by wikipedia in the article on philosophical zoombies:

Marvin Minsky sees the argument as circular. The proposition of the possibility of something physically identical to a human but without subjective experience assumes that the physical characteristics of humans are not what produces those experiences, which is exactly what the argument was claiming to prove.

Some kinds of physicalism allows for the consciousness, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/ . This is where the zombie argument is more effective and more possible.

 

[Juma]

If i could defy gravity what would be the difference?

The zombie thought experiment is begging the question.

It is completely possible that such a zoombie could not exist and then your thought experiement is worthless.


I agree with Marvin Minsky as cited by wikipedia in the article on philosophical zoombies:

Marvin Minsky sees the argument as circular. The proposition of the possibility of something physically identical to a human but without subjective experience assumes that the physical characteristics of humans are not what produces those experiences, which is exactly what the argument was claiming to prove.

Some kinds of physicalism allows for the consciousness, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/ . This is where the zombie argument is more effective and more possible.

No. The zombie argument is useless. As Minski said: it is circular.

 

[ryan]

The process produces consciousness. They are simultaneous.

But obviously the process that is producing consciousness is only one of many processes going on.

As far as Libet, if you care, here's a philosophical examination of the experiment.

http://tap.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/10/15/0959354312460926.full.pdf+html

From our analyses in this article, we may conclude that the results of Libet’s study and
more recent Libet-type experiments do not permit strong (in particular, causal) claims
about the relation between neurological processes, conscious free will, and motor activity.
Instead, these experiments are better characterized as “exploratory experiments” (cf.
Steinle, 1997), which help to chart a developing area of intriguing neuroscientific research.
We are claiming, therefore, not that the experiments do not contribute at all to the debate
on neuroscience and free will, but rather that at present this contribution is still explora-
tory instead of providing a convincing test for or against the existence of free will.

So would you say that there is a difference between me and a zombie twin of me that does everything exactly as I do?

There is no such thing as a zombie twin.

Another empty rat hole to crawl into.

There is nothing to be gained in understanding of consciousness by pursuing imaginary nonentities.

But maybe I'm wrong.

What purpose is served in looking at imaginary "zombies"?

Especially when you have a very well written, although not so easily understood because it is complicated philosophical examination of the Libet experiments and the erroneous conclusions that seem to have become religious dogma in some circles.

The fields of cognitive science and AI have turned out so far to be major disappointments. Riddled with absolute rubbish and attempts to pass off preliminary research as the final word.

I find that these kinds of thought experiments really help sort out what the argument is about. It also helps a person understand how the other person is thinking of the concept. Humans are all very much able to agree on things as science has shown.

We are all rational on this forum, so the more we think about the concept and argue about it, the more I expect we will learn and even agree.

 

[ryan]

If i could defy gravity what would be the difference?

The zombie thought experiment is begging the question.

It is completely possible that such a zoombie could not exist and then your thought experiement is worthless.


I agree with Marvin Minsky as cited by wikipedia in the article on philosophical zoombies:

Marvin Minsky sees the argument as circular. The proposition of the possibility of something physically identical to a human but without subjective experience assumes that the physical characteristics of humans are not what produces those experiences, which is exactly what the argument was claiming to prove.

Some kinds of physicalism allows for the consciousness, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/ . This is where the zombie argument is more effective and more possible.

No. The zombie argument is useless. As Minski said: it is circular.

"producing" the consciousness is only half the battle for physicalists; what then? Does this ghostly material then abide by its own free will, can it interact with the body, what is it, how did it emerge and most importantly for the purposes of this discussion can it be separated from the body to make a zombie?

 

[untermensche]

Using the word "Trump" amounts to an argument to some.

Since there is no physical explanation for consciousness I wonder what those people looking at the evolution of consciousness are looking at.

Probably their navels.

You should start with Moruzzi and Magoun, 1948. Its about source of wakefulness/somnolence. Then read Sokolov 1962 its about ascending reticular activating system. Then there are a few thousand articles on the cerebral arousing system arising from  Locus coeruleus. The stuff by Crick et all is about the evolution of what is necessary for beings to discriminate things from noise and outside from within.

Yeah, their navels. Thanks Trump.

Please tell us again how "I" is the same for seeing and deciding, with appropriate hand wave of course.

You can't look at the evolution of something unless you know what it is.

And nobody knows what consciousness is. And your hand waving is evidence.

And yes it is the exact same "I", the only "I", that initiates movement, is aware of the sensation of vision, and decides.

Except perhaps in multiple personality disorder.

 

[untermensche]

The process produces consciousness. They are simultaneous.

But obviously the process that is producing consciousness is only one of many processes going on.

As far as Libet, if you care, here's a philosophical examination of the experiment.

http://tap.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/10/15/0959354312460926.full.pdf+html

From our analyses in this article, we may conclude that the results of Libet’s study and
more recent Libet-type experiments do not permit strong (in particular, causal) claims
about the relation between neurological processes, conscious free will, and motor activity.
Instead, these experiments are better characterized as “exploratory experiments” (cf.
Steinle, 1997), which help to chart a developing area of intriguing neuroscientific research.
We are claiming, therefore, not that the experiments do not contribute at all to the debate
on neuroscience and free will, but rather that at present this contribution is still explora-
tory instead of providing a convincing test for or against the existence of free will.

So would you say that there is a difference between me and a zombie twin of me that does everything exactly as I do?

There is no such thing as a zombie twin.

Another empty rat hole to crawl into.

There is nothing to be gained in understanding of consciousness by pursuing imaginary nonentities.

But maybe I'm wrong.

What purpose is served in looking at imaginary "zombies"?

Especially when you have a very well written, although not so easily understood because it is complicated philosophical examination of the Libet experiments and the erroneous conclusions that seem to have become religious dogma in some circles.

The fields of cognitive science and AI have turned out so far to be major disappointments. Riddled with absolute rubbish and attempts to pass off preliminary research as the final word.

I find that these kinds of thought experiments really help sort out what the argument is about. It also helps a person understand how the other person is thinking of the concept. Humans are all very much able to agree on things as science has shown.

We are all rational on this forum, so the more we think about the concept and argue about it, the more I expect we will learn and even agree.

But that's the philosophy section, not the science section.

Of course you never know where philosophical speculations may lead, but science is about things that can possible be observed or their effects can be somehow observed, not imaginary entities.

 

[Jolly_Penguin]

There is no Free Will. Estate lawyers always give you a bill.