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What does it mean for something to be "logically possible"?

Very simple: When I look into a mirror, I believe that what I see is the world behind me reflected into it.

Or even better, but no longer so very simple: When I believe I'm looking into a mirror, I believe that what I believe I'm seeing is the world behind me reflected into it.

No knowledge involved. Belief certainly is good enough to explain all our actions.
EB
No, there is knowledge involved; you're just refusing to admit it, and I know why.

If the Sargent needs to pfft (belieeeeeve) something of a serious nature and you haul off by responding to him about what you belieeeeeve, then he is going to be none too happy. Refusing to declare knowledge when you have every justification that your belief IS IS IS IS true, I'd encourage you to muster the courage to step up your declaration a notch.

Yes, you don't 'know' what you'd be telling him is true in the sense that you're infallibly certain beyond the gettierest of mistake. Yes, you do not hold certainty in a Cartesian sense. Yes, you are possibly possibily possibly wrong.

That's okay; you don't need to 'know'; you just need to know, and therein lies the difference. In the former, you need a justified belief that must must must be correct without the possibility possibility possibility of mistake. In the latter, you need a justified belief that is is is actually actually actually correct.

So, yeah, you can cowardly (no offense, just expressive) refuse to affirm knowledge when what you have can be explained safely couched in terms of belief, but a substantively justified belief that you have every reason to believe is true is quite different than run of the mill belief.

I believe my hand is in front of me, and yes, I will never 'know' my hand is in front of me, but I don't just believe my hand is in front of me, as there is more; I know my hand is in front of me ... even though I don't 'know' my hand is in front of me.

No. You say you are SURE that your hand is in front of you. That is a statement about your feeling about your belief.
You feel sure. That is what we normally mean when saying that we ”know”.
 
It's also subject to ambiguity in the hands of philosophers.

To the typical child and adult not exposed to these kinds of subjects, knowledge can be described as:

A justified belief that IS true.

It's only altered and transformed with exposure to these kinds of subjects and becomes:

A justified belief that MUST be true.

”Knowledge” can only be stated from a godlike viewpoint.
And thus shoukd be banished from discussions like this.
That's omniscience.
 
untermensche said:
No. This singular unique water covered rock only became a planet after humans made it one.
That does not parse with common language usage.

If a being came here prior to mankind, he would not have known it was earth since he would have come by long before humans came along to name it, but the referent in this case precedes the naming of it. The object referred to as "Earth" is precisely as old as the object you describe as "this singular unique water covered rock." If I had to guess, you probably don't want to use the terms "water" and "rock" either, but language, what can I say?

Is it? Does ”earth” also refer to the planet that consisted of the matter that later became the earth and the moon?

You see that what is clearcut in your mind is not so clear cut when getting into how the objects are separated from each other. In fact: the separations are made up by us.
An often misguided notion is that an object (for instance, a car) is no more than the sum of its parts, but that notion is faulty, for a car is more than merely the sum of its parts; for example, it also includes the assemblage of those parts. Sure, if you take a door off a car, you still have a car, but taken to the extreme, you'd not be left with a car but what once was a car. When we walk into a parts store, before us are not a bunch of unassembled cars, even if the assembly of the parts would yield them.

The material that is now apart of our planet is not just a part but apart of our planet. The parts prior to becoming apart of our planet was neither apart of or a part of our planet.
 
No, there is knowledge involved; you're just refusing to admit it, and I know why.

If the Sargent needs to pfft (belieeeeeve) something of a serious nature and you haul off by responding to him about what you belieeeeeve, then he is going to be none too happy. Refusing to declare knowledge when you have every justification that your belief IS IS IS IS true, I'd encourage you to muster the courage to step up your declaration a notch.

Yes, you don't 'know' what you'd be telling him is true in the sense that you're infallibly certain beyond the gettierest of mistake. Yes, you do not hold certainty in a Cartesian sense. Yes, you are possibly possibily possibly wrong.

That's okay; you don't need to 'know'; you just need to know, and therein lies the difference. In the former, you need a justified belief that must must must be correct without the possibility possibility possibility of mistake. In the latter, you need a justified belief that is is is actually actually actually correct.

So, yeah, you can cowardly (no offense, just expressive) refuse to affirm knowledge when what you have can be explained safely couched in terms of belief, but a substantively justified belief that you have every reason to believe is true is quite different than run of the mill belief.

I believe my hand is in front of me, and yes, I will never 'know' my hand is in front of me, but I don't just believe my hand is in front of me, as there is more; I know my hand is in front of me ... even though I don't 'know' my hand is in front of me.

No. You say you are SURE that your hand is in front of you. That is a statement about your feeling about your belief.
You feel sure. That is what we normally mean when saying that we ”know”.
I am confident, yes. I am confident that my hand is before me as I type, but that has no bearing on knowledge. People sometimes know things but exhibit hesitancy. This is demonstrated during tests where a student knows an answer but displays lack of confidence.
 
untermensche said:
No. This singular unique water covered rock only became a planet after humans made it one.
That does not parse with common language usage.

If a being came here prior to mankind, he would not have known it was earth since he would have come by long before humans came along to name it, but the referent in this case precedes the naming of it. The object referred to as "Earth" is precisely as old as the object you describe as "this singular unique water covered rock." If I had to guess, you probably don't want to use the terms "water" and "rock" either, but language, what can I say?

Is it? Does ”earth” also refer to the planet that consisted of the matter that later became the earth and the moon?

You see that what is clearcut in your mind is not so clear cut when getting into how the objects are separated from each other. In fact: the separations are made up by us.
An often misguided notion is that an object (for instance, a car) is no more than the sum of its parts, but that notion is faulty, for a car is more than merely the sum of its parts; for example, it also includes the assemblage of those parts. Sure, if you take a door off a car, you still have a car, but taken to the extreme, you'd not be left with a car but what once was a car. When we walk into a parts store, before us are not a bunch of unassembled cars, even if the assembly of the parts would yield them.

The material that is now apart of our planet is not just a part but apart of our planet. The parts prior to becoming apart of our planet was neither apart of or a part of our planet.


Yeah! what comes into what we define as an object is thus also our potential (!) use of it. And that is definitely not ”out there” but only in our heads. Thanks for a good exampke of what I’m talking about.
 
No. You say you are SURE that your hand is in front of you. That is a statement about your feeling about your belief.
You feel sure. That is what we normally mean when saying that we ”know”.
I am confident, yes. I am confident that my hand is before me as I type, but that has no bearing on knowledge. People sometimes know things but exhibit hesitancy. This is demonstrated during tests where a student knows an answer but displays lack of confidence.

The student never ”knows the answer”. ”Knowledge” is not an act. Nobody ever knows.(in the philosphically well defined meaning of the word)
 
I am confident, yes. I am confident that my hand is before me as I type, but that has no bearing on knowledge. People sometimes know things but exhibit hesitancy. This is demonstrated during tests where a student knows an answer but displays lack of confidence.

The student never ”knows the answer”. ”Knowledge” is not an act. Nobody ever knows.(in the philosphically well defined meaning of the word)
Do you realize how that sounds? Of all the students since there were students, never once is it true that they knew the answer to a test question. You think that accords with common usage?

Maybe it's better to question what drives the skeptics doubt than it is to entertain the absurdity that no one knows anything. What we can't be is infallibly certain beyond possibility of mistake. That doesn't imply lack of knowledge, but it doesn't stop philosophers from hijacking the word either, apparently.

Knowledge is a mental state, and despite the fact most agree that knowledge implies belief but not inversely, there has been recent developments for us to take pause and consider knowledge irreducible such that it's a mental state in its own right. I'm still coming to grips on that one though. At any rate, my position is that we aren't deluding ourselves when we think we know things. We know stuff. How do we? Eh, that's another question. Better to understand first what I'm even saying than to move on to that. One things for sure, I don't mean what others twist it to mean.
 
It seems to me that whatever it is that forms a virtual representation of the external world, be it Human, AI or other species of animal, based on information acquired from the external world, it is merely modeling information that already exists and exists independently of all modeling.

Yes. It is modelling external information.
And objects is a part of the model. Not the external information.

The brains subjective representation of information is a model based on objective information, wavelength, airborne molecules, pressure waves, etc. A model that is being constantly tested against an objective world that cares nothing about bad or inaccurate modeling.
 
Yes. It is modelling external information.
And objects is a part of the model. Not the external information.

The brains subjective representation of information is a model based on objective information, wavelength, airborne molecules, pressure waves, etc. A model that is being constantly tested against an objective world that cares nothing about bad or inaccurate modeling.

He thinks the moon is inside his head. That thing you and I call the moon orbiting our planet (outside our heads, in case their percept without ears are listening) is quite obviously an object, but again, the object, I'm gathering, according to him is ... wait for it, wait for it, INTERNAL.
 
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Very simple: When I look into a mirror, I believe that what I see is the world behind me reflected into it.

Or even better, but no longer so very simple: When I believe I'm looking into a mirror, I believe that what I believe I'm seeing is the world behind me reflected into it.

No knowledge involved. Belief certainly is good enough to explain all our actions.
EB
No, there is knowledge involved; you're just refusing to admit it, and I know why.

If the Sargent needs to pfft (belieeeeeve) something of a serious nature and you haul off by responding to him about what you belieeeeeve, then he is going to be none too happy. Refusing to declare knowledge when you have every justification that your belief IS IS IS IS true, I'd encourage you to muster the courage to step up your declaration a notch.

Yes, you don't 'know' what you'd be telling him is true in the sense that you're infallibly certain beyond the gettierest of mistake. Yes, you do not hold certainty in a Cartesian sense. Yes, you are possibly possibily possibly wrong.

That's okay; you don't need to 'know'; you just need to know, and therein lies the difference. In the former, you need a justified belief that must must must be correct without the possibility possibility possibility of mistake. In the latter, you need a justified belief that is is is actually actually actually correct.

So, yeah, you can cowardly (no offense, just expressive) refuse to affirm knowledge when what you have can be explained safely couched in terms of belief, but a substantively justified belief that you have every reason to believe is true is quite different than run of the mill belief.

I believe my hand is in front of me, and yes, I will never 'know' my hand is in front of me, but I don't just believe my hand is in front of me, as there is more; I know my hand is in front of me ... even though I don't 'know' my hand is in front of me.

All I see here is you trying to make what you mean ever more explicit. What I don't see is any kind of serious argument that you are right. In other word, you're trying to make your meaning more explicit without providing any good reason for accepting that what you mean is true. What you should realise is that we're all on the same page as to what humans spontaneously believe. The difference between us is that some of us have taken on board what science says about us humans.

Second, I entirely accept that the way people usually use knowledge words and expressions is meant to suggest they know what they are talking about. However, we can also understand why people would do that even if they actually don't know anything at all about what they are supposed to be talking about.

And, we have different beliefs nowadays because of science, such that we're able to build a different interpretation of what people actually do when they say they know things. Broadly, people do know something, there's really little doubt about that in my view, but what they know is not the purported physical referent of what they say but the mental representation they have of it. And since all we have access to is the contents of our mind, all we can do is in effect talk about this mental representation. The fact that what we mean in doing so is to refer to things outside our mind just shows that we can't help taking the representation inside our mind to be the real world outside. It is indeed easy to check that if I look at a tree I certainly take this thing to be an actual tree outside my mind even though I now understand that I'm deluded about that. And once you understand how this works, it's clear that all you know is the representation of the tree inside your mind and not at all the actual tree outside, if any. All you can do is hope that, if you're indeed a human being as you think you are, your brain is good enough to produce representations of the world outside that will remain good enough for you to survive in this world. And all we need is practical efficiency, not any actual knowledge. And this interpretation is sufficient to explain that we would indeed survive in our environment. In other words, it's enough to know a representation and to take this representation for the real world as long as this representation is good enough to ensure we survive in whatever is the real world. This is no different from the way autonomous cars are now driving on our roads. Their model of their physical environment is very unlike their physical environment but it's nonetheless effective in providing them with the means to drive safely through our streets. I really don't see that we would want to talk about autonomous cars knowing anything at all of our streets and what there is in them.

And again, interpreting the situation in terms of belief is good enough to explain the facts, i.e. what we believe about the world. In other words, we can have a logically consistent view of our situation couched in terms of belief, without any need to go into any knowledge claim beyond knowledge of the representations we have inside our minds. And you haven't explained why this would not be enough somehow. You're not even trying.

Anyway, I think this has been explained to you at length and I don't see how you could possibly change your mind now. And that's Ok. :cool:
EB
 
”Knowledge” can only be stated from a godlike viewpoint.
And thus shoukd be banished from discussions like this.

And I don't see why.

I definitely know pain whenever I'm in pain. Maybe the pain I experience subjectively isn't like anything else you would experience yourself as pain but that's irrelevant. If I experience something subjectively, then I really don't see how this does not amount to knowledge of this something, i.e. knowledge of this thing in itself, as opposed to knowledge of what this thing might be taken to represent. I know redness whenever I experience redness subjectively even though what this redness seems to represent to me, for example the redness of a flower, is redness at all.

The crucial point I think is that it's not even conceivable that I wouldn't know whatever it is I experience subjectively, for example pain, boredom, feelings of tiredness or joy etc. Yes, I can be mistaken that what I experience as a rose in a garden is an actual rose in a garden, but I still know my subjective experience that appears to me as a rose in a garden. If I have a visual hallucination that a monster is sitting on my desk, I'm obviously wrong in my belief that there's a monster, but I can't possibly be wrong in my subjective experience of having the impression that there is a monster. In other words, I know this impression as it appears to me visually even if I fail to understand it's a hallucination.
EB
 
”Knowledge” can only be stated from a godlike viewpoint.
And thus shoukd be banished from discussions like this.

And I don't see why.

I definitely know pain whenever I'm in pain. Maybe the pain I experience subjectively isn't like anything else you would experience yourself as pain but that's irrelevant. If I experience something subjectively, then I really don't see how this does not amount to knowledge of this something, i.e. knowledge of this thing in itself, as opposed to knowledge of what this thing might be taken to represent. I know redness whenever I experience redness subjectively even though what this redness seems to represent to me, for example the redness of a flower, is redness at all.

The crucial point I think is that it's not even conceivable that I wouldn't know whatever it is I experience subjectively, for example pain, boredom, feelings of tiredness or joy etc. Yes, I can be mistaken that what I experience as a rose in a garden is an actual rose in a garden, but I still know my subjective experience that appears to me as a rose in a garden. If I have a visual hallucination that a monster is sitting on my desk, I'm obviously wrong in my belief that there's a monster, but I can't possibly be wrong in my subjective experience of having the impression that there is a monster. In other words, I know this impression as it appears to me visually even if I fail to understand it's a hallucination.
EB

You dont know pain. You feel pain. To feel pain is not have a true belief that you are in pain. Thus feeling pain is not a statement about the world.
 
The brains subjective representation of information is a model based on objective information, wavelength, airborne molecules, pressure waves, etc. A model that is being constantly tested against an objective world that cares nothing about bad or inaccurate modeling.

He thinks the moon is inside his head. That thing you and I call the moon orbiting our planet (outside our heads, in case their percept without ears are listening) is quite obviously an object, but again, the object, I'm gathering, according to him is ... wait for it, wait for it, INTERNAL.

For fuck sake. How thickheaded can you be? This is very simple: ”Object” is a modelling construct/feature/tool/whatever that our brains uses to structurize model created by the input data. When we use our mind this tool is used to represent a feature in the world around us.

The concept of an object the moon is in our heads. The cause of the sensory input (for example the moonlight) is obviously outside our heads. There isnt an object out there but there is something out there that we use this object as a model for.

- - - Updated - - -

Yes. It is modelling external information.
And objects is a part of the model. Not the external information.

The brains subjective representation of information is a model based on objective information, wavelength, airborne molecules, pressure waves, etc. A model that is being constantly tested against an objective world that cares nothing about bad or inaccurate modeling.

Yes? What is your point? What are you objecting?
 
And I don't see why.

I definitely know pain whenever I'm in pain. Maybe the pain I experience subjectively isn't like anything else you would experience yourself as pain but that's irrelevant. If I experience something subjectively, then I really don't see how this does not amount to knowledge of this something, i.e. knowledge of this thing in itself, as opposed to knowledge of what this thing might be taken to represent. I know redness whenever I experience redness subjectively even though what this redness seems to represent to me, for example the redness of a flower, is redness at all.

The crucial point I think is that it's not even conceivable that I wouldn't know whatever it is I experience subjectively, for example pain, boredom, feelings of tiredness or joy etc. Yes, I can be mistaken that what I experience as a rose in a garden is an actual rose in a garden, but I still know my subjective experience that appears to me as a rose in a garden. If I have a visual hallucination that a monster is sitting on my desk, I'm obviously wrong in my belief that there's a monster, but I can't possibly be wrong in my subjective experience of having the impression that there is a monster. In other words, I know this impression as it appears to me visually even if I fail to understand it's a hallucination.
EB

You dont know pain. You feel pain.

For fuck sake. How thickheaded can you be? :p

I'm worried for you here. I think you should watch that blood pressure.


Anyway. Ok, I grant you people often express themselves by saying "I feel pain in my chest" etc. as if pain was something in their chest or their left foot, which it never is. The only material thing that probably couldn't possibly be dissociated from the pain you feel would be some neuronal structure somewhere inside your brain. So, may be this truly is pain.

Anyway, it's irrelevant because it doesn't matter how and how often people choose to express themselves. In French we say, "j'ai mal", meaning 'it hurts', but, literally, "I have pain", as if it was something you could chose not to have. And in English, you can say "I am in pain", as if pain was somehow a fog enveloping you. The point I was making is that I know pain whenever I experience, or 'feel', or 'am in', pain. If you are in pain, there's no way that you could be mistaken about the impression you have. You know the impression as it is. This does not mean you could reliably compare the pain you experience now to the one you experienced yesterday. No. But if you know anything, then you know pain, or the impression of pain, as you experience it on the moment.

But you can still choose not to understand.

To feel pain is not have a true belief that you are in pain.

Well, it's true that if you feel pain then you're sure as hell to believe you're in pain; and of course, it will be true that you're in pain.

Still, I grant you that the associated belief is not essential here. It does not define being in pain.

Thus feeling pain is not a statement about the world.

I agree. So, what's your point?

To say that I am in pain is a statement about my mind. It's equivalent to saying that my mind somehow contains an impression I call pain. So I know pain in this case just because, whatever it is I call pain, it's currently a part of my mind. So, no, it's definitely not about the world (except, trivially, if you choose to assume minds are part of the world).

Ok, so you too have no argument worthy of consideration.

I still don't know why you think 'know' doesn't really mean anything but here you are.

Anyway, thank you for making explicit your beliefs in the matter.
EB
 
My issue is not with science. My issue is with the scientist.

The scientist and I may agree on lots and lots of stuff, and the parts I don't agree with may change as I learn, but for the sake of argument, let's suppose I agree with everything up to and including the quantitative scientifically backed results of how vision works. My issue isn't with experiments or even the results. It's that tiny bit of interpretation of the results that gets spilled onto the science in the last moment that bothers me so.

Ooh ah, look what we found out! Great, I agree with all that. The brain not only does not see but cannot see things external to us. Fine. But, worded like that, science and I are in perfect tango. It's afterwards based on that they start using language to say funny things that don't add up to me. I still see the tree from where I am standing on my feet. Sure, the brain cannot; science has shown us so, but it's quackery of the scientist that speaks beyond the scope of the brain and what it senses and imbues it upon the person that drives my opposition not to science but the fanciful afterthought interpretations of scientific findings of the scientist.
 
Mass/energy gradients in nature (spacetime) are artificial and arbitrary? That's interesting. From observation, they appear to arise naturally. I'm glad you're here to educate everyone and take comments out of context.

No two gradients are the same thing. The universe is nothing but unique entities.

To put any two things into a grouping is artificial and capricious.
Ok, so nature is artificial and capricious because it creates shared Earth-Moon spacetime gradients.

I'm trying to understand where you're going with this- do you mean that nature is artificial?

Read the thread if you want to know what this is about.
It appears as if nature is artificially and capriciously grouping astronomical bodies together. Is that the gist of it?

But the propositional content is still either true or false; it remains factually the case that either the cat is on the mat or it isn't. You think cats and mats are mind dependent; I don't. I think they'll continue to meow.
Without a mind there is only truth. There is only what is. Falsehood is non-existent.
Without a mind? Minds exist as part of truth.
This is a discussion of the idea of "categories". Some claim they exist independent of a mind. My position is they do not. Saying that minds are part of reality helps in no way.
Define category. There are many things in nature that have specific attributes which define which "categories" they fall into (positively charged things, etc.).
 
For fuck sake. How thickheaded can you be? :p

I'm worried for you here. I think you should watch that blood pressure.


Anyway. Ok, I grant you people often express themselves by saying "I feel pain in my chest" etc. as if pain was something in their chest or their left foot, which it never is. The only material thing that probably couldn't possibly be dissociated from the pain you feel would be some neuronal structure somewhere inside your brain. So, may be this truly is pain.

Anyway, it's irrelevant because it doesn't matter how and how often people choose to express themselves. In French we say, "j'ai mal", meaning 'it hurts', but, literally, "I have pain", as if it was something you could chose not to have. And in English, you can say "I am in pain", as if pain was somehow a fog enveloping you. The point I was making is that I know pain whenever I experience, or 'feel', or 'am in', pain. If you are in pain, there's no way that you could be mistaken about the impression you have. You know the impression as it is. This does not mean you could reliably compare the pain you experience now to the one you experienced yesterday. No. But if you know anything, then you know pain, or the impression of pain, as you experience it on the moment.

But you can still choose not to understand.

To feel pain is not have a true belief that you are in pain.

Well, it's true that if you feel pain then you're sure as hell to believe you're in pain; and of course, it will be true that you're in pain.

Still, I grant you that the associated belief is not essential here. It does not define being in pain.

Thus feeling pain is not a statement about the world.

I agree. So, what's your point?

To say that I am in pain is a statement about my mind. It's equivalent to saying that my mind somehow contains an impression I call pain. So I know pain in this case just because, whatever it is I call pain, it's currently a part of my mind. So, no, it's definitely not about the world (except, trivially, if you choose to assume minds are part of the world).

Ok, so you too have no argument worthy of consideration.

I still don't know why you think 'know' doesn't really mean anything but here you are.

Anyway, thank you for making explicit your beliefs in the matter.
EB

You feel pain. Ok.
You remeber pain. Ok.
Know pain? What? I have really no idea what that means.
 
My issue is not with science. My issue is with the scientist.

The scientist and I may agree on lots and lots of stuff, and the parts I don't agree with may change as I learn, but for the sake of argument, let's suppose I agree with everything up to and including the quantitative scientifically backed results of how vision works. My issue isn't with experiments or even the results. It's that tiny bit of interpretation of the results that gets spilled onto the science in the last moment that bothers me so.

Ooh ah, look what we found out! Great, I agree with all that. The brain not only does not see but cannot see things external to us. Fine. But, worded like that, science and I are in perfect tango. It's afterwards based on that they start using language to say funny things that don't add up to me. I still see the tree from where I am standing on my feet. Sure, the brain cannot; science has shown us so, but it's quackery of the scientist that speaks beyond the scope of the brain and what it senses and imbues it upon the person that drives my opposition not to science but the fanciful afterthought interpretations of scientific findings of the scientist.

But the scientist is right. ”Seeing the tree” is an advanced illusion.
 
My issue is not with science. My issue is with the scientist.

The scientist and I may agree on lots and lots of stuff, and the parts I don't agree with may change as I learn, but for the sake of argument, let's suppose I agree with everything up to and including the quantitative scientifically backed results of how vision works. My issue isn't with experiments or even the results. It's that tiny bit of interpretation of the results that gets spilled onto the science in the last moment that bothers me so.

Ooh ah, look what we found out! Great, I agree with all that. The brain not only does not see but cannot see things external to us. Fine. But, worded like that, science and I are in perfect tango. It's afterwards based on that they start using language to say funny things that don't add up to me. I still see the tree from where I am standing on my feet. Sure, the brain cannot; science has shown us so, but it's quackery of the scientist that speaks beyond the scope of the brain and what it senses and imbues it upon the person that drives my opposition not to science but the fanciful afterthought interpretations of scientific findings of the scientist.

But the scientist is right. ”Seeing the tree” is an advanced illusion.

The process by which we see the tree might be advanced, but we are under no illusions.
 
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