What is the actual free will humans have?

[Speakpigeon]

I take the usual terms of the debate on free will to make no sense in relation to our experience as humans.

Yet, rather than try to flog my own definition of free will to unwilling TFT members, I'm mostly interested in the actual conception of free will most people have. So, first, I'd like to start a conversation on possible definitions.

In a second phase, I'll try to do a poll on those definitions, if at all possible.

Please note that I will probably throw into the mix any conventional definitions to give a reasonable choice to would-be voters.

I suppose I have to offer at least one definition to start the ball rolling.

So, here it is:

The human ability to make choices that are not externally determined

Not mine, but good enough I think for what I want to achieve.

Your turn...
EB

 

[Jon Osterman]

There is no such thing. This should be clear from the inability to construct a consistent definition.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

 

[fast]

The ability to do what one wants without compulsion.

Wants is an important factor.

If you threaten me such that I will be punished or harmed unless I either refrain from some behavior or act on some demand, then I'm still acting of my own free will if what I do is indeed what I want to do.

For example, if I want to speed and you don't want to speed, then laws prohibiting my behavior have no effect on you acting of your own free will, but it does have an effect on me doing as I want to do of my own free will.

An objection might be that I am acting of my free will if I speed despite the prohibition, but that's a mistake. The mistake is in thinking compulsory pressure cannot be overcome. It can. If I hijack someone and their car, they could resist the pressure of conforming to my demands, but that doesn't negate the presence of the pressure.

Compulsion is an important factor.

I can compel through constraint (to) and restraint (from). If either shade of compulsion is present, it's a force against free will, but like I said, wants are also important. If I am locked behind bars, I am being kept from going about and doing as I might please, but if I'm perfectly content behind bars and have no desire to roam past the bars, then my staying is still of my own free will.

 

[Speakpigeon]

The ability to do what one wants without compulsion.

Yes, I agree wanting is a major aspect.

Yet, you may choose freely to do something you don't really want to do. You do it because it's the less bad option left to you but you can still be said to do it freely because you still have a choice and you're not forced to do it.

And choice seems to imply some wanting. If you choose an option, even one you don't like, you must be wanting to do it even if not a lot, and perhaps compared to other options you would deem worse.

Yet, if you act because you're forced, it's still true that you choose to act, if only to avoid dire consequences if you didn't act. But in this case it's no longer free will.

So, how could we identify the limit between choosing freely and being forced.
EB

 

[Speakpigeon]

There is no such thing. This should be clear from the inability to construct a consistent definition.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Ok.

So, how would the definition I provided not be consistent, do you think?

EB

 

[ruby sparks]

I take the usual terms of the debate on free will to make no sense in relation to our experience as humans.

Yet, rather than try to flog my own definition of free will to unwilling TFT members, I'm mostly interested in the actual conception of free will most people have. So, first, I'd like to start a conversation on possible definitions.

In a second phase, I'll try to do a poll on those definitions, if at all possible.

Please note that I will probably throw into the mix any conventional definitions to give a reasonable choice to would-be voters.

I suppose I have to offer at least one definition to start the ball rolling.

So, here it is:

The human ability to make choices that are not externally determined

Not mine, but good enough I think for what I want to achieve.

Your turn...
EB

Isn't that a bit like saying that the only constraints on a car are the road, traffic lights, wind, rain, etc?

What about what's under the bonnet?

 

[fast]

The ability to do what one wants without compulsion.

Yes, I agree wanting is a major aspect.

Yet, you may choose freely to do something you don't really want to do. You do it because it's the less bad option left to you but you can still be said to do it freely because you still have a choice and you're not forced to do it.

And choice seems to imply some wanting. If you choose an option, even one you don't like, you must be wanting to do it even if not a lot, and perhaps compared to other options you would deem worse.

Some people have conflicting wants. I don't want to pay this bill, but I want to honor my financial responsibility. If I want to honor my responsibility, then a threat from a creditor to do so does not stand good as compelling me to do what I don't want to do; after all, I want to do it.

Yet, if you act because you're forced, it's still true that you choose to act, if only to avoid dire consequences if you didn't act. But in this case it's no longer free will.

So, how could we identify the limit between choosing freely and being forced.
EB

If we want to act, then force to act doesn't matter. I'll be doing what I want to do either way. There is this fleeting thought that I am being forced to do what I want to do and am resentful for the force since I'm willing to act without force, but at no time am I forced against my will, as my will is such that I want to do it.

Now, if I don't want to get out my car at the intersection where the gunman demands that I do, then that I do want to get out only in fear I might get shot, then what I don't want has already been established, and that's pitted up against the compulsion.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Isn't that a bit like saying that the only constraints on a car are the road, traffic lights, wind, rain, etc?

What about what's under the bonnet?

There's a sense of free will which applies to humans as agents. An agent in this case will be the whole person. It would make no sense to look into the brain or even part of the brain.

I'm sure we all have constraints hardwired into our brains. I could jump from the tenth floor but I don't. And, except in extreme circumstances, I could not jump even if I wanted to. Yet we would all accept that I'm really free to jump.
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

There's a sense of free will which applies to humans as agents. An agent in this case will be the whole person. It would make no sense to look into the brain or even part of the brain.

Not sure. I think it makes no sense not to look in the brain.

I'm sure we all have constraints hardwired into our brains.

Exactly. How can we overlook these?

I could jump from the tenth floor but I don't. And, except in extreme circumstances, I could not jump even if I wanted to. Yet we would all accept that I'm really free to jump.
EB

You may be 'free' in much the same sense as you are free to choose a banana instead of an apple, but the question surely is do you actually have free will to choose? I would say that in both cases (fruit choice or jump choice) it just feels like you do.

 

[Speakpigeon]

If we want to act, then force to act doesn't matter. I'll be doing what I want to do either way. There is this fleeting thought that I am being forced to do what I want to do and am resentful for the force since I'm willing to act without force, but at no time am I forced against my will, as my will is such that I want to do it.

Yes, I agree with that entirely I think.

But you haven't addresses my point that you may choose freely to do something you don't really want to do. You do it perhaps because it's necessary to get something else you badly want because it seems much more important to you. That's understandable but the fact remains that you choose to do something you don't want to do. Don't you agree with that?
EB

 

[fast]

If we want to act, then force to act doesn't matter. I'll be doing what I want to do either way. There is this fleeting thought that I am being forced to do what I want to do and am resentful for the force since I'm willing to act without force, but at no time am I forced against my will, as my will is such that I want to do it.

Yes, I agree with that entirely I think.

But you haven't addresses my point that you may choose freely to do something you don't really want to do. You do it perhaps because it's necessary to get something else you badly want because it seems much more important to you. That's understandable but the fact remains that you choose to do something you don't want to do. Don't you agree with that?
EB

The previous paragraph. The one you didn't quote. The one about conflicting wants.

I don't want to take the trash out, but I continue to do it, and if I'm doing something I don't want to do, then we might want to examine whether I'm doing so of my own free will. I have a choice, and the particular choice chosen was not compelled. Determined, such that there's a cause, but that's a self cause. That I will take it out isn't that I must. There's no woman threatening me. Wait, bad example, lol.

 

[Speakpigeon]

There's a sense of free will which applies to humans as agents. An agent in this case will be the whole person. It would make no sense to look into the brain or even part of the brain.

Not sure. I think it makes no sense not to look in the brain.

It certainly and very obviously makes sense. Free will is at the root of how we conceive of the interaction between citizens in democratic countries. Don't tell me this makes no sense to you!

What matters with respect to free will in this sense is what thing is regarded as the agent. When we say that somebody is running, we don't mean that his knees are running.

I'm sure we all have constraints hardwired into our brains.

Exactly. How can we overlook these?

We don't overlook anything. We can become very much aware of our own internal constraints. But we take our internal constraints to be integral part of what we are as agent.

When we say that somebody is running, we sure know that many parts of his body are as many constraints on his running performance.

You may be 'free' in much the same sense as you are free to choose a banana instead of an apple, but the question surely is do you actually have free will to choose? I would say that in both cases (fruit choice or jump choice) it just feels like you do.

No. It really depends on what sense of free will you have in mind.

I'm talking about the kind of free will people really have. Maybe you're talking about something else.
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

It certainly and very obviously makes sense. Free will is at the root of how we conceive of the interaction between citizens in democratic countries. Don't tell me this makes no sense to you!

The concept or belief in free will does that. Given that I think traditional free will is an illusion, I'm not sure I can agree that free will does it.

Regarding not looking in the brain, if we don't do that, how do you for example distinguish between individuals with varying degrees of diminished capacity?

What matters with respect to free will in this sense is what thing is regarded as the agent. When we say that somebody is running, we don't mean that his knees are running.

Ok. And?

We can become very much aware of our own internal constraints.

I doubt that. Given the large number of attested psychological illusions that pervade our experience, I'd say introspection is highly unreliable.

No. It really depends on what sense of free will you have in mind.

I have in mind a non-superficial one.

I'm talking about the kind of free will people really have. Maybe you're talking about something else.
EB

Even if we were just talking about that and not ideal/ultimate/trad free will, I'd still think we were being superficial. Imo, the 'sort of free will' people really have is heavily dependent on things going on in the brain.

 

[Speakpigeon]

The previous paragraph. The one you didn't quote. The one about conflicting wants.

I don't want to take the trash out, but I continue to do it, and if I'm doing something I don't want to do, then we might want to examine whether I'm doing so of my own free will. I have a choice, and the particular choice chosen was not compelled. Determined, such that there's a cause, but that's a self cause. That I will take it out isn't that I must. There's no woman threatening me. Wait, bad example, lol.

Ok. My bad.

Yet, we still have a problem. If you do something you don't want to do because somebody is threatening you or because of some other reason, we may want to say both that you're not free to act because of the threat and that you are free to act since you do it because protecting yourself from harm is just what seems the more important thing to you. It's just a rational choice you could choose not to make and indeed sometimes it's just what people do.

How do we keep the distinction between things like threats and things we may deem too important to not take into account?
EB

 

[fast]

The previous paragraph. The one you didn't quote. The one about conflicting wants.

I don't want to take the trash out, but I continue to do it, and if I'm doing something I don't want to do, then we might want to examine whether I'm doing so of my own free will. I have a choice, and the particular choice chosen was not compelled. Determined, such that there's a cause, but that's a self cause. That I will take it out isn't that I must. There's no woman threatening me. Wait, bad example, lol.

Ok. My bad.

Yet, we still have a problem. If you do something you don't want to do because somebody is threatening you or because of some other reason, we may want to say both that you're not free to act because of the threat and that you are free to act since you do it because protecting yourself from harm is just what seems the more important thing to you. It's just a rational choice you could choose not to make and indeed sometimes it's just what people do.

How do we keep the distinction between things like threats and things we may deem too important to not take into account?
EB

I see what you're saying. You're using the same word to express different things.

If I may not doing something, I am not free to do something, but because I can do something, I am free to do what I may not. The ability to overcome the pressure of impermissibility doesn't negate the presence of it.

 

[Speakpigeon]

Given that I think traditional free will is an illusion, I'm not sure I can agree that free will does it.

I'm not sure what you mean by "traditional".

I myself prefer the distinction between our everyday sense of free will, which I think is fine, and the sort of metaphysically inflated concept of free will invented for the purpose of fighting ideological wars. I really have no time for the latter.

Regarding not looking in the brain, if we don't do that, how do you for example distinguish between individuals with varying degrees of diminished capacity?

What's stopping you?

And how do you know somebody's capacities are diminished to begin with? You think you start by looking into people's brain?

What matters with respect to free will in this sense is what thing is regarded as the agent. When we say that somebody is running, we don't mean that his knees are running.

Ok. And?

The ordinary notion of free will most people have applies to the person as agent, not to his brain. Opening up a brain won't reveal anything relevant to that.

We can become very much aware of our own internal constraints.

I doubt that. Given the large number of attested psychological illusions that pervade our experience, I'd say introspection is highly unreliable.

Sure. Still, we can sometimes become very much aware of our own internal constraints.

No. It really depends on what sense of free will you have in mind.

I have in mind a non-superficial one.

Good but that still leaves many options.

Me I think of free will as per our everyday sense of free will.

I don't think it would even be possible to function in society without it. Each of our senses serves a purpose and so this one presumably does too.

I'm talking about the kind of free will people really have. Maybe you're talking about something else.
EB

Even if we were just talking about that and not ideal/ultimate/trad free will, I'd still think we were being superficial. Imo, the 'sort of free will' people really have is heavily dependent on things going on in the brain.

I didn't say any different.

I suppose what I'm saying is that it's not practical to deny any validity to our everyday notions on the ground that we know better thanks to science.

None of us is going to function in his daily life on the exclusive basis of our latest scientific discoveries. Not even scientists themselves could do that. Not for now at the vey least and I even doubt ever.

And if we could be forced somehow to really do that, it would just be a bugger-all catastrophe. Beware what you wish for.
EB

 

[ruby sparks]

I'm not sure what you mean by "traditional".

Definitions are tricky, and one always has to be way of generalising, but some people call it Libertarian free will, though personally I think that doesn't quite cover it, since that can be taken to mean freedom from determinism only, and our experience (generalising for a moment) involves more than that, it seems to involve having what I'd call free control, or free determinism, to be a free cause. Which I think is impossible, or appears to be. One definition I like, though it involves a tautology, is that traditional free will is the capacity to freely and willingly (ie with will) choose to do otherwise in the same situation.

Personally, I think that most of us, to one degree or another, sometimes only vaguely sometimes quite explicitly, imagine a little hommunculus self located just behind our eyes. The captain of our little ship, The HMS Freewill.

I myself prefer the distinction between our everyday sense of free will, which I think is fine, and the sort of metaphysically inflated concept of free will invented for the purpose of fighting ideological wars. I really have no time for the latter.

I am not sure what you mean by our everyday sense of free will. Whatever it is, I strongly suspect it involves illusory powers. As for the inflated concept invented for the purposes of wars, I'm not sure what you mean there either.

What's stopping you?

Nothing. But I thought your working definition was for freedom from external causes only. You can't distinguish the causes of diminished responsibility without looking under the bonnet.

And how do you know somebody's capacities are diminished to begin with? You think you start by looking into people's brain?

I'm not sure if that's where you start, but it's certainly one place you should look. Otherwise, you're not getting the whole picture. Genetic considerations, for example. Neurological processes generally.

The ordinary notion of free will most people have applies to the person as agent, not to his brain. Opening up a brain won't reveal anything relevant to that.

You're the first person I've ever met who seems to think neuroscience and psychology aren't relevant to understanding free will.

Sure. Still, we can sometimes become very much aware of our own internal constraints.

Sometimes, yes. Introspection is useful up to a point. But it's wide open to us fooling ourselves.

Me I think of free will as per our everyday sense of free will.

I don't think it would even be possible to function in society without it. Each of our senses serves a purpose and so this one presumably does too.

Sure. But illusions can serve a purpose and still be illusions. It could be said that belief in god is useful in at least some ways, and quite possibly detrimental in others.

I didn't say any different.

I thought you said free will was freedom from external constraints.

I suppose what I'm saying is that it's not practical to deny any validity to our everyday notions on the ground that we know better thanks to science.

I very much think it is. There appears to be a gulf between our positions.

None of us is going to function in his daily life on the exclusive basis of our latest scientific discoveries. Not even scientists themselves could do that. Not for now at the vey least and I even doubt ever.

And if we could be forced somehow to really do that, it would just be a bugger-all catastrophe. Beware what you wish for.
EB

The consequences of uncovering an illusion are secondary to whether it's an illusion in the first place. Personally, I don't think the consequences are likely to be any more adverse than for understanding that belief in god is an illusion (or delusion if you prefer). But even if I did, I don't think it's a good reason to deny something.

 

[OLDMAN]

This is (I think) the guy to go to...

 

[ruby sparks]

This is (I think) the guy to go to...

I agree he's pretty good. Or Jerry Coyne. I'd add one caveat. They're both talking about what we might call ultimate or actual free will, the sort that most people in the street (ie outside of philosophy) seem to think they have. In the sense that they both say we don't have that, then I think they're right. Some say there are 'other varieties of free will' (Daniel Dennett and other compatibilists for example). And then both 'sides' get into an argument where Sam Harris and Jerry Coyne say to Daniel Dennett, 'that's not free will' and he says it is, which to some extent is a naming issue. Not a trivial naming issue, imo, but still a naming issue.

I prefer to think in terms of 'degrees of freedom'.

For what it's worth, here's Coyne....

- - - Updated - - -

[YOUTUBE]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ca7i-D4ddaw[/YOUTUBE]

 

[ruby sparks]

This is also really worth watching:

https://vimeo.com/90101368

Neuroscience appears to be starting to predict our decisions before we become consciously aware of them.

On the face of it, quite remarkable. That said, there are a few big caveats. First, this may apply only to certain types of decision (where deliberation and simulation of possible outcomes is arguably minimal). Second, it involves an interpretation of the role of 'Readiness Potentials' which is open to controversy. Third, it relates only to conscious free will. This is, it seems, part of our everyday experience of what free will feels like, but it could be argued that it's not necessary. Fourthly, the measuring techniques are a bit blunt.

All I would say about it is that it can be taken as evidence in the direction away from free will, though not at all conclusive evidence.