COLOUR

[steve_bank]

There are chimps that fashion tools and pass the skill onto the young by observation and mimic. No words.

Oooh. Tell me more you colorful one. Remember. This is about colour. Not words. Not mimicry. Maybe observation. But always Colour.

We learn as kids by mimicking adult speech...unless you were born all knowing maybe?

 

[fromderinside]

We learn as kids by mimicking adult speech...unless you were born all knowing maybe?

Mimicking? mimic requires knowledge. So nope. All knowing? Maybe. Still. Nothing about colour.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

Well, indeed. "Chairs" are not a relevant concept in any context except within and between human minds. My cat sits on chairs all the time, and the object itself is clearly "real", but I doubt that the cat conceptualizes them as "chairs". We rely on mental categories to make sense of and navigate the swaths of sensory data with which we are constantly inundated.

So how does "chair" differ from "red"

They have different referents, definitions, and qualities. They are both placeholders for concepts, though, as indeed are all words. "We" are highly evolved nervous systems embedded in a physically bounded organism, and we fundamentally perceive the world through a screen of consciousness that our neurological apparatus creates for us.

Which, once again, does not preclude the fact that it is based upon "external" information. You can't just manufacture:



Ex nihilo. The color we call "blue" is "telling" the rods/cones in your eyes what it is. The rods/cones in your eyes in turn are translating that information into a chemical language for your brain to unpack.

Thus, the color "blue" is BOTH internally created AND externally existing.

Once again, we infer this to be the case because something on the order of 94% of every human to have ever existed--i.e., billions upon billions of case studies--prove this to be the case. As well as the fact that there is a percentage that can't discern the color at all or to varying degrees, which are measurable and consistent. As well as the fact that (evidently) other species have the same ability and see the same colors as we do (and beyond).

Can it be proved that we all see the 100% SAME COLOR (writ large)? No, but it does need to be proved to a 100% DEGREE OF CERTAINTY for it nevertheless to be reasonably inferred that it is the thing itself that is informing us what it is.

Everyone itt looking at the above graphic sees that it is what we call "blue." Some of us will see slightly different shades/hues--i.e., minor calibration errors and the like--but, again, that just further goes to proving the fact that we all see the same objective color.

It is nearly impossible that billions upon billions of case studies could do this spontaneously, independently and ex-nihilo--yet with the same measurable degree of similarity--yet that would necessarily have to be the case for color to "ONLY" exist in the brain. The far more logical inference as to why we all--more or less--see the same color--more or less--is because the colors exist externally and we are simply recreating what it is we see "out there."

So, once again, it would fall to the internalist to explain how all of those billions upon billions of case studies could all just spontaneously and independently manufacture the "same" color ex nihilo.

Please, for the love of all that is unholy, do not anyone respond by pouncing on the word "same" as it will just be another red herring run-around. "Same" means (for my purposes) close enough that it can't be explained by anything else, NOT 100% IDENTICAL IN EVERY WAY. 94% (or less; hell, anything over 50%) see more-or-less the same color (due to variations/defects in sensory apparati) is all that is necessary to reasonably establish wysiwyg.

If it were reversed and only something on the order of 5 or 6% saw a similar color, then yes, sure, you'd have an argument, but when EVERYONE (but a few)--billions upon billions and across species--see effectively the same thing, then that is the strongest possible evidence that it is the case, so why contest it?

We don't have to always reinvent the wheel.

 

[Politesse]

Still whacking away at your favorite strawman position, I see.

Which, once again, does not preclude the fact that it is based upon "external" information. You can't just manufacture:

Well, you can (our senses are not infallible, especially on drugs), but no one is claiming that mental categories have no external referents. Only that those referents are not identical, or necessarily accurate representations of, the original sensory data they are interpreting. The categories themselves, in particular, are greatly influenced by language and culture, so their boundaries are often inconsistently defined, and do not reflect natural truths.

If it were reversed and only something on the order of 5 or 6% saw a similar color, then yes, sure, you'd have an argument, but when EVERYONE (but a few)--billions upon billions and across species--see effectively the same thing, then that is the strongest possible evidence that it is the case, so why contest it?

Humans don't all use the same color terms, though, or even equivalent categorizations. They are obviously encountering the same spectrum, since there is a confluence in the order we find color categorizations in, but they divide up the "colors" in at least 8 or 9 common patterns that we see all around the world. So for instance, in many languages, the term applying to the color patch above would correspond to both your "blue" and also your "green", and someone who uses that language primarily would probably think of the patch as "being blue-green" and not considering the distinctions you might have wanted to draw between wha tto you are two colors to be important ones; you'd get the same look I do when I try to explain the important difference between navy and indigo dyes to my non-gay friends.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

Still whacking away at your favorite strawman position, I see.

When you (and ruby) constantly restate shit like this (emphasis mine):

Yes, because color only exists as a mental category

It is not a "strawman" to respond to it.

If it were reversed and only something on the order of 5 or 6% saw a similar color, then yes, sure, you'd have an argument, but when EVERYONE (but a few)--billions upon billions and across species--see effectively the same thing, then that is the strongest possible evidence that it is the case, so why contest it?

Humans don't all use the same color terms, though

Speaking of strawmen.

 

[Politesse]

Yes. "Color" is a mental category. It describes the natural world, but does not exist in it; it is the name for our subjective perception of the wavelengths of reflected light. It can be categorized differently, perceived differently, "fooled", and all the other normal characteristics that mark something as subjective.

You seem unable to distinguish between "not entirely objective" and "completely imagined".

Speaking of strawmen.

Like, I know you must have read at least a little bit of the sentence/paragraph that followed, or you wouldn't have realized that you needed to clip it out for your complaint to make sense.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

Yes. "Color" is a mental category. It describes the natural world, but does not exist in it; it is the name for our subjective perception of the wavelengths of reflected light. It can be categorized differently, perceived differently, "fooled", and all the other normal characteristics that mark something as subjective.

You seem unable to distinguish between "not entirely objective" and "completely imagined".

When people keep using the word "only" it's difficult to so distinguish.

Speaking of strawmen.

Like, I know you must have read at least a little bit of the sentence/paragraph that followed, or you wouldn't have realized that you needed to clip it out for your complaint to make sense.

You responded to my point about the overwhelming majority of case-studies all seeing the same color with a strawman about how a minority use different terms. My "complaint" makes sense with or without including a full quote.

 

[Jayjay]

Yes. "Color" is a mental category. It describes the natural world, but does not exist in it; it is the name for our subjective perception of the wavelengths of reflected light. It can be categorized differently, perceived differently, "fooled", and all the other normal characteristics that mark something as subjective.

You seem unable to distinguish between "not entirely objective" and "completely imagined".

How is color any different from other categories like shapes or objects? If anything, color is more objective than, say, "circular" or "a chair".

 

[Politesse]

Yes. "Color" is a mental category. It describes the natural world, but does not exist in it; it is the name for our subjective perception of the wavelengths of reflected light. It can be categorized differently, perceived differently, "fooled", and all the other normal characteristics that mark something as subjective.

You seem unable to distinguish between "not entirely objective" and "completely imagined".

How is color any different from other categories like shapes or objects? If anything, color is more objective than, say, "circular" or "a chair".

You are listing off other perceptive artifacts, yes. Your brain is the interpretive wing of your nervous system, not a perfect amanuensis of "the real"; it needs invented categories to help it sort through the avalanche of sensory information which which it is constantly flooded, and it dips into the well of language, culture, and previous experience to try and create those categories. The sources of all that sensory information are real, but mental categories are not identical to them, and they often have aspects or connotations that do not relate to the objective qualities of the perceived in any way. So for instance, "yellow" as a cultural category in the West has a number of attributes that are symbolically but not empirically linked to the wavelength that gets categorized under it. Qualities such as "friendly" or "cowardly" or "a yield sign" or "an Asian" or "definitely a field crow rather than a raven given that beak" are also contextually connoted by the term, and although those associations are a part of any reasonable definition of "yellow" - you will find some of them in any dictionary- they are irrelevant to the physicist, having no literal connection to the physical referents of the color. Then, too, different cultures may or may not have a term for yellow at all, and we're apt to draw the boundaries between "yellow" and "red" or "yellow" and "green", with the result that people from different cultures would be apt to both perceive and categorize the physical colors in different but internally consistent ways, even if taking the same test or looking at the same objects. So even if we are talking about the perceptive aspects of color alone, there is no universal consensus about where the boundaries of each color sit, indicating very clearly that color terms are at least partially social constructions, and almost certainly vary individually as well.

You could almost think of your mental concept as something like an imperfect copy of that which is received. With the important proviso that your copy may well become modified, and even become 'real' in the sense that you act on the perceived more so than the real in making decisions and so forth. As Aristotle observed (I'm paraphrasing a bit for clarity from the Greek):

"The general point to be grasped is that each sensory organ receives the perceptible
form of a thing, but without the matter that defines it. As wax, for instance, receives the design on a signet ring
without the iron or gold; yet it acquires the design in the gold or bronze. but not insofar as
(qua) the design itself is truly gold or bronze." ~Aristotle

 

[Politesse]

A practical example of the complications of color:

In my early post-academic years, I used to work in the field as a contract archaeologist. Even on largely monocultural crews, definitions of color terms were actually a serious practical problem as different diggers were apt to classify the colors of artifacts and soils by different folk terms if left unaided; to solve this, we used the Munsell color system to strictly regulate what color terms could be used in reports. The Munsell categorizations are derived from the properties of nature, not from perception, and you generally need the chart in hand in order to use the terms - your brain is incapable of making the color gradations it delineates without the benefit of comparative types. Ie., you need a copy of the chart to compare the color of the soil to the nearest defined swatch in the Munsell handbook. No one can actually perceive just by looking what swatch a color belongs to, you more or less need to be looking directly at a copy of the chart, and there are still apt to be physiological variations and therefore disagreements between different diggers, even very experienced ones. People who are in the field for a while can make better guesses, but not perfectly, or consistently with respect to another perceiver.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

A practical example of the complications of color:

In my early post-academic years, I used to work in the field as a contract archaeologist. Even on largely monocultural crews, definitions of color terms were actually a serious practical problem as different diggers were apt to classify the colors of artifacts and soils by different folk terms if left unaided; to solve this, we used the Munsell color system to strictly regulate what color terms could be used in reports. The Munsell categorizations are derived from the properties of nature, not from perception, and you generally need the chart in hand in order to use the terms - your brain is incapable of making the color gradations it delineates without the benefit of comparative types. Ie., you need a copy of the chart to compare the color of the soil to the nearest defined swatch in the Munsell handbook. No one can actually perceive just by looking what swatch a color belongs to, you more or less need to be looking directly at a copy of the chart, and there are still apt to be physiological variations and therefore disagreements between different diggers, even very experienced ones. People who are in the field for a while can make better guesses, but not perfectly, or consistently with respect to another perceiver.

All of which just proves the rule.

I have red/green color blindness. That typically means (and is the case with me) that I have difficulties discerning subtle changes in hue. As you noted about indigo and navy, I would tend to see them as navy and black or the like. It's only when I put something I think is black next to something I already know to be black that my system corrects itself and I can discern the differences.

I did not learn of this until I was eight years old in a science museum where they had the Ishihara "hidden digit" test and I couldn't see the number 8 in one of the red/green slides. My family thought I was just joking, but when I kept insisting that there was no number--that, in fact, they were the ones joking--it got exponentially worse to the point where I had a minor panic attack and thought the world was ending. How could they all see what wasn't there for me?

And the answer is, of course, that I have some sort of minor malfunction in my optical processing unit. It's measurable, easily identified and overwhelmingly confirmed.

So, I have a choice to make. I can either ignore this and simply say, "The colors are ONLY in my head, so there is no number 8 in that slide, wee, how fun, I'm free to just make up any shit I want and believe any damn thing I want" or, I can say, "Evidently, I have a malfunctioning optical processing unit and need to be aware of that going forward, as it may somehow cause me or my loved ones some sort of harm, possibly grave, so what does that entail for me and everyone else? That we live in an objective universe?"

The objective condition, of course, never changes, no matter which choice I make. The number 8 is in that slide and it is "telling" me that, but what's happening is a shortcircuit of some kind on my end; not that the number 8 is not, in fact, on that slide (or "telling" me that).

So, yes, one could (i.e., has the license to) think of one's self as a copy (indeed, that's exactly what it is; an animated model), but one should not ALSO throw out the fact that a model requires something objective for it to model. This is where the entire structure of our epistemology resides; inference.

Which, once again, is what it would mean if someone were to say that color exists ONLY in one's head. And, again, the reason that's imperative to keep pointing out is because there are real world consequences for slipping down that solipsistic slope.

You can do it, of course. It's easily done. VERY easily done. So easily done in fact that one might wonder why do it? Its outcome is predetermined. It's just like saying, "Goddidit," in fact.

The far more difficult task is to be present and to try to reconcile the objective with the subjective and why it all is. If all you do is affirm the subjective, however, you're just Pinocchio rubbing his wood together.

 

[Politesse]

A practical example of the complications of color:

In my early post-academic years, I used to work in the field as a contract archaeologist. Even on largely monocultural crews, definitions of color terms were actually a serious practical problem as different diggers were apt to classify the colors of artifacts and soils by different folk terms if left unaided; to solve this, we used the Munsell color system to strictly regulate what color terms could be used in reports. The Munsell categorizations are derived from the properties of nature, not from perception, and you generally need the chart in hand in order to use the terms - your brain is incapable of making the color gradations it delineates without the benefit of comparative types. Ie., you need a copy of the chart to compare the color of the soil to the nearest defined swatch in the Munsell handbook. No one can actually perceive just by looking what swatch a color belongs to, you more or less need to be looking directly at a copy of the chart, and there are still apt to be physiological variations and therefore disagreements between different diggers, even very experienced ones. People who are in the field for a while can make better guesses, but not perfectly, or consistently with respect to another perceiver.

All of which just proves the rule.

I have red/green color blindness. That typically means (and is the case with me) that I have difficulties discerning subtle changes in hue. As you noted about indigo and navy, I would tend to see them as navy and black or the like. It's only when I put something I think is black next to something I already know to be black that my system corrects itself and I can discern the differences.

I did not learn of this until I was eight years old in a science museum where they had the Ishihara "hidden digit" test and I couldn't see the number 8 in one of the red/green slides. My family thought I was just joking, but when I kept insisting that there was no number--that, in fact, they were the ones joking--it got exponentially worse to the point where I had a minor panic attack and thought the world was ending. How could they all see what wasn't there for me?

And the answer is, of course, that I have some sort of minor malfunction in my optical processing unit. It's measurable, easily identified and overwhelmingly confirmed.

So, I have a choice to make. I can either ignore this and simply say, "The colors are ONLY in my head, so there is no number 8 in that slide, wee, how fun, I'm free to just make up any shit I want and believe any damn thing I want" or, I can say, "Evidently, I have a malfunctioning optical processing unit and need to be aware of that going forward, as it may somehow cause me or my loved ones some sort of harm, possibly grave, so what does that entail for me and everyone else? That we live in an objective universe?"

The objective condition, of course, never changes, no matter which choice I make. The number 8 is in that slide and it is "telling" me that, but what's happening is a shortcircuit of some kind on my end; not that the number 8 is not, in fact, on that slide (or "telling" me that).

So, yes, one could (i.e., has the license to) think of one's self as a copy (indeed, that's exactly what it is; an animated model), but one should not ALSO throw out the fact that a model requires something objective for it to model. This is where the entire structure of our epistemology resides; inference.

Which, once again, is what it would mean if someone were to say that color exists ONLY in one's head. And, again, the reason that's imperative to keep pointing out is because there are real world consequences for slipping down that solipsistic slope.

You can do it, of course. It's easily done. VERY easily done. So easily done in fact that one might wonder why do it? Its outcome is predetermined. It's just like saying, "Goddidit," in fact.

The far more difficult task is to be present and to try to reconcile the objective with the subjective and why it all is. If all you do is affirm the subjective, however, you're just Pinocchio rubbing his wood together.

I am getting really tired of this strawman nonsense. I never argued that perception has no material basis.

I do think it unreasonable to call that material basis "color", since people are in fact referring to the concept when they use color terms, not to an objective reality that they may or may not have access to, or even intend to reference. That may be an aesthetic disagreement, but I think your argument that your color perception is sometimes, or ever, "strictly objective", has similarly disastrous effects on how people think about perceptive categories and their natural limitations. Such as in my example, wherein the work of scientists was hampered for years by conflicting assumptions about color, rendering older field reports often much less useful than they might be. I can even give you another example. Take, for instance, the role that color perception plays in a courtroom setting. If someone believes that their color categorizations are "objective", then they might have a very false idea about 1.) their own inehrent reliability as an observer 2.) whether it can be reasonably assumed that the witness, interlocutor, judge, and jury mean the same thing by a color term. If color is "in the object, and predictably categorized by all normal human minds", they always would be able to trust a color descriptor in testimony, barring an empriically demonstrable visual disablity. If color is "based on the object, but ultimately generated by cognition and categorized according to linguistic and cultural norm", there will exist the necessary space to question specific testimonies.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

A practical example of the complications of color:

In my early post-academic years, I used to work in the field as a contract archaeologist. Even on largely monocultural crews, definitions of color terms were actually a serious practical problem as different diggers were apt to classify the colors of artifacts and soils by different folk terms if left unaided; to solve this, we used the Munsell color system to strictly regulate what color terms could be used in reports. The Munsell categorizations are derived from the properties of nature, not from perception, and you generally need the chart in hand in order to use the terms - your brain is incapable of making the color gradations it delineates without the benefit of comparative types. Ie., you need a copy of the chart to compare the color of the soil to the nearest defined swatch in the Munsell handbook. No one can actually perceive just by looking what swatch a color belongs to, you more or less need to be looking directly at a copy of the chart, and there are still apt to be physiological variations and therefore disagreements between different diggers, even very experienced ones. People who are in the field for a while can make better guesses, but not perfectly, or consistently with respect to another perceiver.

All of which just proves the rule.

I have red/green color blindness. That typically means (and is the case with me) that I have difficulties discerning subtle changes in hue. As you noted about indigo and navy, I would tend to see them as navy and black or the like. It's only when I put something I think is black next to something I already know to be black that my system corrects itself and I can discern the differences.

I did not learn of this until I was eight years old in a science museum where they had the Ishihara "hidden digit" test and I couldn't see the number 8 in one of the red/green slides. My family thought I was just joking, but when I kept insisting that there was no number--that, in fact, they were the ones joking--it got exponentially worse to the point where I had a minor panic attack and thought the world was ending. How could they all see what wasn't there for me?

And the answer is, of course, that I have some sort of minor malfunction in my optical processing unit. It's measurable, easily identified and overwhelmingly confirmed.

So, I have a choice to make. I can either ignore this and simply say, "The colors are ONLY in my head, so there is no number 8 in that slide, wee, how fun, I'm free to just make up any shit I want and believe any damn thing I want" or, I can say, "Evidently, I have a malfunctioning optical processing unit and need to be aware of that going forward, as it may somehow cause me or my loved ones some sort of harm, possibly grave, so what does that entail for me and everyone else? That we live in an objective universe?"

The objective condition, of course, never changes, no matter which choice I make. The number 8 is in that slide and it is "telling" me that, but what's happening is a shortcircuit of some kind on my end; not that the number 8 is not, in fact, on that slide (or "telling" me that).

So, yes, one could (i.e., has the license to) think of one's self as a copy (indeed, that's exactly what it is; an animated model), but one should not ALSO throw out the fact that a model requires something objective for it to model. This is where the entire structure of our epistemology resides; inference.

Which, once again, is what it would mean if someone were to say that color exists ONLY in one's head. And, again, the reason that's imperative to keep pointing out is because there are real world consequences for slipping down that solipsistic slope.

You can do it, of course. It's easily done. VERY easily done. So easily done in fact that one might wonder why do it? Its outcome is predetermined. It's just like saying, "Goddidit," in fact.

The far more difficult task is to be present and to try to reconcile the objective with the subjective and why it all is. If all you do is affirm the subjective, however, you're just Pinocchio rubbing his wood together.

I am getting really tired of this strawman nonsense.

NOT a strawman--particularly when you use terms like "ONLY"--but irrelevant regardless. Speaking of strawmen:

I never argued that perception has no material basis.

Then it's a damn good thing I never said you did argue that perception has no material basis. That is NOT the same thing as what I just argued, so, yeah, I agree, I'm getting really tired of this strawman nonsense, particularly when you then further state:

I do not think it reasonable to call that material basis "color", since people are in fact referring to the concept when they use color terms, not to an objective reality that they may or may not have access to, or even intend to reference.

Bullshit. When you ask someone, "Is this shirt blue?" you are most definitely not referring to the concept of blueness; you are asking for an affirmation of an objective condition. You need not respond with, "Well, do you mean at what wavelength are the photons bouncing off of this object's material basis vibrating, or whether or not your individual optic nerves are working optimally to be able to discern that?" for it to nevertheless be a question of objective affirmation.

 

[Politesse]

Bullshit. When you ask someone, "Is this shirt blue?" you are most definitely not referring to the concept of blueness; you are asking for an affirmation of an objective condition. You need not respond with, "Well, do you mean at what wavelength are the photons bouncing off of this object's material basis vibrating, or whether or not your individual optic nerves are working optimally to be able to discern that?" for it to nevertheless be a question of objective affirmation.

Well, of course you wouldn't ask that. Because that's almost never what people mean when they say "blue". The idea of blue, not an objective cirsumstance that may or my not exist, is exactly what they are referring to. It would not occur to most people, for instance, to question whether the blue horse they saw in their dream was really blue, even though those objective conditions were in no way met. People might assume that their perception is objective and beyond question, if they've never really thought about it, but I've explained why I would consider that a problem.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

Bullshit. When you ask someone, "Is this shirt blue?" you are most definitely not referring to the concept of blueness; you are asking for an affirmation of an objective condition. You need not respond with, "Well, do you mean at what wavelength are the photons bouncing off of this object's material basis vibrating, or whether or not your individual optic nerves are working optimally to be able to discern that?" for it to nevertheless be a question of objective affirmation.

Well, of course you wouldn't ask that. Because that's almost never what people mean when they say "blue". The idea of blue, not an objective cirsumstance that may or my not exist, is exactly what they are referring to.

ffs. In a literal sense, yes, they--unknowingly, inadvertently--are referring to an abstract concept in the sense that we create a whole shitload of associations and tack on a bunch of different memories and factoids and all kinds of shit when we store information bundles coded as "blue," or "red" or any fucking thing, but that's not what they are asking anyone to affirm and it's not relevant to this discussion.

It would not occur to most people, for instance, to question whether the blue horse they saw in their dream was really blue, even though those objective conditions were in no way met. People might assume that their perception is objective and beyond question, if they've never really thought about it, but I've explained why I would consider that a problem.

So you're being purely pedantic here and just want people to know that, hey, we subjectively experience an objective world, so, you know, watch out for that?

 

[Politesse]

ffs. In a literal sense, yes, they--unknowingly, inadvertently--are referring to an abstract concept in the sense that we create a whole shitload of associations and tack on a bunch of different memories and factoids and all kinds of shit when we store information bundles coded as "blue," or "red" or any fucking thing, but that's not what they are asking anyone to affirm and it's not relevant to this discussion.

It would not occur to most people, for instance, to question whether the blue horse they saw in their dream was really blue, even though those objective conditions were in no way met. People might assume that their perception is objective and beyond question, if they've never really thought about it, but I've explained why I would consider that a problem.

So you're being purely pedantic here and just want people to know that, hey, we subjectively experience an objective world, so, you know, watch out for that?

You're the one who seems confused on that point...

 

[Jayjay]

You are listing off other perceptive artifacts, yes. Your brain is the interpretive wing of your nervous system, not a perfect amanuensis of "the real"; it needs invented categories to help it sort through the avalanche of sensory information which which it is constantly flooded, and it dips into the well of language, culture, and previous experience to try and create those categories. The sources of all that sensory information are real, but mental categories are not identical to them, and they often have aspects or connotations that do not relate to the objective qualities of the perceived in any way. So for instance, "yellow" as a cultural category in the West has a number of attributes that are symbolically but not empirically linked to the wavelength that gets categorized under it. Qualities such as "friendly" or "cowardly" or "a yield sign" or "an Asian" or "definitely a field crow rather than a raven given that beak" are also contextually connoted by the term, and although those associations are a part of any reasonable definition of "yellow" - you will find some of them in any dictionary- they are irrelevant to the physicist, having no literal connection to the physical referents of the color. Then, too, different cultures may or may not have a term for yellow at all, and we're apt to draw the boundaries between "yellow" and "red" or "yellow" and "green", with the result that people from different cultures would be apt to both perceive and categorize the physical colors in different but internally consistent ways, even if taking the same test or looking at the same objects. So even if we are talking about the perceptive aspects of color alone, there is no universal consensus about where the boundaries of each color sit, indicating very clearly that color terms are at least partially social constructions, and almost certainly vary individually as well.

I'm not saying that color terms are not partially social or even individual constructions. What I'm saying is that all things are. Color is not special in any way. We learn to attach labels to colors, like "blue" or "yellow" the same way we learn about any other concepts. People around us point to blue things and our brains connect the signals from our optic system (and visual processing system in the brain) to that label. This isn't even just a cultural process, people from the same culture can have different labels for same colors. Me for example, find myself often wondering why people refer to things I think are "purple" as "pink". But that's just semantics. Most people, and by that I mean people who have the normal three cones in their eyes and no brain damage in their visual cortex, can distinguish the colors just fine. They only have learned to use different labels for them. The same is true of pretty much everything in the world.

Like Koyaanisqatsi pointed out, it is possible that a person is unable to distinguish between different colors due to e.g. color blindness. And there are colors that us normies can't distinguish either, and hence have never invented words for them, but which are obviously different colors for the very rare tetrachromats. So actually, being able to think about colors in objective terms and not just mental or cultural constructs is very useful.

 

[Politesse]

I'm not saying that color terms are not partially social or even individual constructions. What I'm saying is that all things are. Color is not special in any way. We learn to attach labels to colors, like "blue" or "yellow" the same way we learn about any other concepts. People around us point to blue things and our brains connect the signals from our optic system (and visual processing system in the brain) to that label. This isn't even just a cultural process, people from the same culture can have different labels for same colors. Me for example, find myself often wondering why people refer to things I think are "purple" as "pink". But that's just semantics. Most people, and by that I mean people who have the normal three cones in their eyes and no brain damage in their visual cortex, can distinguish the colors just fine. They only have learned to use different labels for them. The same is true of pretty much everything in the world.

Indeed so. And that's exactly why distinguishing between categories and referents is important.

 

[Koyaanisqatsi]

ffs. In a literal sense, yes, they--unknowingly, inadvertently--are referring to an abstract concept in the sense that we create a whole shitload of associations and tack on a bunch of different memories and factoids and all kinds of shit when we store information bundles coded as "blue," or "red" or any fucking thing, but that's not what they are asking anyone to affirm and it's not relevant to this discussion.

It would not occur to most people, for instance, to question whether the blue horse they saw in their dream was really blue, even though those objective conditions were in no way met. People might assume that their perception is objective and beyond question, if they've never really thought about it, but I've explained why I would consider that a problem.

So you're being purely pedantic here and just want people to know that, hey, we subjectively experience an objective world, so, you know, watch out for that?

You're the one who seems confused on that point...

Read what you wrote again:

Well, of course you wouldn't ask that. Because that's almost never what people mean when they say "blue". The idea of blue, not an objective cirsumstance that may or my not exist, is exactly what they are referring to.

You have ironically conflated what a person means with what they are objectively referring to. What a person means when they ask, "Is this shirt blue?" is whether or not the shirt's color is blue; NOT the "idea of blueness." They are asking for a confirmation of an objective condition that they perceive in a certain way, because ALL perception is in a certain way as a matter of brute fact and entirely due to our physical makeup and therefore our only option is to confirm our perception with someone else's perception and pretty much everyone knows this. That's why we ask.

You, however, are ignoring that fact and are instead ironically taking a pedantic position to pointlessly note that when they use the word "blue" it is also loaded with a whole bunch of ancillary elements--e.g., memories; associations; transduction; the fact that the photons are actually bouncing off of, not necessarily being emitted from; etc--that have no salient bearing on why they are asking someone, "Is this shirt blue?"

Iow, they are asking a direct question about an objective condition. You, however, are needlessly pointing out that the direct question objectively (i.e., ultimately) entails a subjective condition. No shit. You're shifting their focus--and stuffing some straw--for no reason.

 

[Politesse]

You're the one who seems confused on that point...

Read what you wrote again:

Well, of course you wouldn't ask that. Because that's almost never what people mean when they say "blue". The idea of blue, not an objective cirsumstance that may or my not exist, is exactly what they are referring to.

You have ironically conflated what a person means with what they are objectively referring to. What a person means when they ask, "Is this shirt blue?" is whether or not the shirt's color is blue; NOT the "idea of blueness." They are asking for a confirmation of an objective condition that they perceive in a certain way, because ALL perception is in a certain way as a matter of brute fact and entirely due to our physical makeup and therefore our only option is to confirm our perception with someone else's perception and pretty much everyone knows this. That's why we ask.

You, however, are ignoring that fact and are instead ironically taking a pedantic position to pointlessly note that when they use the word "blue" it is also loaded with a whole bunch of ancillary elements--e.g., memories; associations; transduction; the fact that the photons are actually bouncing off of, not necessarily being emitted from; etc--that have no salient bearing on why they are asking someone, "Is this shirt blue?"

Iow, they are asking a direct question about an objective condition. You, however, are needlessly pointing out that the direct question objectively (i.e., ultimately) entails a subjective condition. No shit. You're shifting their focus--and stuffing some straw--for no reason.

What is the evidence for your claim? About what people, fundamentally, mean? I put my evidence forward: People routinely use color terms in ways that only make sense if the subjective and variable meanings of color are considered. You are insisting that they mean something very different, but have yet to explain why you think that is so, given that it contradicts the seeming evidence of everyday speech.

Repeating something over and over is not the same thing as producing arguments for it. In fact, it makes your argument come across as considerably weaker. Don't think I haven't noticed that you have all but ignored the many, many specific examples I have suggested for discussion throughout the thread.

ALL perception is in a certain way as a matter of brute fact and entirely due to our physical makeup and therefore our only option is to confirm our perception with someone else's perception and pretty much everyone knows this

This doesn't even make logical sense. IF perception is a matter of brute fact, WHY would we ever need to confirm ours with someone else's? Wouldn't everyone see exactly the same colors in all circumstances without any need for independent confirmation, if that were true? Disagreements wouldn't just be rare in that case, they would be impossible.