The is/ought issue.

[Angra Mainyu]

In Scenario 2, Bob reduces happiness by killing Jack, as he prevents all the future happiness of his murderer. But it is not the case that Bob has a moral obligation not to stab Jack.

I suspect we've been here before.

I'm a rule utilitarian. You can contrive a situation in which the rule doesn't satisfy, but that doesn't make it a bad rule generally.

I would need more information about your variant of utilitarianism, also this is a side issue, but the point is that in some situations, it is not morally wrong to decrease happiness, so it is not the case that conceptually, to be morally wrong is to decrease happiness, and also it's not a case of a necessary equivalence that is not a conceptual equivalence (like water and H2O).

 

[Angra Mainyu]

To claim that X is immoral is the same as saying you ought not do X

In the moral sense of 'ought', yes (well, there are some nuances one could debate, but those are details). That is precisely the point. An 'ought' follows from an 'is' using only logic and the meaning of the words. The question is about moral terms vs. non-moral terms, not about'ought' vs. 'is'. But you are missing the central point. You are agreeing with me! (again, save for some nuances).

The ought is structurally embedded and implicit in the claim that something is immoral.

In the moral sense of 'ought', yes, but you might as well say that the 'is immoral' is structurally embedded and implicit in the claim that you ought not to do something. And my point in that part of the OP is precisely that; it's not about is vs. ought, it's about moral language vs. non-moral language. But alas, that happens with color, or illness, or pretty much anything.

It's not a case of what follows from a proposition that X is immoral.

Oh, no, it does follow.

It's just circular reasoning and a tautology to say we ought no do things that ought not be done...because they are 'immoral'.

Well, it is a tautology, sure, that is my point in that part of the OP; it's not about is vs. ought, it's about moral language vs. non-moral language. But alas, that happens with color, or illness, or pretty much anything.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Your premise of "It is immoral to do X" has no semantic meaning other than "I feel that people ought not to do X."

That is false. You can see that when people engage in moral debates. They do not see each other as talking about what each of them feels. Otherwise, they would be talking past each other. Imagine this:

Bob: I feel that people ought not to have gay sex.
Alice: I feel that it is not the case that people ought not to have gay sex.
Bob: Ah, okay, so looks like we have different feelings!


But now imagine:

Bob: People ought not to have gay sex.
Alice: It is not the case that people ought not to have gay sex.
Bob: We disagree.


In other words, at least the "I feel that" is out of place. Moreover, it might be debatable whether 'A ought not to X' in the moral sense of 'ought' means the same as 'It would be immoral for A to X', or 'If A intends not to behave immorally, then A ought not to X'. If this is so, the moral 'ought' is a means-to-ends 'ought' with an implicit end.

But let me reiterate: these are details. I included the points about deriving a moral 'ought' from 'is immoral' for the sake of thoroughness. It seems some readers are just misreading it.

Thus, you are not deriving an "ought" from an actual "is", but an ought from and ought.

Oh, no, I'm deriving an 'ought' from an 'is'. Clearly, 'is immoral' does not contain the word 'ought'. And that is precisely the point in that part of the OP. it's not about is vs. ought, it's about moral language vs. non-moral language. That is of course a side note.

An "is" is a statement about the objective world that does not depend upon how any mind subjectively feels about it.

No, an 'is' is a statement of the form 'A is B' in English.

"Immoral" has no referent other than how the thing relates to way some mind feels about it.

I do not see a good reason to believe so. Of course, there is no immoral behavior without minds. For that matter, there is no psychotic behavior without minds. But there is a fact of the matter as to whether a person behaves immorally, or psychotically.

The only way your argument makes sense is if you use the word "is" to mean "ought", which is the same as using "implies" to mean "is". So, by the same abuse of meaning, I can say "X implies Y, therefore X is Y."

That is not my argument. It is a side note.

As for "seeing red", yes that is completely subjective experience, like morality. Thus, there is no objective truth to "that is red" without reference to such subjective experience.

Imagine a court case, in which it is disputed whether the driver ran a red light. Surely, there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether the light was red.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

In Scenario 2, Bob reduces happiness by killing Jack, as he prevents all the future happiness of his murderer. But it is not the case that Bob has a moral obligation not to stab Jack.

I suspect we've been here before.

I'm a rule utilitarian. You can contrive a situation in which the rule doesn't satisfy, but that doesn't make it a bad rule generally.

Are you the justice guy? You think justice is a real thing, that can be identified, that is good of itself, that is the goal?

There are some behaviors that would be just to others, sure, and others that would be unjust. In that sense, justice is a "thing" (in the sense that also immorality is a thing). But you do agree that immorality is a real thing that can be identified, right?

And no, I'm not "the justice guy". I'm just a person who believes - like nearly every adult human being in the world - that there is generally a fact of the matter as to whether a human behavior is just or unjust.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Will anyone actually address the real issues at hand?

Please? Any objections that do not miss the points?

 

[ruby sparks]

Imagine a court case, in which it is disputed whether the driver ran a red light. Surely, there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether the light was red.

Loaded comparison (yet again). It may be that there are objective facts about the traffic light (at least in terms of wavelengths or energies of light) but not about morality. This has been put to you repeatedly, in many threads, so it is very odd indeed that you doggedly persist with the comparison.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Imagine a court case, in which it is disputed whether the driver ran a red light. Surely, there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether the light was red.

Loaded comparison (yet again). It may be that there are objective facts about the traffic light (at least in terms of wavelengths or energies of light) but not about morality. This has been put to you repeatedly, in many threads, so it is very odd indeed that you doggedly persist with the comparison.

You fail to realize why your objections fail, but you also fail to realize that I'm talking about color in a number of very different contexts, as my replies are adjusted to the claims of each of my interlocutors. In this particular post, I was replying to ronburgundy, who was actually saying that color was subjective, and I was saying that it was not. It's as if you think a single objection applies to all sorts of different arguments, regardless of their content - either that, or you're just not reading the exchanges: you just read 'color' and deploy your favorite objection.

 

[ruby sparks]

Imagine a court case, in which it is disputed whether the driver ran a red light. Surely, there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether the light was red.

Loaded comparison (yet again). It may be that there are objective facts about the traffic light (at least in terms of wavelengths or energies of light) but not about morality. This has been put to you repeatedly, in many threads, so it is very odd indeed that you doggedly persist with the comparison.

You fail to realize why your objections fail, but you also fail to realize that I'm talking about color in a number of very different contexts, as my replies are adjusted to the claims of each of my interlocutors. In this particular post, I was replying to ronburgundy, who was actually saying that color was subjective, and I was saying that it was not. It's as if you think a single objection applies to all sorts of different arguments, regardless of their content - either that, or you're just not reading the exchanges: you just read 'color' and deploy your favorite objection.

Yes I know ronburgundy was making a specific point, but you have used it with me a lot too. It's a dodgy comparison.

As would be:

1. There is an objective fact of the matter as to whether a light is red.

2. There is an objective fact of the matter as to whether deliberately running a red light is immoral.

Now, both may be true, but the former would be considered less controversial (in terms of wavelengths of light at least) and so appealing to it via comparison to support the latter is dodgy.

By the way, you say the ideas behind a lot of your posts are not originally yours. Whose are they? Can we see an exposition of them?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

As would be:

1. There is an objective fact of the matter as to whether a light is red.

2. There is an objective fact of the matter as to whether deliberately running a red light is immoral.

First, in my reply to ronburgundy, I was not making a parallel, since he accepted the parallel and held that neither is objective, whereas I was saying that they both were, but not using the parallel as it was pointless because he was saying neither was objective.

Second, I was not making that parallel in this thread at all. Rather, this thread is meant to deal with the is/ought objection, not with a claim that there is no objective fact of the matter as to whether it's immoral to run the red light.

By the way, you say the ideas behind a lot of your posts are not originally yours. Whose are they? Can we see an exposition of them?

I do not know who came up with them first. I saw some of the key ones in posts by B20 (and he keeps making those good points, so you can find them easily). Others in works philosophy blogs, but it's been a long time so I don't remember the source of each. Finally, a few I added myself, so in a sense those are my ideas, but are not the main ones and also it's unlikely that I'm the first one to come up with them.

 

[ruby sparks]

As would be:

1. There is an objective fact of the matter as to whether a light is red.

2. There is an objective fact of the matter as to whether deliberately running a red light is immoral.

First, in my reply to ronburgundy, I was not making a parallel, since he accepted the parallel and held that neither is objective, whereas I was saying that they both were, but not using the parallel as it was pointless because he was saying neither was objective.

Second, I was not making that parallel in this thread at all. Rather, this thread is meant to deal with the is/ought objection, not with a claim that there is no objective fact of the matter as to whether it's immoral to run the red light.

By the way, you say the ideas behind a lot of your posts are not originally yours. Whose are they? Can we see an exposition of them?

I do not know who came up with them first. I saw some of the key ones in posts by B20 (and he keeps making those good points, so you can find them easily). Others in works philosophy blogs, but it's been a long time so I don't remember the source of each. Finally, a few I added myself, so in a sense those are my ideas, but are not the main ones and also it's unlikely that I'm the first one to come up with them.

Ok.

Regarding what ronburgundy said, I would agree with him in the sense that I believe colour is a subjective experience, not an objective property of objects or light (eg electromagnetic waves, energies of some sort, surface textures or reflectances) using the definition of subjective as: 'dependent on a subject, eg a mind (or brain)'. There may be other definitions of subjective (or objective).

Also, saying 'It is immoral for agent A to do X' is strictly speaking an 'is' statement, so technically you can get to an ought at least fairly directly from that. The main problem, as I see it, is that it already contains a moral value judgement, and as such it has not been reasonably demonstrated to be an objective (or universal) 'is' (even if it is expressed in the form of an 'is' statement).

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Regarding what ronburgundy said, I would agree with him in the sense that I believe colour is a subjective experience, not an objective property of objects or light (eg electromagnetic waves, energies of some sort, surface textures or reflectances) using the definition of subjective as: 'dependent on a subject, eg a mind (or brain)'. There may be other definitions of subjective (or objective).

That is a debatable matter, but granting that that is correct, the key point here is that that is not the definition of "subjective" that is relevant in this context.

Consider, again, the court case: imagine Bob is accused of running a red light. He replies: 'Your honor, whether the light was red is a subjective matter, so maybe it was red to some police officers, but not red to me'. Clearly, he will not win the case. The judge (if reasonable) will point out that there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether the light was red when he crossed.

Common expressions such as 'there is an objective fact of the matter', 'it's a subjective matter', and so on, do not refer to the 'subjective' things in the sense you describe above.

Also, saying 'It is immoral for agent A to do X' is strictly speaking an 'is' statement, so technically you can get to an ought at least fairly directly from that.

Yes, that was my point in bringing that up. But it was a secondary point, a side issue. The central, crucial issue is that when we make other assessments, like the assessment that a ball is red, or that water is composed of H2O, etc., in the examples I provided, one is also using information from which it does not follow that the assessments are true, in exactly the same manner, so either one is making a fallacy in all cases - in which case, this fallacy is not so important -, or else there is something else that prevents that from being a fallacy. Perhaps, the intuitive judgments are non-verbal and just a case of matching patterns as chimps might, or maybe there is a probabilistic function with the implicit connections, or whatever. But at any rate, my goal was to tackle the is/ought issue.

The main problem, as I see it, is that it already contains a moral value judgement, and as such it has not been reasonably demonstrated to be an objective (or universal) 'is' (even if it is expressed in the form of an 'is' statement).

I do not agree that that is a problem or that I would have a burden to demonstrate it. However, even granting that for the sake of the argument, the objection to the is/ought objection would work, as it would for, say, beauty judgments.

 

[ruby sparks]

That is a debatable matter, but granting that that is correct, the key point here is that that is not the definition of "subjective" that is relevant in this context.

Consider, again, the court case: imagine Bob is accused of running a red light. He replies: 'Your honor, whether the light was red is a subjective matter, so maybe it was red to some police officers, but not red to me'. Clearly, he will not win the case. The judge (if reasonable) will point out that there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether the light was red when he crossed.

Common expressions such as 'there is an objective fact of the matter', 'it's a subjective matter', and so on, do not refer to the 'subjective' things in the sense you describe above.

In terms of everyday language, you may be correct. Fair enough, but what does it have to do with morality?

Yes, that was my point in bringing that up. But it was a secondary point, a side issue. The central, crucial issue is that when we make other assessments, like the assessment that a ball is red, or that water is composed of H2O, etc., in the examples I provided, one is also using information from which it does not follow that the assessments are true, in exactly the same manner, so either one is making a fallacy in all cases - in which case, this fallacy is not so important -, or else there is something else that prevents that from being a fallacy. Perhaps, the intuitive judgments are non-verbal and just a case of matching patterns as chimps might, or maybe there is a probabilistic function with the implicit connections, or whatever. But at any rate, my goal was to tackle the is/ought issue.

The main problem, as I see it, is that it already contains a moral value judgement, and as such it has not been reasonably demonstrated to be an objective (or universal) 'is' (even if it is expressed in the form of an 'is' statement).

I do not agree that that is a problem or that I would have a burden to demonstrate it. However, even granting that for the sake of the argument, the objection to the is/ought objection would work, as it would for, say, beauty judgments.

I often have very little idea what you are on about or what your point is. In what way do you hope to tackle the is/ought problem?

I'm not even sure what you mean by fallacy, or whether it's an everyday language 'fallacy' (eg a mistake), or whether when you say fallacy, it's always that, and nothing to do with logic (except perhaps everyday 'logic').

I get the impression that a lot of your arguments rely on everyday language, intuitions and common sense. I have to say I don't think this is a particularly good basis for analysis, regardless of what you say about the general reliability of such things. We discussed this before, and I am no more convinced than I was the last time.

If you want to claim that in everyday language, there is no significant issue getting an ought from an is, then, fine. I don't think I'd argue because I don't think it would show very much.

 

[Torin]

Suppose a son stabs his father to death with a knife. Everyone agrees that this is morally wrong in some sense.

Now, the OP claims that moral wrongness is perceived like color is perceived. If that's true, I ought to be able to perceive the wrongness of the stabbing like I can perceive the redness of the father's blood.

I can't, though. I can examine the situation in every particular, and I'll never come across a perception of wrongness. I can see the knife, I can see it entering the father's body, I can see the blood leaving the father's body, I can see the father collapsing, etc. But I never perceive any wrongness the way I perceive the colors and sounds (and so on) of all of these entities and events.

What we are given by observation is a bunch of facts about the world (the knife, the stabbing, etc.), and a feeling in me that results from my perceiving those facts. I think any attempt to get over the is-ought gap will need to proceed by knitting those together by some process of conceptual inference - either the facts to one another, or the facts to the feeling. I think the "ought" will need to be inferred, rather than perceived, if it is to be obtained from the "is."

Thoughts?

 

[Angra Mainyu]

In terms of everyday language, you may be correct. Fair enough, but what does it have to do with morality?

That was in the context of ronburgundy's points about color, so it was not about morality. Still, in the case of morality, a similar issue can be raised. The key disagreement in philosophy (both professional and amateur) and in the context of these threads is not whether morality is subjective in the sense you mentioned, but whether there is an objective fact of the matter (or a fact of the matter, which means the same in everyday language) as to whether moral assessments are true.

I often have very little idea what you are on about or what your point is. In what way do you hope to tackle the is/ought problem?

In the way that after considering the matter, it is not reasonable to object to moral assessments based on information about non-moral matters to say that an 'ought' doesn't follow from an 'is', or that moral assessments do not logically followed from information described using only nonmoral terms.

But let me go with an example.

Suppose that Bob accepts that there is very good evidence that any human with ordinary color vision would see this ball as red, under ordinary lighting conditions, and on the basis of that, he reckons that the ball is probably red. Bob rejects the idea that he is committing any fallacy in making that assessment.
Bob also accepts that there is very good evidence that any human with an ordinary moral sense would find the kidnappings, rapes and murders committed by Ted Bundy (as described here), very immoral. Now, when Alice uses that information as evidence that the actions in question were indeed very immoral, Bob objects and says that Alice is incurring the is/ought fallacy, because it does not follow from the premise that any human with an ordinary moral sense would find the kidnappings, rapes and murders committed by Ted Bundy (as described here), very immoral, that the actions were indeed very immoral.

One of my aims is to get readers to realize that Bob is making a mistake, more precisely if Alice is committing a fallacy for the stated reason, then so is Bob with his color assessment, and for the same reason (roughly; one might raise implicit premises as an objection, but that can be properly dealt with too). Note that saying that color is somehow different from morality or that there is an objective fact of the matter would miss the point. The question is about what follows from what, and whether these are cases of making fallacious assessments, or else cases in which one is not deriving the assessment by means of deductive logic but in some other way, and that is not itself a fallacy.

I'm not even sure what you mean by fallacy, or whether it's an everyday language 'fallacy' (eg a mistake), or whether when you say fallacy, it's always that, and nothing to do with logic (except perhaps everyday 'logic').

A fallacy is a formal logical error. In this case, it would be to try to derive a conclusion from certain premises by means of deductive logic, but using an invalid argument. I focus on this meaning of 'fallacy' because that is how the is/ought issue is usually raised.

At any rate, the response to the objection that Alice is making some sort of error (not necessarily that one) would be along the lines that Bob has not provided any kind of reason to reckon that Alice is making a mistake with her moral assessment that Bob is not making with his color assessment.

I get the impression that a lot of your arguments rely on everyday language, intuitions and common sense. I have to say I don't think this is a particularly good basis for analysis, regardless of what you say about the general reliability of such things. We discussed this before, and I am no more convinced than I was the last time.

Yes, this is unfortunate. I realize I will not convince you of that. But the objection to the is/ought objection does not rely on that, as you should be able to see in the OP and my replies above. Now, I will probably not convince you of that, either, but I am also aiming to persuade other readers. Unfortunately, this thread has not attracted much interest, so maybe I won't persuade anyone, but I'm trying, and in doing so, I'm not going to limit my arguments to those I think might persuade you (if any).

 

[Angra Mainyu]

Suppose a son stabs his father to death with a knife. Everyone agrees that this is morally wrong in some sense.

Now, the OP claims that moral wrongness is perceived like color is perceived. If that's true, I ought to be able to perceive the wrongness of the stabbing like I can perceive the redness of the father's blood.

I can't, though. I can examine the situation in every particular, and I'll never come across a perception of wrongness. I can see the knife, I can see it entering the father's body, I can see the blood leaving the father's body, I can see the father collapsing, etc. But I never perceive any wrongness the way I perceive the colors and sounds (and so on) of all of these entities and events.

What we are given by observation is a bunch of facts about the world (the knife, the stabbing, etc.), and a feeling in me that results from my perceiving those facts. I think any attempt to get over the is-ought gap will need to proceed by knitting those together by some process of conceptual inference - either the facts to one another, or the facts to the feeling. I think the "ought" will need to be inferred, rather than perceived, if it is to be obtained from the "is."

Thoughts?

Thanks for the post.

The OP does not claim that moral wrongness is perceived like color is perceived, with our color vision. I am concerned with the is/ought objection.

But since you raise this matter, for that matter, sound is not perceived like color either. You look at the event, but you do not hear the blood, just as you do not see the screams, and you neither hear nor see the wrongness, but you do perceive it, do you not? Sure, you say you have a "a feeling in me that results from my perceiving those facts". But do you perceive the facts? Is the color impression that you see not also perceived as "a feeling in" you, even if a different kind of feeling? Is the sound as you perceived it also not "a feeling in" you, even if distinct from both the perception of redness and that of moral wrongness?

None of this has to do with the response to the is/ought objection, though, but for now, how about this: instead of color, think illness. You can see all of the effects of, say, cancer on a human being. But where do you see the illness in cancer, or psychosis?


But let me go with an example.

Suppose that Bob accepts that there is very good evidence that any human with ordinary faculties would find that a human with the symptoms described as 'psychosis' is ill. On the basis of that, he reckons that psychosis is very probably an illness (maybe so probable that it's beyond a reasonable doubt). Bob rejects the idea that he is committing any fallacy in making that assessment.

Bob also accepts that there is very good evidence that any human with an ordinary moral sense would find the kidnappings, rapes and murders committed by Ted Bundy (as described here), very immoral. Now, when Alice uses that information as evidence that the actions in question were indeed very immoral and reckons that they very probably were, Bob objects and says that Alice is incurring the is/ought fallacy, because it does not follow from the premise that any human with an ordinary moral sense would find the kidnappings, rapes and murders committed by Ted Bundy (as described here), very immoral, that the actions were indeed very immoral.

One of my aims is to show that there is something wrong with Bob's objection, for the same reasons explained in my previous reply to ruby sparks.


ETA:

What we are given by observation is a bunch of facts about the world (the knife, the stabbing, etc.), and a feeling in me that results from my perceiving those facts. I think any attempt to get over the is-ought gap will need to proceed by knitting those together by some process of conceptual inference - either the facts to one another, or the facts to the feeling. I think the "ought" will need to be inferred, rather than perceived, if it is to be obtained from the "is."

But why would the moral assessment have to be inferred? You see the red blood, you hear the screams, you perceive the wrongness too, without resorting to any kind of reasoning: it is an immediate assessment, not something you reason your way to. Still, as I mentioned, if that does not convince you, how about illness? You do not see or hear the illness in a cancer patient, or in a psychotic patient, etc., right?

 

[ruby sparks]

A fallacy is a formal logical error. In this case, it would be to try to derive a conclusion from certain premises by means of deductive logic, but using an invalid argument. I focus on this meaning of 'fallacy' because that is how the is/ought issue is usually raised.

There's something a bit iffy about the way you mix and match standards, imo. One minute it's formal logic, the next it's everyday language.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

A fallacy is a formal logical error. In this case, it would be to try to derive a conclusion from certain premises by means of deductive logic, but using an invalid argument. I focus on this meaning of 'fallacy' because that is how the is/ought issue is usually raised.

There's something a bit iffy about the way you mix and match standards, imo. One minute it's formal logic, the next it's everyday language.

That is not mixing standards at all. If someone says

P1: If all swans are white, there are no black swans.
P2: There are no black swans.
C: All swans are white.

Then they made a fallacy, and a formal logical error. The language is everyday language, but that is not really the issue. You can make formal logical errors in everyday language. By the way, logic was originally developed in the context of everyday language, not formal languages. That came much, much later.

 

[ruby sparks]

Suppose a son stabs his father to death with a knife. Everyone agrees that this is morally wrong in some sense.

Now, the OP claims that moral wrongness is perceived like color is perceived. If that's true, I ought to be able to perceive the wrongness of the stabbing like I can perceive the redness of the father's blood.

I can't, though. I can examine the situation in every particular, and I'll never come across a perception of wrongness. I can see the knife, I can see it entering the father's body, I can see the blood leaving the father's body, I can see the father collapsing, etc. But I never perceive any wrongness the way I perceive the colors and sounds (and so on) of all of these entities and events.

What we are given by observation is a bunch of facts about the world (the knife, the stabbing, etc.), and a feeling in me that results from my perceiving those facts. I think any attempt to get over the is-ought gap will need to proceed by knitting those together by some process of conceptual inference - either the facts to one another, or the facts to the feeling. I think the "ought" will need to be inferred, rather than perceived, if it is to be obtained from the "is."

Thoughts?

In both cases, it's perceptions. Better to say it's a brain-thing, I think. One question is whether or not they are perceptions about objective, actual things or whether they are only in the brain.

In the case of a red light, there is (it very much seems) an actual objective red light (in terms of there being wavelengths of light at least). This does not seem to be the case to an equivalent extent for morality. There is, it seems, no objective morality, as far as we know, and nor are particular moral judgements (opinions) universal.

Yes, the ought is inferred (by human brains) from the is, imo. I'm not ever sure I think infer is the right word. I would say the brain creates the morality. There's nothing in the events outside the brain which are anything to do with morality, of themselves.

 

[ruby sparks]

A fallacy is a formal logical error. In this case, it would be to try to derive a conclusion from certain premises by means of deductive logic, but using an invalid argument. I focus on this meaning of 'fallacy' because that is how the is/ought issue is usually raised.

There's something a bit iffy about the way you mix and match standards, imo. One minute it's formal logic, the next it's everyday language.

That is not mixing standards at all. If someone says

P1: If all swans are white, there are no black swans.
P2: There are no black swans.
C: All swans are white.

Then they made a fallacy, and a formal logical error. The language is everyday language, but that is not really the issue. You can make formal logical errors in everyday language. By the way, logic was originally developed in the context of everyday language, not formal languages. That came much, much later.

Formal logic is not everyday reasoning. You switch between one and the other.

 

[Angra Mainyu]

That is not mixing standards at all. If someone says

P1: If all swans are white, there are no black swans.
P2: There are no black swans.
C: All swans are white.

Then they made a fallacy, and a formal logical error. The language is everyday language, but that is not really the issue. You can make formal logical errors in everyday language. By the way, logic was originally developed in the context of everyday language, not formal languages. That came much, much later.

Formal logic is not everyday reasoning. You switch between one and the other.

If by "formal logic" you mean mathematical logic, sure, but I said a formal logical error, not mathematical logic. And of course, people make formal logical errors in everyday talk.
But for example:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_fallacy

In philosophy, a formal fallacy, deductive fallacy, logical fallacy or non sequitur[1] (Latin for "it does not follow") is a pattern of reasoning rendered invalid by a flaw in its logical structure that can neatly be expressed in a standard logic system, for example propositional logic.[2]

That can be neatly expressed in a standard logical system does not mean it is not committed in everyday talk. Of course, people engage in non-sequiturs all around. But still, since you think I'm making some kind of error, could you explain what it is - not vaguely, but show me the error?