What I think is unreasonable is to assume that using 'mind independent' to describe objectivity, when used in this context, indicates that the speaker believes mental illness is not real (doesn't objectively exist).
Nobody assumed that.
You assumed that's what he meant based on it being what you mean by "mind-independent", not based on what rs had posted.
No I didn't.
'mind independent' is a term commonly used in discussions and literature related moral philosophy. In my experience it is overwhelmingly used to characterise the objectivity of beliefs/claims that are not dependent on the speaker's attitude or opinion.
Same diff -- your usage conforms to
your experience with common usage in discussions and literature. That's still using yourself as the reference, not using rs. rs' posts up to that point didn't support the hypothesis that he conformed to common usage, so AM's attempt to get some clarification on that point was appropriate.
Now I accept that the term 'mind independent' may be used (in the moral philosophy context) to describe objectivity by people who believe mental illness does not objectively exist. I don't think I've ever come across this view. In any event I'm pretty sure it's not common.
That's not what was going on! Nobody was implying rs didn't believe mental illness objectively exists! We were trying to prove to rs that the definition rs was using is wrong.
A definition -- term T means M -- is a scientific theory to the effect that when people say T, the best explanation for the observation that they say T is the hypothesis that the sense they are trying to express is M. Looking for counterexamples is the way you
test such a theory. If you find a counterexample, you've
falsified the theory. When somebody says T means M, but there exists an X such that he says T(X) even though M(X) is false, that's empirical evidence against his theory of the meaning of T. Pointing out that contradiction is not an accusation that he believes M(X).
If "objective" really meant "not dependent on the mind for existence" then mental illness would not objectively exist. But when we point this out, far from assuming that using "mind independent" to describe objectivity indicates that the speaker believes mental illness doesn't objectively exist, we are assuming
the exact opposite. We are assuming the speaker believes mental illness
does objectively exist; more than that,
we are counting on it. We are drawing his attention to the contradiction between simultaneously believing mental illness objectively exists, believing mental illness depends on the mind for existence, and believing "objective" really means "not dependent on the mind for existence", in the hope that the speaker will take note of the contradiction and discard the most dubious of those conflicting propositions: his theory about what the word means.
Understanding a word is like riding a bike. There are probably a hundred people who can ride a bike for every one who can explain why he doesn't fall off. If you ask the average person how he keeps his balance and he tells you how he thinks he does it, then you can take what he says, apply the laws of physics, and show that he'll fall off the bike. But if you do that, it doesn't mean you're accusing him of not being able to ride a bike. You're just disproving his theory about how he pulls off the remarkable feat.
(Incidentally, if, as you say, in the context of discussions about moral realism, "mind independent" actually is typically used to mean "independent of how we as individuals happen to think or feel", then that's just a subtle mistake on the part of typical moral philosophers.
I contend that whether it is or isn't morally permissible to mercy-kill you if you are a terminal cancer patient depends critically on how you as an individual happen to think and feel about being mercy-killed. And, whether you agree with me about that or not, my contention is plainly compatible with moral realism. In my definition I distinguished between what an observer happens to think versus what we as individuals in general happen to think, and that's a necessary distinction if we intend for so-called "mind independence" to have any bearing on the existence of moral facts.)
I understand the distinction you're drawing.
The claim that the mercy killing is morally acceptable retains its objectivity, even though it depends on the cancer patient's attitude,
so long as the claim itself is not dependent on any concern for the suffering of the patient.
Have I got that right?
Maybe I'm misunderstanding you, but that doesn't sound the same as the distinction I was drawing. Suppose you mercy-killed Andy. I'm saying it may well be that your act was moral if Andy wanted to be killed but immoral if Andy didn't want to be killed. So the truth of the claim "It was okay for you to kill Andy" depends on the thoughts and feelings of Andy. But it doesn't depend on the thoughts and feelings of
me. My objection to the definition "independent of how we as individuals happen to think or feel" is that it's too broad-brushed -- it doesn't specify
which individuals are the individuals whose thoughts and feelings the morality of the act is independent of.
Now that's a separate question from the question of why "It was okay for you to kill Andy" is true, if it is. The reason mercy-killing is okay is some situations is precisely because of the suffering of the patient. We're kinder to our dogs than we are to our fellow humans. Morality is of course concerned with suffering. But I'm not sure that's what you were getting at. If what you meant was that the claim is not dependent on whether
I or other observers have any concern for the suffering of the patient, then yes, that's correct.
