• Welcome to the new Internet Infidels Discussion Board, formerly Talk Freethought.

Jokes about prison rape on men? Not a fan.

That's not what was going on! Nobody was implying rs didn't believe mental illness objectively exists! We were trying to prove to rs that the definition rs was using is wrong.

A definition -- term T means M -- is a scientific theory to the effect that when people say T, the best explanation for the observation that they say T is the hypothesis that the sense they are trying to express is M. Looking for counterexamples is the way you test such a theory. If you find a counterexample, you've falsified the theory. When somebody says T means M, but there exists an X such that he says T(X) even though M(X) is false, that's empirical evidence against his theory of the meaning of T. Pointing out that contradiction is not an accusation that he believes M(X).

If "objective" really meant "not dependent on the mind for existence" then mental illness would not objectively exist. But when we point this out, far from assuming that using "mind independent" to describe objectivity indicates that the speaker believes mental illness doesn't objectively exist, we are assuming the exact opposite. We are assuming the speaker believes mental illness does objectively exist; more than that, we are counting on it. We are drawing his attention to the contradiction between simultaneously believing mental illness objectively exists, believing mental illness depends on the mind for existence, and believing "objective" really means "not dependent on the mind for existence", in the hope that the speaker will take note of the contradiction and discard the most dubious of those conflicting propositions: his theory about what the word means.

Understanding a word is like riding a bike. There are probably a hundred people who can ride a bike for every one who can explain why he doesn't fall off. If you ask the average person how he keeps his balance and he tells you how he thinks he does it, then you can take what he says, apply the laws of physics, and show that he'll fall off the bike. But if you do that, it doesn't mean you're accusing him of not being able to ride a bike. You're just disproving his theory about how he pulls off the remarkable feat.

When I said 'mind independent' I meant 'independent of thoughts and feelings about it'. It's that simple, and it's not an unusual usage.
 
The AntiChris said:
You know it isn't as simple as that. It depends on context (Angra in post #281: "the term 'mind-independent' is used in a widely variable manner.")
Which is true. Again, see this post. Not convinced? Evidence is not hard to find. For example, there is the well-known "Darwinian Dilemma" presented by Sharon Street against moral realism, and the papers that followed it - by her and her opponents on the subject.

The following is an small excerpt from Sharon Street's "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value".

Street said:
The defining claim of realism about value, as I will be understanding it, is that there are at least some evaluative facts or truths that hold independently of all our evaluative attitudes
Does that sound like what you're saying? But hold on:

Street said:
It is important to note that it is not enough to be a realist to claim that the truth of an evaluative judgment holds independently of one’s making that particular evaluative judgment. Antirealists can agree with that much. Consider, for example, a constructivist view according to which the truth of ‘X is a reason for agent A to Y’ is a function of whether that judgment would be among A’s evaluative judgments in reflective equilibrium. This view is antirealist because it understands truths about what reasons a person has as depending on her evaluative attitudes (in particular, on what those attitudes would be in reflective equilibrium).
It turns out that on her 'reflective equilibrium' view, whether a person A ought to Y does not depend on the person's actual attitudes or beliefs towards Y, but on the attitutes that she would have on reflective equilibrium. And of course - and crucially - it does not depend at all on the attitudes of the agent assessing whether or not A ought to Y. And this applies to what she calls "normative" judgments, which include moral judgments though are not limited to them.

There is plenty of philosophy literature dedicated to the criticism and defense of mind-independence in this particular sense, which is definitely not the one you have in mind. Others do use that one, of course. And then others other senses of 'mind-independent'.

So, I have already provided two pieces of evidence that the term 'mind-independent' is used in a widely variable manner.":

1. The SEP article says it does.
2. We can see that Sharon Street uses it in a way that is pretty different from the way you propose. You can easily find that there are plenty of replies to her arguments, to this usage is pretty common.


Of course, you can find plenty more evidence yourself. But if you are not convinced yet, sure I can provide more evidence. Again, there is plenty to be found.


The AntiChris said:
At this point it's not clear to me whether use of the "then mental illness wouldnt be objective" comment is a genuine attempt to to understand how the term 'mind independent' is being used or if it's an attempt to discredit the term (as a description of objectivity) by ridicule simply because you dislike its use.
It has various functions, but it's not the latter. I wasn't going for riducule. Rather, I was trying to persuade ruby sparks that the definition that he had provided did not do the work he wanted it to do. In other words, I was showing that it led to conclusions that were counter to his usage of the word 'objective'. I knew that because I know people would agree that there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether someone has schizophrenia, but also because of my previous interactions with ruby sparks.

In the end, I wanted ruby sparks to change his definition, and provide one that would be more useful in this context, and which would not allow one to rule out the objectivity on morality on grounds that would also rule out the objectivity of things ruby sparks would clearly recognize as objective.


The AntiChris said:
If the former, then surely the more charitable approach would be first to ask if the person is using the term in its most commonly used sense - independent of how we as individuals happen to think or feel. If it's the latter, then I think you're a little to late to change things now.
I do not know where you get that that sense is the most common one. In my experience, none is predominant (i.e., above 50% usage), and it's not clear to me which one is the first minority so to speak.
 
That's not what was going on! Nobody was implying rs didn't believe mental illness objectively exists! We were trying to prove to rs that the definition rs was using is wrong.

A definition -- term T means M -- is a scientific theory to the effect that when people say T, the best explanation for the observation that they say T is the hypothesis that the sense they are trying to express is M. Looking for counterexamples is the way you test such a theory. If you find a counterexample, you've falsified the theory. When somebody says T means M, but there exists an X such that he says T(X) even though M(X) is false, that's empirical evidence against his theory of the meaning of T. Pointing out that contradiction is not an accusation that he believes M(X).

If "objective" really meant "not dependent on the mind for existence" then mental illness would not objectively exist. But when we point this out, far from assuming that using "mind independent" to describe objectivity indicates that the speaker believes mental illness doesn't objectively exist, we are assuming the exact opposite. We are assuming the speaker believes mental illness does objectively exist; more than that, we are counting on it. We are drawing his attention to the contradiction between simultaneously believing mental illness objectively exists, believing mental illness depends on the mind for existence, and believing "objective" really means "not dependent on the mind for existence", in the hope that the speaker will take note of the contradiction and discard the most dubious of those conflicting propositions: his theory about what the word means.

Understanding a word is like riding a bike. There are probably a hundred people who can ride a bike for every one who can explain why he doesn't fall off. If you ask the average person how he keeps his balance and he tells you how he thinks he does it, then you can take what he says, apply the laws of physics, and show that he'll fall off the bike. But if you do that, it doesn't mean you're accusing him of not being able to ride a bike. You're just disproving his theory about how he pulls off the remarkable feat.

When I said 'mind independent' I meant 'independent of thoughts and feelings about it'. It's that simple, and it's not an unusual usage, so I have no idea what you mean about trying to prove it wrong.

That is not the definition you provided earlier. B20 is saying we were trying to show to you that you were using a definition that did not match common usage, or even your usage. Now you go with a different definition, which is better but still problematic to some extent, as B20 explained. Now that has been further clarified by The AntiChris, and we'll see whether it needs further clarification.
 
It's very odd that we are wrangling over this. I distinctly remember hypothetical scenarios (one for example about there being no one left in the universe except one psychopath on another planet, who then dies if I recall correctly) being constructed in previous discussions on other threads which involved trying to show that moral judgements were independent of thoughts and feelings (judgements, whatever) about them, effectively by eliminating all entities who could think, feel or make judgements. It appears there was common understanding about the issue then.
 
Fun intermission:

What does anyone think of this?

Mary attends the funeral of her mother. At the funeral she meets a man she had not met before. She thinks he is amazing and believes him to be the love of her life. After the funeral, she realises that she did not get any contact details for him.

A few days later, Mary killed her own sister. Why did she do it?

Best not to think too much and just give a spontaneous answer.
 
It turns out that on her 'reflective equilibrium' view, whether a person A ought to Y does not depend on the person's actual attitudes or beliefs towards Y, but on the attitutes that she would have on reflective equilibrium. And of course - and crucially - it does not depend at all on the attitudes of the agent assessing whether or not A ought to Y. And this applies to what she calls "normative" judgments, which include moral judgments though are not limited to them.

Sorry, but how is Street's meaning not the one AntiChris has in mind, or indeed the one I am using (I am not assuming AntiChris and I mean exactly the same thing, but they seem to be quite similar)?
 
At this point it's not clear to me whether use of the "then mental illness wouldn't be objective" comment is a genuine attempt to to understand how the term 'mind independent' is being used or if it's an attempt to discredit the term (as a description of objectivity) by ridicule simply because you dislike its use.

Possibly it's because if that definition is used, then there are no objective moral truths. Now, if the bar for moral realism can be lowered sufficiently, including by adopting a weaker definition of objectivity (and also in other ways) then maybe it can be argued that there are such things. There's a term for that sort of endeavour, or if there isn't, there should be imo. The phrase, 'defining something into existence' may come close. 'Sophistry' may not be all that far away either. Possibly even 'denialism'. 'Much ado about nothing'? I suspect a search and rescue mission pipe dream.

And yet again I think goalposts are being moved. Hypothetical scenarios where 'no entity capable of making a moral judgement exists' were the order of the day for supposedly demonstrating objectivity in previous discussions. Now objectivity is apparently not about that. The hypothetical scenarios failed in any case (because the person thinking them up existed and was making a moral judgement).
 
It's very odd that we are wrangling over this. I distinctly remember hypothetical scenarios (one for example about there being no one left in the universe except one psychopath on another planet, who then dies if I recall correctly) being constructed in previous discussions on other threads which involved trying to show that moral judgements were independent of thoughts and feelings (judgements, whatever) about them, effectively by eliminating all entities who could think, feel or make judgements. It appears there was common understanding about the issue then.

That did not seem to be the case. I presented several scenarios and arguments, but you kept misrepresenting the exchange and particularly my views (as B20 said, that's "beyond exasperating", and I've taken a lot more of that from you then he did), and still failing to see the point in the analogies and several of the scenarios, speaking about something you called 'independence' or 'independent', even after I challenged your usage of the term - but you did not seem to understand the challenge, and instead kept accusing me a number of bad things.
 
Now you go with a different definition.....

It's not different. It just has what is (not unusually) meant by 'mind independent' clarified.

It's pretty different if you consider the meaning of the words in English. If you meant to say something else, it's a good thing I asked for clarification. But now I see the problem continues - more in my next reply or replies.
 
At this point it's not clear to me whether use of the "then mental illness wouldn't be objective" comment is a genuine attempt to to understand how the term 'mind independent' is being used or if it's an attempt to discredit the term (as a description of objectivity) by ridicule simply because you dislike its use.

Possibly it's because if that definition is used, then there are no objective moral truths. Now, if the bar for moral realism can be lowered sufficiently, including by adopting a weaker definition of objectivity (and also in other ways) then maybe it can be argued that there are such things. There's a term for that sort of endeavour, or if there isn't, there should be imo. The phrase, 'defining something into existence' may come close. 'Sophistry' may not be all that far away either. Possibly even 'denialism'. 'Much ado about nothing'? I suspect a search and rescue mission pipe dream.

And yet again I think goalposts are being moved. Hypothetical scenarios where 'no entity capable of making a moral judgement exists' were the order of the day for supposedly demonstrating objectivity in previous discussions. Now objectivity is apparently not about that. The hypothetical scenarios failed in any case (because the person thinking them up existed and was making a moral judgement).

As I explained to you many times, you are grossly misrepresenting my position - and now B20's too.

No, the sense of 'objective' that we have in mind has not changed in any of these threads. In fact, I already told you it's about whether there is an objective fact of the matter as to whether, say, the killings of Ted Bundy were immoral behavior, or any actual (or sufficiently specified) behavior, all of that in the usual sense of the expression 'objective fact of the matter' in English, and the usual sense of the moral terms (e.g., 'immoral', 'morally permissible', etc. )

You are the one changing definitions.
 
Fun intermission:

What does anyone think of this?

Mary attends the funeral of her mother. At the funeral she meets a man she had not met before. She thinks he is amazing and believes him to be the love of her life. After the funeral, she realises that she did not get any contact details for him.

A few days later, Mary killed her own sister. Why did she do it?

Best not to think too much and just give a spontaneous answer.
Nothing spontaneously comes to mind, and there is insufficient information to even make a probable guess. So, I have no clue.
 
It's pretty different if you consider the meaning of the words in English.

Maybe you should have reverted to the understood meaning you previously had. ;)

What meaning are you talking about? The usual meaning of there being an objective fact of the matter? But you were providing a different definition; that is my understanding of 'objective', not my understanding of what you mean by it. What you mean by it remains a mystery. Even now, because you do not seem to mean the same as The AntiChris (more below).

It turns out that on her 'reflective equilibrium' view, whether a person A ought to Y does not depend on the person's actual attitudes or beliefs towards Y, but on the attitutes that she would have on reflective equilibrium. And of course - and crucially - it does not depend at all on the attitudes of the agent assessing whether or not A ought to Y. And this applies to what she calls "normative" judgments, which include moral judgments though are not limited to them.

Sorry, but how is Street's meaning not the one AntiChris has in mind, or indeed the one I am using (I am not assuming AntiChris and I mean exactly the same thing, but they seem to be quite similar)?

I already explained in my reply to The AntiChris why the meaning is not the same. If that is the one you were using, then the meaning you have in mind and the meaning that The AntiChris have in mind are different - unless of course I misunderstood the meaning The AntiChris is using, in which case he can of course clarify.

Let me explain again: in the constructivist 'reflective equilibrium' view that she gives as an example of an anti-realist theory in which there is not mind-independent normativity (for some reason, she focuses on normativity not morality, but while that is important in general it is not so here for the purposes of this discussion; see her papers for more details), if I make the statement 'Ted Bundy ought not to have killed his victims', then the truth of my statement depends on Ted Bundy's evaluative attitudes ("in particular, on what those attitudes would be in reflective equilibrium", so not his actual attitudes but the ideal ones, on reflective equilibrium). It does not depend at all on my evaluative attitudes, or on the attitudes of any other observer in her capacity as observer.

On this constructivist view (there are more than one possible constructivist views), there is such thing as what the attitudes of a person would be in reflective equilibrium, and that is what determines what a person has reason to do, or equivalently - "equivalently" according to constructivism - what a person ought to do.
 
It does not depend at all on my evaluative attitudes, or on the attitudes of any other observer in her capacity as observer.

Of course it doesn't depend on your evaluative attitudes or those of an observer. I never said it did!

All that it means is that it depends on someone's judgement (thoughts, feelings, attitudes, etc) about it.

I actually am finding it hard to believe you now don't understand this not unusual meaning.
 
So, I have already provided two pieces of evidence that the term 'mind-independent' is used in a widely variable manner.
You're missing the point.

I don't think anyone has claimed that 'mind independent' can only mean one thing. I certainly haven't.
The AntiChris said:
If the former, then surely the more charitable approach would be first to ask if the person is using the term in its most commonly used sense - independent of how we as individuals happen to think or feel. If it's the latter, then I think you're a little to late to change things now.
I do not know where you get that that sense is the most common one. In my experience, none is predominant (i.e., above 50% usage), and it's not clear to me which one is the first minority so to speak.

I can't possibly comment on what you claim is your experience, but I can tell you that on this discussion board, the only occasions, that I can find, on which mind independence (or very similar terms) has arisen in Morals and Principles , "independent of opinions or feelings" has been the intended meaning of the term every time and you have been involved in all of them.
 
Fun intermission:

What does anyone think of this?

Mary attends the funeral of her mother. At the funeral she meets a man she had not met before. She thinks he is amazing and believes him to be the love of her life. After the funeral, she realises that she did not get any contact details for him.

A few days later, Mary killed her own sister. Why did she do it?

Best not to think too much and just give a spontaneous answer.
Nothing spontaneously comes to mind, and there is insufficient information to even make a probable guess. So, I have no clue.

Good. :)

It is good for you in that case I mean.

If you had thought 'in order to hopefully meet the man again' then you might score a bit higher on the psychopath scale than you would have liked. :)

It was just a diversion onto a related point, which I think is interesting.
 
It's very odd that we are wrangling over this. I distinctly remember hypothetical scenarios (one for example about there being no one left in the universe except one psychopath on another planet, who then dies if I recall correctly) being constructed in previous discussions on other threads which involved trying to show that moral judgements were independent of thoughts and feelings (judgements, whatever) about them, effectively by eliminating all entities who could think, feel or make judgements. It appears there was common understanding about the issue then.

That did not seem to be the case. I presented several scenarios and arguments, but you kept misrepresenting the exchange and particularly my views (as B20 said, that's "beyond exasperating", and I've taken a lot more of that from you then he did), and still failing to see the point in the analogies and several of the scenarios, speaking about something you called 'independence' or 'independent', even after I challenged your usage of the term - but you did not seem to understand the challenge, and instead kept accusing me a number of bad things.

The situations you concocted literally did not show independence. That you concocted them to try (but fail) to eliminate 'anyone capable of making a judgement or having thoughts or feelings about it' shows that at that time you essentially accepted and used the not uncommon meaning of mind-independent I am now and always have been using. And now you claim you don't. You repeatedly try to move the goalposts in a variety of ways when it suits you. I haven't even cited them all. The appeal to the lesser standard of probabilities on some occasions and not others is another one. Just about the only thing that remains constant is the ability to resort to pointless, evasive sophistry.
 
You're missing the point.

I don't think anyone has claimed that 'mind independent' can only mean one thing. I certainly haven't.
I do not know where you get that that sense is the most common one. In my experience, none is predominant (i.e., above 50% usage), and it's not clear to me which one is the first minority so to speak.

I can't possibly comment on what you claim is your experience, but I can tell you that on this discussion board, the only occasions, that I can find, on which mind independence (or very similar terms) has arisen in Morals and Principles , "independent of opinions or feelings" has been the intended meaning of the term every time and you have been involved in all of them.

That has not been my experience in that context, either. But it is no longer yours: here there seems to be a clear example: ruby sparks does not mean the same as you do by 'mind-independent'.

ETA: And it's not about whether it can mean more than one thing. Rather, whether relatively common usages (not rare ones) are widely varied in philosophy (and even in amateur philosophy).
 
Back
Top Bottom