Supreme Court to Hear Obamacare Suit

[Horatio Parker]

Although both appellants and the government argue that the ACA, read in its totality, evinces clear congressional intent, they dispute what that intent actually is. Appellants argue that if taxpayers can receive credits only for plans enrolled in “through an Exchange established by the State under section 1311 of the [ACA],” then the IRS clearly cannot give credits to taxpayers who purchased insurance on an Exchange established by the federal government. After all, the federal government is not a “State,” see 42 U.S.C. § 18024(d) (defining “State” to “mean[] each of the 50 States and the District of Columbia”), and its authority to establish Exchanges appears in section 1321 rather than section 1311, see id. § 18041(c)(1). The government counters that appellants take a blinkered view of the ACA and that sections 1311 and 1321 of the Act establish complete equivalence between state and federal Exchanges, such that when the federal government establishes an Exchange, it does so standing in the state’s shoes. Furthermore, the government argues, whereas appellants’ construction of section 36B renders other provisions of the ACA absurd, its own view brings coherence to the statute and better promotes the purpose of the Act.

We conclude that appellants have the better of the argument: a federal Exchange is not an “Exchange established by the State,” and section 36B does not authorize the IRS to provide tax credits for insurance purchased on federal Exchanges. We reach this conclusion by the following path: First, we examine section 36B in light of sections 1311 and 1321, which authorize the establishment of state and federal Exchanges, respectively, and conclude that section 36B plainly distinguishes Exchanges established by states from those established by the federal government. We then consider the government’s arguments that this construction generates absurd results but find that it does not render other provisions of the ACA unworkable, let alone so unreasonable as to justify disregarding section 36B’s plain meaning. Finally, turning to the ACA’s purpose and legislative history, we find that the government again comes up short in its efforts to overcome the statutory text. Its appeals to the ACA’s broad aims do not demonstrate that Congress 16 manifestly meant something other than what section 36B says.

http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/10125254D91F8BAC85257D1D004E6176/$file/14-5018-1503850.pdf

If you had linked to a comedy skit, at least it would be entertaining.

No one is disputing what the partisan district court said. But can you show from the record, the historical record, that this is what Congress intended?

Pedantic quibbling.

The statutory construction is only quibbling IF you have decided that it could not mean what it says. However, as the plain text and construction IS the strongest evidence of intent, the burden of proof is on those who wish to ignore it. If the law says X, and you claim X was not its intent, then YOU MUST PROVE IT.

No one in his right mind believes that ACA was written to exclude subsidies to people using the federal exchange.

Anything can happen with this Supreme Court but that doesn't mean it makes sense.

Not one item in all your rhetorical flights, table pounding, and cites of your RW buddy courts establishes the intent of the ACA authors.

 

[maxparrish]

If you had linked to a comedy skit, at least it would be entertaining.

No one is disputing what the partisan district court said. But can you show from the record, the historical record, that this is what Congress intended?

Pedantic quibbling.

The statutory construction is only quibbling IF you have decided that it could not mean what it says. However, as the plain text and construction IS the strongest evidence of intent, the burden of proof is on those who wish to ignore it. If the law says X, and you claim X was not its intent, then YOU MUST PROVE IT.

No one in his right mind believes that ACA was written to exclude subsidies to people using the federal exchange.

Anything can happen with this Supreme Court but that doesn't mean it makes sense.

Not one item in all your rhetorical flights, table pounding, and cites of your RW buddy courts establishes the intent of the ACA authors.

And you claim to know intent on the basis of your histrionic non-arguments and citation of a TV comic? The only person who may not be in his right mind is someone who is in denial, who has not read the legislative history of ACA and keeps ranting "it can't be".

This was exhaustively explored and explained in a prior thread, so I am not going to recite all the information (I will, however, provide you a link to it at the bottom of the post). Briefly, be aware that:

1) The intentions behind a law are the 500 plus legislators who arrive at and approve a bill through horse-trading, threats, compromises, and favors, each who have both shared and individual intentions and understandings. After a bill is merged with other bills (as was PPACA), amended, and often left unread by those approving it the actual "intentions" of every provision by various authors and voting members is often diverse and not always clear...sometimes it is even incoherent.

2) In statutory law the meaning is primarily in the actual text, what it says it means. And it's language is the best evidence of the overall intent of Congress. Only when the language is contradictory or far too ambiguous to have meaning must the law either be reconciled or returned to Congress. However, such is not the case with PPACA.

3) The plain text is not ambiguous. PPACA directs "each State" to establish an "Exchange". It must be established "by a State" run agency or non-profit created by a State. If a State does not create an exchange then the federal government is required to create their own. However, as an inducement to the States, Section 1401 authorizes premium-assistance tax credits and subsidies and expressly makes them available only through State run exchanges OR regional exchanges established by cooperative agreements between States.

Alder/Cannon legal analysis: http://www.cato.org/publications/leg...ing-v-sebelius

The analysis of Cannon and Alder is exhaustive, and convincing. They surveyed Senate hearings and markups, antecedent legislation, House and Senate floor debates, staff references, and actions.

We surveyed eight Senate committee hearings and markups,110 the Finance Committee Chairman’s Mark of the America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009,111 and the House and Senate floor debates over the PPACA.112 In those venues, Democratic members of Congress and their staffs made 117 references to ‘‘state Exchanges’’ or state-established Exchanges, three references to federal Exchanges, and 359 non-specific
references to Exchanges. Republican members of Congress, all of whom opposed the PPACA, mentioned state or state-established Exchanges forty-one times and federal Exchanges seven times in these venues. The emphasis on state-run Exchanges reflects the PPACA’s emphasis. When Republicans spoke of federal Exchanges, it was typically to raise the specter of a federal takeover of health care------a specter that PPACA supporters downplayed by emphasizing that Exchanges would be created and run by the states.113... the Joint Committee on Taxation’s technical explanation of the revenue provisions in the PPACA and HCERA made fifteen references to state Exchanges, zero references to federal Exchanges, and fifty-one non-specific Exchange references.114 As the authors note: "The statute and the lack of any support for the IRS rule in the legislative record put defenders of the IRS rule in the awkward position of arguing that it was so obviously Congress’ intent to offer tax credits in federal Exchanges that despite a year of debate over the PPACA, it never occurred to anyone to express that intent out loud. A better explanation is that the PPACA’s authors miscalculated when they assumed states would establish exchanges. ...HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius proclaimed states were ‘‘very eager’’ to create Exchanges and predicted most would quickly do so.160 The end result would ‘‘very much be a State-based program.’’161

Shortly after signing the law, President Obama predicted, ‘‘by 2014, each state will set up what we’re calling a health insurance exchange.’’162 If the PPACA’s failure to authorize tax credits in federal Exchanges represents an error at all, it is that miscalculation."

In other words, the law and policy intent to make the States create their own exchanges by offering tax credits, as opposed to not offering credits if the federal government were forced to create an exchange.

http://talkfreethought.org/showthre...43067&highlight=legislative+history#post43067

 

[dismal]

I like this case. Because in the alternate universe dismal and maxparrish are arguing that Obama fucked up and went Super-Constitutional when he created a UHC system in the US, instead of allowing citizens the choice of who to get their insurance through via a continuation of the private system.

I also like the idea of the "stacking" of a court by the Democrats, as if no President before them appointed judges before.

You know what? You could familiarize yourself with what the case is about and then you wouldn't make such ridiculous posts.

- - - Updated - - -

Is it true that Obamacare forces people to buy something from insurance companies? I don't see how that could or should stand up in court. That isn't a tax, but a forced enrichment of private companies. Or have I read it wrong?

That's not the issue. The issue is the language in one section that says people can receive subsidies from the state exchanges. But 36 states with five million people receiving subsidies use federal exchanges. The plaintiffs are arguing that people covered through the federal exchanges are not entitled to subsidies. The govt argues these are the same.

The intent of the law is clear: all exchanges are entitled to subsidies. But if enough RW judges agree to toast Obamacare, it'll happen.

The law says the subsidies are available on state exchanges. There are precedent cases. The bar for ignoring what a law says is high.

 

[dismal]

Yawn. Can't "we" focus on the op rather than using it as a springboard to argue about a red herring? Even if this was about the constitutionality of a UHC system you might note Obama created a sorta UHI system, which is not the same as UHC.

Fact is, the law's plain text does not include tax subsidies for federal exchanges, it excludes them. AND the intent of the law is either to not do so, or it is ambiguous. The invention of hindsight ACA wishful thinking won't do. The law should be applied as written, and Congress can do its job next time around and be clear.

It does not specifically exclude the federally run exchanges. That's the crux of the "issue".

It does not specifically exclude giving everyone a pony either. The nature of laws is not that they authorize everything they do not specifically exclude.

 

[dismal]

Although both appellants and the government argue that the ACA, read in its totality, evinces clear congressional intent, they dispute what that intent actually is. Appellants argue that if taxpayers can receive credits only for plans enrolled in “through an Exchange established by the State under section 1311 of the [ACA],” then the IRS clearly cannot give credits to taxpayers who purchased insurance on an Exchange established by the federal government. After all, the federal government is not a “State,” see 42 U.S.C. § 18024(d) (defining “State” to “mean[] each of the 50 States and the District of Columbia”), and its authority to establish Exchanges appears in section 1321 rather than section 1311, see id. § 18041(c)(1). The government counters that appellants take a blinkered view of the ACA and that sections 1311 and 1321 of the Act establish complete equivalence between state and federal Exchanges, such that when the federal government establishes an Exchange, it does so standing in the state’s shoes. Furthermore, the government argues, whereas appellants’ construction of section 36B renders other provisions of the ACA absurd, its own view brings coherence to the statute and better promotes the purpose of the Act.

We conclude that appellants have the better of the argument: a federal Exchange is not an “Exchange established by the State,” and section 36B does not authorize the IRS to provide tax credits for insurance purchased on federal Exchanges. We reach this conclusion by the following path: First, we examine section 36B in light of sections 1311 and 1321, which authorize the establishment of state and federal Exchanges, respectively, and conclude that section 36B plainly distinguishes Exchanges established by states from those established by the federal government. We then consider the government’s arguments that this construction generates absurd results but find that it does not render other provisions of the ACA unworkable, let alone so unreasonable as to justify disregarding section 36B’s plain meaning. Finally, turning to the ACA’s purpose and legislative history, we find that the government again comes up short in its efforts to overcome the statutory text. Its appeals to the ACA’s broad aims do not demonstrate that Congress 16 manifestly meant something other than what section 36B says.

http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/10125254D91F8BAC85257D1D004E6176/$file/14-5018-1503850.pdf

If you had linked to a comedy skit, at least it would be entertaining.

No one is disputing what the partisan district court said. But can you show from the record, the historical record, that this is what Congress intended?

Pedantic quibbling.

The statutory construction is only quibbling IF you have decided that it could not mean what it says. However, as the plain text and construction IS the strongest evidence of intent, the burden of proof is on those who wish to ignore it. If the law says X, and you claim X was not its intent, then YOU MUST PROVE IT.

No one in his right mind believes that ACA was written to exclude subsidies to people using the federal exchange.

Anything can happen with this Supreme Court but that doesn't mean it makes sense.

Not one item in all your rhetorical flights, table pounding, and cites of your RW buddy courts establishes the intent of the ACA authors.

The problem is there are examples of people who believed exactly this, including a highly paid Obama advisor and MIT health professor considered to be an architect of the law who said exactly this twice on tape.

The reason this is such a problem is that under existing legal precedent the government must demonstrate the specific language is so ridiculous it could not possibly have been intended. Hard to do when your boy is on tape acting like it is in fact the law.

 

[Horatio Parker]

Although both appellants and the government argue that the ACA, read in its totality, evinces clear congressional intent, they dispute what that intent actually is. Appellants argue that if taxpayers can receive credits only for plans enrolled in “through an Exchange established by the State under section 1311 of the [ACA],” then the IRS clearly cannot give credits to taxpayers who purchased insurance on an Exchange established by the federal government. After all, the federal government is not a “State,” see 42 U.S.C. § 18024(d) (defining “State” to “mean[] each of the 50 States and the District of Columbia”), and its authority to establish Exchanges appears in section 1321 rather than section 1311, see id. § 18041(c)(1). The government counters that appellants take a blinkered view of the ACA and that sections 1311 and 1321 of the Act establish complete equivalence between state and federal Exchanges, such that when the federal government establishes an Exchange, it does so standing in the state’s shoes. Furthermore, the government argues, whereas appellants’ construction of section 36B renders other provisions of the ACA absurd, its own view brings coherence to the statute and better promotes the purpose of the Act.

We conclude that appellants have the better of the argument: a federal Exchange is not an “Exchange established by the State,” and section 36B does not authorize the IRS to provide tax credits for insurance purchased on federal Exchanges. We reach this conclusion by the following path: First, we examine section 36B in light of sections 1311 and 1321, which authorize the establishment of state and federal Exchanges, respectively, and conclude that section 36B plainly distinguishes Exchanges established by states from those established by the federal government. We then consider the government’s arguments that this construction generates absurd results but find that it does not render other provisions of the ACA unworkable, let alone so unreasonable as to justify disregarding section 36B’s plain meaning. Finally, turning to the ACA’s purpose and legislative history, we find that the government again comes up short in its efforts to overcome the statutory text. Its appeals to the ACA’s broad aims do not demonstrate that Congress 16 manifestly meant something other than what section 36B says.

http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/10125254D91F8BAC85257D1D004E6176/$file/14-5018-1503850.pdf

If you had linked to a comedy skit, at least it would be entertaining.

No one is disputing what the partisan district court said. But can you show from the record, the historical record, that this is what Congress intended?

Pedantic quibbling.

The statutory construction is only quibbling IF you have decided that it could not mean what it says. However, as the plain text and construction IS the strongest evidence of intent, the burden of proof is on those who wish to ignore it. If the law says X, and you claim X was not its intent, then YOU MUST PROVE IT.

No one in his right mind believes that ACA was written to exclude subsidies to people using the federal exchange.

Anything can happen with this Supreme Court but that doesn't mean it makes sense.

Not one item in all your rhetorical flights, table pounding, and cites of your RW buddy courts establishes the intent of the ACA authors.

The problem is there are examples of people who believed exactly this, including a highly paid Obama advisor and MIT health professor considered to be an architect of the law who said exactly this twice on tape.

The reason this is such a problem is that under existing legal precedent the government must demonstrate the specific language is so ridiculous it could not possibly have been intended. Hard to do when your boy is on tape acting like it is in fact the law.

The Congressmen that designed the law and the CBO understand the intent. None of you has demonstrated that they intended the law to work as you're claiming.

Pedantic quibbling.

 

[dismal]

Although both appellants and the government argue that the ACA, read in its totality, evinces clear congressional intent, they dispute what that intent actually is. Appellants argue that if taxpayers can receive credits only for plans enrolled in “through an Exchange established by the State under section 1311 of the [ACA],” then the IRS clearly cannot give credits to taxpayers who purchased insurance on an Exchange established by the federal government. After all, the federal government is not a “State,” see 42 U.S.C. § 18024(d) (defining “State” to “mean[] each of the 50 States and the District of Columbia”), and its authority to establish Exchanges appears in section 1321 rather than section 1311, see id. § 18041(c)(1). The government counters that appellants take a blinkered view of the ACA and that sections 1311 and 1321 of the Act establish complete equivalence between state and federal Exchanges, such that when the federal government establishes an Exchange, it does so standing in the state’s shoes. Furthermore, the government argues, whereas appellants’ construction of section 36B renders other provisions of the ACA absurd, its own view brings coherence to the statute and better promotes the purpose of the Act.

We conclude that appellants have the better of the argument: a federal Exchange is not an “Exchange established by the State,” and section 36B does not authorize the IRS to provide tax credits for insurance purchased on federal Exchanges. We reach this conclusion by the following path: First, we examine section 36B in light of sections 1311 and 1321, which authorize the establishment of state and federal Exchanges, respectively, and conclude that section 36B plainly distinguishes Exchanges established by states from those established by the federal government. We then consider the government’s arguments that this construction generates absurd results but find that it does not render other provisions of the ACA unworkable, let alone so unreasonable as to justify disregarding section 36B’s plain meaning. Finally, turning to the ACA’s purpose and legislative history, we find that the government again comes up short in its efforts to overcome the statutory text. Its appeals to the ACA’s broad aims do not demonstrate that Congress 16 manifestly meant something other than what section 36B says.

http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/10125254D91F8BAC85257D1D004E6176/$file/14-5018-1503850.pdf

If you had linked to a comedy skit, at least it would be entertaining.

No one is disputing what the partisan district court said. But can you show from the record, the historical record, that this is what Congress intended?

Pedantic quibbling.

The statutory construction is only quibbling IF you have decided that it could not mean what it says. However, as the plain text and construction IS the strongest evidence of intent, the burden of proof is on those who wish to ignore it. If the law says X, and you claim X was not its intent, then YOU MUST PROVE IT.

No one in his right mind believes that ACA was written to exclude subsidies to people using the federal exchange.

Anything can happen with this Supreme Court but that doesn't mean it makes sense.

Not one item in all your rhetorical flights, table pounding, and cites of your RW buddy courts establishes the intent of the ACA authors.

The problem is there are examples of people who believed exactly this, including a highly paid Obama advisor and MIT health professor considered to be an architect of the law who said exactly this twice on tape.

The reason this is such a problem is that under existing legal precedent the government must demonstrate the specific language is so ridiculous it could not possibly have been intended. Hard to do when your boy is on tape acting like it is in fact the law.

The Congressmen that designed the law and the CBO understand the intent. None of you has demonstrated that they intended the law to work as you're claiming.

Pedantic quibbling.

You aren't engaging on the actual issue. The law says the credits are available on state exchanges. Unambiguously, multiple times, with section references.

Under legal precedent courts default to what a law says, not what someone claims its intent is.

In order to ignore what a law says, a court must conclude what the law says is so ridiculous it could not have been intended. It will not be reasonably possible to do this after a weighing of the evidence.

The only question is how many justices can be persuaded to ignore what the law says and the existing legal precedents for dealing with such issues.

 

[ZiprHead]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevron_U.S.A.,_Inc._v._Natural_Resources_Defense_Council,_Inc.

Intent is a valid and established by the Supreme Court method of interpreting laws.

Justice John Paul Stevens:

(1) "First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court as well as the agency must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."

"If the Court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction of the statute . . . Rather,

(2) f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific question, the issue for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–843 (1984).

 

[dismal]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevron_U.S.A.,_Inc._v._Natural_Resources_Defense_Council,_Inc.

Intent is a valid and established by the Supreme Court method of interpreting laws.

Justice John Paul Stevens:

(1) "First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court as well as the agency must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."

"If the Court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction of the statute . . . Rather,

(2) f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific question, the issue for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–843 (1984).

The law unambiguously establishes credits on state exchanges.

 

[Horatio Parker]

Although both appellants and the government argue that the ACA, read in its totality, evinces clear congressional intent, they dispute what that intent actually is. Appellants argue that if taxpayers can receive credits only for plans enrolled in “through an Exchange established by the State under section 1311 of the [ACA],” then the IRS clearly cannot give credits to taxpayers who purchased insurance on an Exchange established by the federal government. After all, the federal government is not a “State,” see 42 U.S.C. § 18024(d) (defining “State” to “mean[] each of the 50 States and the District of Columbia”), and its authority to establish Exchanges appears in section 1321 rather than section 1311, see id. § 18041(c)(1). The government counters that appellants take a blinkered view of the ACA and that sections 1311 and 1321 of the Act establish complete equivalence between state and federal Exchanges, such that when the federal government establishes an Exchange, it does so standing in the state’s shoes. Furthermore, the government argues, whereas appellants’ construction of section 36B renders other provisions of the ACA absurd, its own view brings coherence to the statute and better promotes the purpose of the Act.

We conclude that appellants have the better of the argument: a federal Exchange is not an “Exchange established by the State,” and section 36B does not authorize the IRS to provide tax credits for insurance purchased on federal Exchanges. We reach this conclusion by the following path: First, we examine section 36B in light of sections 1311 and 1321, which authorize the establishment of state and federal Exchanges, respectively, and conclude that section 36B plainly distinguishes Exchanges established by states from those established by the federal government. We then consider the government’s arguments that this construction generates absurd results but find that it does not render other provisions of the ACA unworkable, let alone so unreasonable as to justify disregarding section 36B’s plain meaning. Finally, turning to the ACA’s purpose and legislative history, we find that the government again comes up short in its efforts to overcome the statutory text. Its appeals to the ACA’s broad aims do not demonstrate that Congress 16 manifestly meant something other than what section 36B says.

http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/10125254D91F8BAC85257D1D004E6176/$file/14-5018-1503850.pdf

If you had linked to a comedy skit, at least it would be entertaining.

No one is disputing what the partisan district court said. But can you show from the record, the historical record, that this is what Congress intended?

Pedantic quibbling.

The statutory construction is only quibbling IF you have decided that it could not mean what it says. However, as the plain text and construction IS the strongest evidence of intent, the burden of proof is on those who wish to ignore it. If the law says X, and you claim X was not its intent, then YOU MUST PROVE IT.

No one in his right mind believes that ACA was written to exclude subsidies to people using the federal exchange.

Anything can happen with this Supreme Court but that doesn't mean it makes sense.

Not one item in all your rhetorical flights, table pounding, and cites of your RW buddy courts establishes the intent of the ACA authors.

The problem is there are examples of people who believed exactly this, including a highly paid Obama advisor and MIT health professor considered to be an architect of the law who said exactly this twice on tape.

The reason this is such a problem is that under existing legal precedent the government must demonstrate the specific language is so ridiculous it could not possibly have been intended. Hard to do when your boy is on tape acting like it is in fact the law.

The Congressmen that designed the law and the CBO understand the intent. None of you has demonstrated that they intended the law to work as you're claiming.

Pedantic quibbling.

You aren't engaging on the actual issue. The law says the credits are available on state exchanges. Unambiguously, multiple times, with section references.

Under legal precedent courts default to what a law says, not what someone claims its intent is.

In order to ignore what a law says, a court must conclude what the law says is so ridiculous it could not have been intended. It will not be reasonably possible to do this after a weighing of the evidence.

The only question is how many justices can be persuaded to ignore what the law says and the existing legal precedents for dealing with such issues.

I'm as engaged as you. It's clear as day what the intent of the Congressional authors was. No one here has budged that rock, however long and loud the shouting, however dense and annotated the text walls.

You and others are choosing to ignore the obvious. Considering that you can appeal to the authority of the DC circuit court may make it appear to be less crazy, but that's only an appearance.

This is about power, pure and simple. This is a partisan effort to gut an entitlement on a legal technicality. And you(the RW) may have enough influence in the judiciary to pull it off. But please save all the smoke about truth, justice and the American way.

 

[dismal]

I'm as engaged as you. It's clear as day what the intent of the Congressional authors was. No one here has budged that rock, however long and loud the shouting, however dense and annotated the text walls.

You're engaged all right - just not engaged on what the law says and the actual legal issues and precedents for dealing with cases like this.

Legal cases are not decided by unsupported assertion and personal attack.

 

[Horatio Parker]

I'm as engaged as you. It's clear as day what the intent of the Congressional authors was. No one here has budged that rock, however long and loud the shouting, however dense and annotated the text walls.

You're engaged all right - just not engaged on what the law says and the actual legal issues and precedents for dealing with cases like this.

Legal cases are not decided by unsupported assertion and personal attack.

The biggest unsupported assertion circulating here is that the authors did not intend the relevant subsidies.

 

[dismal]

You're engaged all right - just not engaged on what the law says and the actual legal issues and precedents for dealing with cases like this.

Legal cases are not decided by unsupported assertion and personal attack.

The biggest unsupported assertion circulating here is that the authors did not intend the relevant subsidies.

Ignoring for the moment the fact your claim about what was intended is baseless, in a legal case of statutory interpretation the first way intent is established is by reading what the law says. The law clearly, unambiguously authorizes the credit on state exchanges only. Your emotionalized claims about the general intent do not trump the specific language of the law.

 

[Duke Leto]

So why haven't Republicans gone after RomneyCare? The premise is the same.

Because they do not and never will have majority in the Massachusetts Legislature.

 

[maxparrish]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevron_U.S.A.,_Inc._v._Natural_Resources_Defense_Council,_Inc.

Intent is a valid and established by the Supreme Court method of interpreting laws.

Justice John Paul Stevens:

(1) "First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court as well as the agency must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."

"If the Court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction of the statute . . . Rather,

(2) f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific question, the issue for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–843 (1984).

But no one is arguing against consideration of intent, we arguing that process of finding the intent of Congress is in reading the law.

The first step for the law court is to read the statutory text, to fulfill its basic obligation of statutory interpretation. If the intent of Congress is clear in the language and construction, the court does not need to mine its legislative history. There is no ambiguity to be resolved. And if the text is silent or ambiguous in is concepts or meaning, it is then incumbent upon the court to look at the legislative history to see if it can find intent. If that is also ambiguous then it gives deference to the administrative agencies view as long as the view is reasonable in light of the text.

Stevens, in a later opinion on a separate and unrelated case, stated that "[t]he task of interpreting a statute requires more than merely inventing an ambiguity and invoking administrative deference." ... "To one versed in the English language, the meaning of this
provision is readily apparent. The plain language of the section tells us...".

http://www.aallnet.org/mm/Publications/llj/LLJ-Archives/Vol-105/no-2/2013-7.pdf

And in the Pruitt v. Burwell suit on Obamacare (pg 11 of opinion):

http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/documents/pruitt_v._burwell_summary_judgment.pdf

In other words, Courts "may use statutory language and legislative history at the first step of the Chevron analysis.
Id. at 1157 n.10. When, however, the meaning of the statute is clear, it is both unnecessary and improper to
resort to legislative history to divine congressional intent. Id. Neither the Halbig majority nor the King court
found the legislative history terribly helpful, in any event. See Halbig, 758 F.3d at 407 ("Here, the scant
legislative history sheds little light on the precise question of the availability of subsidies on federal
Exchanges."); King, 759 F.3d at 372 ("We are thus of the opinion that nothing in the legislative history of
the Act provides compelling support for either side's position.").

16Moreover, legislative history may not be used to create ambiguity in the statutory language. See
St. Charles Inv. Co. v. C.I.R., 232 F.3d 773, 776 (10,h Cir.2000). "Our role in construing statutes was summarized by Justice Holmes: 'We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.'" Id. (citations omitted).

As the language and concepts are not ambiguous or contradictory, there is no issue. The IRS rule is in conflict with the law.

 

[TV and credit cards]

Did the federal government direct or request the states establish exchanges? If they were directed to and the federal government did so only due to state refusal then the rest of the law (the subsidy) stands.
No person should be denied a federal benefit due to state political opposition.

 

[maxparrish]

Did the federal government direct or request the states establish exchanges? If they were directed to and the federal government did so only due to state refusal then the rest of the law (the subsidy) stands.
No person should be denied a federal benefit due to state political opposition.

The federal government cannot force states to establish exchanges. However, the federal government can create incentives such as grants, subsidies, to states and their citizens etc. The original thinking of the architects of Obamacare was to have the federal government make the states an offer they could not refuse; i.e., if a State refused to set up exchanges, and the federal government was forced to do so, then that state's citizens would not be given tax credits and premium support - those benefits were only for those States that setup their own exchange (or used a non-profit to do so).

Actually it was a good strategy; how could any State government turn down a benefit to its citizens without incurring the political wrath of their own voters? Well, they did. And that is their option under the law.

With hindsight the ploy backfired and now ACA supporters are screaming that somehow the text and structure cannot be right...perhaps one of the shortcomings of Nancy Pelosie's brainy advice that "You have to pass it before you can know what's in it".

Well, the voters should get the benefit of the (in)competence from whom they elect, no?

PS If the Supreme Court rules the law means what it says, it may be a plus for ACA. Imagine how many states might reconsider setting up their own exchanges when its currently subsidized citizens in the federal exchanges start screaming if they are booted off the ACA dole. If the court truly believed that it is not their job to save the people from their folly, it could give the States one year to create their own exchanges OR convince Congress to change the law to apply to federal exchanges.

 

[Jayjay]

What's so controversial about this case? The authors of the law are still alive. There are documents and notes and early drafts available that shed light on the process. It should be possible to simply ask whoever wrote it if the law was meant to mean a "state" or not. If it can be shown that this was not the intent, then the use of the word "state" would be like misspelling a word or forgetting a comma and should be ignored. If they did mean it, then that's what it means.

Case closed?

 

[Nice Squirrel]

What's so controversial about this case? The authors of the law are still alive. There are documents and notes and early drafts available that shed light on the process. It should be possible to simply ask whoever wrote it if the law was meant to mean a "state" or not. If it can be shown that this was not the intent, then the use of the word "state" would be like misspelling a word or forgetting a comma and should be ignored. If they did mean it, then that's what it means.

Case closed?

Because they don't want to ask the writer of the law because his input will reveal this case as a sham. Correct me if I am wrong, but this case hinges on a cherry picked statement taken out of context.(He has spoken but somehow it hasn't stopped the case from going forward.)

 

[dismal]

What's so controversial about this case? The authors of the law are still alive. There are documents and notes and early drafts available that shed light on the process. It should be possible to simply ask whoever wrote it if the law was meant to mean a "state" or not. If it can be shown that this was not the intent, then the use of the word "state" would be like misspelling a word or forgetting a comma and should be ignored. If they did mean it, then that's what it means.

Case closed?

It clearly says state multiple times, in context, with appropriate section references.

Case closed.

- - - Updated - - -

What's so controversial about this case? The authors of the law are still alive. There are documents and notes and early drafts available that shed light on the process. It should be possible to simply ask whoever wrote it if the law was meant to mean a "state" or not. If it can be shown that this was not the intent, then the use of the word "state" would be like misspelling a word or forgetting a comma and should be ignored. If they did mean it, then that's what it means.

Case closed?

Because they don't want to ask the writer of the law because his input will reveal this case as a sham. Correct me if I am wrong, but this case hinges on a cherry picked statement taken out of context.(He has spoken but somehow it hasn't stopped the case from going forward.)

Who is "the writer of the law"?