fromderinside
Mazzie Daius
- Joined
- Oct 6, 2008
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- Basic Beliefs
- optimist
What bilby wrote.
I'm pretty sure that if one looks carefully one will find scientific method arose from failure of philosophy to deal with reality foundations. One just can't point to the sun and noon and say "it is self evident they are orbiting the earth" can they.
I think you'll find I'm coming from the philosophical perspective things are determined which kind of banishes such as free will. Your problem is explaining things with free will which, by the way, you've been doing a bang up job failing to provide a logical basis. Declarations are not philosophical statements. They more closely resemble religious beliefs.
Claim: Self is an illusion.
An illusion is not something that is not there, it is only something that is not what it seems to be.
View attachment 26166
Humans generally seem to find it easy and natural to locate their centre of conscuiosness.
Of 59 participants in an experiment, 90% identified a location in their bodies for the centre of their consciousness, where their self was felt to be.
83% identified that location to be in their head, between and behind the eyes, as per the dots on the diagram above. That is also where I would have chosen.
There is nothing located in any particular part of the body (or outside of it) where there is a self.
Therefore, self is an illusion, or if you prefer, a subjective sense of self, when it is present (it isn't always or fully) generally seems to involve an illusion, at least the illusion that it has or acts through a centre.
Point Zero: A Phenomenological Inquiry into the subjective Physical Location of Consciousness
http://en.asia.it/adon.pl?act=doc&doc=787
Wrong. But, if you have evidence bring it. Be happy to demolish it.
The illusion of self refers to the impillusion that the self, which the brain shapes, forms, generates, is actually running the show. The brain is the sole agent of perception, thought and response acting through the medium of conscious mind and self identity, a mental map of one's place in the world.
The illusion of self refers to the impillusion that the self, which the brain shapes, forms, generates, is actually running the show. The brain is the sole agent of perception, thought and response acting through the medium of conscious mind and self identity, a mental map of one's place in the world.
Yes. The self is how the brain experiences itself. The brain experiences itself exercising control over the behavior of the body. It uses special functional areas to provide conscious awareness, other areas to store memories, other areas to process visual and auditory data, other areas to perform other tasks.
You might find Michael Graziano's "Consciousness and the Social Brain" enlightening. He discusses some of the data that the brain gathers to construct the notion of self. For example, there is the self's location. During operations people have had the illusion that they are located above their body looking down upon the procedure. The brain organizes sensory data into a model of reality, consisting of things like objects and events. When the model is accurate enough to be useful, as when we navigate our bodies through a doorway, then we call that "reality", because the model is our only access to reality. It is only when the model is inaccurate enough to cause problems, like when we walk into a glass doorway thinking it is open, that we call it an "illusion".
The most usually cited objection to strong emergence, initially formulated by Pepper (1926) and championed today by Jaegwon Kim (1999, 2005), concerns the novel (and downward) causal powers of emergent properties.Kim’s formulation is based on three basic physicalist assumptions: (1) the principle of causal closure which Kim defines as the principle that if a physical event has a cause at t, then it has a physical cause at t, (2) the principle of causal exclusion according to which if an event e has a sufficient cause c at t, no event at t distinct from c can be the cause of e (unless this is a genuine case of causal over-determination), and (3) supervenience. Kim defines mind/body supervenience as follows: mental properties strongly supervene on physical/biological properties, that is, if any system s instantiates a mental property M at t, there necessarily exists a physical property P such that s instantiates P at t, and necessarily anything instantiating P at any time instantiates M at any time.The gist of the problem is the following. In order for emergent mental properties to have causal powers (and thus to exist, according to what Kim has coined “Alexander’s dictum”) there must be some form of mental causation. However, if this is the case, the principle of causal closure is violated and emergence is in danger of becoming an incoherent position. If mental (and therefore downward) causation is denied and thus causal closure retained, emergent properties become merely epiphenomenal and in this case their existence is threatened.More specifically, the argument is as follows. According to mind-body supervenience, every time a mental property M is instantiated it supervenes on a physical property P. Now suppose M appears to cause another mental property M¹, the question arises whether the cause of M¹ is indeed M or whether it is M¹’s subvenient/subjacent base P¹ (since according to supervenience M¹ is instantiated by a physical property P¹). Given causal exclusion, it cannot be both, and so, given the supervenience relation, it seems that M¹ occurs because P¹ occurred. Therefore, Kim argues, it seems that M actually causes M¹ by causing the subjacent P¹ and that mental to mental (same level) causation presupposes mental to physical (downward) causation. [Another, more direct, way to put this problem is whether the effect of M is really M¹ or M¹’s subjacent base P¹. I chose an alternative formulation in order for the problem to be more clear to the non-expert reader.] However, Kim continues, given causal closure, P¹ must have a sufficient physical cause P. But given exclusion again, P¹ cannot have two sufficient causes, M and P, and so P is the real cause of P¹ because, if M were the real cause then causal closure would be violated again. Therefore, given supervenience, causal closure and causal exclusion, mental properties are merely epiphenomenal. The tension here for the emergentist, the objection goes, is in the double requirement of supervenience and downward causation in that, on the one hand, we have upward determination and the principle of causal closure of the physical domain, and, on the other hand, we have causally efficacious emergent phenomena. In other words, Kim claims that what seem to be cases of emergent causation are just epiphenomena because ultimately the only way to instantiate an emergent property is to instantiate its base. So, saying that higher level properties are causally efficacious renders any form of non-reductive physicalism, under which Kim includes emergentism, at least implausible and at most incoherent.
You might find Michael Graziano's "Consciousness and the Social Brain" enlightening. He discusses some of the data that the brain gathers to construct the notion of self. For example, there is the self's location. During operations people have had the illusion that they are located above their body looking down upon the procedure. The brain organizes sensory data into a model of reality, consisting of things like objects and events. When the model is accurate enough to be useful, as when we navigate our bodies through a doorway, then we call that "reality", because the model is our only access to reality. It is only when the model is inaccurate enough to cause problems, like when we walk into a glass doorway thinking it is open, that we call it an "illusion".
My problems with Graziano are primarily bound up in the construct of emergence. Things evolve they don't emerge. The fact that empiricism uses rationalistic principles to some extent does not mean it emerged from rationalism. It is a completely different way of seeing the world based on more precise indicators of relations among things. The need for something other than just observation coincident with the ability to make tools drove the development of both language and historical memory in man. These did not just emerge. They evolved over a lot of time across many generations and in many places. Language, vocalization, is a mechanism, like handwaving and brow furrowing, supporting communication.
I point to Emergence https://iep.utm.edu/emergenc/ particularly section threeObjections to Emergentism https://iep.utm.edu/emergenc/#H3
The most usually cited objection to strong emergence, initially formulated by Pepper (1926) and championed today by Jaegwon Kim (1999, 2005), concerns the novel (and downward) causal powers of emergent properties.Kim’s formulation is based on three basic physicalist assumptions: (1) the principle of causal closure which Kim defines as the principle that if a physical event has a cause at t, then it has a physical cause at t, (2) the principle of causal exclusion according to which if an event e has a sufficient cause c at t, no event at t distinct from c can be the cause of e (unless this is a genuine case of causal over-determination), and (3) supervenience. Kim defines mind/body supervenience as follows: mental properties strongly supervene on physical/biological properties, that is, if any system s instantiates a mental property M at t, there necessarily exists a physical property P such that s instantiates P at t, and necessarily anything instantiating P at any time instantiates M at any time.The gist of the problem is the following. In order for emergent mental properties to have causal powers (and thus to exist, according to what Kim has coined “Alexander’s dictum”) there must be some form of mental causation. However, if this is the case, the principle of causal closure is violated and emergence is in danger of becoming an incoherent position. If mental (and therefore downward) causation is denied and thus causal closure retained, emergent properties become merely epiphenomenal and in this case their existence is threatened.More specifically, the argument is as follows. According to mind-body supervenience, every time a mental property M is instantiated it supervenes on a physical property P. Now suppose M appears to cause another mental property M¹, the question arises whether the cause of M¹ is indeed M or whether it is M¹’s subvenient/subjacent base P¹ (since according to supervenience M¹ is instantiated by a physical property P¹). Given causal exclusion, it cannot be both, and so, given the supervenience relation, it seems that M¹ occurs because P¹ occurred. Therefore, Kim argues, it seems that M actually causes M¹ by causing the subjacent P¹ and that mental to mental (same level) causation presupposes mental to physical (downward) causation. [Another, more direct, way to put this problem is whether the effect of M is really M¹ or M¹’s subjacent base P¹. I chose an alternative formulation in order for the problem to be more clear to the non-expert reader.] However, Kim continues, given causal closure, P¹ must have a sufficient physical cause P. But given exclusion again, P¹ cannot have two sufficient causes, M and P, and so P is the real cause of P¹ because, if M were the real cause then causal closure would be violated again. Therefore, given supervenience, causal closure and causal exclusion, mental properties are merely epiphenomenal. The tension here for the emergentist, the objection goes, is in the double requirement of supervenience and downward causation in that, on the one hand, we have upward determination and the principle of causal closure of the physical domain, and, on the other hand, we have causally efficacious emergent phenomena. In other words, Kim claims that what seem to be cases of emergent causation are just epiphenomena because ultimately the only way to instantiate an emergent property is to instantiate its base. So, saying that higher level properties are causally efficacious renders any form of non-reductive physicalism, under which Kim includes emergentism, at least implausible and at most incoherent.
In effect support for the existence of consciousness as an emergent property, not just the result of a physical adaptation and evolution of uttered subvocal articulation, is "implausible and at most incoherent." Speech does not emerge from fingers typing.
Man invents a lot of thing he presumes are mental states and capabilities when they are just outcomes of neurophysiological processing transduced to others as actions. My second criticism is his use of selected species in selected ways to produce 'results'. It takes a much broader approach than a few electrodes either initiating or reporting to tell a story.
I'm encouraged by his tactic of concentrating on likely sites where transactions might be being generated but by doing such one cannot conclude from that that something has emerged.
Those transactions need be taken together with a variety of other neurophysiological information to reflect what is actually transpiring.
As far as I'm concerned Emergence is just another attempt to reinstate abstraction ladders.
So, while the brain evolved bottom-up, it still exercises top-down control of deliberate behavior.
My problems with Graziano are primarily bound up in the construct of emergence. Things evolve they don't emerge. The fact that empiricism uses rationalistic principles to some extent does not mean it emerged from rationalism. It is a completely different way of seeing the world based on more precise indicators of relations among things. The need for something other than just observation coincident with the ability to make tools drove the development of both language and historical memory in man. These did not just emerge. They evolved over a lot of time across many generations and in many places. Language, vocalization, is a mechanism, like handwaving and brow furrowing, supporting communication.
I point to Emergence https://iep.utm.edu/emergenc/ particularly section threeObjections to Emergentism https://iep.utm.edu/emergenc/#H3
In effect support for the existence of consciousness as an emergent property, not just the result of a physical adaptation and evolution of uttered subvocal articulation, is "implausible and at most incoherent." Speech does not emerge from fingers typing.
Man invents a lot of thing he presumes are mental states and capabilities when they are just outcomes of neurophysiological processing transduced to others as actions. My second criticism is his use of selected species in selected ways to produce 'results'. It takes a much broader approach than a few electrodes either initiating or reporting to tell a story.
I'm encouraged by his tactic of concentrating on likely sites where transactions might be being generated but by doing such one cannot conclude from that that something has emerged.
Those transactions need be taken together with a variety of other neurophysiological information to reflect what is actually transpiring.
As far as I'm concerned Emergence is just another attempt to reinstate abstraction ladders.
Well, that may be a bit over my head. But the Campbell Biology textbook discusses emergent properties in chapter 1, the same chapter where it introduces evolution. It didn't seem to find the incompatibility you are suggesting.
I was reading through the text you quoted and ran into the term "supervenience". I had researched this word in an earlier discussion at a different site, and found it frustratingly counter-intuitive. If A supervenes upon B, then B comes first and causes A. But the roots "super" and "veni" suggest that A comes before B. This led to some head-banging-against-the-wall for me. And it caused me to break out laughing when I read the author's comment, "I chose an alternative formulation in order for the problem to be more clear to the non-expert reader."
The brain, as marvelous as it is, cannot track the atoms that make up a ball and a bat. It models reality with "objects" and "events" and many other larger concepts that make its job easier. It learns to "swing" the bat to "hit" the ball, and then "run" to first base (U.S. Baseball). The body kicks control upstairs to this modeling center when decision-making is required.
So, while the brain evolved bottom-up, it still exercises top-down control of deliberate behavior.
For example, a coed is invited to a party, but she knows she has a chemistry exam in the morning. So, she decides to study instead. This conscious intent then motivates and directs her subsequent actions. She reviews the textbook and her lecture notes, and perhaps uses flash cards. Note that she is deliberately modifying the neural pathways in her brain, by going over the material, in order to make the information come to conscious awareness when triggered by the questions on the test tomorrow. That's top-down causation. It is literally mental control of the physical infrastructure.
Of course, even that mental control will have corresponding physical events. But the individual neurons are incapable of providing this control. It is rather a function being performed by a machine evolved in structure to provide such functioning.
Thinking, like walking, evolved due to the survivability they added to the organism.
Oh, and when I use the term "empirical", I'm suggesting events that can actually be observed and scientifically explained. I do not know the philosophical background around this term. To me, empiricism means simply, "What you see is what you get."
The illusion of self refers to the impillusion that the self, which the brain shapes, forms, generates, is actually running the show. The brain is the sole agent of perception, thought and response acting through the medium of conscious mind and self identity, a mental map of one's place in the world.
Yes. The self is how the brain experiences itself. The brain experiences itself exercising control over the behavior of the body. It uses special functional areas to provide conscious awareness, other areas to store memories, other areas to process visual and auditory data, other areas to perform other tasks.
Doesn't 'exercising control' imply some degree of separation between the controller and the controlled? The brain regulates body functions and responds to its inputs. Not as a single entity but a collection of structures with functions of their own. Sometimes causing conflicting messages and overrides, the desire to eat, the desire to slim down and the conflict that results from opposing drives because there is no single undivided controller..
Doesn't 'exercising control' imply some degree of separation between the controller and the controlled? The brain regulates body functions and responds to its inputs. Not as a single entity but a collection of structures with functions of their own. Sometimes causing conflicting messages and overrides, the desire to eat, the desire to slim down and the conflict that results from opposing drives because there is no single undivided controller..
The self is a function of the brain. There is no dualism. However, within the issues that the self/brain must deal with, there are multiple desires, sometimes conflicting, which the self/brain resolves through the choosing process. The self/body will either eat or not eat. It cannot do both. So, the self/brain is controlling what the self/body will do by choosing what it will do. In the end, there is no dualism.
Yes there is a significant advantage conveyed by integrating hearing, feeling, detecting and lung and heart processing activity, articulations, motor movement initiations, sensed shapes and motions, chemical releases and detections, in near real time. I think I've done a pretty good job of pointing to things that validate there are available physical traces, complexity, and integration of nervous system to being these processes together systematically.
One needn't attribute something, self, not connected to physicalist basis of behavior as emergent.
No. It just is part and parcel of what the brain and body of a being does. And I predict it's engine is just as physical as is subvoclization of something being said that is heard.
Please note the difference between what I wrote and what you labeled. Mine include sources actually used by the person yours is unattached to any material basis for being. It's just a big glorious word, without substance, used to encompass the activities I wrote.
I've made m point?
Naturally.
Yes there is a significant advantage conveyed by integrating hearing, feeling, detecting and lung and heart processing activity, articulations, motor movement initiations, sensed shapes and motions, chemical releases and detections, in near real time. I think I've done a pretty good job of pointing to things that validate there are available physical traces, complexity, and integration of nervous system to being these processes together systematically.
One needn't attribute something, self, not connected to physicalist basis of behavior as emergent.
No. It just is part and parcel of what the brain and body of a being does. And I predict it's engine is just as physical as is subvoclization of something being said that is heard.
Please note the difference between what I wrote and what you labeled. Mine include sources actually used by the person yours is unattached to any material basis for being. It's just a big glorious word, without substance, used to encompass the activities I wrote.
I've made m point?
Naturally.
We all know what we mean by our "selves". I want other "selves" to wear a mask and get vaccinated. Neuroscience is free to thoroughly research and explain in detail how our mental selves are produced by physical brain processes. This does not make the "self" disappear. It only explains the "self" in scientific detail. And there is no need to embrace any sort of dualism (well, aside from the two hemispheres).
I call it the "reductionist fallacy", where we think that, having explained something, we have somehow magically explained it away.